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e present text, the fourteenth century Questiones libri Porphirii attri-
buted to omas Manlevelt, is a new text. Not only in the sense that the
only manuscript that has been handed down to us has never been edited
before, but also in the sense that its contents have so far never been the
subject of any historical or philosophical research. omas Manlevelt,
the author to whom the commentary can be ascribed, moreover, is one
about whom not much is known.
By way of a Þrst introduction to this new text, I will supply it with a
geographical and temporal context, and thus place it against its proper
intellectual background. en I will sketch the contours of its doctrinal
and investigational persuasion, and indicate the main points of interest
of this commentary on the Isagoge. I will also give consideration to
uncertainties surrounding its authorship.
As noted, only one manuscript of the present text has been handed
down to us. is means that I am being saved the burden of comparing
dierent manuscripts. is is outweighed by the burden of solving all
textual obscurities, mistakes, reiterations and omissions in this single
manuscript without having recourse to any other.
e logical tracts of omas Manlevelt promise to be a rewarding Þeld
of investigation in years to come. Critical editions, so scarce thus far, will
become available. Apart from this present edition of his commentary on
the Isagoge, the near future will bring at least two more volumes. Forth-
coming is an edition of omas Manlevelt’s parva logicalia, comprising
De suppositionibus, De confusionibus and De consequentiis, by C. Kann,
S. Lorenz and R. Grass. As a follow-up to the present edition, I intend to
produce a critical edition of its twin text, the Questiones super Predica-
menta, thus completing the commentary on the logica vetus attributed to
omas Manlevelt. is commentary on Aristotle’s Categories consists of
one hundred and twenty-six questiones, the second of which, on equivo-
cal concepts, serves as an appendix to the present edition.
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chapter one
About this text
e text to be edited below is an intriguing, fourteenth century example
of the long tradition of commentaries on a third century ad text, the
Isagoge by Porphyry – or, as it is spelled here, Porphirius. e Isagoge
itself was meant to be an introduction to another, still older and in the
course of time even more vastly commented-upon text, the Categories by
Aristotle.
We have to accept a fair amount of uncertainty as to the authorship
and the exact date and place of origin of this text. As is the case with
many fourteenth century texts, and fourteenth century philosophy and
philosophers in general, hard data on this text are scarce.
at there is only one manuscript available of our text does not make
things easier. ere are assumptions to be made about its authorship,
and about its place and date of origin, but none of these things can be
said with absolute certainty.
With some reservations however, which will become clear in the
course of my introduction, I feel safe to assume that this text, a commen-
tary on the Isagoge in the form of questiones, was composed by omas
Manlevelt in the late s or thereabouts in pre-University Louvain. But
who is omas Manlevelt?
.. omas Manlevelt: on Þrst acquaintance
e one manuscript available of these Questiones libri Porphirii has the
text ascribed to omas Manlevelt. A line of text at the top of the
Þrst folio, supposedly put there by the end of the fourteenth century,
states that these questiones were compiled by the able doctor omas
Manlevelt the Englishman: ‘Hec questiones fuerunt compilate per om.
Manlevel Anglicum doctorem solempnem.’1 Moreover, the author of
these ‘excellent questions on the Old Logic’ is identiÞed on the cover
 Schum , f.
 introduction
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of the manuscript itself as omas Manlevelt: ‘Item questiones optime
ome Manlevelt super veteri arte.’2
In the handbooks of philosophical history, the name of omas Man-
levelt is linked to a set of widely-used logical treatises, presumably com-
posed in Paris around , and spread all over the European continent
in the course of the fourteenth and Þeenth centuries.3 Only recently has
this logician gained some wider attention. In his  paper ‘omas
Maulevelt’s Denial of Substance’,4 Robert Andrews sets out to appraise
our author’s ontology, which is described by him as one ‘more radical
than any other of the Middle Ages, and unparalleled until the time of
Hume’.5 is would bridge a gap of more than four centuries, as David
Hume lived from  until .6
e text with which Andrews is concerned, is a commentary (ques-
tiones) on Aristotle’s Categories, also ascribed to omas Manlevelt. It
is one of the lengthiest of the later Middle Ages, surviving in a single,
densely-written manuscript of over a hundred folios. e commentary
on Porphyry’s Isagoge ascribed to Manlevelt is the twin text to the com-
mentary on the Categories, covering the Þrst forty-odd folios of this very
same single, densely-written manuscript.
Andrews has no doubts about the intellectual background of omas
Manlevelt. To him it is clear that this logician ‘was following in the
footsteps of William of Ockham, another Englishman, writing a bit
earlier in the beginning of the s’.7
 Schum , ibid. More about this ascription in the manuscript itself, and on how
this compilating should be understood, see below, section .. Chapter , of which
this section is the Þrst part, is devoted to the textual and circumstantial evidence that
seems to warrant the ascription of this text to omas Manlevelt. Chapter  will give
a detailed description of the manuscript.
 See, for example, Spade , f.
 Andrews, . is paper was presented at a conference, Skepticism in Medieval
and Renaissance ought, in Uppsala, Sweden, on May , . Andrews has a
slightly dierent spelling of our author’s name: ‘Maulevelt’ instead of ‘Manlevelt’.
More about the diverse ways in which omas’s name is spelled, below, subsection
...
 Andrews , p. .
 On Hume, see e.g. D.F. Norton (ed.), e Cambridge Companion to Hume (Cam-
bridge, ), or any present day reference work. No handbook will be amiss on
Hume’s ideas about substance, or the related issue of causation.
 Andrews , . Another early Ockhamist text, the Defensorium Ockham, is
discussed in Andrews,  and edited in Andrews, . I will come back to this
text in connection with a minor geographical point concerning our own text. See
below, section ..
. about this text 
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We will accept this intellectual dependency of Manlevelt on William
of Ockham (c. –c. ) as a working hypothesis, keeping to it as
long as our own textual evidence warrants it.8 As will become clear, this
working hypothesis happens to be fully warranted by the text edited
below.9
.. Denial of substance
e next chapter in this Introduction, dealing with Manlevelt’s life and
works, will be hampered by a lack of available data. Assuming, however,
that Manlevelt is the author of the present text as well as the accompany-
ing commentary on the Categories partly edited by Andrews, something
like a portrait of Manlevelt can be sketched.
Andrews explains how Ockham had applied his reductive principle to
Aristotle’s ten categories, on the occasion of writing – like Manlevelt – a
commentary on the Categories of Aristotle.10 e categories in medieval
 One point on which I will Þnd occasion to deviate from Andrews’s presentation of
facts is his taking omas Manlevelt to be an Englishman. True, he is also called
omas Anglicus, but as will be pointed out below, subsection .., there is at least
as much reason to think he was German or from the low countries. is would mean
that at the university in Paris, where some vague footsteps of his can be traced, he
would have belonged to the English-German nation anyway.
 Andrews refrains from substantiating his Ockhamist claim about Manlevelt with
factual evidence. But had he chosen to do so, evidence could have been brought
forward in su cient abundance. Manlevelt holds that everything in reality is strictly
individual in nature and that generality is only to be found in concepts in so
far as these refer to the things in reality. If this should sound nominalistic in a
too general manner, Manlevelt’s tenet that each concept or conceptual act in the
mind is as individual in nature as well, should already be linked to a more strictly
Ockhamist background. But there is more, on a general level and in the details: the
acceptance of only two categories of things existing in reality, namely substance
and quality; the way in which God is freely discussed about in logical matters;
the main division of supposition in personal, simple and material; the individual
character of all linguistic items; the absence of any hierarchy among the three main
levels of language, spoken, written and thought; the indivisibility of a continuum;
the way in which all terms, that is to say, all universals as well, are in the end
‘degraded’ to the level of mere accidents (of the human mind, that is), etc. Even
Manlevelt’s half-hearted denial of substance, about which we will have more to say
in the pages to follow, must be looked upon as something ‘naturally’ taking place
in an Ockhamist environment, seeing that another one to deny substance, John of
Mirecourt, was an avowed partisan of Ockhamism as well. (But about ‘Ockhamism’,
and any philosopher’s ‘avowed partisanship’ of it, see below, section . of this
Introduction.)
 Andrews , .
 introduction
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ontology comprised all those vindicated by Aristotle, to wit: substance,
plus nine accidents (quality, quantity, relation, action, undergoing, space,
time, situation, having). Eight of the categories fell victim to Ockham’s
razor; in his ontology, only substance and quality remain as distinct
entities.11 All of the other categories are merely aspects of substances or
qualities, or ways of talking about these substances or qualities. But on
the other hand they are nothing less either.12
e interesting thing is what Andrews tells us about Manlevelt’s way of
Þnishing o this Ockhamist enterprise. Like Ockham, he was engaged in
a radical reduction in the number of the categories as realities of whatever
kind. One by one all of the lesser categories are deleted. Manlevelt,
however, is willing to go a step further than Ockham. He entertains a
radical hypothesis: substance does not exist.13 e only category which
describes the things of the world is that of quality.14
For a Þrst glimpse of the originality to be found with omas Man-
levelt, the audacity of his thinking and the subsequent prudence with
which he tends to tone down the impact of his Þndings – elements abun-
dant in his commentary on the Isagoge as well – we will follow the general
line of his dismantling the categorical framework. It is a specimen of orig-
inality that for reasons that I will go into in the next chapter would stay
unnoticed for centuries.15
 Substance and the third species of quality, to be precise, is all that is le of reality.
See Maurer , .
 For a much more detailed discussion of Ockham’s ontology, see McCord Adams,
.
 Questiones super Predicamenta, q.  concl. , rab, ‘probabiliter posset sustineri
physice loquendo, nullam penitus substantiam esse in istis inferioribus, accipiendo
substantiam pro composito ex materia et forma, vel pro aliqua parte talis compositi.’,
q.  concl. , va, ‘probabiliter posset sustineri, nullam substantiam esse in rerum
natura.’ Edited by Andrews, as an appendix to Andrews .
 Ironically, reducing the number of categories to only one, namely quality, is precisely
what Ockham himself would be accused of by his realist opponent Walter Burley,
in the latter’s second commentary on the Physics (aer ). On this, see Dutilh
Novaes, in her forthcoming article on the Ockham-Burley dispute. According to
Dutilh Novaes, however, Burley’s understanding of Ockham’s position with respect
to the categories seems slightly o the mark. One may speculate, she adds in a
footnote, that Ockham’s reasons for not going this far might have been essentially
theological, just as he accepted entities falling in the category of relation in particular
theological contexts.
 For a thorough investigation of how this remarkable reduction of the number of
categories came about, the reader is to consult Andrews . In what follows I am
heavily indebted to Andrews’ article.
. about this text 
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e Þrst thing to notice, says Andrews,16 is that the very title of Man-
levelt’s questio on the reduction in the number of categories is unusual:
Utrum aliqua substantia sit (‘whether there is any substance’).17 He goes
on to explain that titles of commentary questions in the Middle Ages are
signiÞcant, for they indicate that a speciÞc problem was thought worthy
of discussion. Some titles are indeed routine exercises which everyone
was expected to ask and answer, while others reßect the particular inter-
ests of an author or philosophical school. Non-routine titles that seem to
reßect the particular interest of our author in commenting on the Isagoge,
for example, are those of the tenth and of the last questio: whether a genus
diers from an individual,18 and whether some accident is a substantial
genus,19 respectively. e individuality of even the Þrst of the universals
is investigated, as well as the substantiality of the accident. ese two
very titles present us with our author’s logico-semantical program in a
nutshell.
But let us return to his commentary on the Categories. Among all the
traditions and debates of Categories commentaries, no one ever posed the
question Manlevelt does: ‘Does substance exist?’20 Neither would anyone
other than Manlevelt answer this question in the negative. e reason for
this, one suspects, is that it was held as obvious and self-evident that, of
course, substance exists.
In two conclusions of his determinatio Manlevelt claims that physical-
ly speaking, it can be argued that there is no substance anywhere in
the world, whether terrestrial21 or celestial,22 that is to say, as long as the
 Andrews , p. .
 Questiones super Predicamenta, q. , va–rb, ‘Utrum aliqua substantia sit’.
 q. , rb–rb, ‘Utrum genus diert ab individuo’.
 q. , rb–va, ‘Utrum aliquod accidens sit genus substantiale’.
 John of Mirecourt, who did deny substance, never raised the question so explicitly.
He certainly did not embed it in a commentary on the Categories. In fact, Mirecourt’s
opinion on this matter is not too clear, anyway. See also below, section .. On
Mirecourt: Courtenay .
 Quaestiones super Praedicamenta q.  concl. , rab: ‘Prima conclusio est ista,
quod probabiliter posset sustineri physice loquendo, nullam penitus substantiam
esse in istis inferioribus, accipiendo substantiam pro composito ex materia et forma;
vel pro aliqua parte talis composite.’ (ed. Andrews).
 Quaestiones super Praedicamenta q.  concl. , va: ‘nullum inconveniens, ut
videtur, sequitur si ponatur corpora supracaelestia esse composita ex diversis exis-
tentibus perpetue (perpetuum ms.) sibi invicem adhaerentibus; et si ponatur cuius-
libet orbis motorem esse unum accidens adhaerens orbi, et ipsum movens – sicut
gravitas adhaeret lapidi, faciens ipsum descendere. Nec ad hoc requiritur aliqua sub-
stantia.’ (ed. Andrews).
 introduction
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opposite is not demonstrable – which it indeed is not.23 He not only
argues that substance is unnecessary for explanatory purposes, but –
taking the consecrated host as evidence – also explains how natural
phenomena may be understood in the absence of substance: ‘accidents
(…) support and adhere to each other’.24 e picture is of a world in
which physical objects are aggregates of their properties. ese proper-
ties adhere to one another, and form each other’s substrate, without the
need for an intangible and inaccessible substance.
is radical reformulation of nature, Andrews says, is otherwise com-
pletely unknown in the Middle Ages.25 According to him it does, how-
ever, sound surprisingly similar to the deductions of the British Empiri-
cists four hundred years later, especially those of David Hume.26
However, Manlevelt’s third conclusion of his determinatio all too
abruptly (to Andrews’s liking) recants all he has speculated about sub-
 Quaestiones super Praedicamentaq. concl. , rb: ‘omne illud potest probabiliter
teneri cuius oppositum non potest evidenter probari; sed illud est huiusmodi; igitur
etc. Maior videtur evidens. Et minor declaratur, quia omnes apparentiae possunt
evidenter salvari, non posita aliqua tali substantia; igitur non potest evidenter
probari aliquam talem substantiam esse in istis inferioribus. Consequentia est satis
evidens.’ (ed. Andrews).
 Quaestiones super Praedicamentaq. concl. , rb: ‘positis tantummodo acciden-
tibus sibi invicem subsistentibus et adhaerentibus, salvatur generatio et corruptio,
augmentatio et diminutio, alteratio et loci mutatio, sicut patet in hostia consecrata.’
(ed. Andrews). William of Ockham never seems to get near to even a hint of such
a subtance-less picture of the world. In section . below, Manlevelt’s suggestions
are summarily compared to similar passages in Buridan, Autrecourt, Mirecourt and
Crathorn. It would be interesting to devote a more thorough comparative study to
these authors on precisely this matter.
 Below, however, we will pay due attention to some contemporaries of omas
Manlevelt who at Þrst sight seem to be not too far o our author’s mark.
 Andrews ,  draws special attention to an indeed remarkably Manlevelt-like
passage from David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book i, Ch. i, Sect. vi, ‘Of
Modes and Substances’. It runs: ‘I would fain ask those philosophers, who found so
much of their reasonings on the distinction of substance and accident, and imagine
we have clear ideas of each, whether the idea of substance be derived from the
impressions of sensation or of reßection? If it be conveyed to us by our senses, I
ask, which of them; and aer what manner? If it be perceived by the eyes, it must be
a colour; if by the ears, a sound; if by the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses.
But I believe none will assert, that substance is either a colour, or sound, or a taste.
e idea, of substance must therefore be derived from an impression of reßection, if
it really exist. But the impressions of reßection resolve themselves into our passions
and emotions: none of which can possibly represent a substance. We have therefore
no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor
have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it.’
. about this text 
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stance. Andrews says27 that it ßatly asserts the existence of substance,
in accordance with all of the traditional doctrines, and that Manlevelt
provides no arguments for his reversal of position. He simply states at
the beginning of the conclusion that – presumably also on the non-
demonstrability of its opposite – ‘it can be held as probable what every-
one commonly holds’,28 and, at the end, that ‘Since everyone holds this
position, it need not be explained further.’29 In fact, however, Manlevelt’s
claiming that no substance exists may be less blunt than Andrews seems
to suppose. For one thing, he holds that both the existence and the
non-existence can be held probabiliter. is does not mean that both
hypotheses are equally probable, but that both of these can be argued
for. ‘Reasonably’, taken literally, might be a better translation for ‘proba-
biliter’ than ‘probable’. e non-existence, then, of substance is argued for
on physical grounds, the existence of substance on authoritative grounds.
Moreover, Manlevelt’s recanting of his speculation is not unmotivated.
Aer all, he does no more (but no less either) than claim that it is possi-
ble to bring forward as a hypothesis that no substance exists, as long as its
opposite (that substance does exist) is not proven to be evidently true. Of
course, this hypothesis alone is revolutionary enough. But as long as his
own hypothesis is not proven to be evidently true either, there is room
to allow for the existence of substance. On the other hand, according to
Ockham’s razor ‘entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity’, so why
not do away with substance aer all, as there is no necessity to cling to
substance. From that point of view, Manlevelt, who explicitly adheres to
this principle,30 was indeed under some obligation to maintain his anti-
substance hypothesis.
 Andrews , .
 Questiones super Predicamenta, q.  concl. , vb, ‘probabiliter posset sustineri
tamquam illud quod ab omnibus communiter ponitur, quod est una prima sub-
stantia quae a nullo dependet; quae scilicet est ipsemet deus. Et quod sunt aliae
substantiae separatae individuales et incorruptibiles. (…) Et quod sunt aliae, scilicet
partes istarum substantiarum corruptibilium, utpote materia et forma, quae vocan-
tur partes essentiales, quarum quidem partium quaedam sunt incorruptibiles, sicut
materia (…) et anima intellectiva; et quaedam vero ponuntur corruptibiles, sicut
aliae formae substantiales.’ (ed. Andrews).
 Questiones super Predicamenta, q.  concl. , vb, ‘Et ista conclusio, quia ab
omnibus ponitur, amplius ad praesens non declaratur.’ (ed. Andrews).
 See the edited below, q.  ad arg. contra concl. , i, va: ‘utendo radice
Aristotelis primo Physicorum, ubi elicitur quod pluralitas sive diversitas non est
ponenda sine ratione cogente.’
 introduction
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However this may be, Andrews holds that his own sense of caution
made omas Manlevelt abandon his radical experiment.31 But it was an
experiment which was to recur, says Andrews, with a vengeance, in the
era of Early Modern Philosophy and the ScientiÞc Revolution.32
Andrews concludes his evaluation of Manlevelt’s denial of substance
by admitting that Manlevelt’s speculation remains a footnote to the
history of philosophy, since his work was uninßuential in his lifetime,
and remained unread until our own.33 But an interesting footnote it is.
.. Primacy of individuality
e present study will stick with the Þrst part of the manuscript that has
just been proven by Andrews to contain such a gem. In fact, Manlevelt’s
commentary on the Isagoge, which immediately precedes the commen-
tary on the Categories, forms an intrinsic unity with it, as the traditional
double-headed commentary on the Old Logic. Traversing the commen-
tary on the Isagoge we will Þnd out that omas Manlevelt applies the
very same tactics of extending Ockhamist tenures and insights to any
logical, and if need be metaphysical or theological subject matter. We are
confronted with a radical variety of nominalism, outdoing Ockham in
a number of ways. e individualizing tendency is stretched to its limits
on the subject’s as well as on the object’s side, in an untiring eort to work
out the primacy of the individual over the universal in any kind of detail.
Manlevelt not only stresses the capacity of each individual instance (or
‘token’34) of a term to stand for individual things in the outside world,
 Andrews , f.
 Andrews , .
 Andrews , .
 For a clear exposition of the narrowed particular meaning of an utterance-token
in a particular context in juxtaposition to the general meaning of an utterance-
type, see Nuchelmans , . It should be kept in mind, however, that this is a
modern distinction, which is not used as such by ancient and medieval thinkers.
roughout his study on the ancient and medieval conceptions of the bearers of
truth and falsity, Nuchelmans nevertheless makes ample use of the distinction to
identify the propositions that do bear truth and falsity. us, Nuchelmans , 
holds that with Ockham it is as a rule particular acts of thinking, speaking or writing
that fulÞll this role. e borderline between a propositio in the token-sense and a
propositio in the type-sense with Ockham was rather vague, as he seemed to attribute
a certain duration to these acts, allowing the same oratio (e.g. ‘Sortes is seated’) to
be Þrst true and then false (in the case of Sortes Þrst sitting and then standing up).
It remains to be seen if this borderline was sharper with Manlevelt.
. about this text 
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he also stresses the token character of each instance of rational activity
in itself.35 As each instance of a term – be it a genus, a species, or any of
the remaining Þve universals – is an accident of the individual human
mind doing the thinking, our author’s ‘singularising’ of the domain of
the universals is coupled with an ‘accidentalising’ of this same domain.
e link between terms and reality may look disturbingly thin, if the
linking takes place on an accidental level only. But our author is not
one to do away altogether with logic’s intrinsic capacity for dealing with
things outside the mind – a capacity that to the medieval mind stems
from the signiÞcative character of terms. Uninhibited as he may be in his
Ockhamist fervency, we are also frequently confronted with Manlevelt’s
inability – or is it unwillingness? – to ultimately liberate himself from
convention. Just before things really get out of hand, omas Manlevelt
is always prepared to weaken his Þndings, by calling them nothing
more than a kind of thought experiments or explicitly keeping open the
possibility that things might be otherwise,36 just like in the case of the
rejected category of substance.
Has this sense of caution prevented Manlevelt from getting into seri-
ous trouble with the authorities, as Andrews suggested? is is hard
to tell. But circumstances must have been favourable in one sense or
another. For otherwise this provocative Ockhamist text with its daring
thought experiments may not have been handed down to us in even this
one single manuscript.
 On this, see especially q. , Utrum universale sit in intellectu, vb–ra.
 E.g. q.  concl. , rb: ‘Prima conclusio est quod ens non est universale, quia
non est genus nec species etcetera, et alia numquam ponebantur universalia ab
aliquo. Circa istam conclusionem tamen nota quod ponitur tamquam probabilis
et non tamquam necessaria, precise cum argumentum ab auctoritate negative non
tenet. Quamvis inducat evidentiam, non tamen necessario concludit.’ Or q. 
concl. , va: ‘Et multa istorum dicta sunt gratia exercitii et probabiliter potius
quam exercitive determinationis.’
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chapter two
omas Manlevelt, life and works
e proper way to get acquainted with a philosopher is through his
writings. Unfortunately, the present state of investigation does not allow
us to draw up anything remotely like a deÞnite bibliography of omas
Manlevelt. For a tentative bibliography of omas Manlevelt however,
just as for his biography, we should best turn to Lorenz’s  paper on
life and work of our author.1
.. Bibliography
As undoubtedly written by omas Manlevelt, Lorenz classiÞes the small
tracts on terminist logic, the parva logicalia,2 that have earned him a
place in modern handbooks on medieval logic.3 In the many manuscripts
through which they are preserved they usually come as a trio: De sup-
positionibus, De confusionibus and De consequentiis.4 e authenticity of
the Þrst two of these has never been questioned; the authenticity of the
third, De consequentiis, has to Lorenz’s mind been established by Brands.5
 Lorenz , –. Apart from Lorenz , to be consulted about Manlevelt’s
bibliography are Kaczmarek , xxxvi–xli, Piltz , Schultes and Imbach
, and De Rijk .
 ‘Parva logicalia’ is here used in the sense of ‘short treatises on logical subjects in a
terminist vein’; for two other shades of meaning of ‘parva logicalia’, see Braakhuis
, f.
 Maierù , – has excerpts from Manlevelt’s tracts on supposition and con-
fusion, edited from ms. Vat. Lat.  (De terminis confundentibus, . vb–ra, De
suppositionibus, . vb–rb). Maierù makes explicit comparisons between Man-
levelt’s tracts and Ockham’s treatment of these same subjects in the Summa logicae.
Read, , ,  has some excerpts from Manlevelt’s tract De suppositionibus,
edited from ms. Edinburgh , . r–r.
 is famous trio of tracts, widely used in the later medievals, is shortly to be
presented in a critical edition by Lorenz, Kann and Grass. at these three tracts
may have formed part of a logical summa by Manlevelt is suggested by Maierù ,
, n. .
 Lorenz , , with reference to Brands , f. e same work has also
been ascribed to William of Sutton, but on the ground of doctrinal considerations,
 introduction
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With these three logical tracts comes a set of rules that can also safely be
attributed to Manlevelt: De ampliationibus, De restrictionibus, De appel-
lationibus, De alienationibus and De remotionibus. Furthermore, Lorenz
shows no doubt about the ascription to Manlevelt of a Tractatus de fal-
laciis.6 Manlevelt must also have been the author of a tract on Insolubilia,
that has however not been recovered yet.7 A work of a more polemical
character, the anti-modist Tractatus de improbatione modorum signiÞ-
candi, edited as an anonymous text by Kaczmarek,8 is also to be attributed
to omas Manlevelt, says Lorenz, as long as it not proven otherwise.9 A
De incipit et desinit that in half of its known manuscripts is ascribed to
omas Manlevelt is reckoned by Lorenz to be more justly ascribed to
omas Bradwardine (c. –).10 Until it is seriously researched,
Lorenz refrains from making a deÞnitive statement on Manlevelt’s sup-
posed authorship of the commentary in the form of questiones on the Ars
vetus, known from the Amplonian Library, the Þrst part of which, Ques-
Brands shows that this tract De consequentiis is quite in line with Manlevelt’s De
suppositionibus, and therefore is to be ascribed to Manlevelt as well.
 ere are other such tracts sometimes ascribed to omas Manlevelt, but not con-
sidered by Lorenz. For example there are two manuscripts of a tract on Fallaciae
breves, mentioned by De Rijk , , . In De Rijk’s as yet unpublished handwrit-
ten card-index in Leiden, mention is made of a tract De inventione medii. A work
somewhat out of style with all these, to be found in Lehmann , but also le
unmentioned by Lorenz, was catalogued by the founder of the Bibliotheca Amplo-
nia as glosa egregii poete Maulevelt super Persium cum textu. Piltz , by the way,
mentions quite some manuscripts ascribed to Manlevelt, but does not come up with
titles not taken into account by Lorenz.
 Lorenz , , esp. n. .
 Kaczmarek .
 By lack of investigation into Manlevelt’s works, Kaczmarek , xxvi refrains from
attributing this anti-modist tract to our author. Lorenz, who devotes a long footnote
(Lorenz , , n. ) to a critical examination of Kaczmarek’s opinion on this
matter, is more conÞdent on Manlevelt’s authorship. As long as a critical textual
investigation of the tract does not show that it is not by Manlevelt, says Lorenz, we
my safely ascribe it to him. And such a critical investigation has not taken place
yet, let alone that it has thrown serious doubts on Manlevelt’s authorship. Pinborg
(,  n.) had been of the opinion that in this case the name of a better-
known author (omas Manlevelt) was substituted for the name of a lesser-known
author (John Aurifaber, ß. ). Another serious candidate for the authorship
of the Destructiones modorum signiÞcandi, favoured by Pinborg but dismissed by
Kaczmarek, is Peter of Ailly (–). at omas Manlevelt tends to be
confused with authors chronologically so widely separated from one another, says
enough about his own obscurity. Lorenz, by the way, dismisses Pierre d’Ailly’s
possible authorship as a ‘Pseudo-Kontroverse’.
 For more about this tract, and about the relationship of our author to omas
Bradwardine in general, see below, subsection ...
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tiones libri Porphirii is edited here in full, and the second questio of the
second part of which, Questiones supra Predicamenta, is edited here as an
appendix.11 Aer giving the text its hitherto wanting research, I feel war-
ranted to indeed ascribe these commentaries on the old logic to omas
Manlevelt.
None of the manuscripts containing these texts are older than the
later part of the fourteenth century. As will be seen, the earliest known
manuscript of any of Manlevelt’s works which has a precise date attached
to it stems from .
Possible additions to the list of works ascribed to omas Manlevelt
by Lorenz: commentaries, to wit, on the Physics and De anima, will be
discussed below,12 as the authenticity of these works is dependent on the
authenticity of the text presented here.
.. Biography
e problematic state of the bibliographical information on omas
Manlevelt is more than matched by the almost total lack of biographical
information. For ‘next to nothing is known about omas Maulfelt.’
is lamentation by Brands in his  paper on Manlevelt’s theory
of supposition13 is echoed some years later by Grass in his study on
the theory of consequentiae in pre-university Erfurt,14 in which omas
Manlevelt plays a not unimportant role. In his  paper on Manlevelt’s
denial of substance, Andrews too cannot but concede that indeed little
is known about our author’s life.15 No great advance seems to have been
made, then, since , when N.W. Gilbert presented ‘the mysterious
“omas Maulefelt” ’ as ‘a writer about whom we are almost completely
uninformed’: ‘is logician leads a fugitive existence even by fourteenth
century standards.’16
As it is, hardly any fact can be accepted with a safe degree of certainty
about the life and times and whereabouts of the fourteenth-century
philosopher omas Anglicus dictus Maulfelt.17 Indeed, if I want to
 Lorenz , : ‘Ob diese Kommentare tatsächlich von Manlefelt stammen, bleibt
einer eingehenden Untersuchung vorbehalten.’
 Section ..
 Brands , .
 Grass , .
 Andrews , .
 Gilbert , .
 Maierù ,  holds that Manlevelt being an Englishman is about the only thing
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compile some sort of biography of this logician, I will have to conÞne
myself to a sketchy outline as the highest attainable goal for the moment,
without upholding any pretence that the sketchy results attained so far
will never stand in need of correction. But I do not have to start from
scratch, either.
e most extensive discussion of Manlevelt’s life is in Lorenz’s afore-
mentioned  paper, ‘omas Manlefelt (Maulefelt), Zu Leben und
Werk’18 and this is the paper that provides us with the framework of Man-
levelt’s biography – a framework heartily accepted by Andrews as well in
his  paper.
... Biographical framework
Following Lorenz, Manlevelt’s tentative biography then runs as follows.19
He was born in England,20 but spent most of his active academic life in
Paris in the s and s as a magister artium. He was a dedicated
propagator of the logica modernorum and took it as his task to make away
with the older logico-semantical theory of the modi signiÞcandi.
One of his pupils in Paris was John Aurifaber,21 who around 
spread Manlevelt’s teachings to Erfurt. By the end of  omas
Manlevelt was elected procurator of the English nation at the Paris
faculty of arts. He probably was still teaching in Paris in , but by
 had surely le Paris.22 Later he found employment as a teacher in
pre-university Louvain, probably at the convent school of St. Peter.23 It is
unknown if aer that he worked anywhere else.24
we know about him. In n.  Maierù refers to line of text above the manuscript edited
here (‘Hec quesiones fuerunt compilate per om. Manlvel Anglicum doctorem
solempnem’), and to the Erfurt manucipts Ampl. q  ‘Explicit tractatus fallacia-
rum lectus Lovanii per mag. omam Anglicum dictum Manlvel’. As I will presently
make clear, the mentioning of Louvain, although passed over by Maierù, is not with-
out meaning, either.
 Lorenz .
 See Lorenz , .
 is assumption, based on omas being called Anglicus, is somewhat unsettled by
the circumstance that Lorenz nor anyone else has thus far been able to Þnd a trace
of him in England. See Lorenz , .
 is anti-modist logician is not to be confused with the th century John Aurifaber
(Goldschmidt), friend and disciple of Martin Luther, and editor of the latter’s table
talks. On the th century Aurifaber, see Pinborg , among others.
 Lorenz , .
 Lorenz , .
 is tentative biographical framework by Lorenz is more or less canonized by
the mini-biography of omas Manlevelt in e Cambridge History of Medieval
. thomas manlevelt, life and works 
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His fame rests chießy on his already mentioned works in the parva
logicalia, which seem to have been spread mainly as a trio, comprising De
suppositionibus, De confusionibus and De consequentiis. Widely popular
in the fourteen hundreds, they were in use as textbooks and commented
upon at universities in Germany and beyond: Leipzig, Erfurt, Prague,
Vienna, Krakow, Uppsala. Manuscripts of his work remain in Edinburgh,
Erfurt, Klagenfurt, Munich, Prague, Vienna, Uppsala.25
... Career in Paris
ere are marginal notes to be made to this proposed vita of omas
Manlevelt, for sure. Let us just take a closer look at Lorenz’s reasons for
situating the key period of our author’s career in Paris in the s and
s.
Historical investigations have resulted in pinpointing not more than
one single o cial document in which our author is supposed to be
mentioned. In his book about the university of Erfurt in the thirteenth
and fourteenth century, Lorenz not only links omas Manlevelt to the
Erfurt curriculum, but grants him a place in Parisian history too, by
identifying him as the ‘omas Anglicus, attorney on behalf of the Natio
anglicorum’ who in the Chartularium of the University of Paris is twice
mentioned for the year of  as a Magister actu regens.26
Of course, the twice mentioning of a certain ‘omas Anglicus’ in
the Parisian charters is rather poor when taken as hard evidence for
Manlevelt having stayed in Paris, as Lorenz seems to do.27 us, the
identiÞcation of our omas with the  English master at Paris
Philosophy: ‘ß. s–s. English logician, associated with nominalism. Parisian
master of arts; subsequently taught in Leuven.’ In Pasnau (ed.) , .
 On the use of Manlevelt’s parva logicalia in Europe see for example Pinborg ,
, . For their use in Krakow, see Markowski ,  et al. Andrews ,
, n.  draws special attention to two publications on the established inßuence of
omas Manlevelt in Uppsala. e inßuence of Manlevelt is witnessed in Anders
Piltz, Studium Upsalense. Specimens of the oldest lecture notes taken in the medieval
University of Uppsala (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, ). A Manlevelt
manuscript is also discussed in Andrews .
 e reference in Lorenz ,  n.  is to charters dated January  and , .
Reproduced in Deniße and Châtelain (eds.), , pages  and , respectively.
 Lorenz’s identiÞcation of the Parisian ‘omas Anglicus’ with omas Manlevelt
begs to be questioned, and has in fact been questioned by Courtenay, among others.
Stephen Read, in a conversation with the present author on  November , stated
that the mentioning of this ‘omas Anglicus’ ‘does not prove anything at all’.
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has already been estimated as ‘extremely tenuous’ by Fitzgerald,28 who
points out that the Parisian master of Arts, ‘omas of England’ is only
identiÞed as ‘omas Maulfelt’ in a single Melk manuscript29 and that
most of the manuscripts of this ‘Manlevelt’ date from the s at the
earliest. e dating of our author’s manuscripts may be right, but forms
no conclusive counterproof to his presence at Paris in . Moreover,
Fitzgerald deÞnitely did miss at least two other manuscripts identifying
‘omas Anglicus’ as ‘omas Manlevelt’ or any of its variant spellings.30
Kaczmarek tends to support Lorenz’s hypothesis, but comes up with a
couple of other omases that might just as well have been the omas
Anglicus mentioned in the Parisian charters.31
One circumstantial fact we can be really certain of has no direct
relation to the vita of Manlevelt, namely, that his writings were widely
used and held in high esteem in the Þeenth century middle European
universities of Leipzig, Erfurt, Prague and Vienna. To name but one
example: in the early years of its existence, the University of Leipzig,
founded in , favoured nominalism; among the prescribed textbooks
are those of William Heytesbury and omas Manlevelt.32 To realists, on
the other hand, Manlevelt was a main target of sometimes vicious attacks,
on a par with the most famous or infamous of nominalists. us, in 
in a dispute in Heidelberg, his name was included in a list of infamous
masters accused of heresy by their realist opponent, that also included
Ockham, Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen.33 Manlevelt being part of this
 Fitzgerald , . Fitzgerald’s concern with this matter is provoked by the pos-
sibility that Albert of Saxony might have drawn insights from, or been inßuenced
by, omas Manlevelt teaching in Paris. Somewhat beyond the scope of our study
is Fitzgerald’s other concern, about Albert maybe not being Buridan’s pupil at all,
otherwise than has hitherto been generally assumed.
 Fitzgerald’s reference is to Melk, ms. .
 Apart from the manuscript edited below, Erfurt, ms. ca.q., also Erfurt, ms.
ca.q. is overlooked.
 Kaczmarek , xxxiv.
 See for example Lorenz, , .
 On the  disputation in Heidelberg, see Kaluza . Jerome of Prague (–
), follower and friend of John Hus, and ardent supporter of Wyclif ’s brand
of realism, is reported to have launched the realists’ attack in a ruthless manner:
‘Magister Jeronimus asseruit et temerarie tenuit pocius et melius esse adherendum
doctrine dicti Johannis Wicleph quam doctrine sancti Augustini, palam, publice
et notorie. (…) Et propter hoc intulerit magistros Okkan, Maulveld, Buridanum,
Marsilium et eorum sequaces non dialecticos, sed diabolice hereticos.’ Cited aer
Kaluza , , n. . e quotation is from L. Klicman’s edition of the acts of the
following doctrinal process against Jerome of Prague in Vienna, –.
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realist assault may serve as a perverse proof of his fame in those days.
e spread of Manlevelt’s logical writings all over Europe could not have
taken place if not from a centre of philosophical authority. Paris then is
the only place that seems to come into account. Seen from this point of
view, the spread of his logical tracts does throw some light on Manlevelt’s
vita aer all.
... Bibliographical data from works and manuscripts
Let me examine the information indirectly pertaining to the life of
omas Manlevelt that can be had from his works and the manuscripts
containing these.
If there are doubts to be raised about Manlevelt’s supposed stay in
Paris, his having taught in pre-university Louvain seems to be undis-
puted. ere is at least one manuscript in which the name of omas
is linked directly to Louvain. e text concerned is an exposé by omas
on the fallacies, and the manuscript is to be found in Erfurt. e text
ends: ‘Explicit tractatus fallaciarum lectus Lovanii per mag. omam
Anglicum, dictum Manlovel.’34 ere is no doubt about omas’s author-
ship of this tract on the fallacies. So there seems to be no reason for doubt
about his lecturing in Louvain, as reported in the manuscript of this tract,
either.
e dating of Manlevelt’s work is less straightforward. His treatise
on supposition is dated by Courtenay somewhere before .35 As his
witness for this he takes Pinborg, who mentions that the earliest copy
of Manlevelt’s Tractatus de suppositionibus appears in a manuscript from
Erfurt, now at Göttingen. is manuscript, belonging to the Franciscan
monastery in Göttingen, was written by one Nicolaus in Erfurt, .
Apart from the text by Manlevelt it contains mainly Franciscan tracts on
theological, juridical, astronomical and philosophical matters.36
is dating of the treatise on supposition may not seem to be too
spectacular. It does at least oer a corroboration of the thesis that Man-
levelt did indeed compose his logical treatises before , but it does
little to pinpoint the exact date, which should be around , if he did
indeed compose them in Paris, and if he is indeed to be identiÞed with
the omas Anglicus that Lorenz wants to identify him with.
 Reference to this text is made by Lorenz ,  n. . Also by Maierù , ,
n. .
 Courtenay, .
 Pinborg , f.
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Courtenay does not seem to have found a reason to advance a post
quem dating of Manlevelt’s tract on supposition that is considerably
earlier than its ante quem dating around . However, as long as there
is no hard evidence for a post quem dating of any of Manlevelt’s writings
that would indisputably run against the otherwise feasible biographical
framework laid out by Lorenz, it would seem unwise not to follow
Andrews in his support of Lorenz’s hypothesis that omas Manlevelt
did work in Paris around .37
... Anglicus?
Another question is in how far omas Manlevelt dictus Anglicus is really
an Englishman. I will not follow Courtenay where he takes omas
Manlevelt to have been one of the logicians working in Oxford, even
though Courtenay’s estimation does corroborate mine when it comes to
Manlevelt’s Ockhamist frame of mind.
e English treatises and textbooks in logic produced in the second
and third quarters of the fourteenth century at Oxford, Courtenay ex-
plains,38 provided more than just so many introductions to the various
areas of the logica moderna. ey made continental students aware of
dierent approaches and assumptions in late mediaeval logic. William
Sutton, whose work became popular in German universities, compared
the theories of Ockham and Burley on supposition, favouring the latter.39
Manlevelt, along with Heytesbury and Dumbleton, identiÞed himself
more closely with terminism, and within that, with Ockhamist presup-
positions. Feribrigge and Hunter, on the other hand, show no traces of
nominalism. Manlevelt’s inßuence seems to have been conÞned to the
German universities, while Heytesbury, Billingham, Strode, Feribrigge,
and Hunter were also inßuential south of the Alps.40
One can only agree with Courtenay that omas Manlevelt may be
labelled ‘English’ in as far as he took active part in the development of
the then prevalent British way of philosophising. But was he really an
Englishman?
 More about the terminus post quem and the terminus ante quem of the present text
in section . below.
 Courtenay , .
 Courtenay , f.
 Courtenay , .
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True, he is called omas Anglicus in several manuscripts,41 but this
may reßect nothing more than that he probably studied in England and
was associated with English logicians (or with the English nation at the
University of Paris, which had German and Dutch members as well42)
in the minds of continental scholars. us he may have been named
‘omas the Englishman’ because he approached logic and philosophy in
general in an ‘English’, that is to say: non-modistic frame of mind, which
was deemed an important characteristic in the modistic stronghold that
Erfurt was.43
If his being called Englishman is insu cient to establish his English
descent,44 could we perhaps learn more of Manlevelt’s origin from his
proper name?
... e spelling of the name ‘Manlevelt’
Unluckily, even the way his name is to be spelled is subject of debate.
Besides being called omas Anglicus, his proper name is spelled in
many ways, ranging from Manlevelt to MaulÞeld, and even Manlovel.
We have already met with some dierent ways of spelling in the article
by Andrews and in Schum’s presentation of the latter-day scribbling on
the manuscript of our text.45
Not laying any claim to completeness, Kaczmarek in the introduc-
tion to his  edition of Destructiones modorum signiÞcandi proceeds
to sum up twenty odd variations of Manlevelt’s surname, found scat-
tered among the scientiÞc publications in which more oen than not
passing mention is made of the fourteenth century logician.46 e list
runs: Malvelt, Manfelt, Manlefelt, Manlevel, Manleveld(t), Manlevelt,
Manlovel, Mansfeld(?), Mauelfelt, Maulefelt, Maulevelt, Maulfeld(t),
Maulfelt, Mauliwelt(h), Maulveld, Maulvelt, Mauwelvelt, Mawelfelt,
Mawlfelt, Mawlphelt.
Having scrutinized these variations from a lexico-historical point of
view, Kaczmarek points out the English Maulefelt, with its German
 Erfurt, ms. ca.q.; Erfurt, ms. ca.q.; Melk, ms. .
 More about the four ‘nations’ at the University of Paris below, in section ..
 On this see Kaczmarek’s introduction to his edition of the Destructiones modorum
signiÞcandi, in Anonymus . Also Spade , f.
 Below, it is examined in how far his being named ‘Anglicus’ may be connected to his
possible membership of the English nation at the University of Paris.
 See above, section ., where reference is made to Schum , f.
 Kaczmarek , xxxvi .
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variation Maulfelt, as the most likely form of the logician’s surname.
Kaczmarek’s amply elucidated surmise is that Maulfelt’s is a farmers’
descend, his roots laying somewhere in the West of East Anglia or
thereabout.47
One does not have to be an expert on the subject matter treated so
meticulously by Kaczmarek to raise an obvious objection. It is clear
enough to even the layman’s eye that Kaczmarek’s reasoning is somewhat
speculative, here and there. Seeing the maze of suppositions on which
Kaczmarek’s conclusions rest, they obviously cannot be taken as the last
word on the matter either. at Manlevelt or Maulfelt must have a geo-
graphical connotation, if not to say denotation, seems to be quite sure.
A manuscript of Manlevelt’s Suppositiones, written in Prague in the sec-
ond half of the fourteenth century, ends thus: ‘Expliciunt suppositiones
magistri ome Malvelt’, to which the scribe added: ‘de tali loco’ as an
explanation of the magister’s name.48 All that can be said on basis of
the foregoing is that neither the form of our philosopher’s name nor its
English origin can be established with certainty. In any event, he must
have taught at Louvain, and at least some variations of his name (Maul-
veldt, Mauleveld, Manlevel, Manloval) suggest a Low Countries origin,
rather than an English origin. All this does not go to say that omas
Manlevelt himself must have come from the duchy of Brabant. Neither
can this be taken as decisive disproof of his being of English birth.
But why the real name of our omas Anglicus should not be in some
way connected to the German hometown of Martin Luther, Mansfeld,49
to make but one wild guess in another geographical direction, is far
beyond the scope of this study.50
 Kaczmarek , xli. at Manlevelt’s name does indeed have a geographical
meaning is also indicated, as we will presently see, by the scribe of one of the mss.
of his tract on supposition, who added ‘de tali loco’ as an explanation of the name
spelled by him ‘Malvel’. See De Rijk , .
 See De Rijk , .
 In a footnote to his list of variations of our philosopher’s name, Kaczmarek explains
why precisely this variant is provided with a question mark. e variant stems from
the catalogue of the Erfurt Collegium Universitatis ca. , and it is Kaczmarek’s
opinion that the writer has mistakenly read or written Mansfeld for Maulfeld, an
all too understandable mistake, precisely because of the nearness of Erfurt to the
town and county Mansfeld. Indeed, there is a speculative tinge to Kaczmarek’s line
of reasoning.
 It would have been nice if there was a town, village or cottage by the name of
‘Manlevelt’ or any of its variations to be found in the vicinity of present-day Louvain,
but alas, scrutinizing maps and atlases did not yield any such result.
. thomas manlevelt, life and works 
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For the present edition, the choice for ‘omas Manlevelt’ as the
spelling of our author’s name is not entirely arbitrary. It stays close
enough to the spelling used in the note jotted down above the very
beginning of our text, ‘om. Manlevel’. Also it is in accordance with
the spelling used by Maierù in his handbook on late scholastic logical
terminology51 and the intended spelling used in the forthcoming edition
of the parva logicalia by Kann, Lorenz and Grass.52
Let me say a few more things on his English background and on the
dating of his works.
... omas’s English background and the dating of his works
In his  book e Mediaeval Liar, Spade cites a medieval text in which
Manlevelt’s Insolubilia is mentioned together with the Insolubilia by
omas Bradwardine (c. –), Roger Swineshead (ß. before ;
d. ca. ) and William of Heytesbury (b. before ; d. /).53 e
grouping of omas Manlevelt with three English thinkers seems to Þt in
well with Manlevelt himself being called Anglicus. But as I have already
noted, there remains a shadow of doubt whether omas Manlevelt
indeed was English, despite this namegiving. N.W. Gilbert remarked in
 that Manlevelt is not even listed in any British biographical register
that he had been able to consult.54 To my knowledge no such listing has
been discovered since then.
Looking at the biographical data of the other two thinkers, the least
one can say about this mentioning is that it is not incompatible with the
tentative dating of Manlevelt’s philosophical activity around the thirties
or forties of the fourteenth century. is tentative dating of Manlevelt’s
works seems to be corroborated even further by a characteristic that is
lacking in them, but that is to be found a little later on in the fourteenth
century. A philosopher writing around the Þies and early sixties like
Albert of Saxony (d. ), by way of traceable quotations makes implicit
 Maierù , passim.
 is spelling of our author’s name has also been used by Brands  and by Kann
, but strangely enough not by Lorenz, who is also involved in the forthcoming
edition of the parva logicalia, in his  tentative biography, whose title has
‘omas Manlefelt (Maulefelt)’, sticking to the letter f instead of v, and keeping open
the possibility of the letter u replacing the letter n.
 Spade , f. e text cited by Spade is an anonymous, probably early th
century Quaestiones libri insolublilium Hollandrini.
 Gilbert ,  n. . Lorenz  does not come up with any such Þndings either.
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mention of several early fourteenth century thinkers,55 while such quo-
tations seem not to be found with Manlevelt. Explicit mention is made
by omas Manlevelt of only a handful of more or less contemporary
thinkers, all of whom had died years before he took to writing anyway:
Robert Grosseteste (d. ),56 omas Aquinas (d. ),57 and Peter of
Spain (d. ).58
For curiosity’s sake, attention must be drawn to a remarkable if not
coincidental similarity in a minor detail: in both Manlevelt’s and Albert
of Saxony’s commentary on the Isagoge reference is made to Plato’s eagle’s
nose.59 It is unclear whether this must be looked upon as a sign of intel-
lectual kinship between the two. On the other hand, Manlevelt’s use of
the adjective ‘aquilinus’60 to designate Plato, might link him to Albert of
Saxony aer all, seeing that Albert makes use of the very same, rather
uncommon epithet to designate Plato. A possible philosophic relation-
ship between our author and Albert of Saxony is also taken into account
by Fitzgerald, who draws attention to the remarkable a nity Manlevelt’s
writings on supposition show with Albert’s. e problem is, Fitzgerald
says, that no one really knows what a connection between them would
even be supposed to be.61 If Lorenz’s assumption that omas was teach-
ing in Paris around  is right, the connection can hardly have been
other than a kind of teacher-pupil one, with Albert on the pupil-end.62
is conclusion would not be subscribed to by Fitzgerald, whose view of
the matter is that our author’s treatments of material and simple suppo-
sition seem to be elaborations on Albert’s views rather than vice versa.
Fitzgerald cannot but conclude, however, that at this stage of research
into omas Manlevelt, it is just too early to hazard even a guess about
the interrelationship between him and Albert of Saxony, even though
there are striking similarities. Research will greatly beneÞt by the critical
 See, for example, Fitzgerald’s  edition of Albert of Saxony’s Twenty-Five Dis-
puted Questions On Logic.
 q. : In Posteriorum analyticorum.
 q. : Summa theologiae.
 q. : Summulae logicales.
 q.  concl. , vb, of our text; Albert of Saxony, In Porph., p. , §.
 q.  concl. , vb: ‘omnis sciturus vel omne scitum diert a Platone aquilino;
Sortes est sciturus; igitur Sortes diert a Platone aquilino.’
 Fitzgerald , .
 Just like John Aurifaber may well have been Manlevelt’s pupil at the Parisian faculty
of Arts around .
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edition of omas Manlevelt’s parva logicalia.63 More questions will then
probably come somewhat closer to an answer. Chief among these will be
the question concerning the relationship between Manlevelt’s theory of
supposition and Ockham’s theory.64
... omas Manlevelt and Albert of Saxony
Meanwhile, the interconnection between Manlevelt and Albert of Sax-
ony did receive some more probing attention on the occasion of both
philosophers’ respective thoughts on a technical aspect of supposition
theory, the so-called ‘descensus copulatim’. is is a rather unusual mode
of ‘descending to singulars’ for terms used in personal supposition in a
proposition.65 Via this descensus copulatim, the descent to singulars for
the term ‘man’ in the proposition ‘Socrates diers from every man’ will
result in the conjunctive proposition ‘Socrates diers from this man and
that man and …’, and not ‘Socrates diers from this man or that man
or …’ Read66 and Brands67 have written articles about this subject matter;
Kann pays considerable attention to this matter in the introduction to his
study on Albert of Saxony’s Perutilis logica.68 Without going into the tech-
nical details here, it is worthwhile to notice that all three adhere to the
hypothesis that it was omas Manlevelt who inßuenced Albert of Sax-
ony.69 ey take Manlevelt’s tract De suppositionibus to have been written
 See above, section ., where reference is made to the forthcoming critical edition
by Lorenz, Kann and Grass.
 Recently, Dutilh Novaes has proposed an intensional interpretation of Ockham’s
theory of supposition, contrary to the more common referential interpretation
(Dutilh Novaes ). Rather than a theory of reference, she holds that Ockham’s
theory of supposition is a theory of (propositional) meaning, providing a formal
method for the semantic analysis of (certain) propositions, generating their possible
meanings. An interesting matter of further study would be whether or not Man-
levelt’s theory of supposition would lend itself to such an intensional interpretation
as well.
 For a general account of the descent to singulars one may consult Spade ,
chapter : ‘e Ups and Downs of Personal Supposition’. For a more speciÞc account
on the nominal conjunctive descent or descensus copulatim see Dutilh Novaes a,
. Maierù, , . treats descensus in its relation to confusio. On descensus





 us Kann ,  holding that there are indications that Albert of Saxony ‘Positio-
nen Manlevelts übernommen bzw. sich mit ihm auseinandergesetzt haben könnte.’
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aer William of Ockham’s  Summa logicae and before ,70 that
is to say, before the Perutilis logica, which should be dated between 
and .71 Not only does Albert of Saxony tread in Manlevelt’s footsteps
when it comes to the descensus copulatim, even using the same problem-
atic proposition ‘Sortes diert ab omne homine’, but both thinkers’ main
partition of the types of supposition show a highly remarkable likeness
as well. ey both accept an initial tripartition in simple, material and
personal supposition, while limiting simple supposition to conventional
terms: spoken and written terms do have simple supposition, but mental
terms (having ‘natural supposition’) have not.72 e dierences between
omas Manlevelt’s and Albert of Saxony’s theories on the main division
of supposition as well as on the descensus copulatim are not in the main
lines, but in the details, suggesting that Albert of Saxony developed his
own ideas while involved in a philosophical discussion with Manlevelt,
whose ideas had crystallized into the tracts at Albert’s elbow. If so, this
forms a further strengthening of my surmise that omas Manlevelt did
his major work in the s and s.
  being the year of the earliest known commentary on a tract ascribed to omas
Manlevelt, De consequentiis. Brands , .
 e s are the period from which the most and the most important of Albert of
Saxony’s writings stem, as well as those of John Buridan – which puts a considerable
burden on those maintaining that Manlevelt may have been a Buridanist instead of
an Ockhamist. at Buridan’s De consequentiis may be of the s does not make
this dierent, in as far as the s still is the undisputed era of Buridan’s main
writings.
 Berger, ,  holds that to the best of his knowledge the terminology of signiÞ-
care naturaliter proprie/communiter is due to Albert of Saxony. In a footnote he cites
Brands, claiming however that this terminology was already employed by Manlevelt
in the s. For a more nuanced discussion on simple supposition, also in relation
to ‘natural signiÞcation’ in distinction to ‘natural supposition’, see Panaccio’s forth-
coming article on Ockham and Buridan on simple supposition.
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chapter three
Why this text is to be ascribed
to omas Manlevelt
As we have seen,1 Manlevelt’s main biographer Lorenz is not sure if the
commentaries on the old logic contained in manuscript erfurt. Wis-
senschaliche Allgemeinbibliothek ca °  (also referred to as Erfurt,
Bibl. Ampl. ), the Þrst part of which is edited here, are to be added
to Manlevelt’s bibliography. at is to say, by lack of serious investiga-
tion of this text, Lorenz refrains from making a deÞnitive statement on
Manlevelt’s supposed authorship. Other possible additions to the list of
works ascribed to omas Manlevelt by Lorenz: commentaries, to wit,
on the Physics and De anima, will be discussed below. For the moment I
will Þrst investigate the candidature of the Questiones libri Porphirii itself
as an authentic work by Manlevelt.
e very least that can be ascertained about the authorship of this
text is that it is ascribed to omas Manlevelt, that there are no reasons
beforehand to assume that this ascription would be incorrect, and that
there is reason enough to take the ascription to be correct. e authen-
ticity of the second part of our Erfurt manuscript, i.e. the commentary
on Aristotle’s Categories automatically follows.
.. e manuscript
Even the circumstantial fact that the sole manuscript of the present text
is to be found in the Bibliotheca Amploniana may not be entirely without
meaning when we take a look at the doings and interests of its founder,
Amplonius Rating de Bercka.2 Amplonius was a representative of the
group of Masters that around the year  travelled from one university
to the next, lecturing as they went, and obtaining their own collection of
books while en route.3
 Introduction, ..
 On Amplonius and his library see Speer  and Kadenbach .
 e Bibliotheca Amploniana in Erfurt, obtained as a gi made by Amplonius in 
 introduction
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e works collected by Amplonius in his Erfurt library centred mainly
around philosophy in all its branches, with special interest in logic,
mathematics and philosophy of nature as well as medicine, and works
on theology, and juridical works on private law and church law. Seeing
its founder’s interest in logic, there seems to be nothing improbable about
his wandering o to Louvain and buying a commentary on the Old Logic
by omas Manlevelt there.
is then, is the context in which the only remaining manuscript of
this commentary on the Isagoge by Porphyry has been preserved. ere
is no positive proof or even a hint that this commentary or its twin
commentary on the Categories in any way entered the logical curriculum
at Erfurt University, but Manlevelt’s works on the parva logicalia did
indeed. Already in  not only the logical works by Aristotle were
commented upon in Erfurt, but also the parva logicalia. In modern logic,
which tended to develop into a ‘logic of language’, an important role was
played by the termini mentales.4 In this connection Manlevelt’s views
were treated alongside those of John Buridan, Marsilius of Inghen and
others.5 e meagrest of conclusions to be drawn from this then would
be that probably a set of commentaries on the Old Logic by precisely
omas Manlevelt would Þnd a home there.
A word on the coherence between these two commentaries on the
old logic Þrst. Above I have already hinted at the doctrinal agreement
and the similarity of tactical approach in the two commentaries.6 On
this evidence alone, the more than tentative conclusion can only be that
the author of our commentary on the Isagoge was the same one that
composed the commentary on the Categories studied by Andrews. e
connection between the commentaries is established right away by the
and still enlarged during the th century, is today one of the most important col-
lections of manuscripts in Germany, and the biggest preserved medieval collection
of a late-medieval scholar in the world. e Bibliotheca Amploniana may also give
us some insight into the late-medieval teachings at the University of Erfurt, founded
in , of which Amplonius was the founding master and second rector. From the
very start this university was held in high esteem, and around the middle of the Þf-
teenth century had proven itself as a worthy champion of the nominalist cause of
the ‘via moderna’ against the realists of the ‘via antiqua’. Again, see Speer .
 On this, see Markowski , esp. , , with a reference to the Puncta materiarum
librorum quasi omnium que pro baccalariatus gradu Erfordie leguntur et examinan-
tur, Erfurt, ba, cms Qu .
 Markowski , . Manlevelt’s views are treated in the Puncta materiarum libro-
rum quasi omnium que pro baccalariatus gradu Erfordie leguntur et examinantur,
vb.
 Introduction ..
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Þrst questio of the commentary on the Isagoge, which is concerned with
the necessity of knowing something about genus and species etcetera (the
subject matter of the Isagoge, that is) before turning one’s attention to
the categories.7 A distinction on equivocation made in the Þh questio is
said to serve for the commentary on the Categories as well.8 e nd
questio of the commentary on the Isagoge takes up a theme normally
reserved for treatment in a commentary on the Categories: whether there
are ten highest genera and no more and no less than ten.9 Moreover, apart
from the many implicit references,10 in for example the rd and rd
questio of the commentary on the Isagoge there are explicit references
to the commentary on the Categories that is to immediately follow.11
at the two commentaries are in fact to be looked upon as the two
chapters of one continuing story, is visualized by the table of contents that
rounds o the manuscript. Without any hint of a subdivision, the table of
contents, Þlling the last few folios of the manuscript, does not even make
a distinction between the two parts in the enumeration of the questiones.
e questiones on Isagoge and Categories are simply numbered through
there.
From this safe starting ground let me now see if it can be ascertained
that omas Manlevelt and none other is the name to be attached to these
two commentaries. In fact it is the name, and the only name, actually
attached to the manuscript.
 q. , ra–vb: ‘Queritur circa initium Porphirii, utrum necesse sit aliquem scire quid
genus sit et quid species etcetera ad cognitionem predicamentorum habendam’.
 q.  dist. , ra: ‘(…) et totum istud presuppono usque ad Questiones de predica-
mentis.’
 q. , va–ra: ‘Utrum tantum sint decem genera et non plura, neque pauciora.’
Deo volente I will go into this matter on a later occasion, and compare Manlevelt’s
view on the number of categories with the views expressed by Albert the Great and
John Duns Scotus, who indeed take up this theme in their commentaries on the
Categories, and with those by omas Aquinas and William of Ockham, who take
up this theme in other works, but then, did not compose a commentary on the
Categories. John Buridan did also shine his light on the number of categories, but
seems to have worked in quite another direction than our author did; see King .
For the views of Albert the Great, omas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus on this
matter, see Bos and Van der Helm .
 q. . dist. , ra, q.  concl. , rb, among many others.
 q.  concl. , va: ‘Sed de isto plus patebit supra Predicamenta.’. q.  concl. ,
va: ‘supra Predicamenta diusius patebit de ista materia’. q.  ad ., vb: ‘Et hoc
diusius pertractabitur Supra Predicamenta’. q.  〈Ad secundum in oppositum〉,
vb: ‘Qualiter vero compositum ex subiecto et accidente Þt in predicamento, et
qualiter non, patebit Super Predicamenta, quia ibi potius habet locum’. See also q. 
concl. , va, and q.  ad ., ra.
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According to the catalogue edited in  by W. Schum, the text stems
from the middle of the fourteenth century, and its author is identiÞed on
the cover of the manuscript itself as omas Manlevelt: ‘Item questiones
optime ome Manlevelt super veteri arte.’12
e ascription to omas Manlevelt is corroborated by a line of
text, supposedly added in the late fourteenth century at the top of
the recto-side of the Þrst folio: ‘Hec questiones fuerunt compilate per
om. Manlevel Anglicum doctorem solempnem.’13 is compilating
must be understood, not as a gathering together of materials from dier-
ent sources, but in a technical sense.14 A compilated commentary, then,
is a revised version on the basis of reports jotted down by students dur-
ing lectures. Frequently the compilated version was accepted as an edited
text and used for further copies. Such a compilation was usually made by
the master himself, or in some cases by one of his pupils.15 ere being
no explicit mention here of the name of a student making the compila-
tion, seems to suggest that this compilation of questiones on the Isagoge
was done by Manlevelt himself. is would mean that the manuscript
edited here is either an autograph of omas Manlevelt, or a copy based
on it.
is seems to leave little doubt about omas Manlevelt really being
the author of the present text. One last word of caution may be warranted,
however. e manuscript, of course, was bound in its cover many years
aer the text was written down, while even the line of text at the top
of the Þrst page – if the dating by Schum is correct – was only added
decades aer completion of the manuscript. Seeing that the text of the
commentary itself does not make any mention of its compiler (nor of the
place or date of its compilation, for that matter), there seems to remain
then – notwithstanding the name of omas Manlevel(t) being added
twice later on, and although there is no clear counter-evidence – room
for at least a shadow of doubt on its authorship.16
 Schum , f.
 Schum, ibid.
 An explanation on the technical term ‘compilatus’ is to be found in Fluëler ,
f., where Fluëler also gives a list of compilated versions of Buridan’s commen-
taries.
 Flüeler, , ., presents a case where the compilation of one of Buridan’s
commentaries is not made by Buridan himself, but by one of his students, sitting
in front of him.
 For a complete description of the ms, see below, chapter .
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It would seem wise then, to look a little deeper into the evidence
about the authorship of the present text, and about its place and date
of compilation.
.. Comparison with other texts
It will be worthwhile to compare the works that are without any doubt
genuine Manlevelt – in as far as the present state of knowledge about
these parva logicalia allows us – with the Questiones libri Porphirii, to
establish whether this text can be taken as genuine Manlevelt as well.
At Þrst sight, this comparison seems to indicate that the attribution to
omas Manlevelt is correct. at is to say, doctrinal concurrence is
demonstrable and there are no clues leading us to conjecture that the
early attribution of this text to Manlevelt would be false.
ere is one reference to a tract, Manlevelt’s authorship of which is
undisputed: De suppositionibus.17 e doctrinal point in question, in the
context of which this reference is made, is vintage Ockhamist nomi-
nalism, namely that ‘man in general’ is nothing but a universal term:
‘“homo in communi” nihil aliud est quam terminus universalis’. Here,
as elsewhere in our commentary, the sparse things that Manlevelt has
to say about supposition are completely in line with the theory on sup-
position unfolded in his tract devoted to it. For example, the main
division of supposition in material, personal and simple division, as
expounded in the th questio,18 is the same that we Þnd in the tract
De suppositionibus: ‘Suppositio dividitur in suppositionem materialem,
simplicem et personalem.’19 And so, although there is only one refer-
ence to the tract De suppositionibus in this commentary on the Isa-
goge, this one reference is interesting enough, for it supports our con-
jecture that the commentary on the Isagoge was composed by Man-
levelt aer he had Þnished his theoretical tracts on the parva logi-
calia.
Unfortunately, there are no other references to De suppositionibus or
any of the remaining tracts on the parva logicalia. What we do have,
however, are references to two of his own works that have hitherto
 q.  ad ., va: ‘ “homo in communi” nihil aliud est quam terminus universalis,
sicut diusius in tractatu De suppositionibus est declaratum.’
 q.  〈Distinctio〉, vb: ‘In ista questione presupponitur distinctio de suppositione
materiali et personali et simplici’.
 Cited aer a dra of the forthcoming edition by Kann c.s.
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never been listed among the titles of omas Manlevelt. e Þrst is a
commentary on De anima, referred to not only in the commentary on the
Isagoge,20 but in the commentary on the Categories as well.21 e second
must be a commentary on at least one of the books of Aristotle’s Physics,
for in the rd questio there is mention of a Questio de tempore sive quarto
Physicorum.22 And in the th questio there is mention of a Questio de
inÞnito, commenting on the third book of the Physics.23 Which brings me
to the conclusion that if the Questiones libri Porphirii is to be genuinely
attributed to omas Manlevelt, then two more titles have to be added
to his bibliography as well: questiones on De anima and on Physics. Of
course, these additions will remain of a highly hypothetical character
only, as long as no texts are found to give body to this compartment of
Manlevelt’s supposed bibliography.24
.. Geographical circumstances
A remarkable geographic indication which is to be found in the pages of
our present commentary on the Isagoge should not be le unmentioned:
Et in ista signiÞcatione tota multitudo Romanorum dicitur genus Roma-
norum vel Romanum a principio productivo, scilicet, Romulus, et tota
multitudo Brabantiorum a principio contentivo circumscriptive, scilicet
Brabantia (…)25
 q.  ad ., va: ‘ut patet in questione de ista materia super secundum De anima’.
q.  concl. , rb seems to contain such a reference as well: ‘de quo apparebit
tertio De anima.’ Other possible references to these Questiones super De anima are
in q.  concl. , ra, and ad ., ra.
 Questiones super Predicamenta, q.  ad ., ra: ‘Et de ista materia haberetur quo-
dammodo diusius in questionibus secundi De anima, ubi tractaretur de speciebus
representationis.’
 q.  dist. , va: ‘de quo alibi diusius patet, utpote in Questione de tempore sive
quarto Physicorum.’
 q.  concl. , ra: ‘et de longitudinibus gyrationis que sunt inÞnite quodammodo
extensive, habentur multe conclusiones scientiÞce, sicut patet in questione tertii
Physicorum De inÞnito.’
 De anima was heavily studied and commented upon in Manlevelt’s days and intel-
lectual environment. It would be interesting to compare his Ockhamist-hued ques-
tiones on De anima, if ever these were to be found, with the psychological expositio’s
and questiones that have originated from the so-called ‘School of Buridan’ in mid-
fourteenth century Paris, i.e. John Buridan, Nicole Oresme, Marsilius of Inghen, and
Albert of Saxony. On these, see Marshall .
 q.  concl. , rb
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Brabantia, of course, is the duchy of Brabant, which in omas’s days
encompassed the present day Belgian provinces Brabant and Antwerp,
as well as the Dutch province Northern Brabant. Why would the duchy
of Brabant and its inhabitants come to be mentioned in a medieval text
on logic, or on any subject, for that matter? Of course, it would be
stretching our point too far, if we would link this mentioning of the
duchy of Brabant directly to the background of our omas himself,
and claim that he must have been a Brabantian, like the once infamous
philosopher who has been given the name of this very province: Siger
of Brabant (–).26 On the other hand, it would seem equally
unwise to deny any possible connection between the mentioning of this
speciÞc duchy, which never plays even the slightest role in logical history,
and the background of this speciÞc manuscript. If not the philosopher
himself is to be pointed out as the linking pin, either as someone born
there or as someone teaching there, then maybe it is the copyist who
was born or raised in Brabant, or whatever other link one can think
of.
In fact, the mentioning of the duchy may really be meaningful. ere
does exist at least one other manuscript in which the name of omas is
linked directly to the duchy. e text concerned is an exposé by omas
on the fallacies, and the manuscript is to be found in Erfurt. e text
ends: ‘Explicit tractatus fallaciarum lectus Lovanii per mag. omam
Anglicum, dictum Manlovel.’27 ere is no doubt about omas’s author-
ship of this tract on the fallacies. So there seems to be no reason for doubt
about his lecturing in Louvain, as reported in the manuscript of this tract,
either. e city of Louvain in Belgian Brabant in omas’s days was still
 Brabant, of course, is also the homeland of Siger of Brabant, the philosopher who
was the target of omas Aquinas’s severe criticism during his lifetime, but who
in his aerlife was rehabilitated by Dante, who placed him in the Fourth Sphere
of Heaven, the Sun, home of theologians and fathers of the church, and who put
benevolent words about him in the mouth of his guide there, none other than the
very same omas Aquinas. (Paradiso x, –): ‘Questi onde a me ritorna il tuo
riguardo,/è ’l lume d’uno spirto che ’n pensieri /gravi a morir li parve venir tardo:
// essa è la luce etterna di Sigieri, /che, leggendo nel Vico de li Strami, /silogizzò
invidiosi veri.’ (‘is, whence to me returneth thy regard,/e light is of a spirit
unto whom/In his grave meditations death seemed slow. // It is the light eternal of
Sigier, /Who, reading lectures in the Street of Straw,/Did syllogize invidious verities.’
tr. Longfellow) See Krop’s introduction to Siger of Brabant , ,  on Siger’s
relationship to Dante and to Brabant, respectively. On Siger, omas Aquinas and
Dante: Ebbesen , .
 Reference to this text is made by Lorenz ,  n. .
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awaiting the foundation of its university. Lorenz’s guess is that omas
was probably lecturing in the School of St. Petri there.28
To further substantiate the claim that omas Manlevelt was indeed
lecturing in Louvain and did compose his commentary on Porphyry’s
Isagoge there, let us take a look at the anonymous tract already men-
tioned above,29 the Defensorium Ockham. e Defensorium Ockham, a
Þerce defence of the radical reductionism of William of Ockham, oers,
according to its editor Andrews, a rare glimpse of how Ockham’s theories
began to transform the mindset of his immediate successors, showing
how Ockham’s theories exhibit an immediate plausibility, and how his
strategies were enthusiastically adopted.30
Ebbesen is quite sure that the anonymous author must have been
working in Denmark.31 He points out that the geographical examples
in the text are only two, namely Denmark (four times) and Rome (Þve
times). When the two localities are used in conjunction, it is to indicate
two distinct places: here and there. Now tradition prescribes that ‘here’
is the place where the speaker and his audience are, and ‘there’ is a well-
known place far away, usually Rome. us, in his Summa logicae, William
of Ockham uses England or more speciÞcally London to indicate the
‘here’. at Denmark is used in the Defensorium Ockham instead of
Ockham’s English examples, leaves room for only one explanation: the
‘here’ for the author of the Defensorium Ockham is Denmark.
Mutatis mutandis, the fact that omas Manlevelt makes mention of
Brabant and its inhabitants in Questio  of the present text leaves room
for just one explanation, viz. that the author and his audience must be
placed in precisely this duchy. And the reason for this is exactly the same
as the reason why the author of the Defensorium Ockham must be placed
in Denmark. In both cases Rome is the standard well-known place far
away,32 the ‘there’, and Denmark and Brabant respectively are the ‘here’.
e very least that can be said about Brabant for being in all likelihood
the place of origin of this commentary on the Isagoge is that it does in
no way contradict Lorenz’s assumption that Manlevelt must have been
drawn from Paris to pre-university Louvain. In fact, the one Þts in quite
nicely with the other.
 Lorenz , f.
 Introduction ., n. .
 Andrews , .
 Ebbesen , .
 q.  concl. , rb: ‘tu scis quod Roma est pulchra civitas, quia tu credis dicentibus’.
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Ebbesen calls the case of the Defensorium Ockham unique. For no
other known work may be claimed to have originated in the teaching of
philosophy among Nordic Franciscans.33 omas Manlevelt’s case seems
to be quite as unique. For what other mature work in philosophy is
known to have originated in pre-university Louvain?
So what we have on the one hand is a manuscript of a text which is
certainly by omas, in which he is said to have lectured in Louvain, Bra-
bant. And on the other hand we have a text which is probably by omas,
in which the highly uncommon geographical example of Brabant is used,
and which for that reason can safely be taken to have originated there.
It seems to be warranted, then, to look upon this coincidence as a piece
of circumstantial evidence that the present commentary on the Isagoge
really is by omas. And if this is so, the present text may in its turn be
taken as complementary, if not superßuous proof that omas indeed
did lecture in some school in Louvain.34
.. e dating of the Questiones libri Porphirii
A terminus post quem is not hard to establish for our text, even by the
most cautious of standards. If its author is working on the continent, as
seems obvious from the references to Brabant, and if he is even in the
widest sense a follower of Ockhamist doctrines, the terminus post quem
of the Questiones libri Porphirii is to be assumed around . at year
is generally taken to mark the beginning of the rapid spread of Ockham’s
doctrine and method in Paris.35
Above, we have seen that Courtenay advanced an ante quem dating
of Manlevelt’s tract on supposition around .36 Following this dat-
ing of Manlevelt’s Tractatus de suppositionibus, and supposing that the
 Ebbesen , . I will go deeper into the Franciscan connection below, section
..
 Above, in section ., attention was paid to the sense in which these Questiones libri
Porphyrii are to be understood as a compilation. Namely as a revised version of
a reported work. According to Flüeler, , , such compilated commentaries
were made especially in Paris. is is not to say that compilations were not made
elsewhere as well. Manlevelt had been teaching in Paris before coming to Louvain,
and may very well have continued this practice there. So this text being a compilation
is in no way inconsistent with my supposing that it originated in Louvain.
 Courtenay ,  makes mention of Ockham’s Summa logicae being studied and
intellectually digested in Paris by .
 Introduction ...
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Questiones libri Porphirii were composed still somewhat later than that,
the present text would at least share this ante quem dating around .
is ante quem dating does not conßict with my provisional adherence
to Lorenz’s biography of omas Manlevelt. As I have explained, by lack
of a post quem dating of any of Manlevelt’s works running against the
otherwise feasible biographical framework laid out by Lorenz, we should
stick to this biographer’s hypothesis that omas Manlevelt worked in
Paris around , and le for Louvain not too long aerwards, by
the end of the s. Fitting the present commentary in with Lorenz’s
tentative biography of omas Manlevelt leads me to assume that the
Questiones libri Porphirii were composed in Louvain in the late s or
s.
Manlevelt’s fame did not rest on the commentary on the Categories
treated by Andrews, nor on the commentary on the Isagoge edited
below. Otherwise than would have been the case with almost any other
philosopher, this lack of fame on account of his commentaries on the
Old Logic was not due to their status as works of youth. In fact, while
most philosophers did their work on the Isagoge and the Categories at
the start of their academic career, in all probability these commentaries
were not works of youth at all, but are samples of Manlevelt’s mature
thinking, written aer his Parisian parva logicalia. In the foregoing I have
explained my reasons for sticking to Manlevelt’s biographical framework
as put forward by Lorenz, according to whom Manlevelt spent most
of his active academic life in Paris in the s and s, and later
went to Louvain.37 For one thing, the reference made in the Questiones
libri Porphirii, supposedly written in Louvain, to an earlier tract De
suppositionibus, being one of Manlevelt’s Parisian parva logicalia, Þts in
well with this tentative biography by Lorenz. On the hypothesis then
that the Questiones libri Porphirii must chronologically be placed aer
the completion of his renowned logical treatises, and aer he had le
Paris for a place of considerably less intellectual splendour, Louvain, the
only reason conceivable for their lack of general renown is precisely that
they were written in the by then outlying intellectual district of pre-
university Louvain, far from the Parisian centre. Otherwise it would
be hard to understand why Manlevelt’s sound but unspectacular logical
treatises on supposition, confusion and consequences were lastingly used
and commented upon all over the Continent, while our commentary
 See above, subsection ...
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on Porphyry’s Isagoge and its accompanying commentary on Aristotle’s
Categories seem to have had little or no impact at all, in spite of the
highly original and adventurous character of both these commentaries.
Had works like these seen the light of day in the Parisian centre of
intellectual activity, they could not have failed to make a stir. If not
endowing their author with everlasting fame, they would at least have
caused considerable scandal.
But is there not another terminus ante quem to be found, that would
support a more deÞnite dating of our text than that provided by Courte-
nay’s?
It is generally acknowledged that  marked the beginning of the
rapid spread of Ockham’s doctrines and method in Paris. is makes
its University a favourable surrounding for a thinker like Manlevelt,
building on the philosophical groundwork laid out by Ockham, be it
as only a follower, or as an innovator in his own right. Unpleasant
things however were bound to happen some ten years later, around
, when philosophy in an Ockhamist vein became the target of
repression in Paris. Adhering to Manlevelt’s biography as reconstructed
by Lorenz, one must reckon that our author had already le Paris for
Louvain by then. Kindred spirits like Autrecourt and Mirecourt had
been working in Paris shortly before the trouble began (Autrecourt,
–) or would be working there shortly aer (Mirecourt, –
). But what shape did these troubles exactly take? e order of
events unfavourable to Parisian Ockhamism is meticulously unfolded
by ijssen in his study on Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris
–.38
On December , , the masters of the faculty of arts at Paris issued
a statute prohibiting the dissemination of six listed errors.39 e Þnal
paragraph of the  statute alludes to previous legislation concerning
‘the doctrine of William called Ockham’ (de doctrina Guillelmi dicti
Ockham alias statuimus). e Ockhamist hermeneutics is allegedly based
on the idea that texts have an objective, literal meaning, independent
of the subjective intention of the author. It appears to assume that this
objective literal sense of texts could be grasped by virtue of the properties
of speech (proprietates sermonis). e authors of the  statute criticize
the Ockhamists for ignoring other important hermeneutical clues for
 ijssen . On this crisis over virtus sermonis, see also Courtenay a.
 ijssen , .
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interpreting texts, such as the author’s intention (intentio auctoris) and
the context of discourse (materia subjecta). In short, the Ockhamists
were reproved for employing too narrow a concept of the literal sense
of texts, one that suocated the authorial meaning and neglected the
context of discourse.40
e Statute is, and aimed to be, of considerable doctrinal importance.
e issue it addresses – the interpretation of the Bible and of other
authoritative texts – was of major importance in the intellectual climate
prevalent in the middle of the fourteenth century. e text of the Statute,
although it is anti-Ockhamist, is directed not against Ockham personally
but against his followers in Paris.41 In Ockham’s own supposition theory,
the distinction of propositions for making their possible readings explicit
may be said to be a key element.42
In the light of this Statute of December , , the view to be distilled
in a certain text on the (non-)distinction of propositions may give a
terminus ante quem for the date of this text. e Faculty of Arts had in
the third article of this Statute condemned the view that no proposition
should be distinguished. So, if an author ßatly denies that a proposition
should under any circumstance be distinguished, we may be sure that
this particular text of his stems from before the issuing of the Statute in
. Van der Lecq and Braakhuis have in fact used this device to date a
certain text by John Buridan.43
Unfortunately, the Statute is of no help in determining a more exact
terminus ante quem for the Questiones libri Porphirii than that provided
by Courtenay, as its author throughout the text feels free to make distinc-
tions.44 He is an Ockhamist alright, but certainly not one in the dogmatic
sense of the Statue.
 But of Ockham himself this is simply not true. Ockham is always talking about
‘distinguishing’ propositions. Moreover, Ockham himself is always saying things like
‘what Aristotle really meant is …’, thus clearly considering the intentio auctoris. In
this sense it could even be argued that the  statute actually is rather Ockhamist
in spirit.
 Braakhuis ,  approvingly cites these conclusions from a  article by
Kaluza.
 Dutilh Novaes , esp. –, draws attention to the fact that the phrase
‘propositio est distinguenda’ occurs countless times in Ockham’s Summa logicae.
 Introduction to John Buridan, ; see also Braakhuis .
 E.g. q.  dist. , ra: ‘ista propositio “plures homines sunt unus homo” est
distinguenda eo quod poterit accipi in sensu proprio vel in sensu transsumptivo’,
q. dist. , ra: ‘ista propositio (…) est distinguende penes amphiboliam: in sensu
proprio falsa est; in sensu transsumptive secundum quod iam expositum est, est
vera. Et ista distinctio in ista materia maxime est necessaria, quia Porphyrius et alii
. why this text is to be ascribed to thomas manlevelt 
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.. e Franciscan context
What is interesting about the manuscript of the Tractatus de supposition-
ibus used by Courtenay, apart from its role in providing a terminus ante
quem, is the Franciscan context it constitutes for omas Manlevelt’s text
on supposition.45 e manuscript is kept in a Franciscan monastery and
contains mainly tracts by Franciscan writers. A question may come to
mind: was omas himself a Franciscan as well? And was he, or was he
not, a theologian as well as a logician? ese same questions have been
raised about an equally unknown thinker from roughly the same era and
comparable intellectual background: the author of an anonymous Ock-
hamist treatment of the categories, brought to attention and later edited
by Andrews under the title ‘Defensorium Ockham’.46 I will have a look at
the answers given to these questions, and then try and answer the same
questions concerning omas Manlevelt.
When sketching the spiritual silhouette of the otherwise unknown
early Ockhamist author of the Defensorium Ockham, Andrews comes
to the conclusion that he was probably a Franciscan.47 He sums up the
following criteria in support of this conclusion: the author’s model in
Ockham; his Franciscan position on divisive issues as the univocity of
being and the plurality of forms; a verbatim passage from John Duns
Scotus, as well as the Subtle Doctor’s being mentioned directly and
indirectly; his cavils about Ockham’s theories, similar to those of Walter
Chatton.
Applying these same criteria to the author of the text to be edited
below, I Þnd that he meets the bulk of them. Manlevelt clearly has his
model in William of Ockham; while not advancing an opinion on the
plurality of forms, he deÞnitely adheres to the univocity of being;48 while
never directly being referred to, the Subtle Doctor forms is constantly
doctores in ista materia loquitur transsumptive potius quam proprie.’, q.  dist. ,
ra: ‘ista propositio “hoc accidens est inseparabile” in communi locutione stat loco
istius “hoc accidens ab aliquo subiecto est inseparabile”, et ideo, si cui placeat, potest
distingui secundum amphiboliam’, q.  concl. , va: ‘distinguendo predictam
propositionem secundum ampliationem sensus proprius est falsus, sicut predictum
est; sensus vero transsumptivus in quo dicit eam auctor, est verus’ More about
Manlevelt’s distinguishing of propositions below, subsection ...
 On this manuscript and its dating, see above, subsection ...
 Andrews  and Andrews , respectively. See above, section ..
 Andrews , .
 q.  concl. , rb: ‘ “ens” predicatur de pluribus univoce’.
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present on the background of Manlevelt’s discussions, if only under the
realists’ guise of the ‘antiqui’ so regularly rejected; a certain argument in
our text, brought forward by way of an ‘opinion’ about three propositions
containing the same subject, two of which are dubious and one of which
is known with certainty, might very well be a verbatim citation from John
Duns Scotus;49 cavilling Ockham – whether or not our author is guilty
of such a thing – seems to me the least of all possible hallmarks of the
Franciscan mind.
On the basis of the criteria applied, one cannot but assume that if the
author of the Defensorium Ockham was a Franciscan, our author of the
Questiones libri Porphirii was a Franciscan as well. And if we may add the
overwhelming attention paid to the individual in its individuality as an
extra criterion, the case for our author being a Franciscan becomes even
stronger. Aer all, from Roger Bacon onward, the individual was the key
subject of Franciscan thought.50
One of the few philosophers cited by name in the Questiones libri
Porphirii is Robert Grosseteste,51 virtually the founding father of the
Franciscan school in England.52
ere is no lack of circumstantial evidence of our author’s Franciscan
hue, either. For example, one of the oldest transcripts of a text by omas
Manlevelt is to be found in a manuscript from Göttingen, , tran-
scribed by one Nicolaus in Erfurt.53 is Nicolaus himself was probably
 q.  opinio , vb: ‘Aliqui arguunt sic: quandocumque alique tres propositiones
sic se habent quod in dubio sunt due, et tertia certa sive 〈s〉cita, et quod habent
idem subiectum, tunc aliud est predicatum propositionis scite a predicato proposi-
tionis dubie; sed sic se habent iste tres propositiones: “ista quantitas est substantia”,
“ista quantitas est accidens”, “ista quantitas est ens”, nam prima et secunda alicui
sunt dubie, et tertia est eidem scita; igitur aliud est predicatum in mente propo-
sitionis scite a predicato alicuius aliarum propositionum. Et per consequens unus
est conceptus entis distinctus a conceptu substantie et conceptu accidentis.’ On this
type of argument, which is to be found in exactly the same manner somewhere
in the Quaestiones super Praedicamenta by John Duns Scotus, see Honnefelder,
.
 Bérubé , : ‘l’École franciscaine se fera le champion de l’intellection de l’indivi-
duel’.
 q. , ad argumentum in oppositum: ‘secundum Lincolniensem, primo Posteriorum
capitulo de per se, homo est risibilis ratione suorum principiorum essentialium, ita
quod talibus principiis simul unitis sic videlicet quod homo existat, Deus non posset
facere quin homo esset risibilis’.
 See Bérubé ,  on ‘son inßuence prépondérante dans la formation de l’École
fransiscaine d’Angleterre’.
 On this manuscript, see Pinborg , , n. . Also, .. above.
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a Franciscan;54 in any case the manuscript contains several texts of Fran-
ciscan origin, and the manuscript belonged to the Franciscan monastery
in Göttingen.
.. e theologian background
If the author of the Questiones libri Porphirii, omas Manlevelt, was
a Franciscan, the further question that comes to mind is: was he a
theologian as well?55
Once again I turn to the author of the Defensorium Ockham, who
explicitly refused to address theological problems,56 and about whom the
same question was asked. To Ebbesen it was unclear whether he was a
theologian.57 is author did explicitly state that in logical matters he
did not want to be a theologian. But aer all, this statement lends itself
to opposing interpretations. Either he was a theologian who wanted to
theologize in his theological works only and not in a treatise devoted to
logical matters, or he wanted to say that he was not a theologian and that
as a logician he was of the opinion that theological matters were not to be
touched upon in a logical context. Anyway, to Ebbesen it was less than
obvious how the treatise could Þt into the arts course of a university;
there were too many references to theological matters for an arts faculty
work.
For an arts faculty work on logic, there is an abundance of references
to God and theological matters in Manlevelt’s text as well. Not only is
 Pinborg, op. cit., , n. .
 A curious remark in the second question of our author’s commentary on the
Categories is a token of his keen awareness of the dierence between laymen and
clergy, although laymen and clergy are alike in their knowledge of things in the
world without necessarily having knowledge of the concepts by which they know
these things: ‘(…) conceptus se ipso concipitur confuse tantum et remisse. Propter
quam confusionem et remissionem laici non possunt se intelligere tales conceptus,
nec etiam clerici, nisi ex consequenti et argumentative, facta diligenti inquisitione
qualiter intellectus se habet in concipiendo rem extra.’ (Questiones in Predicamenta
q. , reply to the third argument of the last string of ‘ad oppositum’ arguments; rb).
What Manlevelt seems to mean is that not only laymen, but also the generally well-
educated clergy tend to go by imperfect knowledge. One is vaguely reminded of
Buridan Þghting the ‘theologizantes’. On this, see De Rijk . It would be a matter
of further study to determine if Manlevelt would have joined Buridan in his Þght.
 ‘quia in logica nolo esse theologicus’; see Andrews , .
 Ebbesen , .
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God the subject matter of the th questio,58 where God’s place within
the Porphyrian Tree is discussed,59 but He is brought into the discussion
in many other questiones as well. Right in the Þrst questio the nature of
God’s knowledge is compared to human knowledge;60 the truth of faith
is set o against the truth of reason.61 Logical rules are explicitly stated
to not always hold in theological matters.62 eologians do get their say
in our text.63 What the theologians have to say does not necessarily tally
with what the logician or the natural philosopher has to say.64 But when it
comes to crossing the boundaries between logic and theology, our author
adheres to the same ambiguous stance as the author of the Defensorium
Ockham. In questio  he touches upon the subject matter of the unity
of the Son of God and His assumed nature, and says explicitly that such
matters are to be decided elsewhere.65
So we do not come to a decisive answer to the question whether
omas Manlevelt may have been a theologian. We are le just as empty-
handed as Ebbesen was concerning the anonymous defender of Ockham.
In conclusion I have to admit then that Manlevelt’s taking holy orders
can neither be conÞrmed, nor denied. However, the range of Manlevelt’s
ideas as well as the sort of problems he is prone to tackle, very neatly Þt
in the outline of the Franciscan worldview. Aer all, this freely bringing
up God and matters divine in a logical context, while at the same time
drawing of an intransgressable line between natural knowledge and logic
on the one hand and theological knowledge on the other hand – which,
incidentally, we also see in the commentary on the Categories that forms
 q. : ‘Utrum hec dierentia “immortale” sit constitutiva Dei’.
 On the closely related problem for medieval philosophy concerning the inclusion
of God within the framework of the Aristotelian categories, see Tabarroni . For
an overview of diagrammatic representations of the Tree of Porphyry in texts of the
Arts Faculty, –, none of which containing a branch for God, see Verboon
, –.
 q.  dist. , ra–rb.
 E.g. q.  concl. , rb–va.
 q. concl. , rb: ‘omne quod ab alio diert, potest concludi ab eodem dierre per
aliquod medium, quod est accidens separabile. Et hoc precise verum est in materia
naturali; quod dico propter personas in divinis in quibus forte ista conclusio non
haberet locum.’
 E.g. q.  concl. , ra for the theologian’s view on the nature of angels; q. : on
the divisibility of the continuum; q.  and : on human nature.
 In q.  concl. , rb it is conceded that ‘primum mobile non movetur’ is possible
according to the theologians.
 q.  dist. , rb: ‘isti duo modi unitatis propriissime dicuntur unitates per se, quia
sunt maxime unitates que Þunt ex distinctis rebus excepta sola unitate Þlii Dei et
nature assumpte, de qua nihil ad presens quia alterius existit speculationis.’
. why this text is to be ascribed to thomas manlevelt 
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the sequel to our text – is a deÞning feature of Franciscan, if not more
speciÞcally, Ockhamist thought.
I am going to conclude this chapter of my investigation in a moderately
conÞdent tone. I have not proven anything about the life and career
of omas Manlevelt. While I do feel conÞdent that my Þndings Þt
in quite well with the biographical framework laid out by Lorenz, and
that these Þndings thus give further acceptability to Lorenz’s tentative
biography of Manlevelt on the one hand, and su cient plausibility to
the Questiones libri Porphirii forming part of Manlevelt’s – somewhat
extended – bibliography on the other hand.
For this reason I feel warranted to present this text as omas Man-
levelt’s.
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chapter four
Historical background
is chapter will sketch the historical background of the Questiones
libri Porphirii edited here. In a broad historical sense, there is the long
tradition of commentaries on the Isagoge into which Manlevelt’s text
is to be placed. So Þrstly, in section . I will explain why the Isagoge
is worth commenting upon, and to what commentaries it has given
rise. In a narrower historical sense, Manlevelt seems to have taken part
of the Ockhamist movement of the early fourteenth century, and is
intellectually associated with the universities of both Oxford and Paris.
So secondly, in sections .– I will see in how far Manlevelt can be called
an Ockhamist, say something about Ockhamist trends in Oxford and
Paris, and spend some thoughts on Manlevelt’s possible connections with
either of these universities.
.. Porphyry’s book, and what it is about
... e Organon
e authority of the text commented upon in the Questiones libri Por-
phirii, the Isagoge by Porphyry (c. –), is derivative of the authority
of the text to which this Isagoge was meant to be an introduction: the Cat-
egories by Aristotle (–).1 e Isagoge was more than one thousand
years old by Manlevelt’s time, and the Categories was six centuries old by
Porphyry’s time and therefore sixteen hundred years old by Manlevelt’s
time. e Categories in its turn was the Þrst of a series of six treatises by
which Aristotle single-handedly laid the foundations on which the com-
plete system of logic was to rest for more than two millennia.2 Together
 For a most excellent survey of the history of commentaries on the Isagoge the reader
is referred to Libera  and to the author’s introduction to Porphyry .
 In the Philosopher’s own words: ‘When it comes to this subject [i.e. logic], it is
not the case that part had been worked out in advance and part had not; instead,
nothing existed at all.’ De sophisticis elenchis , b–. Cited by Smith ,
 introduction
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these six treatises were to Þnd their place in philosophical history and
curriculum under the collective title of Organon: apart from the Cate-
gories, these were the Perihermeneias or De interpretatione, the Analytica
priora, the Analytica posteriora, the Topica and the De sophisticis elenchis.
e subject matter of each of these works is indicated in a few words.
De interpretatione is about the structure of propositions and their truth-
values. e Prior Analytics is about inference, by way of the syllogistic
method; in fact, it contains the Þrst ever systematic exposition of a theory
of correct inference itself. e Posterior Analytics is about demonstration:
valid reasoning leading to scientiÞc, certain knowledge. e Topics,
leaving the Þeld of strict demonstration for that of dialectics in a broader
sense, is about equally valid reasoning in Þelds where there is no certainty
to be had, leading to knowledge that is probable at the most. In this
treatise Aristotle unfolds his own theory of the Predicables, which was to
be developed by Porphyry in his Isagoge; of the eight parts of the Topics,
two are about accident, one about genus, one about property, and two
about deÞnition. e Sophistical Refutations is about logical fallacies and
as such can be looked upon as an appendix to the Topics.3
... e Categories
Pinpointing the subject matter of the Categories has always been more
problematic.4 e Categories presents us with Aristotle’s ten-fold cate-
gorization of what there is. e ten highest categories are substance,
quantity, quality, relation, place, time, situation, condition, action, and
. Smith’s is as good and insightful an introduction to the logic of Aristotle as one
can get in forty pages.
 Smith  groups De interpretatione and the Prior and Posterior Analytics together
as covering the Þeld of demonstration, and the Topics and Sophistical Refutations
as covering the Þeld of dialectical argument. Aristotle’s Rhetorica, traditionally not
a part of the Organon, might also be grouped with these works on dialectical
argument.
 Even its position within Aristotelian logic is matter of debate. See Smith , f.
An ancient tradition took it to be a preface to the whole of logic, giving a theory
of the meanings of the terms of which propositions or composed. ere is some
irony, then, in the fact that the Categories was to lose that role to its own prefatory
treatise, the Isagoge. But an even older tradition entitled it ‘Prefatory Materials for the
Topics’, thus binding it closer to the more ‘dialectical’ compartment of Aristotelian
logic (Topics, Sophistical Refutations, and maybe even including the Rhetoric) than
to the works concerned with demonstration in a strict sense (De interpretatione and
the two Analytics). at the Isagoge in its role as introduction to the Categories picks
out part of the contents of the Topics lends some plausibility to this last tradition.
. historical background 
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passion.5 But what is the nature of these categories: are they primarily
things, words, or concepts?6
Now, in the categories of being items are collected and sorted out
by which man can name reality, and this categorization is the basis for
forming complex wholes (for instance ‘white man’) and propositions and
judgements (for instance ‘men are white’) that in their turn are the basis
for inferences, in the end constituting real knowledge about the world.
So the theory of the categories is fundamental for philosophy.7 One
 For a general survey of the discussions on the categories through the ages, see
H. Baumgarter a.o., ‘Kategorie, Kategorienlehre’, in J. Ritter and K. Gründer (eds.),
Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie iv, Darmstadt , cols. –.
 To avoid misunderstanding, one should keep in mind that ancient and medieval
philosophers are said to have taken for granted a parallelism between thought and
reality. is means that they accepted that there are things that exist in reality
and that there can be, and is, knowledge of those things. e assumption of this
characteristic of Medieval as well as Ancient thought is usually indicated as ‘the
parallelism postulate’. e key text on the parallelism postulate might well be De
Rijk . ese things as conceived by human understanding are designated by a
term. So human understanding does involve a subjective element when the thing
is conceived or named, but thanks to the parallelism, the thing conceived matches
the thing in reality. e question need not be asked whether a kind of gap has to be
overcome: there is no gap. For an explanation of the role of the parallelism postulate
in the semantics and ontology of Aristotle, see De Rijk a and b. Latest
insights tend to limit the scope of the parallelism postulate. See, for example, Dutilh
Novaes’s forthcoming article on Burley.
 A word here on the relevance of Aristotle’s categories for present-day philosophical
practice. e twenty-Þrst century had its philosophical kick-o in Paris, where, on
the th and th of February  an international symposium was held at the
Centre Georges Pompidou, entitled Quelle philosophie pour le xxie siècle? Subject
of this symposium was Aristotle’s categories, that, according to the avant-propos
to its textual edition (J. Benoist e.a. ), during twenty centuries had dictated
the elementary grammar of philosophical reasoning. e question asked at the
symposium was: what rests today of these categories? Must we abandon them? Or
should we rethink them anew? One may be tempted to say this question about the
relevance of Aristotle’s categories for today’s philosophizing is already answered by
looking at the list of ten renowned contributors to the symposium, who each have
lent their names to one of Aristotle’s categories, by writing an essay about it. If, say,
J.R. Searle deigns to write some twenty-odd pages about the category of time, then
things are not looking too bad for this category, at least from an inspirational point of
view. On the other hand, as I. Hacking remarks in his contribution on the category
of quality, having lived a fruitful life for twenty centuries, Aristotle’s Organon had
deÞnitely had its time by the th century. So it is hardly to be expected that it will
arise to its former philosophical omnipresence in the century we are now living in.
Or is it? (For a system of thought ‘deÞnitely moribund in the th century’ it was a
present enough source of inspiration in the intervening centuries, if we only think of
C.S. Peirce’s  paper ‘On a New List of Categories’, F. Brentano’s early th century
 introduction
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could even say that one’s choice of a particular theory of categories
depends on what kind of philosopher one is.8
What, then, is the nature of the members of the categories? Are these
members (primarily) terms which refer to something in reality? Or are
they things so far as (and only so far as) these are captured in a linguistic
expression or thought? In the context of medieval philosophy, a penchant
towards one or the other of these options will place a thinker in the camp
of either the ‘realists’ or the ‘nominalists’.9
... e Isagoge
Now, keeping in mind that the categories, about which these intricate
questions are asked, are the highest genera, and that genus is the Þrst
of the Þve universals or predicables treated by Porphyry in his Isagoge,
it will come as no surprise that the problems involved with the nature
of the categories will also come to the fore when the nature of these
predicables is discussed. In fact, it was the Isagoge that ignited the
never-ending war between realists and nominalist on the nature of the
universals.
e author of the Isagoge, the little introductory book to the Categories
that virtually came to function as an introduction to the whole body
of Aristotelian logic in the centuries to come,10 was not an Aristotelian
himself. Pupil of the founder of Neo-Platonism Plotinus (?-),
Kategorienlehre, or W.E. Johnson’s turn-of-the-th century theory of determinants
and determinables – a distinction recasting the Porphyrian one between universal
and particular.)
 E. Lask, Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre,  () (Gesammelte
Schrien , ): ‘Was für eine Kategorienlehre man wählt, hängt davon ab, was für ein
Philosoph man ist.’ Cited in Bos & Van der Helm , .
 ese labels, clear as they may seem, should be used with some caution. It is not
that ‘nominalists’ deny the usefulness of universal concepts in referring to certain
aspects of concrete things in ‘reality’, rather they tend to take more seriously than
the ‘realists’ the Aristotelian conviction, shared by all, that reality consists of concrete
things only; in the light of the ‘linguistic’ character of all speaking and thinking about
reality they reject every instance of ontological projection of our mental objects and
other thought-constructions. See De Rijk ,  n. .
 According to Barnes in the introduction to his  translation of the Isagoge,
Porphyry’s little book is really meant as an introduction not to the Categories in
particular, but to logic in general, comprising as it does the theories of predication,
deÞnition, and proof. Whether meant as such by its author or not, the Isagoge at least
de facto, being the introduction to the Þrst part of the Organon, was the introduction
to the whole of Aristotelian logic. See Porphyry , xv.
. historical background 
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Porphyry was honoured by Simplicius, the sixth century commentator
on Aristotle, as being the most erudite of all Neo-Platonists.11
Written in Sicily12 at the request of the Roman senator Chrysaorius, the
Isagoge originally seems to have been only an occasional piece of work.
In this work Porphyry builds on Aristotle’s treatment of the so called
predicables in his Topica. But there was one little dierence to begin with.
With Aristotle the predicables were four in number; with Porphyry their
number is Þve. Aristotle’s deÞnition is not included in Porphyry’s list,
while species and dierence are added. So to sum up in familiar Latin
the complete series of Þve predicables, or quinque voces, as they came to
be called in the Middle Ages, we get: genus, species, dierentia, proprium
and accidens. We will not go into the logico-philosophical consequences
of this re-listing of the predicables here, but accept the Þve as listed by
Porphyry, because that is the list that was to go down in history.13
 Porphyry must count as the pivotal Þgure in the transition of ancient philosophy
to the middle ages and beyond. Not only did he compose the Isagoge and compile
Plotinus’ Enneads, thus contributing two texts of everlasting endurance, but even
greater was his indirect inßuence on the course of philosophical history, by pro-
viding Augustine (–) with his essential reading material. In the Confessiones
Augustine makes no secret about the powerful inßuence the ‘books of the Platon-
ists’ exercised on him – the ‘Platonists’ in fact being an inextricable mix of Plotinus
and Porphyry, in Latin translations. e Churchfather seems to have been initially
unaware that Porphyry was also the author of Against the Christians. Once he had
discovered Porphyry’s hostility, that became a leading motif of his later discussions
on Platonism, notably those in Books – of the De civitate Dei. On Augustine’s
change in appreciation of Porphyry, see O’Donnell , .
 Porphyry’s move to Sicily, and in consequence, his writing the Isagoge there, would
seemingly not have happened, had it not been for a Þt of melancholy on the part
of this famed pupil of Plotinus. ‘I myself at one period had formed the intention of
ending my life; Plotinus discerned my purpose; he came unexpectedly to my house
where I had secluded myself, told me that my decision sprang not from reason
but from mere melancholy and advised me to leave Rome. I obeyed and le for
Sicily (…). ere I was induced to abandon my Þrst intention but was prevented
from being with Plotinus between that time and his death.’ Porphyry, On the Life
of Plotinus and the Arrangement of His Work, . Translated by S. MacKenna, cited
from the  Penguin edition.
 Was it Porphyry’s logico-technical acumen that attracted so many readers, inter-
preters and commentators throughout history? Another one of Porphyry’s works,
the philosophical allegorization of a passage in Homer’s Odyssey, best-known under
its Latin title De antro nympharum, was translated by omas Carlyle, and sub-
sequently illustrated by William Blake. But there seems to be room for doubt
about the literary qualities of the Isagoge helping to pave the way to its everlast-
ing logico-philosophical glory. Schopenhauer compares Porphyry favourably to all
other Neo-Platonists, when it comes to clear and coherent writing; in fact Porphyry
is the only one among them that one can read for one’s pleasure. ‘Die Lektüre der
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... e three questions
Also to go down in history was the intrinsic linking of logic and meta-
physics, the basis for which was laid by Porphyry in raising three ques-
tions somewhere in the beginning of the Isagoge: () Are genera and
species substances? () Are they corporeal or incorporeal? () If the lat-
ter, are they in sensible things or separated from them?14 Even though
Porphyry dismisses these questions right away as being of a too meta-
physical nature to be treated in an introductory work of logic such as
the Isagoge was meant to be, he in fact had laid the foundations for the
war about universals that would rage through the Middle Ages. Are the
predicables, or universals, something really existent or not?
Porphyry’s literally stated intention notwithstanding the notorious
ree Questions would continue to be raised and – in utterly divergent
ways – be answered in connection with the Isagoge. e Þrst who did
try to provide his readers with the answer to the problem Porphyry
refused to resolve in a logical context, was the one to have coined the
term ‘universalia’ as well, viz. Boethius, in his two commentaries on
the Isagoge, which thus proved to be instrumental in providing Latin
medieval philosophy with its main subject-matter, and the terminology
to discuss it in. e irony has been remarked by many an observer: the
medieval preoccupation with the ontological status of universals arose
out of Boethius’ comments on a passage where Porphyry discards the
question as unimportant in a logical context.15
Neuplatoniker erfordert viel Geduld; weil es ihnen sämtlich an Form und Vortrag
gebricht. Bei weitem besser, als die andern, ist jedoch, in dieser Hinsicht, Porphyrius:
er ist der einzige, der deutlich und zusammenhängend schreibt; so dass man ihn
ohne Widerwillen liest.’ (Parerga und Paralipomena, cited from Sämtliche Werke vi,
) Baumstark, on the other hand, in his monograph on Syrian commentaries on
the Isagoge, criticizes Porphyry’s lack of style, accusing him of being tedious, dry and
all too fond of schematizations. Faults for which Porphyry’s Syrian intellectual back-
ground is to blame, says Baumstark. ‘Porphyrios war hellenisierter Syrer. Seine εºςα-
γωγª, obwohl nach bestimmter Überlieferung im römischen Westen geschrieben,
ist denn in ihre Dürre und Trockenheit, der schmucklosen und stillosen Sach-
lichkeit des Ganzen und der bis zur Langeweile schematischen Behandlungsweise
des Einzelnen ein echtes Kind syrischen Geistes.’ (Baumstark , )
 Isagoge prooem.,  (.–): ‘Mox de generibus ac speciebus illud quidem, sive
subsistunt sive in solis nudis purisque intellectibus posita sunt sive substantia
corporalia sunt an incorporalia, et utrum separata an in sensibilibus et circa ea
constantia, dicere recusabo.’ (Tr. Boethii)
 Boethius, pl b–a
. historical background 
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In his introduction to the French translation of the Isagoge Libera
rightly speaks about the paradox of the Isagoge: ‘Nul livre, sans doute,
n’a eu dans l’histoire de la philosophie un destin comparable à celui
de l’Isagoge: susciter (et entretenir) durant des siècles la controverse
que son auteur avait, en le composant, explicitement voulu éviter.’16
Probably these ree Questions coming with the Quinque Voces, the
Five Words, added just that little bit of complementary interest needed
for this introductory work to become an instant classic. For an instant
classic it was.
... Commentaries on the Isagoge
Not only did the Isagoge continue to be translated and commented upon,
from late Antiquity until the present day, be it on its own or as part of
the logical canon, but in the Middle Ages its string of commentaries
even led to a spin-o of tracts dedicated to its very subject matter: the
universals.
An excellent overview of the immensely inßuential aerlife of Por-
phyry’s occasional piece is provided by Libera in La querelle des univer-
saux, and in the introduction to his Greek-French-Latin edition of the
Isagoge.17
 Porphyry , xxxiii
 Libera , Porphyry . All this translating and commenting should be seen
in its proper perspective. Porphyry’s Isagoge shares the interpretative fate of the
Aristotelian body of work it came to be so indissolubly attached to. As is the case
with almost anything that Aristotle has written, the interpretation of Porphyry’s
Isagoge has come to be the subject matter of many centuries’ worth of debate, the
process of interpreting having started already in Late Antiquity. With respect to
Aristotle’s De generatione et corruptione and other libri naturales Þrst available to
the Latin west from the end of the twelh century onward, ijssen , esp. .,
has argued that the full signiÞcance of the response to these texts – be it in the
form of translations or in the form of commentaries or autonomous tracts about
their subject matter – can be better understood with the help of the terminology
of ‘appropriation’ and ‘naturalization’ as employed by Sabra in his insightful 
article on the reception and reworking of Greek science in medieval Islam. e
same goes for the response to Porphyry’s Isagoge. e translation movement then,
according to ijssen’s adoption of Sabra’s insights to Western Latin circumstances,
represents the process of appropriation, which was a decidedly active process: the
Greek science and philosophy were not pressed upon the Latin West, no more than
they were pressed upon medieval Islam. e commentary literature then represents
the process of naturalization. Over time, the imported Greek knowledge came to
be totally absorbed and thoroughly transformed in its new Latin context, even in
such a way, says ijssen, that the Western culture became its new natural home. Of
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e Latin tradition of commentaries can be given a not altogether
arbitrary starting point in the year .18 In that year at the Arts Fac-
ulty in Paris the study of all known works by Aristotle was prescribed to
all students. Other universities followed or had already preceded Paris.
And so, for the next four hundred years, these works came to be rou-
tinely studied and commented upon all over Europe. e main vehicle
by which Aristotle’s ideas – and Porphyry’s ideas along with them – were
mastered, assimilated, and further developed was the commentary liter-
ature. ijssen has to admit, however, that unfortunately so far only few
doctrinal aspects of the commentary tradition have been studied. In the
next chapter of this Introduction I will return to the commentary tradi-
tion in relation to the present text.
When trying to come to terms with Manlevelt’s commentary on the
Isagoge, it is important to know something about the tradition of com-
mentaries on the Isagoge, and the answers to the main questions posed
by it. e explanations and the general line of a solution indicated by
Boethius are held to be of even importance with the questions posed by
Porphyry. e dichotomy between res (things) and voces (words) that
was to hold sway from the eleventh century onwards goes right back to
this very same dichotomy in late Antiquity, expressed in such a clear a
manner in Boethius’ logic: ‘e Categories is not about things, but about
words’.19 To the medieval logicians, the same held for the Isagoge as well,
and so from the eleventh century onward, logic was taken to be a scientia
sermonicalis, a linguistic science. For a fair enough presentation of the
medieval interpretation of Porphyry’s questionnaire one may best turn
course, Sabra’s nor ijssen’s contentions are very revolutionary. Hardly any mod-
ern scholar would disagree with them about the element of activity in translating
Greek philosophical works into Latin. As acknowledged by ijssen, this aspect is
also emphasized, for instance, by Lohr , –. One might turn to De Rijk
 as well. e Isagoge itself of course was a key element in the Greek body of
science, logic and wisdom absorbed in medieval Islam. It promises to be a worth-
while venture, if one was to seek out in how far Sabra’s ideas about the ultimate
petriÞcation of medieval Islamic philosophy (Sabra , .) are also applica-
ble to the late scholastics loosing themselves in hair-splitting and sterility. On a
whole dierent scale, the labels of ‘appropriation’ and ‘naturalization’ in a Sabra-
ian sense would also come in handy to give some cachet to the humble handi-
cra of editing obscure medieval manuscripts for a twenty-Þrst century academic
readership.
 ijssen , .
 Boethius, pl , b: ‘non de rerum generibus, neque de rebus, sed de sermonibus
rerum genera signiÞcantibus in hoc opere tractatus habetur’.
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once more to Libera, who devotes a paragraph to precisely this subject
in his already o-quoted introduction to the French translation of the
Isagoge.20
Has the dichotomy ever been overcome? If so, one would expect to
Þnd a consensus among present day scholars, on a convincing interpreta-
tion Þrmly rooted in tradition. According to De Rijk,21 the categories are
neither the terms (words) nor the things as such, but are the things for so
far they are signiÞed by the terms, and, in a manner of speaking, adapted
to our sensations of them and our intellection of them. Categorization:
just what the word means. Libera, who gives this fair summarization
 Porphyry , lxii–lxxv, where we learn that a large portion of the original
problem, to wit the Stoic contribution to the Stoic-Platonic-Peripathetic amalgam
that Porphyry’s theory of the universals turned out to be, was to play no role at all in
the medieval discussion, while the Platonic contribution as well as the Peripathetic
contribution wore one and the same Aristotelian mask. Porphyry’s Þrst question,
whether genera and species are substances, was posed in Stoic language, according
to Libera, and was given a peripathetic and anti-stoic answer by Porphyry himself.
Not, however, in the Isagoge itself, but in his commentary on the Categories and
in a work known under the title of Sentences (Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes,
ed. B. Mommert. Leipzig ). Genus and species, as the abstract essences of
the material things, were not just a Þgmentum, an ‘empty concept’ without a real
counterpart (such as the universal of the Stoics), but a veritable entity present in
its totality in each of the things determined by it, and acquiring the status of a
universal in our thought by way of abstraction. is is how the instigator of the whole
discussion on the status of universals thought about it himself. But as remarked
before, Porphyry’s posing the question proved to be historically fertile and his
answer did not. Moreover, the whole Stoic or anti-Stoic aspect of the matter got lost
as well. All in all, the deÞciencies in the transmission of texts by Porphyry and his
contemporaries, combined with the unfavourable destiny of the Stoic sources, has
prevented the medievals to take full measure of the discussion potentially instigated
by Porphyry. e ‘conceptualistic’ interpretation was partly preserved via Boethius,
but soon got to be replaced by other models, inspired by the Aristotelian psychology
and epistemology. is change of paradigm is witnessed, Libera says, by the Latin
translation of the Greek  πºνoια: intellectus. From ‘concept’ as with Porphyry, it
came to mean ‘intellect’ (νoϋς) as in the sense of Aristotle’s De anima.
 De Rijk ; . De Rijk is leading in the Þeld of study of the Categories; from
his very Þrst endeavours in philosophy in the s the categories have had his
keen interest and up to his latest publications the categories hardly ever go without
mention. De Rijk’s dissertation was about Aristotle’s Categories and one of his latest
books, the critical edition of the tract on intentiones by Geraldus Odonis (De Rijk
), contains a neat summarization of his Þndings on Aristotle’s categories as
well. Perhaps the most rewarding presentation of De Rijk’s views on this matter is
to be found in a series of s articles in Vivarium – containing reÞnements when
compared to the dissertation, and presenting things in a more detailed manner when
compared to the introduction to his edition of Geraldus Odonis. e full-ßedged
account of De Rijk’s view on these matters is to be found in his monumental two-
volume study Aristotle. Semantics and Ontology (De Rijk a and b).
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of De Rijk’s views,22 points out that this presentation of Aristotle’s true
intention is very close to the thesis on this matter by Simplicius – a fact
that is not likely to be denied by De Rijk. But just the same Libera rounds
o his description of De Rijk’s and Simplicius’ views by stating that he
does not subscribe to them. Instead of looking for an ‘authentic’ Aris-
totelian interpretation, Libera holds that the interpretational tradition on
the subject matter of the Categories cannot be done justice if any ambigu-
ity of the Aristotelian position is excluded beforehand. So even nowadays
there is no consensus among the champions of ancient and medieval phi-
losophy on Aristotle’s real intention on the status of the categories.23 To
Manlevelt’s mind, however, the true nature of the categories, and that of
the universals, did not seem to be a matter of discussion anymore. eir
status had already been ascertained once and for all, and had been dis-
covered, we may safely surmise, by William of Ockham: a universal is a
concept referring to a multiple of which it is a natural sign. at is the
context within which he worked and within which we must try to under-
stand him.
.. omas Manlevelt’s Ockhamism
Ockham, of course, is famous for Ockham’s razor, the principle (actually
deriving from Aristotle) that ‘entities should not be multiplied beyond
necessity’.24 While Ockham sliced away at the undergrowth of medieval
realism,25 Manlevelt will be seen taking up this razor, boldly slicing away
at our very conceptual framework.
 Porphyry , xl–xli.
 ere is not even consensus about which scholars are to be reckoned ‘mainstream’
Aristotle scholars. Some would say that De Rijk is not a mainstream Aristotle
scholar. e mainstream would in that case adhere to the view that Aristotle was
really a realist about the categories. See, for example, Frede .
 See Spade  and Dutilh Novaes’s forthcoming contribution to the Companion
to Burley on how the ‘razor’ by itself is quite innocuous. e point is what is to be
considered as ‘beyond necessity’.
 Andrews ,  holds that in doing this, Ockham was responsible for an enor-
mous conceptual shi within philosophy, and has been accorded credit variously
for the ScientiÞc Revolution, the Protestant Reformation, and the modern world
view. For the ScientiÞc Revolution credit, Andrews refers to P. Duhem Le Système du
monde,  vols. (Paris, –). For the Protestant Reformation credit, Andrews
refers to Heiko Oberman, e Harvest of Medieval eology: Gabriel Biel and Late
Medieval eology (Durham, Labyrinth Press, ) –. For the modern world
view credit, he refers to Gordon Le, William of Ockham: e Metamorphosis of
Scholastic Discourse (Manchester: Manchester University Press, ) xiii.
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With regard to the Ockhamist background of omas Manlevelt,
signalled by Andrews,26 the regrettable thing is that Manlevelt does
never mention William of Ockham by name. Of course, this is no
argument against his Ockhamism; Manlevelt just displays the reluctance
for naming any contemporary, be it philosophical friend or foe, that for
one reason or another is shared by all medieval authors – detrimental as
it may be to our understanding of what was going on and of who was
engaged in a polemic with whom. is does not mean that Manlevelt
refuses to take sides. He does range himself with the moderni and their
‘modern way’ (via moderna) and turns himself with them against the ‘old
way’ (via antiqua), associated with thirteenth century scholasticism.
In fact, ranging himself with the ‘moderni’ may be the most one can
hope for as a means for a fourteenth century thinker to denominate
himself.27 Ockham had scarcely any avowed disciples, even though we
have already met at least one of them, be it an anonymous one, in the
author of the Defensorium Ockham.
In so far as thinkers were termed ‘Ockhamists’ at all, this label was
used in a disparaging way. us we read about ‘Occhaniste’ and a ‘secta
Occanica’ in a series of statutes and ordinances issued by the Parisian
Arts Faculty and its English-German nation respectively in the years
–, directed against the teaching and discussing of the ‘sci-
entia Okamica’.28 Scotists in late fourteenth-century Paris qualiÞed the
 Andrews .
 e ‘Ockhamism’ of even the most famous (or infamous) of Ockhamists has been
called into question. ‘at such Þgures as Nicholas of Autrecourt and John of
Mirecourt were called “Ockhamists” tells us more about their social attitudes –
or the attitudes of those who so labeled them – than about their philosophical
positions.’ (Boler ,  n. ). Concerning the ecclestial condemnation in
 inßicted upon Nicholas of Autrecourt, De Rijk holds that a comparison, let
alone a connection, with the condemnation of William of Ockham is inappropriate
(Nicholas of Autrecourt , ). e term ‘Ockhamism’ only came in general use in
the th century, as a general label for the th century thinkers who followed in the
doctrinal footsteps of William of Ockham. Contemporary writers did not generally
refer to this school of nominalist thought as ‘Ockhamism’. One  manuscript
even speaks of the century of Buridanism, and not that of Ockhamism. As a term
‘Ockhamism’ did survive the twentieth century, and is not likely to lose its usefulness
to present-day investigators. Whether or not they called themselves so, there is a
clear-cut enough group of thinkers conveniently labelled by the term ‘Ockhamism’.
See, for example, the acts of a symposium on ‘Ockham and Ockhamists’ edited by
Bos and Krop in .
 For a rendering in extenso of these documents, and a highly nuanced interpretation
thereof, see Courtenay & Tachau .
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Ockhamists as ‘rudes et terministae’. Only since the  Paris decree on
Nominalism, they come to be called, and call themselves, ‘nominalists’.29
Given the widespread use of Ockham’s logical criteria of demonstra-
tion and evidence there is good reason to label ‘Ockhamist’ in the wide
sense the nominalist movement that in the fourteenth and Þeenth cen-
turies was known as the ‘modern way’, and that was to branch o in an
Ockhamist school in a stricter sense, besides a Buridan school of nom-
inalism, and a Marsilian school. And for the same good reason omas
Manlevelt may safely be labelled an Ockhamist as well. To be even more
speciÞc: an Ockhamist in the strictest sense, seeing the high level of doc-
trinal concordance with the Venerable Inceptor.30
No such doctrinal concordance is to be found with either of the other
two schools of nominalism. is is not the place to go into the intricate
relationship between Buridanism and Marsilianism. e least that can be
said about it is that these two varieties of nominalism are mutually closer
related to each other than either of them to Ockhamism in its strictest
sense. For my present purpose it will su ce to indicate the dierences of
Manlevelt’s thought to either Buridanism or Marsilianism, and therefore
to the amalgamation of the two schools. In our case it is Buridanism that
Manlevelt is compared to.
With a career spanning roughly the same span of years as that of John
Buridan, omas Manlevelt was not in any sense a Buridanist. Doctrinal
concordances with the work of William of Ockham abound, but speciÞc
concordances with the work of John Buridan, other than sharing a
common ‘nominalist’ worldview, are few, while doctrinal divergences are
many. Buridanist key terms such as ‘contractio’ (referring to the relation
between the more general and the less general, including the relation
between genus and species as well as the relation between species and
individual) are hardly to be found in the works of our author,31 and both
 Maurer ,  is of the opinion that Ockham’s traditional title of nominalist is
justiÞed by the Venerable Inceptor himself, who in Summa logicae i, , p. . refers
to universals existing in the mind as ‘mental names’ (nomina mentalia).
 is high level of doctrinal concordance between omas Manlevelt and William of
Ockham is surely deserving of further study. On the medieval problem of universals,
and Ockham’s role in solving this problem by replacing the via antiqua conception
with his own via moderna conception, see Klima .
 On ‘contractio’ in the Buridanist technical sense, see for example King ,  and
especially  n. . It has to be admitted, though, that Manlevelt does talk about
signs being contracted, in q.  distinctiones, ra: ‘Divisio vero logicalis vocatur
ista qua aliquod signum commune contrahitur pro aliquibus signiÞcatis per aliquam
. historical background 
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thinkers have quite dierent ways of tackling the question of the number
of the categories, to take but two random examples. If not to be taken as a
proof, then at least as a strong indication that Manlevelt cannot have been
a Buridanist in a strict or even a wide sense is the historical circumstance
that Manlevelt’s logical tracts in use at various European universities had
to make place for those by John Buridan.32 is would not have been
necessary had the two of them shared the same doctrine.
Moreover it must be remarked that historians of philosophy nowadays
tend to deny there ever having been a ‘Buridanist school’, any more than
an ‘Ockhamist school’.33
dierentiam vel per aliquam suam speciem, sicud hoc signum commune “animal”,
quando additur sibi hec dierentia “irrationale”, contrahitur ad standum pro aliis
suis signiÞcatis.’, and also in q.  dist. , vb: ‘dierentia addita alicui non convert-
ibili cum eo cuius est dierentia constitutiva, contrahit ipsum, ut totum resultans ex
ipso et tota dierentia convertibiliter cum eo cuius est dierentia, contrahit ipsum
cui additur ad standum tantummodo pro signiÞcato vel signiÞcatis illius cuius est
dierentia, sicut hec dierentia “rationale mortale” addita subiecto vel corpori vel
animali contrahit ipsum ad standum tantummodo pro signiÞcato vel signiÞcatis.’
And in q.  concl. , ra: ‘nulla dierentia speciÞca est necessaria ad divisionem
generis in suas species secundo modo per se, quia talis divisio potest Þeri per pro-
prium quod competit tali speciei per se secundo modo, ut si Þat talis divisio: animal-
ium aliud risibile, aliud hinnibile, in qua divisione nulla ponitur dierentia speciÞca,
et tamen genus dividitur in suas species, idest: per aliqua que contrahunt genus ad
standum pecise pro suppositis talium specierum, sicut hoc proprium “risibile” con-
trahit hoc genus “animal” ad standum precise proprie pro suppositis “hominis”.’
 Lorenz , f.
 Courtenay ,  holds that ‘If a Buridan school existed, and I think it is a label
that obscures more than it enlightens, it was based on a compatibility of intellectual
outlook on certain issues, not on any institutional context.’ From several dierent
perspectives, institutional, geographical, and intellectual, ijssen  rejects the
notion of a Buridan school in the fourteenth century altogether. He sees the Þve
big names commonly associated with Buridanism ‘John Buridan, Albert of Saxony,
Nicole Oresme, emon Judeus, and Marsilius of Inghen as a small intellectual
network of nearly contemporary masters of arts, who were familiar with each other’s
work and at times responded to one another. is concept seems more adequate than
that of a uniÞed Buridan school in explaining the dynamics of conßict and alliance
that we encounter in the texts.’ (ijssen , ) A dierence with the supposed
school of Ockhamism – if we may add our own little note here – is that there never
has been written a Buridan defensorium while we do have a defensorium ockham,
and that on the other hand the spreading or teaching of Buridanist ideas was never
o cially prohibited in any university. So there seems to have been some kind of
Ockhamist alliance aer all. No doubt, Manlevelt’s feeding ground has to be looked
for in this direction.
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.. Ockhamism in Oxford and in Paris
Quite roughly the development and spread of Ockhamism or whatever
label this nominalist movement is given, can be divided in two phases,
with a geographical shi marking the beginning of the second phase.
Between  and  there was the rapid spread of Ockham’s doctrines
and method in Paris and Oxford. From  onward the ‘modern way’
got to be less closely associated with Ockham’s teachings, and Paris
became more important than Oxford, at this time.
A neat arrangement of things happening in the Þeld of late medieval
logic is presented by Spade.34 ConÞning his attention to the two centuries
span between  and , its most original contribution, he says, was
made before , especially at Oxford. is had everything to do with
the revival of terminism, aer it had oddly undergone a sharp decline
on both sides of the Channel in the s. In France, terminism was
replaced for half a century by modism until the s, when John Buri-
dan suddenly restored the theory of supposition and associated terminist
doctrines. In England, it was Walter Burley who very early in the four-
teenth century began to do new work in the terminist tradition. Spade
distinguishes three distinct stages in English logic aer . e best
work was done between  and , the period during which Burley
and Ockham were the paramount Þgures, setting the high standard for
the next generation, associated with Merton College, Oxford, to live up
to. Spade mentions the names of Richard Kilvington, William Heytes-
bury, omas Bradwardine, Adam Wodeham and Richard Billingham.
e name of Holkot could have been added by Spade as well. But omas
Manlevelt, who did hold the Oxford logicians in high esteem,35 is not
directly linked by Spade to this logical heyday. Instead, he places our
author in the stage of consolidation, lasting from  until , along
with logicians like Richard Lavenham, John Wyclif, Ralph Strode and
Richard Feribrigge – a time of sophisticated, but no longer especially
original work.36 Spade acknowledges that this is a period not yet well
 Spade , .
 See q.  (rb), where Manlevelt makes mention of the good work being done ‘in
universitate Ocsonienti’. More on this below, subsection ...
 omas Manlevelt thus is placed by Spade in presumably the wrong period, and
probably the wrong intellectual context (that is to say: the wrong country). But
this misplacing need not be the reason for Spade’s failing to appreciate Manlevelt’s
originality. e reason will rather be Spade’s not being acquainted with Manlevelt’s
. historical background 
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researched. I may add that indeed in a circumstantial way Manlevelt
Þts in well with this period in so far as he himself has not been the
object of thorough historical investigation either. And it is precisely
this circumstance that allows one to place him maybe a little closer
to the hotbed of logical originality than directly warranted by Spade’s
admittedly rough division of late medieval logic. at is to say: nothing
really prevents one from placing him in Spade’s Þrst stage of English
logic aer , namely the period between  and , when the
best work was done. In fact, there is reason enough to positively place
him there, the overall high quality of his work being a main argument.
Another argument happens to be provided by Spade himself, who in
an earlier study cites a medieval text in which omas Manlevelt’s tract
on Insolubilia is mentioned alongside the Insolubilia of Bradwardine
and Heytesbury37 – which clearly connects Manlevelt to the period in
which the best work in English logic was done. e very least that can
be said is that he needs not to be associated in any way with the third
stage of development of English logic, lasting from  until  and
labelled by Spade as one of shocking decline. Medieval logic, he says, ‘was
eectively dead in England aer .’38
Is it Spade’s placing omas Manlevelt in the wrong stage of devel-
opment of British logic, which prevents him from acknowledging the
originality of his work? No, any lack of appreciation seems rather to be
caused by the inaccessibility of all Manlevelt’s works unedited until now –
a drawback that the present edition will only partially do away with.
In fact, however, one will still have to take into account the possibility
that omas Manlevelt was not a British logician at all, but a continental
thinker who worked under a strong British inßuence.39 Ockham’s con-
frere Adam Wodeham however is known to have been instrumental in
transmitting much English learning (and, we may safely presume, much
Ockhamist teaching) to Paris. is explains Manlevelt’s Ockhamist frame
of mind, whether he has some Mertonian background or whether he
received his complete intellectual education in Paris.
highly original but hardly-known logical works. is edition of his Questiones libri
Porphyrii should contribute to a keener appreciation of Manlevelt’s standing as a
logician and philosopher.
 See Spade .
 Spade , .
 See above, subsection .. of this Introduction.
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.. Parisian denials of substance
Aer having overcome an initial reluctance, of which the above men-
tioned  Statute of the Paris Arts Faculty bear witness,40 the ‘modern
way’ becomes settled as a relatively stable, and in some respects scientif-
ically fruitful, philosophical school that endured and spread throughout
central Europe in the late fourteenth and early Þeenth century. Famous
names in this Parisian setting are John Buridan and Gregory of Rimini.41
Infamous among these second phase Parisians were John of Mirecourt
and Nicholas of Autrecourt, who denied the existence of substance. As
we have seen, our own author was one to deny substance too, albeit in
a cautious enough way and in parentheses, so to speak.42 Nevertheless,
it is hard to tell what prevented the works of omas Manlevelt to join
in the censorship that befell those of Mirecourt and Autrecourt: his cau-
tion, or the presumable fact that he made his daring statement about the
non-existence of substance not in Paris, centre of learning, but in Lou-
vain, and so out of the immediate sight of those keen enough to prevent
philosophers to dare think such thoughts.43
 See above, section . of this Introduction.
 e results of the work done in Paris by John Buridan in the Þeld of natural
philosophy spread to the new universities of central Europe, presumably carried
there by Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Inghen. at is to say: both these
illustrious men were long taken to have been pupils of Buridan. Quite recently,
however, Fitzgerald has come up with a reversal of this story. See Fitzgerald ,
especially the introductory chapter titled ‘Albert, Buridan, and Maulfelt’. According
to Fitzgerald, Albert was already an old man when he came to Paris, and long from
becoming Buridan’s pupil there, he was the one to criticize Buridan’s thoughts as
expressed in his Summulae, causing Buridan to revise these. So if anything, Buridan
was inßuenced by Albert of Saxony, rather than the other way round. But this
is not the place to go into this, notwithstanding its possible importance for the
interpretation of the data known about our own author. A name to remember in
connection with the spread of the ‘modern way’ to the new universities in the
German countries in late th century is Henry Totting of Oyta. More about him
below, subsection ...
 Further witness of the fact that the status of the category of substance became
a subject of discussion in the Þrst half of the th century is to be found in a
text discussed in Courtenay , whose anonymous author, a contemporary of
Nicholas of Autrecourt, shares the latter’s ideas about the indemonstrability of
substance.
 Too farfetched is another possible hypothesis: that the works containing Manlevelt’s
controversial ideas did share the fate of those by Mirecourt and Autrecourt, and as
a result are untraceable apart from this one manuscript that we are using for our
edition.
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I have already contemplated a spectacular manifestation of this Ock-
hamist frame of mind in Manlevelt’s denial of substance.44 So far, I have
closely followed Andrews’ interpretation of this remarkable text when it
comes to its historical roots and its uniqueness. In all fairness it has to be
conceded, however, that maybe Manlevelt’s doing away with the category
of substance was not such a unique thing in his time aer all.
e name comes to mind of a more cautious thinker like John Buridan,
but also the names of more outrageous Þgures like John of Mirecourt and
Nicholas of Autrecourt. All of them were working in Paris around the
same time I think that omas must have been there, but wild ideas did
not seem to be limited to Paris alone, when one takes into account an
Oxford thinker like Crathorn.45 Putting Manlevelt’s attack on substance
in a more contemporary context may also throw some more light on the
precise nature of his Ockhamism.
Mirecourt, a known follower of William of Ockham working in Paris
around –, may be looked upon as no less a forerunner of
David Hume than omas Manlevelt is taken to be, by rejecting the
Aristotelian notion of causality.46 Even closer to Manlevelt’s position is
that of Autrecourt, working in Paris somewhat earlier, in –,
who held that the existence of substance is unprovable – a view that
not only merited him the honorary nickname ‘medieval Hume’, but
in Autrecourt’s case met with severe oppression by the ecclesiastical
authorities.47
Buridan, deriving crucial information from the Eucharist – that is to
say: information not to be had anywhere else in the world – comes on
the evidence of transsubstantiation to the conclusion that accidents too
cannot be denied their subsistence.48 e wording may not be spectac-
ular, but the impact is no less devastating to the traditional Aristotelian
categorical framework than the downright denial of the existence of sub-
stance, as proposed but hastily withdrawn by omas Manlevelt.
 is Introduction ..
 e list of Manlevelt’s contemporaries holding more or less ‘Humean’ ideas does not
have to stop short here, as a glance at the anonymous text edited in Courtenay 
will su ce to convince anyone interested in the matter.
 See Weinberg , . See also De Rijk , .
 See Weinberg , and in a more condensed form Weinberg , . See also
De Rijk’s edition of texts by Autrecourt.
 See De Rijk , , , .
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Crathorn, lecturing in Oxford around , is one who dares to deny
the existence of substance as well.49 at is to say: he advocates a complete
agnosticism as regards the knowability of substance.50 Being a Domini-
can philosopher and theologian, his intellectual background however
was quite dierent from that of the other thinkers. His Dominican back-
ground makes it unlikely that he will have taken William of Ockham as
his intellectual master, while the others, with the exception of Buridan,
must be reckoned as belonging to the Ockhamist ‘school’, if ever there
was one. Moreover, Crathorn made his remarkable pronouncements in
Oxford, and not in Paris, where the others were at work.
Apparently, Manlevelt’s denial of substance did not come out of the
blue.51 e prime category was seen with a critical eye, if it did not come
under downright attack, both in Paris and in Oxford. e question is not
whether omas Manlevelt was the Þrst to deny its existence, or if he
was only inspired to do so by others. When it comes to his intellectual
background, what matters is rather if his doing so should be seen within
a primarily Oxonian, or a primarily Parisian context.
Ockham has himself never denied the existence of substance. (So
when viewed from an Ockhamist point of view Manlevelt has really
taken a decisive step by doing so.) Ockham seizes upon the fact of
transsubstantiation during the Eucharist to set out the categories of qual-
ity and quantity against one another, without concerning himself with
the category of substance. Just like Buridan, however, omas Man-
levelt Þnds occasion in the very same Eucharistical fact to doubt the
demonstrability, if not the very existence of the category of substance.52
In one of the preliminary arguments of the questio on the existence of
substance in his commentary on the Categories, it is stated that ‘nat-
urally speaking we don’t experience, nor have any reason to believe,
that there is any more substance in an unconsecrated communion wafer
than in a consecrated one (according to theologians); for the same rea-
son we cannot experience or prove that there is any substance in an
 See Schepers  and . See also De Rijk , .
 ‘Substantia enim per propriam speciem non cognoscitur pro statu isto.’ Cited by
Schepers ,  n. .
 Maybe the Þrst ‘reductionist’ in any relevant sense of the term was Peter John Olivi
(–). Historically, however, he is somewhat beyond the scope of this study
on omas Manlevelt.
 For Buridan on this, see De Rijk , especially –. For Manlevelt on this, see
Andrews .
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unconsecrated communion wafer, and likewise for any other thing what-
soever’.53 e least that can be said is that both of them, unlike Ockham,
tend to question the privileged position of substance when it comes
to its subsistence. Does this mean that one has to draw Manlevelt out
of the Ockhamist corner and push him over to the Buridanist cor-
ner?
Mirecourt and Autrecourt were Ockhamists taking the same remark-
able step with regards the category of substance, and they were also in
Paris, which is quite in line with our hypothesis that Manlevelt was also
an Ockhamist working in Paris: evidently, it was an endeavour that Ock-
hamists there and then were willing to embark on. As yet, there is no need
then, by sticking to our Parisian hypothesis, to place Manlevelt under a
Buridanist, rather than an Ockhamist sphere of inßuence.
Crathorn working in a Manleveltian vein in Oxford poses no necessity
to give up my Parisian hypothesis either. Prima facie at least the case for
Oxford is in no way stronger than the case for Paris, and thus the former
cannot pose any counterweight to the evidence pointing to Manlevelt
being a Parisian. True, Pinborg tends to push Manlevelt all the way
into the British corner, with Bradwardine and the other Calculators,
to be more speciÞc.54 But Lorenz, Þnding full support in Andrews, is
quite convinced of Manlevelt’s Parisian whereabouts, while he does not
rule out the possibility of him having received a preliminary training in
Oxford.55
.. e University of Paris
In some ways, omas Manlevelt’s name seems to be connected both
to the University of Paris and to the University of Oxford. In the next
subsection I will have something to say about Oxford. Now I will take
a look at the University of Paris, with its four ‘Nations’ – a system that
 Questiones super Predicamenta, q.  ., vb, ‘non habemus aliquem exprientiam
vel rationem naturaliter loquendo quod magis substantia sit in hostia non conse-
crate quam in hostia consecrate, et per nihil possimus experiri vel ratione probari
substantiam esse in hostia consecrate, sicut patet per theologos; igitur pari ratione
per nihil possimus experiri vel probare substantiam esse in hostia non consecrate;
et pari ratione nec in aliqua alia re.’ (ed. Andrews). Translation by Andrews ,
.
 Pinborg , .
 Lorenz , f.
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needs a brief word of explanation.56 It will turn out that this four Nations
system leaves room for Manlevelt having resided there. It may even throw
some light on his name and loyalties.
Final authority in the Parisian arts faculty lay in the general congre-
gation of the arts masters, presided over by the rector. is congregation
was itself the combination of four smaller organisms, loosely based on
a geographical classiÞcation: the French, Picard, Norman, and English
nations. e English nation included students from central and northern
Europe, and was in time to be called the English-German or even simply
the German nation.57 In Paris only the largest faculty, that of arts, had
nations. e nations comprised masters of arts from the arts faculty, and
included professors of higher faculties with a degree in arts.58 Incoming
students in arts were enrolled by mutual agreement with a master, who
would be responsible for overseeing his studies. e master so chosen
had to belong to the nation with which the student would be a liated
on the basis of geographical origin.59
Now as we have seen, there is a omas Anglicus mentioned twice
as a Magister actu regens and the proctor of the English nation in the
Chartularium of the University of Paris for the year of .60 If this is
really omas Manlevelt, this would mean that by that time he would
have been a member of the English nation.61
 See the statute of  in Deniße and Châtelain , –,  .
 Boyce , : ‘During and prior to the fourteenth century the nation had always
been designated as the English nation; (…) it retained the name Anglicana until
well into the Þeenth century. (…) e Þrst use of Alemania as a title of the nation
occurred in August, , but it was not until – that it was normally used.’
 Together, the four nations acted as the faculty of arts, providing, for instance, for
the needs relative to the curriculum, the degrees, and the organisation of teaching.
In addition to those common duties, the nations exercised activities as separate
corporate components. e members of the nation were headed by a proctor
(procurator) chosen for a period of one month by the masters and oen re-elected
several times. Each nation had its own revenues and expenditure, treasury, seal,
libri nationis, patron saints, and authority to regulate its own members. See ijssen
, ; Gieysztor , .
 Courtenay , 
 Deniße and Châtelain , , –, , cited by Lorenz ,  n. . See
above, subsection .., footnote .
 e Liber procuratorum of the English nation has survived and was edited by Deniße
and Châtelain. It oers a conscientiously kept administration from  onward,
but bad luck has it that it contains only a few scattered notes from the years 
and . e name of omas Manlevelt is not to be found in the entire Liber
procuratorum, a fact which Lorenz accepts as a proof by negative demonstration
that Manlevelt must have been a teacher in the Parisian arts faculty precisely in the
years  and , and certainly not aer . See Lorenz , 
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But even if this identiÞcation should be correct, does this mean that
our author was really an Englishman? First appearances notwithstand-
ing, this is not necessarily so. Lorenz has to confess that he could not
Þnd a trace of our author in England.62 is would be very strange, if
it did not just leave open the possibility that omas Manlevelt ‘dictus
Anglicus’ was not an Englishman aer all. e English nation was quite
heterogeneous in its makeup, consisting of masters not only from Eng-
land, but from northern, central and north-eastern Europe as well. In the
fourteenth century, when Manlevelt is supposed to have been one of its
members, its roll included masters from the British Isles, Holland and
part of Flanders, from the Germanies and the Scandinavian countries,
and also from Hungary and the Slavic lands.63 As stated, geographical
boundaries were indeÞnite and quarrels over this lack of clarity were fre-
quent, especially between the English nation and the Picard nation, made
up of masters from the Low Countries and from northern France.
In most cases the boundaries of the nations coincided with the bound-
aries of groups of dioceses. e various enumerations of these dioceses
in present-day literature, not altogether consistent the one with the other,
may very well reßect the source of conßict between the nations in those
days. According to Courtenay, the Picard nation included as their stu-
dents those from the dioceses of Beauvais, Noyon, and Laon on the
southern edge of Picardy, and all dioceses north and east (érouanne,
Tournai, Cambrai, Liège) up to the le bank of the Meuse, thus including
a portion of Holland and a small portion of the diocese of Utrecht.64 is
would include the duchy of Brabant. Kibre, on the other hand, names
Laon, Cambrai, Liège, Utrecht and Tournai as the dioceses making up the
Flemish province of the Picard nation.65 None of these dioceses were then
part of the duchy of Brabant. Boyce, aer warning us once again that the
geographical boundaries which deÞned the areas from which the mem-
bers of the various nations emigrated to Paris were in most cases vague
and indeÞnite, holds that the continental area of the English-German
nation comprised approximately all the land lying north or east of the
Meuse, thus including Holland, and parts of the dioceses of Utrecht and
Liège (the other portions of which were claimed by the Picards).66
 Lorenz , .
 Such is the precise listing of the roll by Kibre , .
 Courtenay ,  n. .
 Kibre , .
 Boyce , f.
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Clarity seems to have been brought in this matter by the outcome
of a mid-fourteenth century conßict between the two nations, dragging
along from  until .67 e conclusion of the debate was that the
English-Germans and the Picards settled on the River Meuse in the Low
Countries as the boundary between the two nations.68 at is to say:
the boundaries only took deÞnite shape aer the ‘Englishman’ omas
Manlevelt’s presumed lecturing in Louvain, the heart of the disputed
region of Brabant.
e least that can be said is that before the settling of the boundary
along the river Meuse, the move from Brabant to the Picard nation
in Paris was not the obvious one. e fact that the most famous of
all Brabantian philosophers, Siger, belonged to the Picard nation, has
generally been taken as a sign of Siger’s Frenchifying.69 In other words,
a Brabantian should more rightly have joined the English nation, rather
than the Picard nation.
e gist of all this is that the borderline position of Louvain in Brabant,
only entering the Picard nation for good in the second half of the
fourteenth century, leaves ample room for the admittedly speculative
conclusion either that Manlevelt as a Brabantian may have belonged to
the English nation in Paris,70 or that Manlevelt if he really was from
English, or more precisely Oxonian-Mertonian origin, may easily have
come into contact with the Brabantians in the English nation at the
Parisian arts faculty. us, both directions are open: omas Manlevelt
as an Englishman moving from Paris to Louvain, or omas Manlevelt
as a Brabantian meriting the nickname ‘the Englishman’ in Paris, before
returning to Louvain. And then again, he could also simply be German,
or any other of the above-mentioned nationalities clearly belonging to
the English-German nation, while not being English.
ijssen has rightly drawn attention to the fact that in Paris, possibly
because of the Venerable Inceptor’s English origin, Ockham’s ideas found
 See Kibre , – for some more quarrels between the Picard and English-
German nations.
 ijssen , .
 For example, Siger of Brabant , . In his introduction to Siger’s text, its
translator into Dutch, Krop, bases his idea of Siger being FrenchiÞed on Van
Steenberghen’s  monograph Maître Siger de Brabant.
 Above, in subsection .. of this Introduction, I already put forward the suggestion
that Manlevelt’s being called omas Anglicus in several manuscripts may reßect
nothing more than a possible association with English logicians or with the English
nation at the University of Paris, which had German members and members from
the low countries as well.
. historical background 
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more adherence in the English-German nation than in any of the other
nations of the arts faculty.71 Whatever the precise impact of the  ‘anti-
Ockhamist’ statute alluded to in the previous chapter of this Introduction
may have been, the Parisian climate for an Ockhamist way of thinking
seems to have been favourable enough in the few decennia preceding
the statute. And that is exactly the period in which Manlevelt must have
worked there. is also explains why his logical tracts, conceived in this
period, could receive the warm welcome that was in fact bestowed upon
them on the European mainland, taking full advantage of the splendour
Paris had in the Þeld of intellectual developments. As can be seen from
the example of John Buridan, whose ideas were enthusiastically received
in Middle-Europe without Buridan himself ever setting foot there,72 the
intellectual infrastructure was such that an innovative thinker like in our
case omas Manlevelt did not have to travel in person, for his ideas to
take hold all over Europe.
.. e University of Oxford
Relaying my attention from Germany and Brabant to England, I will now
look at a possible connection of omas Manlevelt with the University
of Oxford. To be more precise, I will see in how far our author’s name
can possibly be linked to Merton College.
When sketching the overall development of British logic, it has already
been seen that among all Oxford Masters the Mertonians in particular
contributed much to the development of logic in the early fourteenth
century. Even more important were their achievements in the Þeld of
physics.
While in a way continuing the Þne logical tradition started o by
William of Ockham, Merton cannot, contrary to popular belief, claim
Ockham as one of its illustrious Fellows. Nevertheless, as maintained
by Weisheipl in his  article on ‘Ockham and some Mertonians’, the
contributions of the Mertonians cannot be appraised properly without
reference to William of Ockham.73 Many of the later writings of Walter
 ijssen , –.
 To be consulted on this matter is, for example, De Rijk .
 is is not an opinion shared by all scholars. ere are those to whom it feels more
like quite dierent circles. Dutilh Novaes, for instance, never had the impression
that except for Burley, the other Mertonians really knew much about Ockham. On
the other hand, if our surmises are correct, omas Manlevelt is closely enough
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Burley, for example, were directed against the nominalism of William
of Ockham under the guise of ‘true’ Aristotelianism. e fundamentally
new physics as well as the vigorously orthodox theology of omas
Bradwardine stands in sharp contrast to the teachings of Ockham. But
later Oxonians, even at Merton, were more favourably disposed towards
the views of Ockham. By the end of the century, however, John Wyclif
again reacted strongly against the nominalism of Ockham.74
e attractive simplicity and disturbing unorthodoxy of Ockham’s
views both in theology and in philosophy, says Weisheipl, had the inevi-
table result of arousing sharp opposition as well as ardent enthusiasm.75
omas Manlevelt, if his name is to be connected to Merton at all, is of
course to be placed among the enthusiasts.
... Manlevelt and Bradwardine: De incipit et desinit
Now, one of the medieval thinkers whose authorship has been confused
with that of omas Manlevelt was omas Bradwardine.76 e latter,
already mentioned several times before, was a prime member of the so-
called Oxford Calculators or ‘Mertonians’. He was famous for his work
on insolubilia77 and the science of motion as well as his opposition to
contemporary Pelagianism.
A genre closely related to the insolubilia, and one practised by Brad-
wardine as well, was that of the probationes,78 in vogue since the s.79
It was concerned with procedures for proving sentences of all types, and
the scope of one of its subgenres was limited to propositions containing
the terms ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’.80
associated with Ockham as well as the Mertonians. is might in itself serve as a
secondary clue that a direct acquaintance of the Mertonians with Ockham is not to
be ruled out beforehand.
 Weisheipl , .
 Weisheipl , . Which goes to show once again that Ockham is pre-eminently
a philosopher to leave a school behind him. Aer all, why should a philosopher who
was honoured with a defensor Ockham not also lend his name to the philosophical
trend that had our author as one of its most original partisans? And who is to
doubt that in a slightly later period a thinker like Henry Totting of Oyta was an
‘Ockhamist’?
 As already mentioned above, section ..
 On this, see Read , and especially the edition and translation of Bradwardine’s
Insolubilia by Read: omas Bradwardine .
 e main name for probationes is another Mertonian, Billingham.
 On the subject of probationes, one may consult De Rijk , –.
 e genre of the probationes and its subgenre on the terms ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’
. historical background 
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omas Bradwardine’s treatise on ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’, edited by Niel-
sen in , has been transmitted in four manuscripts. Two of these
manuscripts are to be found in the Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana; one
in the Bibliothèque Royal Albert er in Brussels; one in the Dominikan-
erkloster in Vienna. e Vienna and Brussels manuscripts name omas
Manlevelt as the author of this work.81 e two Vatican manuscripts how-
ever point out omas Bradwardine as its author.82 Nielsen’s deciding the
question of authorship with a very high degree of likelihood in favour of
omas Bradwardine has to my knowledge never been challenged.83
A marginal note might be made, however.84 Nielsen shows the pos-
sibility of establishing a doctrinal concordance between the treatise
being in vogue in the s does not mean that no attention was paid to these subject
matters earlier on. Braakhuis  cites a manuscript containing an overview of
teachings in logic in Paris, –. One of the subjects treated by then was that
of the sincategoreumata including a paragraph ‘de verbis “incipit” et “desinit” ’.
 e Vienna manuscript has the ascription in its incipit as well as its explicit:
‘Incipit tractatus de incipit et desinit magistri ome Maulfeld’, ed. Nielsen ,
; ‘Explicit tractatus de duabus dictionibus “incipit” et “desinit” editus a magistro
oma Manlovel’, ed. Nielsen , . e Bruxelles manuscript has the ascription
in its explicit only: ‘Explicit tractatus de istis duabus dictionibus “incipit” et “desinit”
editus a magistro oma dicto Manlovel Anglico’, ed. Nielsen , .
 Nielsen , f.
 e ascription to Manlevelt, if correct, would directly have linked him to a genre
in vogue since the s, and would thus be entirely in line with our tentative
dating of his philosophical activity around that time. Even if incorrect, however,
the ascription at the very least counts as an indication that to contemporaries and
near-contemporaries omas Manlevelt’s name did not sound absurd when put
forward as being the author of a work stemming from the s or s – omas
Bradwardine having died in . And this, in turn, counts as an indication that his
philosophical activity may indeed very well be dated around that time.
 In fact, quite another marginal question might be posed as well, one that would
put our whole enterprise upside down, if answered in the a rmative: would it
be possible that not omas Manlevelt but omas Bradwardine is the author of
the commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge edited here? Luckily, this question can be
discarded right away and need not disturb us further, if only because, aer all, it
is the name of omas Manlevelt and not the name of omas Bradwardine that
is connected with our manuscript in the writing above the Þrst columns. No, there
really is no need to fear some kind of diabolical reversal of the ascription of our
manuscript, in connection with the possible ascription of the Bradwardinian text on
‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’ to omas Manlevelt. Apart from there being no prima facie
doctrinal reasons obliging us to consider omas Bradwardine’s authorship, there
is no internal evidence at all pointing in omas Bradwardine’s direction. On the
contrary, in as far as references to the author’s own works are to be found in the texts,
these are either to a title undoubtedly written by omas Manlevelt, and not known
from the bibliography of omas Bradwardine (namely the tract on Supposition),
or to works not known from Manlevelt’s bibliography, but not known from omas
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on ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’ and Bradwardine’s other writings. In his tract
De continuo Bradwardine touches on the question whether one should
assign internal or external limits to the so-called permanent thing. Here
he strongly suggests the point of view that decision of this question
should be in favour of an external limit:
… et alicuius rei permanentis, ut hominis, non est aliquod ultimum
intrinsecum sui esse.85
is point of view is considered to be of fundamental importance in the
treatise on ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’:
Secunda suppositio est hec quod non est dare ultimum instans rei perma-
nentis in esse.86
On the evidence of a doctrine on ‘desinit’ espoused in Manlevelt’s Con-
fusiones, Nielsen holds that omas Manlevelt defends the view that
permanent objects are limited internally:
Similiter hec dictio ‘desinit’ dicitur exponi uno modo per unam (scil.
propositionem) a rmativam de presenti et negativam de futuro, ut in hac
propositione ‘Sortes desinit esse’ hoc est ‘Sortes nunc est et immediate post
hoc Sortes non erit’. Alio modo exponitur per unam negativam de presenti
et a rmativam de preterito ut ‘desinit esse motus’ id est ‘nunc non est
motus et immediate ante hoc fuit motus’.87
Nielsen concludes that this view is strictly opposed to the one sustained
in the treatise on ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’, and this would disqualify omas
Manlevelt as its author.
Bradwardine’s bibliography either (namely the commentaries on De anima and
Physica). One might say that this apparent lack in Manlevelt’s bibliography does
not amount to so much, seeing the still highly provisional status of his biography
and bibliography. Has omas Bradwardine written any commentaries at all on
works by Aristotle? Lohr  only mentions, under the heading ‘doubtful’: De
fallaciis elenchorum en Quaestiones super xii libris Metaphysicae. Weisheipl 
sums up eight certain works and four uncertain, among which no commentary on
Aristotle whatsoever. Moreover, the fact that Brabant plays a geographical role in our
manuscript does point in the direction of omas Manlevelt, as we have seen, but
points away, if anything, from omas Bradwardine. To wit: omas Bradwardine –
whose life is comparably well-documented, at least in comparison to our author’s
life – was all over the place, so to speak, as confessor of king Edward iii. But there
is no mentioning of his following the king to Brabant, let alone that he would have
been a teacher in pre-university Louvain (see e.g. Lohr , Weisheipl  and all
the more recent handbooks).
 Cited by Nielsen, , .
 Ed. Nielsen, , . It should be noticed, however, that this ultimum instans is not
speciÞed here as either an ultimum intrinsecum or an ultimum extrinsecum.
 Cited by Nielsen, , .
. historical background 
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Is Nielsen’s citation from Manlevelt’s Confusiones really proof of his
holding the view that the ceasing of permanent objects is limited inter-
nally, rather than a non-obliging explanation of what we mean when we
say that something ceases to be? If so, the view held by Manlevelt in the
Confusiones does not seem to tally well with the view to be distilled from
his treatment of accidents ceasing to be in the commentary on the Isagoge
edited here. In the forty-second questio Manlevelt seems to be a strict
adherent to the Aristotelian dictum that
… non est dare ultimum instans rei permanentis in esse.88
And so it might turn out that the doctrinal concordance between the
treatise on ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’ and Bradwardine’s other writings estab-
lished by Nielsen can also be established between this treatise and at
least one of Manlevelt’s other writings, viz. the one here presented. In
short, Nielsen holds that the treatise on ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’ Þts omas
Bradwardine and does not Þt omas Manlevelt, while I hold that this
treatise on ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’ may Þt omas Manlevelt aer all, when
his Questiones libri Porhirii is taken into account. But of course, this is
not the place to seriously challenge Nielsen’s widely accepted ascription
of the treatise on ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’ to omas Bradwardine. e most
that may be said at this moment is that the question of the authorship of
this treatise could be given a more thorough treatment now than when
Nielsen published his edition. As is acknowledged by Nielsen, it was very
di cult for him to Þnd a solution to this question, because at the time the
knowledge of Manlevelt’s career and works was very limited. Since ,
at least some light is thrown on these matters, and this light may also
clear up the matter le somewhat unsatisfactory solved on Manlevelt’s
side by Nielsen.
... Manlevelt and Bradwardine: Opus artis logicae
In the same issue of the Cahiers de l’Institut de Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin
that contains Nielsen’s edition of the treatise on ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’,
there is a reprint of Pinborg’s edition of another treatise attributed to
Bradwardine: the Opus artis logicae. at there remains more to be
said about the authorship and interrelationship of the diverse works
attributed to Bradwardine and/or Manlevelt may be gathered from the
introduction to this reprint, where it is remarked that in some respects
 q  concl.  rb.
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this tract seems to stand closer to the ideas of Manlevelt, but on the other
hand illustrates the same doctrinal trends as the treatise on ‘incipit’ and
‘desinit’.89
In fact Pinborg takes up again an aspect already pointed out by him
in his introduction to the earlier version of this edition: if the treatise
on ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’ is by Bradwardine, the Opus artis logicae can
hardly be attributed to him and vice versa. e author of the treatise
on ‘incipit’ criticizes Ockham’s analysis of propositions like ‘Sor bis
bibit vinum’ and ‘Sor incipit esse grammaticus’ as involving a thus far
unnamed type of supposition, and asserts instead that the terms ‘vinum’
and ‘grammaticus’ have no supposition at all. In the Opus artis logicae
as well as in Manlevelt’s De suppositionibus they are supposed to have
suppositio confusa tantum.90
e least that can be said about it is that it is an intricate matter. Fur-
ther insights into Manlevelt’s theories on confused supposition will be
needed to clear up the intricacy. On the correlation between syncate-
goremata and words introducing confused supposition, including modal
terms, verbs introducing opaque reference and incipit/desinit, all listed
in Manlevelt’s Confusiones, one may consult the relevant quotations in
Maierù’s standard work on late scholastic logical terminology,91 but the
indispensable step forward can only be made when the critical edition of
Manlevelt’s logical treatises De suppositionibus, De consequentiis and De
confusionibus, now in preparation by Kann, Lorenz and Grass, has seen
the light of day.92
Without stretching the matter further than necessary or warranted by
the present state of investigation, there are at least some indications that
the linking of Manlevelt’s thoughts to the intellectual circle of the Oxford
calculators or Mertonians might not be that far-fetched aer all. One
such indication is to be found in the present text. In it, omas Manlevelt
speaks with more than a hint of appreciation about the groundbreaking
investigations taking place in Oxford, at the time of his composing
his commentary on the Isagoge in Louvain, presumably.93 Would he do
 Pinborg , .
 Pinborg ,  n. .
 Scattered through the body of the text and the footnotes Maierù  contains
several quotations edited from the manuscripts of Manlevelt’s logical treatises.
 A deÞnite date for this edition has not yet been set.
 q.  (rb): ‘Pro ista questione et pro omnibus consequentibus et subsequentibus se
argumentis est notandum quod nihil determinative, sed tantummodo exercitative
. historical background 
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that, if he were not educated there, or in another way thoroughly ac-
quainted with the latest developments over there?94
Another such indication is to be found in the Bibliotheca Amploniana
in Erfurt, where one of the manuscripts contains the Insolubilia by
omas Manlevelt, along with other logical texts by authors, who are
all of undisputedly listed as calculators, like Bradwardine and Burley.95
InsigniÞcant as it may seem, even Manlevelt’s use of the letters of the
alphabet to stand not only for people and things,96 or their accidental
properties,97 but also for propositions98 lends his work a somewhat Mer-
tonian hue. So ‘A’ or ‘B’ can stand not only for Sor or his whiteness,
but also for propositions like ‘Omnis substantia est homo’. Bottin has
pointed out that it was Bradwardine who introduced this attitude, widely
dicitur in eisdem, et hoc ad istum Þnem ut aliqua inveniantur quia multum sit
inventum quia iste est modus inveniendi, sicut patet in universitate Ocsonienti in
qua plura nova inveniuntur quam in aliquo alio studio generali.’
 Other European authors were aware of Mertonian activity at the time even if they
did not have clear links with Merton. What distinguishes Manlevelt from them
is his overtly expressed appreciation for the ‘experimental’ method to obtain new
knowledge.
 e manuscript dates from the Þrst half of the fourteenth century, and is listed
number o by Schum, number  by Amplonius himself. e contents are listed
by Sylla , p. . A close scrutiny of this text by Manlevelt might be the best way
to Þgure out whether there really is a Mertonian inßuence.
 For instance, in q.  and q. , respectively. q.  concl. , va: ‘capiatur hoc
individuum mentale “iste homo” demonstrando Sortem vel Platonem, et vocetur
totus Sortes A, et Sortes preter digitum B, et vocetur individuum mentale Sortes C,
tunc sic: C predicatur univoce de A et de B, igitur C predicatur de pluribus, et C
est individuum propriissime acceptum, igitur individuum propriissime acceptum
predicatur de pluribus’, etc. q.  ad . rb–va: ‘Ad quartum conceditur quod omne
istud quod diert per aliquod accidens, tantum diert quantum istud accidens
ipsum facit dierre, ut si A per aliquid dierat a B, tunc A tantum diert a B quantum
istud accidens facit ipsum A dierre a B’, etc.
 For instance in q.  concl. , rb: ‘capiatur aliquis calor naturalis sine quo hoc
animal non potest existere. Qui calor vocetur A, et incipiat aliquod agens in hoc
instanti remittere A; tunc sic A post instans non erit, quia immediate post hoc instans
corrumpetur secundum aliquid sui’, etc.
 For instance in q.  and q. . q.  secundo quantum ad secundam proposi-
tionem, rb: ‘Et vocetur hec propositio in intellectu “omnis homo est substantia”
A, et ista propositio “omnis substantia est homo” B, tunc sic: quidquid est pars A,
est pars B, et e converso, ergo A est B, quia ex eisdem partibus resultat totum’, etc.
q.  concl. , va: ‘vocetur ista propositio “Hec substantia est” A, in qua demon-
straretur hoc genus generalissimum substantia, et ista propositio “Substantia est” B’,
etc.
 introduction
2011013 [Van der Helm] 01-Introduction-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 76
adopted among the Mertonians aer him, toward the use of the letters of
the alphabet as singular names of sentences.99
omas Manlevelt’s very name, oen su xed as it is with the identi-
fying adjective ‘Anglicus’, may be interpreted as a further indication of
his being associated with the Mertonians, who in their own days were
not called Mertonians at all. As pointed out by Sylla, contemporary and
slightly later Continental philosophers rather tended to call the mem-
bers of the group simply ‘Anglici’ or ‘Britannici’.100 And this is precisely
the way in which Manlevelt was not only given credit in the Brussels
manuscript of the ‘incipit et desinit’ text variously ascribed to him or
omas Bradwardine,101 but also the way in which he is introduced
in the late fourteenth-century note102 added to the sole manuscript of
this present edition: ‘Hec questiones fuerunt compilate per om. Man-
level Anglicum doctorem solempnem.’ Manlevelt being called ‘Anglicus’
should of course not be counted as conclusive evidence of his being a
‘Mertonian’. Mertonians being called English does not mean that every-
one called English should be a Mertonian. By calling the members of the
Merton School ‘Anglici’ or ‘Britannici’, their contemporaries and near-
contemporaries were doubtless associating them with the larger group
of British logicians whose contribution to logic was considered note-
worthy, sometimes further associating these ‘British’ with nominalism.103
And this seems to be a denomination that Þts quite well with omas
Manlevelt in any case, no matter whether his Britishness should be taken
literally or associatively: a nominalist he was, and his contribution to
logic was noteworthy enough, seeing the widespread use of his logical
tracts. By the late Þeenth and early sixteenth centuries however, the
members of the narrower Mertonian group were being called Calcula-
tores, and this is an epithet never awarded to omas Manlevelt.104
Apart from the doctrinal evidence, Nielsen points to the mode of com-
position of the treatise on ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’ as proof of Bradwardine’s
 Bottin , .
 Sylla , f.
 See above, note .
 In the dating of this addition to the manuscript we follow Schum .
 Sylla, , .
 Taking in consideration the present state of knowledge about the Mertonians as well
as about Manlevelt, it may well be just too early to deÞnitely establish his exact
relationship to them. In q.  of his commentary on the Isagoge Manlevelt – to
give just another example – sets out to answer the question whether there is to be
had knowledge of inÞnity. It is a matter of further investigation, to estimate to what
degree he is indebted to the Mertonians in his treatment of this matter.
. historical background 
2011013 [Van der Helm] 01-Introduction-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 77
authorship. e fact that the author has clearly attempted to construct his
exposition along axiomatic lines tallies well with Bradwardine’s predilec-
tion to do so in the works of which he is the incontestable author.
One may wonder, however, if this predilection for the axiomatic man-
ner really is exceptional enough to serve as an identifying mark for
Bradwardine’s (or anyone’s) authorship. e anonymous author of the
early fourteenth century Defensorium Ockham,105 to take just one exam-
ple, makes an attempt to see Aristotle’s Categories as a book that pro-
ceeds more geometrico and for his own part tries to follow in Aristotle’s
footsteps.106 is is not to say that proceeding more geometrico is so
widespread that even Aristotle already knew its ins and outs, but it is
to say that in the fourteenth century such a proceeding was widespread
enough for a defender of Ockham to read it into Aristotle.
Furthermore, if one sees what Nielsen exactly means by Bradwar-
dine’s proceeding more geometrico in the treatise on ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’,
namely that it is modelled according to the scheme ‘deÞnitiones – suppo-
sitiones – conclusiones’, the case for Bradwardine’s authorship does not
really seem to get stronger in this respect. Nielsen’s remark that the fact
that Bradwardine in this treatise has chosen to substitute ‘distinctio’ for
‘deÞnitio’ makes no dierence of signiÞcance, and may even be turned
into its opposite. For the substitution of ‘distinctio’ for ‘deÞnitio’ leads
us from Bradwardine’s terminology into that of omas Manlevelt. And
the scheme ‘distinctiones – suppositiones – conclusiones’ is precisely the
scheme that lays at the core of Manlevelt’s handling of many a questio on
Porphyry’s Isagoge or Aristotle’s Categories.
at Manlevelt’s way of handling things is not too dierent from the
Mertonians’ is borne out by Fitzgerald, who in the introduction to his
critical edition of Albert of Saxony’s Twenty-Five Disputed Questions On
Logic brings forward that Manlevelt’s treatment of terms like ‘aliud’, ‘non-
idem’, ‘diert’ and ‘incipit’ and how they aect the personal or material
supposition of terms in his tract De confusionibus (the authenticity
of which has never been questioned) is reminiscent of the treatment
‘secundum usum Oxonie’.107
 Edited by Andrews .
 Ebbesen , .
 Fitzgerald , . As we have already seen, Fitzgerald dates Manlevelt’s philosoph-
ical activity a couple of decennia later than we do, in faithful adherence to Lorenz’s
tentative sketch of our author’s vita. at may explain why Fitzgerald concludes his
comparison of Manlevelt’s method to the treatment ‘secundum usum Oxonie’ with
a speciÞcation relating to the late th and early th centuries.
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A last remark on the authorship of the treatise on ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’:
in the discussion on the authorship of the anti-modist treatise Destruc-
tiones modorum signiÞcandi108 it was brought forward that the name of
a better-known author (in that case: omas Manlevelt) may in some
cases be substituted for the name of a lesser-known author (in that case:
John Aurifaber).109 May the tables in the case of the treatise on ‘incipit’
and ‘desinit’ not have turned for omas Manlevelt, resulting in the sub-
stitution of omas Bradwardine’s still better-known name for his?110
 See above, subsection ...
 Pinborg ,  n.
 And a well-known name ‘Bradwardine’ was indeed. We have already seen Siger
of Brabant being honoured with a place in the Fourth Heaven of Dante’s Paradiso
among the souls of the wise. omas Bradwardine was awarded a place in Literature’s
pantheon hardly less honourable than Siger’s. In one of Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales,
the Nun’s Priest’s Tale verses –, he was placed on a pedestal, on a par with
St. Augustine and Boethius: ‘But I ne kan nat bulte it to the bren/As kan the hooly
doctour Augustyn,/Or Boece, or the Bisshop Bradwardyn’. (‘But I can not separate
the valid and invalid arguments/As can the holy doctor Augustine, /Or Boethius, or
the Bishop Bradwardyn’.) Chaucer, by the way, was the neighbour of Ralph Strode,
himself an admirer of omas Bradwardine, and Fellow of Merton College in –
, thus belonging, as the reader may recall, to the stage of consolidation of British
logical excellence, according to Spade’s measurement lasting from  until  –
a time of sophisticated, but no longer especially original work. As Ralph Strode
must have been very young when omas Bradwardine died in , it is unlikely
that the two Mertonians ever met in person. Ralph Strode was awarded his own
philosophical praise in Book  of Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde, verses –:
‘O moral Gower, this book I directe/To the and to the, philosophical Strode,/To
vouchen sauf, ther nede is, to correcte, /Of youre benignites and zeles goode.’ (‘O
moral Gower, I address this book to you, and to you, philosophical Strode, that you
may promise to correct it, where need is, of your righteous zeal and benignity.’) If
any reader should Þnd fault with this digression, let the writer of this Introduction
be his sole target. If however one should take pleasure in these bits of literary lore,
thanks must be given to Stephen Read, who put me on their track.
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chapter five
Form and contents of this text
Manlevelt’s commentary on the Isagoge combines its highly original con-
tents with an almost ‘classical’ styling of its questiones-format. is for-
mat is the subject of the Þrst part of this chapter. Later in this chapter
a suggestion will be made as to why Manlevelt would mould his treat-
ment of the universals to the shape of a commentary rather than an
autonomous tract.1
.. Questiones
e form in which this commentary is written, questiones, is one of the
standard ways of presentation of a philosophical standpoint accepted in
the later medieval intellectual community. Basically, it is the thirteenth-
century standardization of the way authoritative philosophical texts had
been handled since Hellenistic times.
is kind of commentary consists of a series of highly formalized
disputes about the problems to which a chosen text has given rise.2 Orig-
inally such questions formed only the latter part of a teacher’s lectures.
Gradually, the amount of straightforward, sequential commentary was
replaced with a discussion of special problems. In time, consideration
of these special problems, or questions (questiones), completely replaced
the commentary.3
 e reader is again referred to Libera  and to that author’s introduction to
Porphyry  for a most excellent survey of the history of commentaries on the
Isagoge. Once more, the summary in De Rijk  of things discussed here has
proved very useful to the present writer.
 Weijers  stresses the fact that there is no general study on the subject of teaching
methods in the Faculty of Arts. She points out that most studies published on the
questio are related to theology. She adds (p. ) that ‘il vaudrait mieux parler des
questiones de la Faculté des Arts au pluriel, car il y en a de nombreuses espèces (celles
dans les commentaires, les questions indépendantes des textes de base – soit la ques-
tio disputée pendant une dispute, soit les questions à propos des matières ensignées –
les questions servant d’exercises, celles des compendia pour les examens).’
 On the rise of the commentary in questiones-format see Kenny & Pinborg , f.;
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By being ‘published’ – i.e. by copies of the lectures being rented or
sold – the questiones format became the most important category of
scholastic literature. Because it utilized the basic form of a scholastic
disputation, this genre became almost synonymous with the notion of
scholastic method.4
e Questiones libri Porphirii has all the usual characteristics of a
commentary in the questiones genre, and more speciÞcally, it may by its
formal distinguishing marks alone be dated as an early fourteenth sample
of the genre.5
... e structuring of the Questiones
Especially in earlier phases of the development, one Þnds cases of several
questiones being telescoped into one: Þrst the arguments of a number
of dierent questiones are given, and then the questiones are solved one
aer another. is practice is absent in the present text. Each questio
stands on its own, in the sense that the argumentation concerning the
subject-matter dealt with is neatly rounded-o within the scope of each
successive questio. One is saved the intricate linking of questiones as is
sometimes done for example by John Duns Scotus in his commentaries
on the old logic and the Metaphysics, where the treatment of the subject
matter touched upon in one questio is sometimes postponed to a later
questio.6
Grant , f. It is generally assumed that this form of commentary was instigated
by the rules laid down in Aristotle’s freshly rediscovered Topica. According to De
Rijk , , however, the role played by the logica nova in these matters did
not exceed that of a secondary, though powerful impulse. Gilbert of Poitiers and
Clarembald of Arras, fervent propagandists of the questio in the Þrst half of the
twelh century, still were deeply immersed in the logica vetus. If the exact starting-
point of the questio-way of philosophizing is to be pin-pointed, it would be the year
, when Sic et non was written by Peter Abelard. As already indicated by its
very title, the scholastic method as an explicit technique of establishing the truth
by opposing pro and contra is to be found here in nuce. e most important rule is
that of the logico-semantical analysis: ‘mind the dierent meanings terms may have
in various statements’. In a sense, then, the development of the scholastic method
was in fact that of medieval logic and semantics.
 Grant , .
 On the general characteristics of the genre, see Kenny & Pinborg , –.
 See B. Ioannis Duns Scoti Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge et Quaestiones
super Praedicamenta Aristotelis, ed. R. Andrews e.a. (St. Bonaventure ). In the
commentary on the Isagoge questions  and  and questions –, respectively, are
telescoped into one. e same holds for questions –, –, –, – and
–, respectively, of the commentary on the Categories.
. form and contents of this text 
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Another way of structuring such sub-questions, by dividing a questio
into several articles, is absent in the present text as well. What we
do Þnd, however, is the fourteenth- and Þeenth-centuries’ practise of
structuring the solution according to conclusions and corollaries, each
being defended and dubia being solved.
In this text as in any other commentary of the genre, the last part of a
questio contains the refutations of the arguments leading to the solution
opposite to the one advocated by the author. And for this text as well
as for any other commentary of the genre goes that for determining
the author’s own argument, the most important part is, of course, the
solution with its distinctions.
e intrinsic order within each successive questio is clear and highly
homogenous: typically, the question, stated in the titulus questionis as
a question usually introduced by ‘Consequenter queritur utrum’, is Þrst
supplied with some conÞrmative arguments – in the main not more than
three or four, followed by usually just one argument ‘ad oppositum’, tra-
ditionally the opinion of Porphyry himself or another authority of the
same calibre. ese arguments pro and contra are answered in the last
portion of the questio. Between the listing of these arguments and their
answering we Þnd the body of the questio (or corpus questionis). Without
the author bothering to introduce it by such a standard phrase like ‘ad hoc
dicendum/dico’, this body is usually made up of one or two distinctions,
more likely than not consisting of the logico-semantical Þne-tuning of
the nuances of the key terms used, followed by a numbered set of con-
clusions, from which we can learn the author’s own insights in the matter.
e average number of conclusions is about half a dozen, sometimes less,
and sometimes running up to no less than ten (questio ), eleven (ques-
tio ) or even twelve (questio ). Ample use is made, in presenting these
conclusions as well as in the answering of the initial arguments at the
start of the questio, of the terminological subtleties laid bare in the dis-
tinctiones. Within the scope of a given conclusion, counterarguments are
sometimes taken up and are in their turn countered again. Occasionally
this leads to a confusing to and fro of arguments, counterarguments and
sub-counterarguments.
Exceptions to this regularity of composition are few. In the th ques-
tio the Þrst initial argument is countered right away, and not addressed
again in the successive answering of the initial arguments at the end of
the questio. In the st questio the place normally reserved for the distinc-
tions is occupied by a set of (mostly anonymous) opinions on the subject
whether ‘being’ is a genus. e nd questio, concerned with whether
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only the dierentia speciÞca causes dierences per se, is complete with a
distinction and some conclusions and all, but here there is a declaration
inserted at the head of the body of the question, that is to say: between the
argument ‘ad oppositum’ and the distinction. e st questio, whether
‘proprium’ is said in a fourfold manner, again leaves out the distinctions
and replaces them with an opinion in need of reprobation. In the th
questio, taking the example of a white raven as its starting point, there are
no distinctions as well, but there is a set of suppositions instead. On the
whole, however, the tapestry of one of the forty-Þve questiones is inter-
changeable with that of any of the others.
Of course, there is nothing unique in this text’s highly formalized pat-
tern of letting the conclusions in the body of a questio be preceded by
distinctions. is same pattern is to be found, for example, in the com-
mentaries on the Isagoge and Categories by Albert of Saxony.7 I have
already paid attention to the similarity in a minor detail: the reference
made in both Manlevelt’s and Albert of Saxony’s commentary on the Isa-
goge to Plato’s eagle’s nose.8 As I remarked there, it is unclear whether this
must be looked upon as a sign of intellectual kinship between the two.
... References given
From the fourteenth century onwards there is an increasing tendency
to give exact references – a tendency unfortunately not yet shared by
Manlevelt, which must be taken as an indication that the present text will
probably not stem from a period later than the Þrst half of the fourteenth
century.
References to opponents are strictly anonymous, ‘aliqui’ serving the
purpose of introducing them. References to authorities are quite stan-
dard; apart from Porphyry himself and Aristotle, we Þnd Boethius, Avi-
 It remains a matter of further investigation, however, to make sure in how far this
similarity between omas Manlevelt and Albert of Saxony goes with a similarity
of contents. Unless a thorough study would prove otherwise, the Þrst impression
remains that from a philosophical point of view the commentaries on the old logic by
Albert of Saxony are less interesting than those by our author. Compare the remark
by Fitzgerald ,  that Manlevelt’s tract De confusionibus is a more detailed
treatment than Albert’s. To Fitzgerald this suggests that our author’s treatment is
really closer in time to the treatments aer Albert, rather than before Albert. He
does not seem to take into consideration the possibility that Manlevelt may be a
sharper logician than Albert. A Þrst comparative glance at both authors’ question-
commentaries on the Isagoge will follow below.
 See above, subsection ... e use of the adjective ‘aquilinus’ occurs in q. 
concl. , vb, of our text; Albert of Saxony, In Porph., p. , §.
. form and contents of this text 
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cenna and Averroes, and an occasional reference to Robert Grosseteste,
Peter of Spain or omas Aquinas.9 Ockhamists nor Scotists are men-
tioned as such by Manlevelt, but for the reasons given in the previous
chapters it is safe to assume that that the ‘moderni’ brought up by him
can be identiÞed as nominalists, or maybe even more speciÞc as Ock-
hamists, while for Manlevelt the realistic tenets of the realists, or maybe
even more speciÞc: the Scotists are outworn and truly outdated.
.. Why a commentary?
e genre of the Questiones, being the perfect embodiment of the scho-
lastic method, has the advantage of granting us the fullest insight in a par-
ticular author’s own thoughts on a subject. erefore we must consider
ourselves lucky that we have omas Manlevelt’s questiones on the Isa-
goge, and not for instance an Expositio on the same subject. In the genre
of the Expositio it was common for medieval authors to limit themselves
to a faithful explanation of an authority’s (usually Aristotle’s) view, with-
out any criticism of this authoritative (usually Aristotelian) point of view.
Whereas in the Questiones, which are only rather loosely connected with
the authoritative text, there is ample room for the occasional deviance
from authority (usually disguised as adherence to authority anyway).10
For all its originality the present text, attributed to omas Manlevelt, Þts
in quite well with the state of developments as sketched thus far, albeit
that he pushes this form to its extremes. Not only does he dig deeper
into this particular brand of logico-semantical subject matter connected
with Porphyry’s Isagoge than anyone else, but quantitatively he breaks
new ground as well, by composing a commentary on the Isagoge which
is of itself already of an unprecedented size, and which is solidly inter-
locked with its subsequent commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, thus
forming one huge treatment of the basic elements of logic. Manlevelt’s
commentary on the Isagoge contains . words; both commentaries
on the Old Logic together contain a total of . words.11
 For the exact references, see the Index to the edition below.
 See De Rijk a,  on Buridan’s Questiones and Expositio on the Metaphysics,
with a sidestep to omas Aquinas’s commentary on the Metaphysics.
 Buridan’s more or less contemporary commentary on the Isagoge, for example, totals
about . words, while the commentary by Oyta, writing considerably later than
Manlevelt, has somewhat less than . words.
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Even though he does not mention the Venerable Inceptor by name, it
is safe to surmise that for Manlevelt the ongoing problem about univer-
sals had come to a conclusion by William of Ockham’s presentation of
them as mental signs or conceptual acts indicating individual things in
reality. So it was no longer useful to write a tract on their status, seeing
that their status had been secured once and for all by his great nominal-
ist predecessor. Not that Manlevelt referred to himself, his predecessor or
any of the other logicians working in the same frame of mind as ‘nom-
inalists’; he just labelled those who saw the Ockhamist light ‘moderns’,
as opposed to those who had not seen it and who were simply referred
to as ‘some’ or ‘others’. In his work the term ‘olden ones’ (antiqui) is
reserved for the really ancient philosophers, such as the contemporaries
of Aristotle or Porphyry. In this we witness a sharp development if not
reversal in the use of terms. William of Ockham himself had referred
to his more realistic opponents as ‘moderns’, presenting his own view
as being in accordance with the intention of the real ‘Olden Ones’: the
revered philosophers of antiquity. As noticed before, when they come to
be mentioned by Manlevelt he labels them ‘antiqui’ as well. So the term
‘antiqui’ did not shi meaning when used by Ockham and Manlevelt,
respectively, but its counterpart ‘moderni’ did. And so it turns out that
one and the same term is used in an honoriÞc and more pejorative way
within one and the same context.12
But why, with manners on their status settled, did Manlevelt take
the trouble to occupy himself with the universals at all, and why did
he choose the medium of a commentary in the form of questiones on
the Isagoge – a commentary of a sheer volume never seen before in the
history of commentaries on the Isagoge?
e impression that the logical, linguistic or ontological status of the
universals is no longer an issue, is warranted by the very beginning
of the text of the Commentary. Contrary to what is usual in other
commentaries on the Isagoge, there is no discussion on the nature of
logic, let alone the status of the universals that make up the basic scheme
of logic. Instead there is a discussion on the use of knowing something
about universals, in order to know something about the categories, that
is, the way we intellectually organize our knowledge about the world and
 A shi in the meaning of ‘antiqui’ takes place as well, as can be witnessed from the
works of the th century logician Nicholas of Amsterdam, who sees William of
Ockham himself as one of the ‘antiqui’, constantly referring to ‘Ockham and the
antiqui’. On Nicholas of Amsterdam see Bos’s forthcoming study on this logician.
. form and contents of this text 
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all the individual things in it. In other words, Manlevelt takes everything
the ‘moderns’ had to say about the status of universals and about the
status of the categories as one of the universals for granted, and sets out to
explain the precise functioning of these universals, and the relationship
between what is the subject matter of the Isagoge and what is the subject
matter of the Categories; in fact, his commentary on the Categories
proceeds seamless from his commentary on the Isagoge.
Seeing that omas Manlevelt takes the work done by William of Ock-
ham as the strongest possible foothold, it is not to be expected that his
explanation of the working of the universals, in so far as he is break-
ing new ground, will be incompatible with the general line of logico-
semantical philosophizing set out by the Venerable Inceptor. At least,
Manlevelt will have no intention to deviate from Ockham’s line of think-
ing; he simply sets out to bring the Ockhamist theory on the universals
a step further by bringing into map not the individual things indicated
by the rightful use of our universals, but these very universals them-
selves, that in their rightful use turn out to be just as individual as the
things in the world indicated by them. It remains to be seen, however,
what Manlevelt really does by thus exploring the boundaries of our
human intellect: furthering the cause of Ockhamism or destroying the
very basis under our intellectual dealings with the world.13 My commen-
tary on omas Manlevelt’s commentary will hopefully prove helpful in
 If Manlevelt may be called a champion for the individual in the Þeld of logic, he
indeed addresses the right issues. In the Prologue to his general study of the devel-
opment of the problem of individuation in scholasticism from  to , Gracia
points out that this problem of individuation was especially fascinating for late
medieval scholastics, not only on the basis of its perennial philosophical interest
and the implications it has for other philosophical issues such as the problem of
universals, but also because of its substantial theological ramiÞcations. Among the
theological doctrines to which the problem of individuation is related, Þve in partic-
ular stand out: the Trinity, original sin, the immortality of the soul, the resurrection
of the body, and the nature of angels. (Gracia , ix) As the problem of individ-
uation only occurs when a philosopher maintains that there are natures or essences
in individuals, in some way common to the individuals and yet diversiÞed in them,
this problem of individuation, in the usual ‘metaphysical’ sense of the term, does not
arise in Manlevelt’s philosophy, just as it does not arise in Ockham’s philosophy, or
Buridan’s philosophy, for that matter. (Compare Maurer  and King .) But
this does nothing to mitigate the implications of his strictly individualist tenets in
logic for the other philosophical and theological issues, as sketched by Gracia. e
problem of universals of course makes out the kernel of Manlevelt’s commentary on
the Isagoge, but some of Gracia’s theological doctrines are just slightly touched upon
as well: the Trinity in q.  and the nature of angels in q. .
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evaluating the merits of Manlevelt’s endeavour and will just as hopefully
show these merits to be worthy of deeper investigation, but will certainly
and perhaps regrettably not provide the last word on this matter.
e question why omas Manlevelt did not write a tract on univer-
sals instead of this commentary has already been answered. e reason
why he chose to tackle the Isagoge and the Categories in one sweep is
obvious too: he wanted to deal with the basic concepts allowing us to
think, speak and theorize about reality. And the question why he chose
the genre of the commentary in the form of questiones to do so is not
di cult to answer either. As already noticed, the most important prin-
ciple with this type of commentary is that of logico-semantical analysis,
the painstakingly pinpointing of the dierent meanings terms may have
in various statements. With Manlevelt one Þnds this analysis brought to
a higher degree, as it were: here it is the terms used to speak about the
use of terms themselves that are scrutinized. Apart from being the genre
best equipped to go into technical detail, the questiones-form oers the
proper stage to bring forward the pros and cons about a certain mat-
ter, and perhaps most important, it is the genre in which one can safely
raise controversial themes and present controversial opinions on these
themes, provided that one stresses the hypothetical character of this free-
ßoating philosophising in time, be it on the pro- or con-side of the matter.
‘It is just something that might be said by way of thought-experiment.’14
us one may even freely introduce God on one of the branches of the
Porphyrian Tree,15 or maintain that substance does not exist.
.. e originality of omas Manlevelt’s approach
How far does omas Manlevelt depart from the customary way of
dealing with the subject matter of the Isagoge?
In the introduction to his trilingual edition of Porphyry’s Isagoge,16
where Porphyry’s Greek text is accompanied by the Latin Translatio
Boethii and provided with a French translation by Libera and Segonds,
Libera points out that certain questions raised in the Middle Ages in
connection with the Isagoge are typically neo-platonic in character, going
 See for example the ninth conclusion of the forty-fourth questio: ‘Et multa istorum
dicta sunt gratia exercitii et probabiliter potius quam exercitive determinationis.’
 q. : ‘Utrum hec dierentia “immortale” sit constitutiva Dei’.
 Porphyry , cxxxv–cxl.
. form and contents of this text 
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back to the source of the treatise itself: the neo-platonic thought-world
of its author, who was the pupil and biographer of Plotinus, and the
editor of Plotinus’ philosophical lifework, the Enneads. Among these
neo-platonic questions are those concerning the very subject of the
treatise, the universal as such.
Other questions are special to the Middle Ages, but still are prompted
by the placing of the Isagoge at the head of the corpus of Aristotle’s
logic, within the philosophical canon. ese are the questions centring
on the status of logic as a science. What is the subject of logic: the modus
sciendi in general, being, the syllogism? Is logic a ‘real’ science of things,
or a science of language and thinking? Also, the famous (or infamous)
questions raised but immediately discarded by Porphyry himself get a
full treatment: those about the ontological status and independent being
of universals. Following this path even further, certain authors do not shy
away from treating fundamental metaphysical problems, like the nature
and cause of individuality. Common stock is also the questioning of the
sense and rightness of the deÞnitions of the respective universals as put
forward by Porphyry.
Giving no more than the mere tables of contents of four diverse
commentaries on the Isagoge – by Martin of Dacia (d. ), Peter of
Auvergne (d. ), Radulphus Brito (d. ) and William Russell (Þrst
half Þeenth century)17 – as a Þrst instructive means to superÞcially
assess the developments taking place during the Middle Ages, Libera
shows the permanency of certain questions or groups of questions.18
From the question of the ontological status of the universal, to that of
ascertaining if the accident is a universal or if its inherence in a subject
is part of the deÞnition of accident, not to mention the problem of
the number of universals and the su ciency of the division made by
Porphyry.
us surveying the evolution of the commentaries on the Isagoge,
one immediately sees the development of philosophical interests in the
Middle Ages, as well as the changes of style and the technical methods
and languages.
Certain technical distinctions, says Libera, run from one text to an-
other, undergoing, however, an evolution. He gives the example of the
 Mag. eol., ofm, Oxford; a Scotist living in the Þrst half of the Þeenth century,
who around  was the subject of lawsuits on account of herecy.
 Porphyry , cxxxv .
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distinction between the diverse types of universals – metaphysical, phys-
ical, logical – treated in an impartial manner by Martin of Dacia in the
late thirteenth century, but with a Þerce realistic approach later on by
the Scotist William Russell. In omas Manlevelt, one might add, one
Þnds neither Þerceness nor impartiality. He just treated the universals
in a nominalistic approach and felt he had only to do with the logical
type.
e evolution hinted at by Libera is to be described in terms of
the tendency of the commentators to treat the questions raised about
the Isagoge in a particular theoretical frame of mind, harbouring the
achievements of their own respective schools of thought. While Martin
of Dacia and Peter of Auvergne were still open-mindedly dealing with
Aristotle and Plato, William Russell was directly confronting the theses
put forward by Ockham and the ‘Ockhamists’, indierently citing ancient
authorities like Averroes and Avicenna alongside modern authorities like
Albert the Great, Antoine André and John Duns Scotus. As such, omas
Manlevelt may well have been one of the Ockhamists of days past, at
whom the criticism of William Russell was directed.
Where, then, would be the place of Manlevelt within this sketch of
developments? Clearly, his point in dealing with the Isagoge is not to
confront Aristotle and Plato, but rather to harness a nominalist, anti-
realistic stance in a strongly Ockhamist vein. In this he takes a stance
diametrical opposite to that of William Russell, who would later defend
the realistic Scotist’s viewpoint by attacking the Ockhamists. In fact, Plato
has shrunk to the role of none more than the occasional opponent to
Sortes in the various propositions used as examples for all kinds of logical
purposes. e citing of authorities, for that matter, is done by Manlevelt
in a way that resembles that of the Scotist opponent of the century
to come. As already noted, with him, more or less ancient authorities
like Boethius, Avicenna and above all Averroes stand side by side with
more or less modern authorities like Robert Grosseteste, Peter of Spain
and omas Aquinas. Albeit that these moderns are only mentioned
sporadically.
In fact, Manlevelt seems so conÞdent with the achievements of nomi-
nalism, that he does not care too much for a lot of the traditional, partly
neo-Platonist ßavoured problems posed in connection with the Isagoge.
Seemingly, Manlevelt takes these problems to have already been solved
once and for all from the outset. e subject matter of Porphyry’s tract
(and therefore the status of the universal as such) is taken for granted,
just as well as the status and subject matter of logic as a science.
. form and contents of this text 
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While he refrains from handling the number and su ciency of the
universals as stated by Porphyry, Manlevelt does treat the number of the
categories instead. Normally, one would expect to Þnd this matter treated
in a commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, rather than in a commentary
on the Isagoge.
Of course, he does not make a clean break with all the traditional
questions, but while implicitly or explicitly solving time-honoured ques-
tions concerning the connection between Sortes old and Sortes young,19
and the colour of the raven,20 Manlevelt seems to be more than any
other thinker focussed on the problems concerning individuality, the
atomisation of the extramental world, the token-character of our diverse
instances of knowledge of a world that is itself radically broken down
to individual things, etcetera. us Manlevelt presents us with a striking
glimpse on the developments of philosophical interests, as reßected in his
particular, sometimes quite radical handling of the problems occasioned
by his commenting on Porphyry’s age-old Isagoge.
Manlevelt’s commentary on the Isagoge does not contain the usual
preliminary chapters on the status and nature of logic, the formal subject
of logic, or the place of logic within philosophy, let alone on the nature
of philosophy itself. One will also look in vain for any treatment of
the question as to the ontological status of the universals, a matter so
pre-eminently tied up with the reading of the Isagoge, that traditionally
no commentator would dare to leave it untouched. e fourth questio,
whether universals are in the intellect, does not so much discuss the
ontological status of the universal, as its exact way of being in the
intellect.
Porphyry’s questionnaire came down to knowing if the genera and
species subsisted by themselves or were to be found, as universals, only
in the intellect by which a human being does his thinking. If I now
try to connect Manlevelt’s commentary on the Isagoge to the tradition
of commentaries and interpretations before him, the Þrst thing that
has to be said – with the risk of repeating myself – is that Manlevelt
does not run through this questionnaire at all. Apparently he does not
deem it necessary, because the matter has been settled in a satisfactory
 q.  concl. , va: ‘generaliter: omne ens diert a non ente, et omnis terminus
cum alio termino a quo vere negatur, vere predicatur de seipso mediante hoc verbo
“diert”, sicut si “senex” vere negatur a Sorte, tunc hoc est vera: Sortes diert a Sorte
sene, et sic de quocumque alio termino qui vere de Sorte negatur.’
 q. , vb–va: ‘Utrum corvus possit subintelligi albus’.
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manner. And the one who has done this settling can be no other than
William of Ockham, who does treat Porphyry’s questionnaire in his own
commentary on the Isagoge.21
What was it then that was to be found in the intellect when it came to
universals?
According to scholastic realism it is an intelligible form (species intel-
ligibilis), abstracted from the sensible images by the light of the active
intellect. According to Ockhamist nominalism it is a concept, i.e. a con-
ceptual act, referring to a multitude of singular objects of which it is the
natural sign. And here it is that Manlevelt comes into play: by exploring
exactly what it means for a conceptual act to be a sign of such a mul-
titude of singular objects, and exactly how such a sign does what it is
supposed to do. omas is breaking new theoretical ground here, and
deserves every scholar’s keenest attention, if only because what he does
here is completely lacking in Ockham.
It will turn out that Manlevelt does not shy away from drawing the
logical consequences from the basic tenet already adhered to by William
of Ockham himself: a mental concept as well as any thing in extramental
reality is really and truly an individual.22 Even a universal, though it is
universal insofar as it is a sign of many things and is predicable of them,
as the sign itself it is really and truly an individual. A spoken or writ-
ten word is really an individual sound or blot of ink, though it can be
a conventional sign of many things. A mental concept is also really and
truly an individual; its universality is its function of being a natural sign
of many things. Ontologically, then, every universal is a particular thing:
‘quodlibet universale est una res singularis.’23 Individuals, Ockham says,
cutting even more grass from under Manlevelt’s feet, are also primarily
diverse (primo diversa): there is nothing that is one and the same in any
two individuals.24 We could not wish for a stronger statement of the rad-
 Ockham, op ii, – (Expositionis in librum Porphyrii prooemium §). Ockham’s
most extensive and penetrating account of the subject is to be found however in
the Ordinatio, dist. , qq  to . For a comprehensive treatment of Ockham’s views
as expounded in these questions from the Ordinatio, one may well consult Maurer
.
 See Maurer , , whose concise wording of Ockham’s standpoint is thankfully
reproduced here.
 Summa logicae i, , p. ..
 Ordinatio i, d. , q. , p. .–: ‘dico quod aliqua esse “prima diversa” potest
intelligi dupliciter: vel quia nihil est unum et idem in utroque, sed quidquid est
in uno simpliciter et absolute de se non est aliquid quod est in alio; et isto modo
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ical incommunicability of individuals, says Maurer.25 One may wonder if
he would not deem Manlevelt’s subsequent treatment of individuality on
the level of words and concepts too strong a statement of this very same
radical incommunicability of individuals.
What one does Þnd in this particular commentary on the Isagoge then,
is a full treatment of all Þve Porphyrian universals, never termed ‘pred-
icables’ by Manlevelt, but always thus: ‘universals’. Considerable atten-
tion is paid to the individual, sometimes (but not by omas Manlevelt)
called ‘the sixth predicable’,26 and to the Þh of the Porphyrian pred-
icables, the accident. It is things accidental and individual that seem
to be the main interest of omas Manlevelt in a nutshell. e ideas
expounded in this text on these subjects will form the core interest of
future research, where an attempt will be made to unravel some of the
leading threads running through Manlevelt’s questiones on the Isagoge.
.. omas Manlevelt’s theory of signs
To a nominalist’s mind like omas Manlevelt’s, universals derive their
universality from their being signs of a multiplicity of things in the
outside world.27 But a full-ßedged theoretical treatment of signs is not
included in the Questiones libri Porphirii.
Manlevelt’s theory of signs, as far as it can be distilled from his com-
mentary on the Isagoge, seems to be quite in line with William of Ock-
ham’s theory.28 For one thing, Manlevelt’s juxtaposition of written, spo-
ken and mental terms throughout this commentary is easily compati-
ble with Ockham’s view on the three levels of language.29 As succinctly
concedo quod omnia individua sunt se ipsis primo diversa, nisi forte aliter sit de
individuis ex quorum uno generatur aliud propter identitatem numeralem materiae
in utroque.’
 Maurer , .
 Manlevelt is quite explicit about this in the Þrst conclusion of q. , vb: ‘nullum
individuum est universale’.
 For a survey of medieval theories of signs, see Meier-Oeser .
 e crucial questio to be searched for bits and pieces of a theory of signs is q. :
‘Utrum species sit res distincta a termino sive a signo’.
 In passing, Manlevelt also mentions still dierent types of conventional signs, like
a piece of red cloth in front of a tavern signiÞes there being red wine to be had,
and a piece of bluish-green cloth wine from the Garonne region. Also, there is the
Þnger-language used in certain monasteries. q.  concl. , ra: ‘Alia vero possunt
poni universalia ad placitum, quamvis ex communi usu non ponantur, sicud signa
communia ex consuetudine aliquas res signiÞcantia appellative, sicud panniculus
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explained by Spade,30 spoken words, according to Ockham, are subordi-
nated to concepts, and written expressions are related in the same way to
spoken expressions. But for Ockham subordination is not a kind of sig-
niÞcation relation. He agrees with everyone else that written expressions
are conventionally (ad placitum) correlated with spoken ones, and spo-
ken ones conventionally related with mental expressions. But he denies
that this correlation amounts to a signiÞcation relation.31 Spoken words
do not make me think of concepts, and written words do not make me
think of spoken words. What a written term in personal supposition sig-
niÞes is exactly what the spoken term in personal supposition signiÞes,
which in turn is exactly the same as what the mental term in personal
supposition signiÞes: the individual things in the outside world. e only
dierence being that a written or spoken term has conventional signi-
Þcation (but signiÞcation nevertheless), and a mental term has natural
signiÞcation.32
Neither does Manlevelt ever seem to imply a signiÞcation relation
between written and spoken terms on the one hand, and mental terms
on the other. Instead he accepts the three as equivalent, the written and
spoken term having conventional signiÞcation (ad placitum), and the
mental term having natural signiÞcation.33
But again the focus is on the individualizing aspects on the part of the
signs: each sign is a sign in its own right. And from this individualizing
tendency when it comes to signs, it is a small step to stressing the indi-
rubeus positus ante tabernam signiÞcat vinum rubeum, et pannus glaucus signiÞcat
vinum de Garunna, et motus digiti secundum quod aliqui claustrales utuntur,
appellative signiÞcant sua signiÞcata. De quibus, quia non sunt in usu, non dicetur.’
e example of a circle signifying wine in the tavern, by the way, is also given by
Ockham, as mentioned by McCord Adams , . Both cases brought forward by
Manlevelt seem to have been stock examples of things that in the broadest sense may
function as signs, anyway. Meier-Oeser ,  makes mention about ‘the famous
circulus vini, a wreath of foliage, attached outside the tavern, indicating that wine is
sold inside, or the conventional gestures of monastic sign languages’ already being
used by Peter Abelard some two centuries before Manlevelt (Peter Abelard: Log.
‘Ingredientibus’ (: )).
 Spade , .
 Spade ,  makes a reference to Ockham’s Commentarium in Perihermeneias 
(a–).
 For an apt visualization of a spoken or written term’s subordination to the mental
term, while standing in a relation of signiÞcation to things in the outside world, see
Spade , .
 q. dist. , rb: ‘aliqua sunt eadem secundum equivalentiam que dierunt genere,
sicut signum vocale et signum scriptum.’
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vidualizing aspects when it comes to concepts, in their role as signs. It
is the token-character of concepts that comes to the fore in an unprece-
dented manner. If Ockham stressed the individual character of all things
in the extramental world, now Manlevelt in a like manner stresses the
individual character of all things mental. But his radicalizing of the Ock-
hamist way of thinking is not without consequences or risks for the status
of human knowledge. Will not the generality that is a key property of all
genuine knowledge get lost in the process?34
As far as logical terms are considered in their capacity to stand for
individual things in the outside world, Manlevelt joins Ockham in stress-
ing the token-character of the references made to the individuals in the
outside world. us one might say that on the res-side of the matter
there is nothing but individuals to refer to. But omas Manlevelt draws
our attention to the fact that in our minds there is nothing but singular
instances of referring as well. On the ratio-side of the matter as such,
Manlevelt once again stresses the token-character of each instance of
rational activity.35 By doing so, he is nothing less than ‘singularising’ the
domain of the universals, and our acts of understanding.
Questio , whether a universal is in the intellect, oers a Þne example
of Manlevelt’s ‘singularising’ method. One can hardly fail to notice the
emphasis he puts on the token-character of the universals in actual use.36
ere is no doubt in Manlevelt’s mind about the mental universal
being in the intellect in a subjective manner, that is to say, as an accident
in a subject. e mental universal (just like any other concept) is an acci-
dent of the intellect in the same way as the vocally expressed universal is
in the air. e only kind of universal that is not an accident is the written
one, because the writing itself as a physical thing (say, the little lines of
ink on a piece of paper) is a substance or rather a string of substances.37
 For a background to this question, one may consult Nuchelmans  on type-
utterances and token-utterances as bearers of truth and falsity, especially with
Ockham (p. ), Holkot (p. .), Burleigh (p. ), Pierre d’Ailly (p. ) and
Paul of Venice (p. ). at Buridan may be counted among the renewers but not
among the reckless renewers, may be clear from De Rijk .
 See q. , rb–vb: ‘Utrum universale sit in intellectu’.
 On singularity, one may compare our author’s ideas to those expressed by Ockham in
Summa logicae pars i cap.  (De hoc communi ‘universale’ et de ‘singulari’, opposite
sibi).
 q.  concl. , vb: ‘omne universale mentale est in intellectu subiective’; concl. ,
ra: ‘universale vocale est in aere tamquam in subiecto, sicud omnis vox, (…) et
universale scriptum non est in aliqua substantia tamquam accidens in subiecto, quia
est substantia vel substantie’. On the written universal, Manlevelt seems to deviate
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In his opinion that the (mental) universal is an accident of the intel-
lect, and that each of these mental universals is a singular accident for
that matter, Manlevelt is in agreement with William of Ockham. In the
Summa logicae it is stated that the universal that is naturally a sign pred-
icable of many things is nothing else than an intentio animae, and that
this intentio animae, signifying a plurality of things in the extramental
world, is in itself singular.38 Manlevelt was certainly not the only one
to agree with Ockham on this matter. In fact, this opinion on the men-
tal universals seems to have been common ground among thinkers not
necessarily to be labelled followers of the Venerable Inceptor. With the
Mertonian Richard of Campsall (d. ca. /), one Þnds the same idea
of universals being singular accidents of the soul.39 And as if to stress
the non-Ockhamist origin of this line of thinking, Campsall as well as
Ockham himself bring in the testimony of no less an authority than Avi-
cenna.40
Manlevelt however is not content to simply rephrase what has been
stated before. He goes on to investigate what it means in actual practice
to have this succession of singular universals, each signifying a multi-
from Ockham, who holds that universals are not in any way substances. See, for
instance, the last paragraph of Summa logicae pars i, cap. : ‘(…) propositio non
est nisi in mente vel in voce vel in scripto; igitur partes eius non sunt nisi in mente vel
in voce vel in scripto; huiusmodi autem non sunt substantiae particulares. Constat
igitur quod nulla propositio ex substantiis componi potest. Componitur autem
propositio ex universalibus, universalia igitur non sunt substantiae ullo modo.’
Manlevelt himself does not make a big thing out of this apparent deviation from
Ockham’s line of thought. In fact he says that we need not waste words on the written
(and the spoken) universals: ‘non oportet sermonem prolongari’ (q.  concl. , ra).
Remarks in this same vein are usually made by Manlevelt either when things become
too self-evident, or when things quite on the contrary tend to become too out-of-
the-way.
 Summa logicae pars i, cap. : ‘universale naturaliter, quod scilicet naturaliter est
signum praedicabile de pluribus (…) non est nisi intentio animae’ (Opera Philo-
sophica i, ); ‘tenentes quod universale est quaedam qualitas mentis praedicabilis
de pluribus, non tamen pro se sed pro illis pluribus, dicere habent quod quodlibet
universale est vere et realiter singular: quia (…) intentio animae, signiÞcans plures
res extra, est vere et realiter singularis et una numero, quia est una et non plures res,
quamvis signiÞcet plures res’ (Opera Philosophica i, ).
 ‘Ideo dicendum est quod genus et species et huiusmodi universalia non sunt res
extra animam (…) sed sunt formae universales existentes in anima sicut in subiecto,
quae tamen sunt formae singulares in essendo sicut alia accidentia in anima.’ Cited
in William of Ockham Opera Philosophica i,  n. . For Campsall see E.A. Synan,
,  (‘Contra ponentes’ §).
 Reference with Ockham is to Avicenna, Metaph., v, c. , with Campsall to the same
work, c. .
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plicity of things in the outer world, going on in our minds. In doing this,
he remains perfectly in line with the main tenets of Ockhamism, and
with the course later medieval logic would take in general. As succinctly
explained by Meier-Oeser,41 thirteenth century terminist logicians like
William of Sherwood and Peter of Spain had not been particularly inter-
ested in the concept of signiÞcation. Leaning on the insights unfolded
by Biard,42 who characterizes Ockham’s logic as ‘régie par le concept de
signe’,43 Meier-Oeser points out that with Ockham, however, the concepts
of sign and signiÞcation take centre stage in logic.
e description Þts quite well with Manlevelt as well: logic is seen as
exclusively concerned with signs, primarily with mental signs, secon-
darily with vocal or written signs.44 Traditional ontological issues, as for
instance the questions of universals and the number of categories – the
Þrst of which, of course, is the main subject of the present text, and the
second of which Þnds a place within the context of Manlevelt’s treatment
of the universals45 – are reformulated as semantic questions. Ockham’s
logic, says Meier-Oeser,46 marks an important step in the progressive
‘mentalization’ of the sign, characteristic of the mentalist logic arising in
the early fourteenth century, and remaining dominant throughout the
later Middle Ages. us, Ockham’s semantics, as well as his theory of
mental language built on trans-idiomatic mental words (verba mentis) or
mental concepts governed by a trans-idiomatic mental grammar, trans-
formed terminist logic into a theory of thought processes. In general, the
importance of the concept of sign was undisputed among logical authors
from the fourteenth century onward. is is not to say that Ockham’s
speciÞc theories did not come under severe criticism by his opponents.
Also, they were no less severely modiÞed by his followers – among them
omas Manlevelt.
e possibilities and di culties of us having two or more universals
in mind at the same time run as a leading thread to the conclusions of
 Meier-Oeser , f.
 Biard , Biard .
 Biard , . Cited by Meier-Oeser , .
 In the present text by omas Manlevelt, the number of references to signs as logic’s
core business is legion. Usually the mentioning of ‘sign’ comes in a pair with ‘term’:
‘signum vel terminus’. With Manlevelt as well as it already was with Ockham, it is
the sign within a propositional context that counts.
 q. , va–ra: ‘Utrum tantum sint decem genera et non plura, neque pauciora’.
On Manlevelt’s treatment of the number of the categories, see above, footnote  to
section ., and below, the paragraph on q.  in subsection .. of this Chapter.
 Meier-Oeser , .
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Questio , about a universal being in our intellect.47 Experience shows
that it is possible for two mental universals to be in one intellect simul-
taneously, as we can have a proposition like ‘man is a living being’ in our
mind.48 is fact of experience can also be proven in a more fundamental
way. Two accidental things that are not mutually incompatible can be in
the same subject simultaneously, like light and sound in the air, or white-
ness and sweetness in milk. Well then, just such mutually non-conßicting
accidental things are the subject and predicate of the proposition ‘man is
a living being’; therefore two universals can be in one intellect simultane-
ously.49 Experience also tells us that it is possible to have two universals
of the same species specialissima simultaneously in one intellect, like in
‘man is man’.50
Manlevelt is taking a step in a more psychological direction51 with the
next conclusion, which states that an intense universal and a weakened
universal can be simultaneously in the intellect. To show this, Manlevelt
once again points to our daily experience: we can learn one thing while
our head is with another thing.52 From here on, Manlevelt seems to
 q. , rb–vb: ‘Utrum universale sit in intellectu’.
 q.  concl. , vb: ‘Secunda conclusio est ista quod duo universalia mentalia
possunt simul esse in eodem intellectu. Ista conclusio probatur per experientiam,
qua experimur nos habere talem propositionem in mente nostra: “homo est animal”.’
 q.  concl. , vb: ‘Item, quecumque duo accidentalia et non repugnantia possunt
simul 〈esse〉 in eodem subiecto, in quo quodlibet eorum naturaliter potest esse; sed
talia duo accidentalia sunt subiectum et predicatum istius conclusionis “homo est
animal”, que sunt duo universalia, igitur aliqua duo universalia possunt simul esse
in eodem intellectu. Maior videtur evidens, quia nulla ratio potest assignari quare
talia duo accidentalia non possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto, sicud lumen et vox,
quia in nullo repugnant quia possunt simul 〈esse〉 in aere, sicud dulcedo et albedo
que simul sunt in lacte, et sic de aliis.’
 q.  concl. , vb: ‘Tertia conclusio est ista quod aliqua duo universalia eiusdem
speciei specialissime possunt simul esse 〈in〉 intellectu. Ista declaratur, quia talis
propositio mentalis: “homo est homo”, “animal est animal” potest tota simul esse
〈in〉 intellectu; et predicatum et subiectum sunt duo universalia mentalia eiusdem
speciei specialissime, igitur duo universalia mentalia eiusdem speciei specialissime
possunt simul esse in intellectu. Maior videtur haberi per experientiam; minor nota
est de se.’
 On this point Manlevelt’s ideas seem to advance beyond the mere ‘mentalization’
of the sign, which Meier-Oeser considers to be a deÞning trait of logic from the
early fourteenth century onward, and begin – as will be touched upon below in the
paragraph on q.  in subsection .. – to foreshadow the psychologically oriented
logic of Port-Royal by some centuries.
 q.  concl. , vb: ‘universale intensum et universale remissum possunt simul esse
intellectu. Ista declaratur per experientiam, quia experimur nos frequenter addiscere
aliquam rationem de qua remisse arguamus, et simul cum hoc cogitare de aliqua alia
ratione intense.’
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be breaking new ground, making serious business of the melting of
logical principles with psychological observations. e rather startling
Þh conclusion is that two intense universals cannot be in the intellect
simultaneously. is is already demonstrated by experience, as we cannot
intensely think about two dierent things at the same time, just like we
cannot write while giving a speech. e principle that two most intense
universals are in no way incompatible – adduced earlier to support the
conclusion that two universals can be in one intellect simultaneously –
does not hold. e reason is not an incompatibility of the universals,
but an incompatibility of attention on the part of the intellect itself. e
intellect cannot intensely occupy itself with two dierent things at the
same time. True, the subject and predicate of the mental proposition
‘man is a living being’ are in the intellect simultaneously, but not both
equally intense.53 In his treatment of the principal arguments of this
questio, Manlevelt explains that the intensity of the universals is a matter
of succession: Þrst the subject of the proposition is in the mind in
an intense manner, and then the predicate.54 is makes one wonder
how genuine human knowledge is possible. If not even the subject
and predicate of one and the same proposition can be paid intense
attention simultaneously, how do we save the possibility of this subject
and predicate really getting joined before the intellect? Aer all, the
establishing of the right relationship between subjects and predicate
is what knowledge and science are ultimately built on. What kind of
worldview arises from such radical nominalism? An extramental world
seemingly existing of nothing more than a myriad of loose particles. And
the intellect grasping nothing more than a myriad of loose mental little
contents.
 q.  concl. , vb–ra: ‘duo universalia intensa non possunt simul esse in intellectu.
Ista declaratur iam per experientiam, quia experimur nos non posse distinctis cogi-
tationibus intense de distinctis rebus cogitare, sicud non possumus scribere et cum
hoc aliquam orationem intentissime dicere. Contra istam conclusionem instatur, et
videtur quod contrariatur predictis, nam talia duo universalia intensissima in nullo
repugnant, igitur possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto, circa quod habent Þeri. Ad
istud breviter dicitur quod causa quare non possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto,
non est repugnantia universalium, sed est repugnantia advertentiarum ipsius intel-
lectus, qui non potest, saltem dummodo est in corpore, advertere se intense dis-
tinctis advertentiis distinctis rebus. Et si dicatur quod ista duo universalia que sunt
subiectum et predicatum istius propositionis mentalis “homo est animal”, 〈sunt〉
simul in intellectu sicud supra positum est, ad istud breviter dicitur quod ista duo
universalia non sunt simul intense (…)’.
 q.  ad ., ad probationem prime propositionis, rb: ‘Est ergo primus conceptus
causatus per subiectum, et alius per predicatum secundario causatum (…).’
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In passing, Manlevelt seems to suggest that intellectual di culties of
this kind are just part of the burden we have to bear by being alive. ese
shortcomings will be over once the soul is freed from its corporeal cage.
For what dierent interpretation can be given to his contention that the
intellect cannot intensely pay attention to dierent things, as long as it is
in a body.55
If, however, Manlevelt’s radicalizing of Ockhamism entails the pos-
sible destruction of human knowledge, is not this radicalizing of Ock-
hamism then an act of self-destruction on the part of Ockhamism? In
other words, in going one step beyond where the Venerable Inceptor
himself made a halt, does omas Manlevelt not lay bare the intrinsic
incompatibilities of the very Ockhamist program? It makes one think of
what Libera has to say about the reasons for the continued existence of
realism aer Ockham. One of these reasons has to do with the intrinsic
shortcomings of Ockhamism, and the weak spots in its challenging of
rival systems.56
But let me turn my attention Þrst to the text of Manlevelt’s commen-
tary on the Isagoge itself. Aer all, apart from the obvious objective of
having something to lecture about, why did he compose this commen-
tary? Not to involve himself in the battle of the universals, because that
battle had already been fought, and, to Manlevelt’s Þrm conviction, was
won by William of Ockham. What Manlevelt set out to do was to elab-
orate the status of the Þve predicables in an Ockhamist sense. e work
that was to be done was to be found in the Þeld of semantics.
In this sense, the present text, attributed to omas Manlevelt, Þts in
quite well with the state of developments as sketched in the Þrst part of
this chapter.
 q.  concl. , ra: ‘intellectus, (…) non potest, saltem dummodo est in corpore,
advertere se intense distinctis advertentiis distinctis rebus’.
 See Libera ,  for a listing of reasons why realism could survive Ockham,
chief among which ‘les insu cisances et faiblesses mêmes de la position nominal-
iste sur plusieurs points de doctrine ou d’argumentation précis.’ Mention is made
of some of these deÞcits: ‘celui de la critique occamiste du répresentationnisme
thomiste, qui méconnait le sens et la portée de la théorie thomassienne de la forme
intelligibile (…), ou, dans le système d’Occam lui-même, celui de la reduction du
concept à un signe naturel et celui de la notion cardinal d’intuition intellectuelle du
singulier.’
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.. A brief summary of the contents of the questiones
Some of the subjects that omas Manlevelt feels inspired to tackle on
the occasion of his reading of the Isagoge most certainly deserve a full
thematical treatment. is edition will have served its purpose if it does
indeed give rise to further studies, in which the main ideas expounded
in the text of the Questiones libri Porphirii will be treated. It may prove
helpful, however, to start with a brief summary of the contents of each of
these successive questiones.
... e individuum
Manlevelt’s Questiones libri Porphirii do lend themselves to a grouping
along the lines of the Þve universals.57 However, there is one extra element
that keeps cropping up. And this element is the individuum, which is
always in the back of Manlevelt’s mind, guiding his thoughts and serving
as his ultimate goal of investigation. True, the individual is never with
so many words added as an extra universal to Porphyry’s list of Þve, to
which he faithfully adhered. Indeed, as we have seen, the individuum
is explicitly denied his status in the Þrst conclusion of q. .58 But the
apparent contradictio in terminis notwithstanding, ‘individuum’ is de
facto accepted as the sixth ‘universal’ in one meaningful passage towards
the end of Manlevelt’s commentary.59 Here, individuum together with
species, proprium, accidens and dierentia speciÞca form an exhaustive
list of all that divides the genus (dividit genus).60
e primacy of the individual over the universal cannot be better
expressed than it has been by the thirteenth century Franciscan thinker
Roger Bacon: one individual is worth more than all universals in the
world.61 is primacy of the individual found a Þerce defender in Bacon’s
 See below, subsection ...
 See above, section .. In q.  concl. , vb it is stated: ‘nullum individuum est
universale’.
 q  concl. , rb: ‘(…) omne quod dividit genus, vel est species, vel individuum,
vel est proprium, vel accidens, vel dierentia speciÞca.’
 e overview of diagrammatic representations of the Tree of Porphyry in texts of
the Arts Faculty, –, contained in Verboon , –, makes it clear that
individuals tend to Þnd a place in these quite naturally, as a kind of little ‘roots’ to
the trees.
 ‘Unum individuum excellit omnia universalia de mundo’, from Roger Bacon’s Liber
i Communium Naturalium pars , d. , c.  (ed. R. Steele, page ). e force of
Bacon’s wording is testiÞed by its regularly being used as a reference in present
 introduction
2011013 [Van der Helm] 01-Introduction-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 100
fourteenth century fellow-Franciscan William of Ockham. And the
quickest glance on the present commentary on the Isagoge will reveal that
omas Manlevelt, whose possible Franciscan background was touched
upon earlier,62 is a warm supporter of the individual as well. What does
this primacy of the individual over the universal amount to?
To omas Manlevelt as well as to Ockham, it is of the greatest
importance to draw a sharp distinction between the level of thinking
(ratio) and that of things (res).63 e two domains must be kept apart
in all considerations.
Now according to Ockham reality outside the knowing subject con-
sists of individual things (substances and qualities) and none other than
individual things. ings of a general nature do not exist in extramen-
tal reality. ere are no genera or species as such to be found in the real
world, nor any other universal, let alone such out of the way things as
Platonic Ideas.
So the only object of our thought that can be found in reality is
the individual. is individual is somehow known in a non-abstract
manner.64 On the other hand, the intellect does not know the individual
in its individuality (sub propria ratione singularitatis).65 It is observed by
De Rijk66 that even Ockham does not escape from understanding the
singulare according to its external, sensible qualities. On the res-side,
Ockham saw no other possibility than to interpret the ‘humanity’ and
the ‘whiteness’ of an individual person as some kind of entities, albeit that
they only exist in a concrete form, in a concrete individual. And, one may
add, even to Ockham there is no other way to convey knowledge about
an individual on the ratio-side than to make use of notions that each in
turn will be catalogued as one of the Þve predicables, which are general
in character.
Ockham was not unique in giving the individual, as far as we have
knowledge about it, a certain prominence in his logical considerations.
As observed by Libera in his authoritative study on the war of the uni-
day studies on the philosophical status of the individual, for example in Aertsen
, xi, De Rijk , .
 Above, section ..
 For the importance of this distinction, and the gradual sharpening of it, within the
works of Ockham, see Bos , .
 Ordinatio i, d., q..
 Ordinatio i, d., q..
 De Rijk , .
. form and contents of this text 
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versals, the problem of the intellectual knowledge of the individual was a
distinguishing mark of the fourteenth century treatises on the universals.
‘En ce qui concerne les universaux, le trait saillant du xive siècle est
l’arrivée au premier plan du problème de la connaissance intellectuelle
intuitive du singulier.’67
But it is the change of view that matters. Whereas other thinkers broke
their minds over the question how the universal is individualised, taking
the universal as their starting point to try and reach the individual, Ock-
ham thought it would be wiser and certainly less foolish to investigate
how the singular, the individual could become a universal, and in what
highly limited sense it could do so.
In short, to cite Spade on this matter, one does not need a metaphysical
‘principle of individuation’; one needs an epistemological ‘principle of
universalization’.68 On this, Ockham is honest enough to admit that he
simply does not have the answer. In forming universal concepts, he
says, ‘nature works in a hidden way’. Nevertheless, it is clear that the
focus has been shied in Ockham from a metaphysical question to an
epistemological one.69
In his commentary on the Isagoge omas Manlevelt however does
not address the epistemological question, but simply accepts the fact of
there being universal concepts applied to individual things.
It is no new thing of course for omas Manlevelt to treat the individ-
ual in connection to the Þve predicables. In fact, the individual already
found its natural place within Porphyry’s own Isagoge. Its inclusion in
the considerations from this very start onward has resulted in its some-
times half-seriously being referred to as the ‘sixth predicable’.70 is is
not to be said, however, that all the questions raised about the individ-
ual in the context of the predicables are necessarily standard. Starting
from Porphyry’s text and the questions instigated by him, the commen-
tators gradually moved on to exploring Þelds that were not at all covered
by the Isagoge itself. When the theory of the predicables was moulded
into a compendium examinatorium (basically, a series of questions that
a student must be able to answer in order to pass an exam on the sub-
ject) in Paris in the Þrst decades of the thirteenth century, no mention of
 Libera , .
 Spade , .
 Spade , f.
 See for instance Bos , . On the candidature of the individuum as sixth
predicable see also above, section ..
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the individual was made in the division of Porphyry’s text as presented
there, but at any rate two out of the twenty-nine questions which the stu-
dent should be able to answer in an exam were about the properties of
individuals.71 ese questions did not move the student an inch from the
text under examination. Halfway into the thirteenth century, the funda-
mental metaphysical hints made in passing by Porphyry began to get full
attention. In the subsequent commentaries on the Isagoge, questiones are
devoted to such problems as the nature and cause of individuation and
whether the universals are separated from the singulars. In his introduc-
tion to the French translation of the Isagoge Libera traces such questiones
in the commentaries by modist thinkers like Martin of Dacia (d. )
and Radulphus Brito (d. ), and by Peter of Auvergne (d. ).72
So even though other thinkers, like John Duns Scotus (d. ), do not
devote any questiones in their commentaries on the Isagoge to the indi-
vidual and even William of Ockham does not have a chapter on the
individual in his Expositio, to include some questiones on the individ-
ual was not an unusual thing to do in omas Manlevelt’s days, when
compiling a commentary on the Isagoge. And it did not go out of usage
aerwards. Henry Totting of Oyta’s commentary, for example, probably
written in the s, also includes a couple of questiones on the individ-
ual. e second of these is completely sensible, moreover, when seen in
an Ockhamist way: whether a principle of individuation is necessarily
required for there being an individual.73 Of special interest in this con-
text seems to be the commentary by William of Russell, who according
to Libera openly challenges the theses by Ockham and the ‘Occamis-
tae’, especially the one that states that the individuals of one species are
by themselves (se ipsis) alike and dislike, and the one that in his view
reduces the universal to a ‘natural sign of the singular things’ like smoke
for a Þre.74 Russell’s own stance is a hardened realist’s. According to him,
a logical universal has as its basis a truly existing common nature existing
in a plurality of things in the outside world.75
 See Porphyry , cxxxi–cxxxiv, taking as his point of reference a manuscript
edited by Cl. Laßeur from c. –.
 Porphyry , cxxxv–cxxxix.
 Heinrich Totting von Oyta, Quaestiones in Isagogen Porphyrii, q. : Utrum neces-
sario ad esse individui principium individuationis requiratur (ed. J. Schneider).
 Porphyry , cxxxix.
 ‘Est (…) universale logicum, quod est intentio communis fundata super rem com-
munem, de pluribus praedicabilis. Est etiam universale metaphysicum, quod est illa
res communis subiecta tali intentioni, quae est vera res existens in pluribus extra
. form and contents of this text 
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But notwithstanding the fact that he is by no means original or unique
in spending a few questiones on the individuum, omas Manlevelt
stands apart from all other commentators in the prominence given to
the individual-related questions.
In his commentary, the questiones dealing explicitly with the individ-
ual come right aer the introductory questiones dealing with universals
in general, and the questiones about the Þrst among the predicables, the
genus. In fact, in the tenth questio, genus and individuum are directly
linked to each other, when omas Manlevelt explicitly raises the ques-
tion whether genus diers from individuum. is may all seem evident
enough, but it all depends on how one considers the individuum: whether
large (in Þrst intention) or stricte (in second intention).
e predicable generally taken to be of the least importance, the acci-
dent, is accordingly treated in the very last questiones of our commentary,
but takes on an unexpected importance, when seen in the light of the
individuality that is so important to Manlevelt’s logical scheme of things.
Is not the individual most properly characterized by its individual acci-
dents?
In this, as in all matters, omas Manlevelt starts from an unmistak-
able Ockhamist stance. From there, however, he goes where no Ock-
hamist has gone before.
Individuality-related problems neither touched nor resolved in Man-
levelt’s commentary are those concerning the principium individuationis,
which as already remarked is not really something an Ockhamist deems
worthy to trouble our minds about, and those concerning our direct
knowledge of individual things, which is an epistemological problem and
not a logical one. en, of course, problems like these are better reserved
for commentaries on the Metaphysics and on the De anima, respectively.
But omas Manlevelt shies away from no logical question concern-
ing individuality. roughout the commentary he tackles all kinds of
questions, approaching all sides of the matter. us he has interesting
things to say about the individual character of all reality. He presents
individuum largely taken as a transcendent term.76 He draws a sharp
animam.’ Cited by Libera in Porphyry , cxxxix, from A.D. Conti, ‘A Short Sco-
tist Handbook on Universals: e Compendium super quinque universalia of William
Russell,o.f.m.’, Cahiers de l’Institut de Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin,  (), –. e
citation is from page .
 q.  concl. , va: ‘Tertia conclusio est ista quod “individuum” large acceptum
est transcendens. Ista statim patet quia “individuum” sic acceptum convertitur cum
“ente”.’
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distinction between individuum in its large or Þrst intentional sense, and
individuum in its strict or second intentional sense,77 and even seems to
be discerning a strictest sense, meaning individuum taken personally.78
e individualising tendency with omas Manlevelt is not restricted
to the res-side of the matter, but is manifest on the ratio-side as well,
in the way he stresses the concrete, individual character of references,
propositions and knowledge.
But what does Manlevelt really mean by all this? e individual on
the res-side: what does it look like? And the individual on the ratio-
side: how does this function? What does the individual’s central place in
Manlevelt’s thinking really amount to? Does it involve a turning upside-
down of the relative value of the Þve predicables, accident being the
distinguishing mark of the individual? It is a question commonly asked
by all commentators coming before and aer omas Manlevelt, also by
those diering from him in intellectual outlook: in what measure does
the individual add something to the species? And the answer would be:
what is added is the accidental.79 So it seems only natural that the relative
value of the predicables is turned upside down when the individual is the
centre of attention.80
Being an Ockhamist, omas Manlevelt not only takes it for granted
that reality is strictly individual in nature and in no sense common or
universal – which is to say that in the outer world there are only indi-
vidual things, and that all universality is to be conÞned to our concepts
referring to these things – , but he also fully subscribes to Ockham’s tenet
 q.  dist., va: ‘Distinctio premittenda est ista quod iste terminus individuum
potest accipi dupliciter, scilicet, large vel stricte. Large secundum quod est nomen
prime intentionis, signiÞcans re〈m〉 materialiter existentem sive istud sit signum
sive res que non est signum. Stricte secundum quod est nomen secunde intentionis,
signiÞcans signum quod signiÞcative sumptum non predicatur de pluribus saltem
univoce. Et sic accipit Porphyrius individuum quando dicit quod individuum est
quod predicatur de uno solo.’
 q.  concl. , va: ‘ “individuum” strictissime et propriissime acceptum predicatur
de pluribus univoce personaliter sumptis.’
 See, for example, the titles of the th and th question of the early fourteenth
century Quaestiones super Isagogen Porphyrii by the modist Radulphus Brito, as
summed up by Libera in Porphyry , cxxxvii f. q. : ‘Utrum individuum addat
aliquid reale super speciem’. q. : ‘Utrum illud accidens quod individuum addit
supra speciem includatur in signiÞcato individui’.
 An altogether dierent topic would be the conventionality of written and spoken
terms, which would add another dimension to the dierent ways of looking at
things.
. form and contents of this text 
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that ontologically, as an actual act of knowing, that is as an actual mental
quality, a universal is really and truly an individual: ‘quodlibet universale
est una res singularis’.81 Just like a spoken or written word is really an
individual sound or blot of ink, while being universal insofar as it is
the conventionally established sign of many things and is predicable of
them, a mental concept is also really and truly an individual, while being
universal insofar as it is a natural sign of many things.82
What Manlevelt seems to have for his program is to draw out the
consequences of this Ockhamist individualism on the conceptual side of
aairs, and see what all this means for our possibility to gain knowledge
of things.83
... e accident
Closely related to this emphasis on the individual is the attention paid by
Manlevelt to all things accidental.
e forty-second out of forty-Þve questiones libri Porhirii is the Þrst
one directly concerned with the discussion of the Þh out of Þve pred-
icables. It puts us in the middle of Manlevelt’s view of things real and
things logical.
e subject matter of this questio is as traditional as can be: whether
an accident can be present without the subject being destroyed.84 Before
answering this question however Manlevelt sets up three distinctiones in
which he draws a sharp line between Þrst and second intentions, between
logic and reality.
 William of Ockham, Summa logicae i, , Opera Philosophica I, p. ..
 On William of Ockham’s successive thoughts on the universal, see Maurer . is
concise rendering of Ockham’s view on the matter of universals Þtting so neatly with
our author’s view may count as a sure sign that Manlevelt indeed is an Ockhamist
in any reasonable sense of that term.
 See McCord Adams , . for an account of Ockham’s thoughts on the matter.
Ockham, she explains, will be identifying each universal with a really existent mental
act. In creatures, a mental act is a quality, namely, an accident inhering in a mental
substance (Summa logicae i, c.  (Opera Philosophica i, , ); Quodlibeta v, q. 
(Opera eologica ix, )). Only particulars really exist. Hence, each mental act
is a particular. All universals – genera, species, dierentia, propria and accidents –
are particular qualities, and hence: an accident. What makes names universal and
what sorts them into one category rather than another is not what they are, but what
and how they signify. All that really exists are particular substances and particular
qualities.
 q. , vb–vb: ‘Utrum aliquod accidens absit et assit preter subiecti corruptionem’.
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We should remember that to the medieval mind there existed only two
things: the extramental world and our knowledge about it. And these are
supposed to Þt neatly together. Busying himself with the logical side of
this bifurcated reality, Manlevelt works out the nominalist scheme to its
utter Ockhamist consequences. e logical scheme and reality should
Þt one another like the proportionate mall Þts a clay Þgure. But what if
the clay of reality keeps slipping o the sides of the mall, no matter how
hard you try to Þt the one to the other? What if reality turns out to be a
completely shapeless lump of clay once you try to li the mall for even a
second?
If the picture just presented is appropriate, it should give an indication
of the out-of-the-way world-view Manlevelt’s project results in. But a
word of caution may be in order here. Manlevelt invariably takes one
step back aer presenting his most revolutionary ideas, and states that
these are only a kind of thought-experiment. is can be interpreted as a
sign of modesty, maybe, or as a sign of prudence. I feel inclined to be just
as modest (or prudent) in presenting my interpretation of these rather
wild ideas.
e program carried out by omas Manlevelt involves the conse-
quent keeping apart of logic and extramental reality. And maybe it is not
a coincidence that he stresses this bifurcation in this very questio on the
accidents, by dedicating a set of distinctiones to it. But in the course of this
questio Manlevelt at least gives the impression of being simply unable to
uphold the strict bifurcation.
Yes, we get to see strange scenes unfold before our eyes, with the blur-
ring of the border between logic and extramental reality: the whitening
of a black-skinned Ethiopian,85 a Þre existing without heat, an animal
losing his natural body-heat.86 Are we not witnessing then the dawning
of a Heraclitean sort of reality, in which everything tends to ßood over
into everything else? Everything seems to be constantly moving; noth-
ing seems to remain the same from one instant to the next. And mixed
into this Heraclitean frame is there not a hint of Anaxagoreism as well?
 q.  ad opp., ra: ‘intellectus potest assentire huic propositioni “corvus est albus”
et huic “Ethiops est albus”, et hoc intellectis signiÞcatis vocabulorum, quia corvus et
nigredo sunt res totaliter distincte, et nigredo non sequitur corvum nec Ethiopem
ratione suorum principiorum essentialium, sed ratione alicuius complexionis acci-
dentalis’.
 q.  concl. , rb: ‘Patet igitur quod sine omni caliditate potest ignis existere,
et per consequens omnis caliditas est separabilis ab igne, et consimiliter sine omni
calore naturali potest hoc animal existere’.
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Might not all be all in all? With Manlevelt we have an Ockhamist setting
eye on all this strangeness. But remarkably enough insights into the ßoat-
ing world not at all unlike those developed by omas Manlevelt are also
traceable in the works of his contemporary Francis of Mayronnes, also
known as the Prince of Scotists.87 So the shi from a stable and solid Aris-
totelian worldview to a highly instable and ßuent Heraclitean worldview,
unexpected as its occurrence may be, was not at all limited to thinkers of
a highly nominalist frame of mind, but occurred within the realist camp
of Scotists as well.
In the Þrst distinction preceding the body of q. , Manlevelt distin-
guishes two ways in which an accident may be accepted. First, for the
term that is predicated in an accidental manner, and in this way we have
the Þh universal. Secondly, for a thing belonging to a subject with which
it does not form a unity, and in this way we use the term in its Þrst
intention, signifying something in the outside world.88 us, this prelim-
inary distinction is just enough to draw a sharp enough line between the
physical world and the world of logics; between the Þrst intentions and
the second intentions; between falsehood de virtute sermonis and truth
secundum intellectum auctoris. In fact, it is the very subject-matter of
this questio that is thus decided: whether an accident is present or absent
without the subject being destroyed. For it is true not de virtute sermo-
nis but secundum intellectum auctoris, who means to say that an accident
may be present or absent without the subject being destroyed.89
Maybe the distinction between the dierent ways in which an acci-
dent is accepted, will also shed some further light on the status of the
individual thing, that is to say: the connection of the presumably ‘stable’
individual subject to its presumably changeable accidents.
Questio  has just that for its subject matter: can an accident be
present and absent without the subject being destroyed? In other words:
is this description of the accident given by Porphyry a correct one?
 On Mayronnes, see Bos .
 q.  dist. , ra: ‘Prima distinctio est ista quod “accidens” accipitur dupliciter. Uno
modo pro termino qui accidentaliter predicatur, hoc est, non per se primo modo
vel secundo modo dicendi per se. Et sic accidens est quintum universale. Et isto
modo iste terminus “accidens” est nomen secunde intentionis. Alio modo accipitur
“accidens” pro aliqua re inherente alicui subiecto cum quo non facit per se unum,
sive talis res sit signum, sive non. Et sic iste terminus “accidens” est nomen prime
intentionis.’
 q.  concl. , ra: ‘hec propositio: “accidens adest et abest etcetera” est vera
secundum intellectum auctoris, quia stat loco istius “accidens potest adesse et abesse
preter subiecti corruptionem”.’
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e twofold manner, then, in which ‘accident’ can be accepted, is in
fact announced somewhat earlier in Manlevelt’s commentary, namely in
the Þrst distinction of the thirtieth questio, where the problem is raised
whether one thing can dier from another by an inseparable accident.90
Here it is stated simply that accident is accepted in a logical context for
a term that is predicated in an accidental manner, and in the context of
reality as a thing which inheres in a subject in an accidental manner.91
e full treatment however of this subject matter is in the forty-second
questio.
First, ‘accident’ can be accepted as a term which is accidentally predi-
cated. at is to say: a term which is not predicated per se, in the Þrst nor
the second way in which per se is said. ese two ways in which a term
can be predicated per se may need some clariÞcation. is clariÞcation
is to be found elsewhere in Manlevelt’s commentary.92 In the Þrst way
a term is said to be predicated per se not according to any of the parts
of the subject, but according to the subject as a whole; the second way
according to a part of the subject. us, genus and species are predicated
per se primo modo; dierentia and proprium are predicated per se secundo
modo. And accident is predicated per se neither primo modo nor secundo
modo. For accident, as already indicated by its very name, is predicated
not per se at all, but only accidentally.
 q. , va–rb: ‘Utrum aliquid ab alio dierat inseparabili accidente’.
 q.  dist. , va-b: ‘In ista questione primo premittitur distinctio de accidente
reali et de accidente logicali, non quod sic diert, scilicet quod nullum accidens
logicale sit accidens reale scilicet realiter alicui subiecto inherens, sed quod accidens
logicale accipiatur tantummodo pro termino qui accidentaliter predicatur, et reale
pro re que accidentaliter inheret alicui subiecto, de quo plus dicitur capitulo de
accidente.’
 In the second distinction of the ninth questio, the two ways of predicating are
discerned when considering the predication in quid and in quale in q.  dist. , vb:
‘Secunda distinctio est ista quod predicari in quid vel predicari in quale accipitur
dupliciter: uno modo primo, idest, non ratione alicuius partis, alio modo non
primo, quia ratione alicuius partis.’ On dierentia and proprium being predicated
per se secundo modo, see for example the fourth conclusion of the thirty-seventh
questio: ‘Quarta conclusio est ista quod nulla dierenti a speciÞca est necessaria ad
divisionem generis in suas species secundo modo per se, quia talis divisio potest
Þeri per proprium quod competit tali speciei per se secundo modo, ut si Þat talis
divisio: animalium aliud risibile, aliud hinnibile, in qua divisione nulla ponitur
dierentia speciÞca, et tamen genus dividitur in suas species, idest: per aliqua que
contrahunt genus ad standum pecise pro suppositis talium specierum, sicut hoc
proprium “risibile” contrahit hoc genus “animal” ad standum precise proprie pro
suppositis “hominis”.’
. form and contents of this text 
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Secondly, ‘accident’ can be accepted as a thing inherent to a subject
with which it does not form a unity on itself, whether such a thing is a
sign, or not.
In the Þrst manner, accident is the Þh universal, and the term ‘acci-
dent’ is a name of second intention.
In the second manner, the term ‘accident’ is a name of Þrst intention,
and is not to be confused with the Þh universal. Just like, as it is
remarked in passing in the aforementioned distinction of the thirtieth
questio, no logical accident is a real accident, in a real manner inhering
in a subject.
‘Presence and absence’ and ‘subject of an accident’ are likewise accept-
ed in the same twofold manner, that is to say: either in a real manner on
the level of Þrst intentions, meaning the real inherence or separation,
or in a logical manner on the level of second intentions, meaning the
a rmative or negative divisio.
Something is logicaliter said to be ‘present or absent’ by a rmative or
negative division; realiter by real inherence or real separation.93
And then ‘subject of an accident’ is logicaliter taken to be that of which
an accident is accidentally predicated; realiter that in which an accident
realiter inheres.
Taking this sharp distinction between logic and reality as his starting
point, Manlevelt goes on to draw some conclusions that may be said to
range from the over-obvious to the highly remarkable.
e Þrst conclusion states the obvious, namely that the law of contra-
diction does not allow that an accident can be both present and absent,
either in logic or in reality.94 e famous deÞnition of the accident as
something that is present and absent without the subject being destroyed,
is easily saved however, if we are prepared not to stick with its literal
meaning, but take into account the intention of the author. And that is
what Manlevelt does in the second conclusion. What is really meant by
the deÞnition is that the accident can be present and absent without the
 q.  dist. , ra: ‘Logicaliter aliquid dicitur “adesse et abesse” per divisionem
a rmativam vel negativam, realiter per realem inherentiam vel per realem separa-
tionem.’
 q.  concl. , ra: ‘Prima conclusio est ista quod nullum accidens adest et
abest preter subiecti corruptionem, et hoc qualitercumque accipitur “accidens” sive
“adesse et abesse”, quia ex hoc sequeretur quod aliquid competeret alicui et istud
non competeret eidem, quod est manifesta contradictio, sicud pretangebatur 〈in〉
argumento principali.’
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subject being destroyed.95 And this is the interpretation that Manlevelt is
to follow throughout his discussion of the famous deÞnition.
As remarked before, this is not the Þrst nor the only time that omas
Manlevelt opposes the literal meaning, that is to say the meaning de
virtute sermonis, to what is really meant by the author, that is to say the
intentio auctoris.96 In the thirtieth questio, for example, we read about
an accident being inseparable in a general manner of speaking, but
not in its literal sense.97 Elsewhere the meaning de virtute sermonis is
equated to the proper sense and opposed to the Þgurative sense: a certain
proposition is held to be false de virtute sermonis sive in sensu proprio,
but true in sensu transsumptivo.98 A pair of opposites to be reckoned
with in this context, although not be equated to the opposition between
the meaning de virtute sermonis versus the intentio auctoris, is the actus
exercitus in opposition to the actus signiÞcatus. Both of these are logical
acts, but whereas the proposition fulÞlling an actus exercitus is to be
identiÞed by the use of e.g. the copula ‘est’, the proposition referring
to an actus signiÞcatus is to be identiÞed by the use of e.g. the verb
‘predicatur’. e dierence between these two logical acts is succinctly
brought to the fore by Nuchelmans: ‘e very act of predicating, of
which the conventional copula indicates that it is being simultaneously
performed by the speaker, may subsequently be made the object of a
reßective predication of higher level in which the initial performed act is
merely conceived of and described rather than eectively performed, and
thus becomes an actus signiÞcatus.’99 In the twenty-Þh questio, whether
several men by participating in a species are one man,100 the two pairs of
 q.  concl. , ra: ‘Secunda conclusio est ista quod hec propositio: “accidens
adest et abest etcetera” est vera secundum intellectum auctoris, quia stat loco istius
“accidens potest adesse et abesse preter subiecti corruptionem”.’
 See above, section ..
 q.  concl. , vb: ‘si dicatur quod si hoc accidens sit inseparabile, igitur est non
separabile, igitur non-separabile, dico quod ista propositio “hoc accidens est insep-
arabile” in communi locutione stat loco istius “hoc accidens ab aliquo subiecto est
inseparabile”, et ideo, si cui placeat, potest distingui secundum amphiboliam, et dici
in sensu propria et in sensu transsumptivo vera secundum quod iam declaratum.’
 q.  concl. , ra: ‘conceditur communiter ista propositio: “Sortes et Plato sunt
eiusdem speciei specialissime nullo termino existente”, que quidem proprie falsa
est de virtute sermonis sive in sensu proprio, sed vera est in sensu transsumptivo.
Et est sensus “Sortes et Plato habent formas similes ultimata similitudine”, et hoc
extendendo nomen “similitudinis” ad substantiam.’
 Nuchelmans , .
 q. , va–va: ‘Utrum participation specie plures hominess sunt unus homo’.
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opposites happen to be nicely matched when it comes to interpreting the
proposition that ‘several men are one man’. In its proper sense, that is to
say according to its meaning de virtute sermonis, we have to do with an
actus exercitus. But taken not in its proper but in its Þgurative sense, we
have to do with an actus signiÞcatus, and then the intentio auctoris can
be reconstructed thus: of several men, that is to say, of several names of
men is predicated ‘one man’. ‘Sortes is one man’, ‘Plato is one man’, and so
forth.101 is is not to say, of course, that in general there exists a one-to-
one relationship between actus signiÞcatus and the intentio auctoris on
the one hand, and actus exercitus and the virtus sermonis on the other
hand.
Of course, the paired opposition between the actus exercitus as the
literal meaning and the actus signiÞcatus as the intention of the author
comes in very convenient for any nominalist trying to do away with all
hints of realism. Ockham himself has made proper use of it on several
occasions. He uses the opposition to lay out the ways in which genera
and species can or cannot be said to be substances, and the ways in
which substance can or cannot be said to be not in a subject. In at least
one passage he explicitly links each of these logical acts to its proper
intentional domain: the actus exercitus has to do with Þrst intentions;
the actus signiÞcatus with second intentions.102
Manlevelt Þnishes o his treatment of the status of the diverse terms,
and at the same time his commentary on the Isagoge, by securing the
status of each and every predicable as accidents, in a way.103 Accidents
taken in their being of second intention, that is.
 q.  dist. , ra: ‘Secunda distinctio est ista quod ista propositio “plures homines
sunt unus homo” est distinguenda eo quod poterit accipi in sensu proprio vel
in sensu transsumptivo. Sensus proprius est actus exercitus, qui accipitur ex vir-
tute sermonis et ex constructione grammaticali, sicut termini iacent. Sensus vero
transsumptivus sive improprius est actus signiÞcatus, scilicet iste: de pluribus homi-
nibus, hoc est, de pluribus nominibus hominum predicatur unus homo. Qui actus
signiÞcatus debet sic exerceri: “iste homo est homo, et iste homo est homo, et sic de
singulis”, vel sic: “Sortes est unus homo, Plato est unus homo, et sic de singulis”.’
 Ockham Summa logicae i ; OPh i .– on genera and species being sub-
stances; Summa logicae i , OPh i .– and Expositio in librum predicamen-
torum Aristotelis, cap. , OPh ii .– on substance being in a subject. For an
exposition of Ockham’s view on these matters, see Kaufmann , .
 q.  concl. , ra: ‘omne genus substantiale est accidens, et omnis species sub-
stantialis, et omnis dierentia, et omne proprium, quia quodlibet istorum est termi-
nus, et ultra: igitur aliquod accidens est genus substantiale, et aliquod accidens est
species, etcetera.’
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e reason for this is that each term can be said to be used in an
accidental manner to refer to something, up to the least likely candidate
for such a way of referring: the substantial genus. Manlevelt does not have
to look very far to Þnd an example, for Aristotle provides him with the
master, who only accidentally is called a man or an animal.104 Essentially,
of course, a master is the master of a slave. ‘Master’, in other words,
is an item belonging to the category of relation. And for this reason
‘man’, being an item belonging to the category of substance, can only be
predicated trans-categorically, that is to say, accidentally of ‘master’. So
even the prime example of a substantial genus, animal, can be used in an
accidental manner to refer to something, and therefore, in this way is an
accident.
To push matters still a little further, Manlevelt even mentions God as
being an accident in this way, for God is used in an accidental manner
to refer to the knower of some proposition A – an item belonging to
the category of relation.105 It was already revolutionary for Manlevelt to
hold that an accident can be truly ascribed to God, namely, ‘knowing the
(contingent) proposition A at a time when this proposition A happens to
be true’.106 Aer all, in the very Þrst Questio of this commentary on the
Isagoge God was given full honour as being the First Science and First
Cause, without Whom no knowledge whatsoever would be possible.107
But now God himself, or at least the term ‘God’ is awarded the status
of a mere accident. But if even a substantial genus is an accident, so is
every substantial species, and every dierence, and every property, for
all of these are terms and as such are accidents, in the way that they are
veriÞed of something in an accidental manner, just like ‘man’ is veriÞed
in accidental manner of ‘master’.108
 Aristoteles, Categoriae, , a–, tr. Boethii: ‘ut si servus ad dominum dicitur,
circumscriptis omnibus quae sunt accidentia domino, ut esse bipedem vel scientiae
susceptibilem vel hominem, relicto vero solo dominum esse, semper servus ad illud
dicetur; servus enim domini servus dicitur.’
 q.  concl. , ra: ‘sicud “homo” est accidens domino, ita “Deus” est accidens
scienti A propositionem.’
 q.  concl. , va: ‘accidente isto modo accepto, scilicet, pro uno predicabili
accidentaliter, Deo potest competere aliquod accidens, quia: capiatur ista propositio
“Sortes sedet”, que tantum sit vera per unam horam, et vocetur A, tunc hoc accidens
“sciens A” competit Deo, quia hec est vera: “Deus est sciens A”, et hoc accidens potest
adesse Deo et potest abesse, sicud de se notum est.’
 q.  concl. , rb: ‘prima scientia que est prima causa est necessaria, et sine ipsa
nulla cognitio potest haberi.’
 In his two-volume study on Aristotle’s semantics and ontology, De Rijk makes a case
for an onomastic approach to Aristotle’s ‘speaking about things’. at is to say, the
. form and contents of this text 
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Of course, all terms are not accidents in every sense of the term ‘acci-
dent’. In this context, Manlevelt distinguishes three senses of ‘accident’,
the Þrst one being the sense in which all predicables – as terms – are
accidents because they are veriÞed of something in an accidental man-
ner. e second sense of ‘accident’ is the well-known one of being able to
be there or not be there without the subject being destroyed, for example
‘sitting’ as an accident of ‘man’. And the third sense in which something
extrinsic which is an accident is in reality inherent in a subject, such as for
example the term ‘black’ connotes something extrinsic to a raven, which
is realiter in the raven as an accident in a subject.
e second sense, needless to say, is not the sense in which any
substantial genus is an accident. For of whatever subject the term ‘animal’
is predicated in a true manner, of this same subject ‘animal’ cannot be
veritably denied without the subject being destroyed in the process.
What are we to make of this? Is this just an innocent device by
Manlevelt, to hold that every predicable in a sense is only an accident? Or
does this conclusion weigh heavier, if only we take in account the place
it takes our text, namely, as its Þnale?
e least one can say is that the link between terms and reality tends
to look rather thin, if the linking takes place on an accidental level only.
Of course, adhering to a conventional relationship linking the terms to
reality is nothing unusual. In fact, it is the Aristotelian manner of seeing
these things. But is Manlevelt not taken (albeit with some reserve) to
be the author of a treatise, devastating to the modist way of thinking?109
Might not, then, his stressing of the merely accidental status of the
Þve Porphyrian predicables when applied to the real world, be a thinly-
disguised way of criticising the ‘natural’ link supposed to exist between
terms and things by some, presumably the modists so severely attacked
by him in another context? But I am entering the Þeld of speculation here.
basic mental activity involved on this score, according to De Rijk a, , should
be taken in terms of onomastics (‘naming’, ‘appellating’), rather than, as is commonly
done, in terms of apophantics (‘sentence predication’ and ‘statement-making’).
Should perhaps omas Manlevelt’s approach be taken in terms of onomastics as
well? And would Manlevelt then be immune to De Rijk’s verdict on present-day
scholars like Cohen, Matthews and Bäck, namely that their apophanticly inspired
conclusions about Aristotle are ‘entirely beside the point’? (De Rijk a, )
is would be a fruitful matter of future investigation, that can best be undertaken
on the occasion of the critical edition of omas Manlevelt’s Questiones super
Predicamenta, which I intend to produce as a follow-up to the present edition.
 See above, section . on the anti-modist Tractatus de improbatione modorum
signiÞcandi.
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... e general structure of the text
e foregoing interpretation of Manlevelt’s intentions may serve as a
starting point and a guiding thread for future studies, in which any one
of his basic themes could be scrutinized. To Þnish o this Introduction,
Þrst the general structure of his text needs examining. e general
grouping of questiones in Manlevelt’s commentary on the Isagoge then
is as follows.
qq. – are concerned with general questions about our knowledge
of the universals as related to our knowledge of the categories, and to
our capacity to make divisions and deÞnitions, and about the location of
universals in our intellect.
e Þrst universal, genus, is treated in qq. –, with qq. –
concentrating on the individual rather than the genus.
e second universal, species, is treated within the context of qq. –
, with qq.  and  again concerning itself with the individual, and
qq. – with more general themes like the transcendentia, the exact
number of genera, and the highest genera.
e third universal, dierentia, gets ample treatment in no less than
thirteen consecutive questiones: qq. –.
e fourth universal, proprium, is awarded one questio: q. .
e last four questiones, qq. – are dedicated to the Þh universal,
accidens.
... A comparison to other questiones-commentaries on the Isagoge
It is up to future investigations to thematically probe a little deeper into
the text of Manlevelt’s commentary. Meanwhile, a bird’s eye one-by-one
view on the respective questiones may already give an indication as to
what problems are raised and solved in the text to follow.
In fact, the mere enumeration of the questiones asked by omas
Manlevelt about Porphyry’s text and the comparing of these questiones
to tables of contents of questiones-commentaries by fellow-nominalists110
is enough to strengthen my conviction that Manlevelt was a nominalist
of an Ockhamist denomination.
 is quick scan of question-titles is a not uncommon short-cut to obtain a good Þrst
impression of a questions-commentary. Kenny and Pinborg , : ‘e selection
of tituli 〈questionis〉 reßects current interests, and so a mere list of questions is oen
indicative of the time and place of origin of the commentary.’
. form and contents of this text 
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I will limit my attention to three examples.111 John Buridan and Albert
of Saxony are two philosophers whose names are frequently mentioned
in connection with omas Manlevelt; Henry Totting of Oyta’s views
on logic have not recently been studied, but on Þrst sight a comparison
between his and Manlevelt’s views may be worthwhile. Let us see to what
questions the Isagoge gave rise to for John Buridan, Albert of Saxony and
Henry Totting of Oyta, respectively.112
John Buridan: Quaestiones in Isagogen Porphyrii:113
. Utrum logica sit scientia;
. Utrum logica sit scientia speculativa vel practica;
. Utrum universale sit subiectum proprium in libro Porphyrii;
. Utrum universalia sint substantiae;
. Utrum ista propositio ‘animal est genus’ vel ‘homo est species’
debeat concedi vel negari;
. Utrum propositio in qua subicitur terminus materialiter sumptus
sit universalis particularis indeÞnita vel singularis;
. Utrum deÞnitio generis sit bona;
. Utrum deÞnitio speciei sit bona;
. Utrum deÞnitio individui sit bona;
. De arbore Porphyrii;
. Utrum deÞnitio dierentiae sit bona quam ponit Porphyrius;
. Utrum deÞnitio proprii sit bona quam ponit Porphyrius;
. Utrum deÞnitio accidentis sit bona;
 Otherwise a comparison to, e.g. the Tractatus de universalibus by Ockham’s critic
Wyclif might have come into consideration. Wyclif does round o the Þeen
chapters of his treatise with four chapters discussing six questions, whose enu-
meration do not promise much in the way of a concordance between Manlevelt’s
logico-semantical inspired treatment of the universals and Wyclif ’s seemingly more
theologically-orientated interest in the matter: . – Is substance said univocally of
primary and secondary substances?; . – Can a universal be generated, changed, or
created?; . – Is annihilation compatible with the postulation of universals as set
out above?; . What are we to say about speciÞc distinctions?; . – Whether genus
and species could be fuller, or extend over more supposits than they do now?; . – Is
everything universal? And if so, is it not superßuous to posit universals of the second
intention of nature? (John Wyclif , –)
 A similar comparison between the mere tables of contents of commentaries on the
Isagoge by Martin of Dacia, Peter of Auvergne, Radulphus Brito and William Russell
is given by Libera in Porphyry  cxxxv .; somewhat deeper goes the comparison
of Andrew of Cornwall’s questions on the Isagoge with the Porphyry questions by
Simon of Faversham and John Duns Scot in Andrews .
 Source: John Buridan .
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. Utrum sint quinque praedicabilia non plura neque pauciora;
. Utrum universale sit genus ad quinque praedicabilia seu univer-
salia;
. Utrum genus species dierentia et proprium suscipiant magis et
minus sicut et accidens.
John Buridan: Tractatus de dierentia universalis ad individuum (pars
secunda), a.k.a. Duae quaestiones de universali:114
. Utrum universale sit actu praeter animam;
. Utrum universale sit praeter animam unum unitate alia ab unitate
numerali.
Albert of Saxony: Alberti de Saxonia Quaestiones in Porphyrii librum
praedicabilium:115
Prooemium:
. Utrum de quinque praedicabilibus sit una scientia;
. Utrum universale sit proprium subiectum scientiae huius;
. Utrum quodlibet universale sit ens;
. Utrum hic terminus universale sit genus ad quinque universalia;
. Utrum isti termini genus, species, dierentia, proprium, accidens
et individuum possint deÞniri;
. Utrum praedicabilia sint quinque et non plura neque pauciora;
Alberti Parvi quaestio unica de genere:
. Utrum deÞnitio generis sit bona;
Alberti Parvi quaestio prima de specie:
. Utrum deÞnitio speciei quam ponit Porphyrius sit bona;
Quaestio secunda [de specie]:
. Utrum deÞnitio individui quam ponit Porphyrius sit bona;
Quaestio tertia [de specie]:
. Utrum haec propositio sit vera, scilicet ‘aliquis homo est species’;
Alberti Parvi quaestio unica [de differentia]:
. Utrum deÞnitio dierentiae sit bona;
Alberti Parvi quaestio unica de proprio:
. Utrum deÞnitio proprii sit bona;
quaestio unica de accidenti Alberti Parvi:
. Utrum deÞnitio accidentis sit bona.
 Source: John Buridan .
 Source: García .
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Henry Totting of Oyta: Quaestiones in Isagogen Porphyrii:116
. Utrum notitia quinque universalium sit inter species scientiae col-
locanda;
. Utrum universale sit subiectum scientiae Porphyrii;
. Utrum obiecta scientiÞca conclusionum in Porphyrio traditarum
sint omnibus incomplexe signiÞcantibus realiter condistincta;
. Utrum cognitio quinque universalium sit necessaria et ad cogni-
tionem praedicamentorum, ad di nitionem et ad divisionem, nec
non ad ea, quae requiruntur ad demonstrationem;
. Utrum universale sit aliqua res extra animam, ab omnibus suis
singularibus participatum;
. Utrum sint tantum quinque universalia;
. Utrum universale sit genus ad quinque universalia, ista scilicet
genus, species, dierentia, proprium et accidens;
. Utrum genus sit principium specierum sub se contentarum;
. Utrum di nitio generis a Porphyrio data sit bona;
. Utrum unum individuum sit tantum de uno solo praedicabile;
. Utrum necessario ad esse individui principium individuationis re-
quiratur;
. Utrum di nitio speciei specialissimae data a Porphyrio sit bona;
. Utrum species possit salvari tantum unico ipsius individuo exis-
tente;
. Utrum ens dicatur univoce de decem praedicamentis;
. Utrum participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo;
. Utrum inferius possit praedicari de suis superioribus;
. Utrum aliquid diert a seipso dierentia communiter dicta;
. Utrum dierentia speciÞca sive dierentia inter proprie dicta ha-
beat facere diversitatem essentialem entium speciÞce distincto-
rum;
. Utrum dierentia sit divisiva generis et constitutiva speciei;
. Utrum aliqua di nitionum dierentiae a Porphyrio datarum sit
bona et convertibiliter conveniens eidem;
. Utrum di nitio proprii a Porphyrio data sit bona, ista scilicet:
‘Proprium inest soli omni et semper’;
. Utrum omne proprium realiter sit distinctum ab eo, cuius est pro-
prium;
 Source: Henry Totting of Oyta .
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. Utrum di nitio accidentis data a Porphyrio, scilicet quod ‘adest et
abest praeter subiecti coruptionem’, sit bona;
. Utrum corvus potest intelligi albus et Aethiops nitens candore.
omas Manlevelt: Questiones libri Porphirii:
. Utrum necesse sit aliquem scire quid genus sit et quid species
etcetera ad cognitionem predicamentorum habendam;
. Utrum scire quid sit genus etcetera sit necesse ad divisionem facien-
dam;
. Utrum noscere quid sit genus sit necessarium ad assignationem
di nitionem.;
. Utrum universale sit 〈in〉 intellectu;
. Utrum genus sit equivocum.;
. Utrum genus sit cui supponitur species, et hoc est querere utrum
illa di nitio generis sit bene data;
. Utrum genus sit principium suarum specierum;
. Utrum genus predicetur de pluribus dierentibus specie;
. Utrum omne genus predicatur in quid;
. Utrum genus dierat ab individuo;
. Utrum individuum predicetur de uno solo;
. Utrum aliquod individuum sit terminus communis;
. Utrum proprietas unius individui inveniatur in altero;
. Utrum species sit res distincta a termino sive a signo;
. Utrum homo sit species animalis;
. Utrum genus et species sint sibi invicem relativa;
. Utrum in di nitione speciei sit necesse poni genus;
. Utrum ista di nitio speciei ‘species est que predicatur de pluribus
numero dierentibus in eo quod quid sit’, sit bona;
. Utrum omne quod est ante individua, sit species specialissima;
. Utrum individuum sit nomen appellativum;
. Utrum unum sit genus omnium; hoc est querere, utrum talia tran-
scendentia aliquid, res, ens, sint genera;
. Utrum tantum sint decem genera et non plura, neque pauciora;
. Utrum genera generalissima sint principia rerum;
. Utrum inÞnita relinquenda sint ab arte;
. Utrum participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo;
. Utrum inferiora predicentur de superioribus;
. Utrum species sit pars generis;
. Utrum aliquid dierat a seipso;
. Utrum aliqua substantia dierat ab alia separabili accidente;
. form and contents of this text 
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. Utrum aliquid ab alio dierat inseparabili accidente;
. Utrum dierentia speciÞca semper faceat aliquid ab alio dierre
specie;
. Utrum omne faciens per se dierre sit dierentia speciÞca;
. Utrum dierentia per se suscipit magis et minus;
. Utrum hec dierentia ‘animatum sensibile’ sit constitutiva sub-
stantie animalis;
. Utrum hec dierentia ‘immortale’ sit constitutiva Dei;
. Utrum eadem dierentia sit discretiva generis et constitutiva spe-
ciei;
. Utrum dierentia speciÞca sit necessaria ad divisionem generis;
. Utrum dierentia speciÞca sit necessaria ad di nitionem facien-
dam;
. Utrum ista di nitio dierentie sit bene data: ‘dierentia est qua
abundat species a genere’;
. Utrum aliqua alia di nitio dierentie convertitur cum dierentia;
. Utrum proprium dicatur quadrupliciter;
. Utrum aliquod accidens absit et assit preter subiecti corruptionem;
. Utrum ex subiecto et accidente componatur aliquod per se unum;
. Utrum corvus possit subintelligi albus;
. Utrum aliquod accidens sit genus substantiale.
As I set out at the beginning of this chapter,117 certain questiones receive
a more complex treatment than others; they may contain sub-arguments
and reports of alternative positions.118 It is Andrews’s readily to be en-
dorsed surmise that this sort of complexity grows out of a tradition of
successive treatments of an issue. It is generally previous authors and
their opinions that are responsible for alternative opinions inserted into
the ordinary progression of argument. Increased complexity is then a
sure sign that we are getting further along in the chain of development
of tradition. An obvious mark of continuous tradition is similarity of
questions, which is all the more remarkable when the questions are
only loosely prompted by the original text. Similarities in preliminary
arguments do not so much argue direction of inßuence, but do indicate
a shared tradition.119
 is Introduction, section ..
 As indicated in section ., this applies especially to questiones , , ,  and .
 Andrews , .
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e outcome then is that common arguments and turns of phrase
are the signs of direct inßuence. erefore, if it so happens that one
author quotes and rejects views which another author sets forth as his
considered opinion, one can be sure that the Þrst author has read the
other, and not the other way around.120
Keeping this in mind, I will conÞne myself now to a bird’s eye view of
the lists of questiones. What is to be seen then is that the commentaries
by John Buridan and Albert of Saxony more or less form a pair, and the
commentaries by omas Manlevelt and Henry Totting of Oyta more or
less the other pair.
Albert and John seem content to run through the deÞnitions given of
the respective universals, while refraining from going into matters too
loosely prompted by Porphyry’s original text. Of the thirteen questions
posed by Albert, no less than ten are also to be found in John’s commen-
tary. Of course this is largely to be explained by the superÞciality of their
questioning, but when Albert and John do distance themselves some-
what from Porphyry’s text, their questions are also similar when the one
commentary is compared to the other. at concerning the number of
universals is to be found with John as q. , with Albert as q. . True,
Henry poses the same question in his q. , but Manlevelt instead of this
raises the same question about the number of categories in his q. .
ere are dierences as well. For example, John on a par with omas
and Henry is consequently speaking only of universals, while Albert
speaks about predicables as well as universals.
Henry chooses a somewhat more traditional opening to his commen-
tary than omas does by raising a couple of preliminary questions
concerning the scientiÞc status of an investigation into the universals,
omitted by the author of the present text. As soon however as it is the uni-
versals themselves that are at issue, Henry is remarkably close to omas
in the questions that he raises.
omas’s Þrst three questiones,121 concerning the necessity of knowing
the universals for building up scientiÞc knowledge, are taken up together
by Henry in q. ,122 while omas’s q. , whether a universal is in
 Andrews , .
 Circa initium Porphirii, utrum necesse sit aliquem scire quid genus sit et quid
species etcetera ad cognitionem predicamentorum habendam; Utrum scire quid sit
genus etcetera sit necesse ad divisionem faciendam; Utrum noscere quid sit genus
sit necessarium ad assignationem di nitionem.
 Utrum cognitio quinque universalium sit necessaria et ad cognitionem praedica-
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the intellect, is rephrased by Henry as q. : whether a universal is
something extramental. Both have a questio (omas’s q.  and Henry’s
q. , respectively) on genus as the principle of its species. Whether
an individual is predicated of only one is omas’s q.  and Henry’s
q. . An explicit question on an individuating principle is raised by
Henry (q. ), but not by omas. e answering of Henry’s q. ,
whether being is said univocally of the ten categories, plays a pivotal
role in omas’s q. , whether there is one genus of all things. e
wording of q.  by Henry is exactly the same as omas’s q. : ‘Utrum
participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo’. From there on
both philosophers go on to ask whether inferiors can be predicated
of superiors (omas q. , Henry q. ). Whether something diers
from itself is again a question taken up by Henry (q. ) and omas
(q. ) alike. Henry’s q.  and omas’s q.  both seem to turn
on the necessity of the speciÞc dierence for the division of a genus,
while the more general question whether dierentia is dividing the
genus and constituting the species is asked in q.  (Henry) and q. 
(omas) respectively. Apart from a few more general questiones shared
by both, attention should also be drawn to Henry’s last questio (q. ),
‘Utrum corvus potest intelligi albus et Aethiops nitens candore’, echoing
omas’s penultimate questio (q. ) ‘Utrum corvus possit subintelligi
albus’.
Henry Totting of Oyta is not one of the best-researched among the
late-medieval philosophers, but with all due provisions one can be fairly
sure that he was an Ockhamist (if one is allowed to use this label) work-
ing in Prague, Paris and Vienna in the second half of the fourteenth
century.123 In the introduction to his edition of the Quaestiones in Isa-
gogen Porphyrii Schneider draws some interesting parallels with Ock-
ham’s thoughts on the matters touched upon by Henry.124 A comparison
between Henry’s commentary and that by omas Manlevelt promises
to be even more interesting. Here there is a striking similarity of ques-
tiones, which is all the more remarkable because the questions are only
loosely prompted by the original text. In other words: what shows itself
here according to the criteria laid down by Andrews is an obvious mark
of a continuous tradition. A closer textual scrutiny of both texts should
mentorum, ad di nitionem et ad divisionem, nec non ad ea, quae requiruntur ad
demonstrationem.
 For information on Oyta, it is still Lang  we best turn to.
 Henry Totting of Oyta , .
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reveal any similarity in preliminary arguments to further strengthen the
plausibility of this shared tradition. It might even be that this particular
tradition was started by Manlevelt himself, just like the tradition con-
cerning the so-called ‘descensus copulatim’ was supposedly started by
him and then picked up by Albert of Saxony.125 Ideally, such scrutiny
of both authors’ commentaries on the Isagoge will bring to light some
signs of direct inßuence in the form of common arguments and turns of
phrase. It will be interesting to Þnd out if the one author (Henry) does
indeed quote and reject views which the other author (omas) sets forth
as his considered opinion – the surest sign one can wish for that the one
may have read the other.
... omas Manlevelt’s commentary, questio by questio
Let us not get carried away. Let me begin with taking a look at the text to
be edited below. omas Manlevelt – I have made this remark before –
does not start his investigation by raising the traditional questions either
on the very subject of the treatise, the universal as such, or on the status of
logic as a science. Instead, inq.  he places the subject matter126 of the Þrst
and second halves of his commentary on the Old Logic in perspective:
is it necessary to know about the universals (i.e. the subject matter of
Porphyry’s Isagoge, commented on in the present text, the Questiones
libri Porphirii) to have complete knowledge of the categories (i.e. the
subject matter of Aristotle’s treatise, commented on in the Questiones
super Predicamenta). What strikes the reader about this very Þrst questio
is the unconcerned way in which God is brought up in a logical context.127
In qq.  and  one learns that knowledge of the universals is neces-
sary to completely be able to make logical divisions and deÞnitions.128 In
short, without knowing the universal there would be no science whatso-
ever.
 See above, subsection .. of this Introduction, for the discussion by Read, Brands
and Kann on this particular topic.
 Every Þeld of scholastic science has its own subiectum. is subiectum lends a unity
to a particular science, distinguishes a particular science from other sciences, Þxes
a place for this particular science within the whole of all sciences, and so forth. For
a discussion of this subiectum as it was looked upon around the year , with an
emphasis on he subiectum of theology, see Krop , .
 q.  dist. , rab; q.  concl. , va.
 To put it in a few words, divisio (division) is simply the way to descend from a highest
genus to its lowest species – by doing what the word says: making divisions. Just
as categorizing is simply the way to ascend from the lowest species to the highest
. form and contents of this text 
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In q.  it is stated that the mental universal,129 which is a natural
universal, is in the mind in a subjective manner,130 and that two such
universals may be in the mind simultaneously. e attention paid to the
respective universals in the process of knowing presents itself as a topic,
which is to recur in the remainder of Manlevelt’s text. More will have
to be said about this in future studies. Note the token-character of the
universals in actual use,131 and the tendency towards a psychological-
epistemological account of logic. Manlevelt seems to be breaking new
ground here, oddly foreshadowing the psychologically oriented logic of
Port-Royal by some centuries.
q.  presents us with the rather disturbing conclusion that ‘genus’ is
equivocal, and even that a concept in a sense is equivocal.132 is matter
genus – by putting things together. at which divides a genus, constitutes a species,
in Porphyry’s treatment of the predicables. Now the theory of the predicables, which
was universally held to be the proper introduction to Aristotle’s treatment of the
categories, was exempliÞed by the tree of Porphyry. But this tree of Porphyry was the
result of a dichotomizing process of division, taking one of the categories, substance,
as its starting point. So in a way the theory of division seems to be even more basic
than the theory of the predicables. No wonder, then, that division, the theory of
which was developed by Boethius, is generally accorded an important role in the
medieval scheme of thinking. In his treatise De divisione Boethius provided not only
medieval logic but all of medieval philosophy with some of its basic conceptual tools.
It is a study of dierent sorts of division – e.g. the division of a genus into its species
or the division of a whole into its integral parts – and as such forms an important part
of the logical heritage on which the scholastic period built. Boethius’ De divisione
was indeed part of the canon of the logica vetus, which means that all subsequent
medieval philosophizing on the subject was wont to take this tract as its starting
point. Logical divisions and deÞnitions, then, are more or less complementary ways
of classifying terms or concepts. Simply put, division is the laying out of a term or
concept in its underlying terms or concepts (for example: a genus in its respective
species). us: animals (genus) are either rational animals (species) or irrational
animals (species). DeÞnition is the pinning down of a term or concept by combining
the genus it belongs to with its speciÞc dierence. us: a man (species) is an
animal (genus) that is rational (dierence). Much more about this in Manlevelt’s
own distinctions on divisions in q , ra and on deÞnitions in q , vb.
 A universal as it is to be found functioning within our mind, in contrast to its being
found functioning in writing or speech.
 at is to say: as an accident inhering in a subject.
 A token in this sense is an individual instance of a universal. For a clear exposition
of the narrowed particular meaning of an utterance-token in a particular context in
juxtaposition to the general meaning of an utterance-type, see Nuchelmans , .
See also above, section ., especially the foot-note relative to this subject.
 A term is called equivocal, in a generally accepted Aristotelian manner, if the one
term goes with dierent meanings. In the Þrst distinctio to q.  ‘utrum aliquod
individuum sit terminus communis’ (vb), Manlevelt gives a general deÞnition of
equivocity in a common noun: ‘“Commune equivocum” dicitur istud quod competit
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is taken up in some detail in the second questio of the commentary on the
Categories: ‘utrum aliquis conceptus sit equivocus’, added as an appendix
to the present edition. is is certainly a matter deserving further study.133
q.  states the relationship between genus and species: there are always
more than one species to one genus. e exact way species are contained
under a genus is explained in q. . Furthermore, in q.  one learns that
species underlie being as well as genus. A sharp line is drawn between
genus as a building block in our conceptual framework, and things in
reality falling under a genus.
e conclusions of q.  deÞnitely stand in need of further investiga-
tion. Is every genus by itself predicated134 of several things (Þrst conclu-
sion), or is no genus so predicated (fourth conclusion)? And is every
genus predicated of several things by some signiÞcate of it (sixth conclu-
sion), or is no genus thus predicated? Might this apparent contradiction
have anything to do with dierent levels of supposition?135 e three main
types of supposition do play an important role in the settlement of sev-
eral questions to come.136
pluribus ratione diversorum conceptuum, sive isti conceptus sint simplices, sive
compositi, ita videlicet quod istud commune competit uni mediante uno conceptu
simplici, et alteri mediante alio, et tertio mediante tertio, quamvis ex istis concepti-
bus unus conceptus componatur’. A more detailed exposition of the diverse types of
equivocation is given here in the distinctio to q.  ‘utrum genus sit equivocum’ (ra).
 e more interesting is this theorizing about the possibility of there being equiv-
ocal concepts, as this seems to be a glaring contradiction to what Ockham holds:
‘Aequivocatio vero nullo modo est conceptuum’. (Expositio in librum Praedicamen-
torum Aristotelis, cap. . Opera Philosophica pars ii, ).
 Predicating is the labelling of a certain thing by a certain term. What is at stake
here is whether the highly individual things in the outside world can be adequately
labelled by such a highly general term as a genus happens to be. Further on in his
commentary, in the disinctio to q.  ‘utrum inferiora predicentur de superioribus’
(ra–rb) Manlevelt makes a distinction between predicating in a large sense and in
a strict sense. In a large sense, it extends to all kinds of predication, whether true or
false, a rmative or negative, etc. In a strict sense, it is restricted to a rmative, true
predication.
 Supposition in medieval logico-semantical theory is the way a term in a proposition
stands for something. is something can be either a thing or things in the outside
world (personal supposition), or the concept itself (simple supposition), or the word
itself in its written or spoken form (material supposition). As remarked in footnote
 to subsection .. above, Dutilh Novaes has recently proposed an intensional
interpretation of at least Ockham’s theory of supposition, contrary to the more
common referential interpretation (Dutilh Novaes ).
 omas Manlevelt delivered some short but highly inßuential tracts on the ‘new’
logic while lecturing in Paris in the ’s. One of these tracts, explicitly referred
. form and contents of this text 
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In q.  it is explained that every genus is essentially predicated. is
does mean that a genus cannot also be predicated in quale. is is made
to in our commentary on the Isagoge, was on the theory of supposition (q. ,
ad ., va). e commentary on the Isagoge does not contain any theorizing about
supposition, apart from a main dividing of supposition into material, personal
and simple in the distinctio to q.  ‘utrum homo sit species animalis’ (vb),
but a theory of supposition is presupposed by the scant references to supposition
made use of in the commentary. For example, throughout q.  ‘utrum inferior
predicentur de superioribus’ (vb–vb) use is made of the diverse subtypes of
personal supposition, also in relation to the predicate or the copula in a proposition.
It will be worthwhile to see in how far these references are compatible with the
elaborate theory presented in Manlevelt’s tract on supposition, once its critical
edition is published. e contents of Manlevelt’s tract on supposition, meanwhile,
are neatly brought into a diagram by Maierù , . is diagram visualizes
four levels of division and subdivision of supposition, according to Manlevelt.
e Þrst and main division is into material, simple and personal supposition. Of
these three, only personal supposition is further subdivided, Þrst into determinate,
distributed and confused personal supposition. en confused personal supposition
is further subdivided into merely confused personal supposition and confused and
distributive personal supposition. Finally, the confused and distributive personal
supposition is again subdivided into mobile and immobile. e Þrst thing to be
remarked about the initial threefold division of supposition as advocated by omas
Manlevelt is that it is very much like the schematization to be distilled from
Ockham’s Summa logicae. (For a visualization, see Spade , .) e only
dierences are that before making the tripartite division into simple, material
and personal supposition, Ockham distinguishes between proper and improper
supposition, and that he infuses one level of division of the personal supposition:
personal division is Þrst subdivided into discrete and common personal supposition,
and then common supposition is further subdivided into determinate and confused,
whereas Manlevelt skips the common personal supposition. Ockham’s distinction
between proper and improper supposition is not worked out in too many details,
and needs not distract us. Su ce it to say that with improper supposition we have
to think of the reference a term has when it is used Þguratively and not literally.
If Ockham’s discrete personal supposition is roughly to be equated to omas
Manlevelt’s distributed personal supposition, the pictures of both schematizations
completely match. An even more perfect match to Ockham’s scheme, down to
every detail of the personal supposition, is to be found with Albert of Saxony, who
however makes no mention of improper supposition. is Albert of Saxony is worth
mentioning if only because according to Brands  he has severely criticized
omas Manlevelt’s theory. But a possible misunderstanding must be put aside now.
From the likeness of the schematizations of the supposition theories by Manlevelt,
Ockham and Albert of Saxony the impression might arise that all medieval theories
of supposition were alike, and that all of them started o with a tripartite division
of supposition into simple, material and personal division. But the truth is far from
that. Spade (, –) put in diagrams the divisions of supposition proper
by medieval thinkers from the thirteenth century handbook-writer Peter of Spain
(d. ) onward, and a quick glance at these diagrams shows that this threefold
division was to be found with hardly anyone apart from the three nominalists just
mentioned. is picture is conÞrmed by the diagrams in Maierù , –.
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clear by the example of the genus ‘coloured’, that is predicated in quale of
substance, albeit in an accidental manner.137
q. , which most certainly stands in need of a fuller treatment than it
is rewarded in this bird’s eye view, addresses the key matter of Manlevelt’s
undertaking: whether genus (the most all-compassing of universals) dif-
fers from individuum (the least all-compassing of predicates, and there-
fore not even counted among the universals, even though it may seem
to get a hint of the status of a universal in the enumeration referred to
before).138 As names of Þrst intention,139 genus and individuum do not
dier, both signifying beings in reality which, aer all, are all individ-
ual in nature. Here as in so many other places, one is again reminded
that the generality of the universals is in their second-intentional use, not
in their Þrst-intentional use. In their Þrst-intentional use, all universals
signify things in reality, which are individual in nature. In their second-
intentional use, all Þve universals signify signs or names which in their
turn, and signiÞcatively taken, are predicated of more than one of these
individual things. (Each occurrence of these signs, one should keep in
mind while studying Manlevelt’s commentary on the Isagoge, is an indi-
vidual occurrence of such a particular sign – whether spoken, written or
mental.)
at is why in q.  it is stated that individuum in its strict sense (i.e.
in its second-intention use) is univocally predicated of more than one
thing. It is, namely, predicated univocally of so many signs that in their
turn, and signiÞcatively taken, are predicated of only one thing.
q.  nicely lends itself to a comparison with Manlevelt’s undisput-
edly authentic tract on supposition; by which it will turn out that the
countering of the second initial argument is in full accordance with
 q  concl. , vb: ‘aliquod genus predicatur in quale in primo, sicut patet de hoc
genere “coloratum”, quod predicatur in quale de substantia.’ q  ad ., ra: ‘genus
predicatur tam in quid quam in quale de suis propriis speciebus, sicut hoc genus
“corpus animatum” (…). Predicatur etiam genus in quale accidentale quamvis non
de suis speciebus.’
 q  concl. , rb that is: ‘(…) omne quod dividit genus, vel est species, vel
individuum, vel est proprium, vel accidens, vel dierentia speciÞca.’
 Simply put, as a name of Þrst intention a term itself refers to things in the outside
world. As a name of second intention a term refers not to a thing in the outside
world, but to a concept or a term which (as a name of Þrst intention) in its turn
refers to things in the outside world. us, ‘man’ in ‘I see a man in the street’ is
a name of Þrst intention, while ‘man’ is a name of second intention in ‘Man is a
species’.
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that tract. e third and Þnal conclusion of q.  treats individuum in its
Þrst-intention use as a transcendent term.140
e Þh conclusion of q.  brings up an interesting argument about
the shared individuality of the whole Sortes and Sortes except his Þn-
ger.141 is argument was to be further developed in the mid-fourteenth
century by William of Heytesbury and Albert of Saxony. It has recently
been named the ‘Socrates-Minus Argument’.142
q. , whether individuum is a general term, oers some distinctions
on univocity and equivocity, in their relationship to generality.143 omas
Manlevelt seems to toy with the possibility of there being equivocal con-
cepts – a theme taken up in q.  of his commentary on Aristotle’s Cate-
gories, to be added as an appendix to the present edition. His conclusions
 A transcendent term, in this context, is a term that is applicable to everything
there is in the outside world, like ‘being’, ‘something’, ‘thing’. Now what can be
said of all things (ens, unum, verum, bonum, sometimes supplemented with res
and/or aliquid, the last two originally stemming from Avicenna), can be said of
several things as well. But on the other hand, what can be said of several things
cannot always be said of all things. On this simple truth rests the distinction
drawn by Ockham, which allows him to say in a straightforward manner why
‘ens’ cannot be one of the categories: ‘accipiendo “universale” pro illo quod praed-
icatur de pluribus, et non de omnibus, per quod “ens” excluditur.’ (Expositio in
librum Porphyrii de praedicabilibus, Prooemium, Opera Philosophica ii, , l. –
.)
 q.  concl. , vab: ‘Quinta conclusio est ista quod “individuum” strictissime et
propriissime acceptum predicatur de pluribus univoce personaliter sumptis. Que
declaratur sic: et 〈i〉 capiatur hoc individuum mentale “iste homo” demonstrando
Sortem vel Platonem, et 〈ii〉 vocetur totus Sortes A, et Sortes preter digitum B, et
vocetur individuum mentale Sortes C, tunc sic: 〈iii〉 C predicatur univoce de A et de
B, igitur C predicatur de pluribus, et C est individuum propriissime acceptum, igitur
individuum propriissime acceptum predicatur de pluribus. Et quod C predicatur
univoce de A et de B, declaratur, quia hec est vera: “A est iste homo, et B est iste
homo”, quia idem est conceptus proprius absolutus ipsius A et ipsius B.’ Etc. e
whole man without his Þnger also Þgures in q.  ad ., va: ‘aliquod animal est
pars integralis animalis, sicut totus homo preter digitum est animal, et tamen est
pars integralis animalis compositi ex digito et tali residuo.’
 e ‘Socrates-Minus Argument’ is called so aer the present-day ‘Descartes-Minus
Argument’, originally invented by Peter van Inwagen. e gist of both these argu-
ments is that arbitrary undetached parts of physical objects, like ‘all of Socrates
except his Þnger’ simply do not exist. See Fitzgerald . It would be an interesting
point of further investigation to Þnd out in how far Manlevelt’s argument is in line
with the Socrates-Minus Argument developed by William Heytesbury and Albert
of Saxony.
 Manlevelt distinguishes here between complex and incomplex equivocal terms. His
example of a complex equivocal, ‘Sortes or Plato’, is not known to me from any other
medieval philosopher.
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oer a suggestion of a theory on what now would be called something
like ‘the uniquely referring use of denoting phrases’144 which is quite
compatible with present-day insights on the subject.145
q.  lays a link to Manlevelt’s treatment of the proprium in q. . e
fourfold possible relationship between proprium and species established
there in a traditional Porphyrian fashion is foreshadowed here when it
comes to the possibility of a property of one individual to be found in
another individual. is is indeed possible, except however for property
in its strictest sense: belonging to some individual alone and totally and
always.146 An intriguing distinction is added, namely that between an
individual for this moment, and an individual tout court,147 again turning
on the theory of the ‘uniquely referring use of denoting phrases’.
Aer the group of questiones – in principle concerned with genus,
but automatically returning to individuum, qq. – highlight the
second universal, species, but the focus of attention is automatically
turned upward back to genus, then even still further up to the conceptual
realm of the transcendent terms and again downward to the individuum.
e core of nominalist teaching is hit upon right away in q. , where
in the seventh conclusion it is stated that every species in the sense
of a universal is a sign.148 e Þrst thing to note is that the idea that
 at is to say: a phrase denoting one, and only one unique individual thing in the
outside world.
 Without, of course, quite anachronistically wishing to attribute to omas Manlevelt
the precise ideas on this subject as developed by philosophers like Russell or
Strawson.
 Manlevelt’s thoughts on this subject stand in need of a closer scrutiny, which
however will be postponed to a later occasion. One may wonder, for instance, if a
property belonging to some individual alone and totally and always can justly be
called a property at all. A property, aer all, belongs to a species, and not to an
individual.
 at is to say: an individual, the circumstances being as they are, as opposed
to an individual, no matter what the circumstances. us, ‘Sophroniscus’s son’ is
an individual’s name if said Sophroniscus happens to have only one son. q. 
dist., ra: ‘potest “individuum” adhuc accipi dupliciter, quia quoddam dicitur
individuum ut nunc, et quoddam simpliciter. Individuum ut nunc potest istud dici
quod pronunc non competit alicui nisi uni soli, ita quod non competat pluribus,
quamvis sine nova impositione posset pluribus competere, et talia individua sunt
omnes termini habentes tantum unum suppositum. Et ad istum intellectum loquitur
Porphyrius quando dicit quod Þlius Sophronisci sit individuum, idest, iste terminus
“Þlius Sophronisci”, si solus sit ei Socrates Þlius. Individuum vero simpliciter dicitur
istud quod non potest univoce pluribus competere sine nova impositione, sicud
“Socrates” et “hoc album” et “hoc veniens”, etcetera.’
 q.  concl. , ra: ‘omnis “species” quinto modo accepta est signum simplex vel
compositum.’
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a concept, in the sense of a conceptual act, is a sign is by no means
self-explanatory. It is rather a basic Ockhamist tenet, arrived at by the
Venerable Inceptor aer quite some deliberation.149 It will not be without
signiÞcance that the ‘ad oppositum’ takes into explicit consideration the
opinion of the ‘moderns’, that is: the Ockhamists. A small but interesting
thing is that in his treatment of the Þrst counter-argument to his tenth
conclusion Manlevelt speaks of the ‘radix Aristotelis’, and not about
Ockham’s razor.150 Aer all, what Ockham was supposed to have done,
and what Manlevelt was ostensibly doing in Ockham’s footsteps, was
nothing other than truly adhering to the teachings of the Philosopher.
One of the meanings of species is that of ‘similitudo representativa’.
In this sense species is a sign or term as well, according to omas
Manlevelt in his sixth conclusion.151 For William of Ockham the main
struggle had been to choose between the species in its sense of ‘similitudo
representativa’152 and the concept in its sense of ‘conceptual act’ as the
candidate for the generalizing capacity of signs or terms.153 It would be
interesting to see what Manlevelt would have to say about this matter
in his commentary on De anima, referred to in q. , but alas, this
commentary is not otherwise known to us.
In q.  the dierent ways in which man can be said to be a species of
animal are expounded. Ample use is made here of the theory of suppo-
sition. Manlevelt’s trinity of material, personal and simple supposition is
 See Maurer , esp. p. . With William of Ockham a Þctum theory of the
concept is only slowly abandoned for an intellectio theory.
 q.  ad arg. contra concl. , i, va: ‘Ad primum istorum dicitur quod ista con-
clusio est asserenda et non dubitanda utendo radice Aristotelis primo Physicorum,
ubi elicitur quod pluralitas sive diversitas non est ponenda sine ratione cogente.’
is last phrase, forbidding us to accept a plurality (of things, or causes) if there is
no rational need to do so, is to be found in the works of Ockham with slight alter-
ations: ‘entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitate’ or even closer ‘pluralitas
non est ponenda sine necessitate’. is is what came to be called ‘Ockham’s razor’.
Manlevelt could not have referred to this razor, however, for the simple reason that
the term only came into use centuries aer Ockham’s death. Moreover, the ‘radix
Aristotelis’ was already known to John Duns Scotus as well, and had thus been in
use in Franciscan circles for quite some time.
 q.  concl. , ra: ‘aliqua “species” quarto modo accepta est signum vel termi-
nus, quia conceptus lapidis que est similitudo representativa lapidis, est terminus
mentalis de quo dicit Aristoteles, tertio De anima, quod lapis non est in anima, sed
species lapidis’.
 Quite literally, a likely image in the mind, representing the things in the outside
world.
 Once again, see Maurer .
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not as straightforward as one might think in retrospect. omas Man-
levelt is in accord on this matter with Albert of Saxony, for example, who
also adheres to this main tripartition of supposition. But things are quite
dierent with a thinker like John Buridan, for whom simple and material
supposition are one and the same thing.154 is once again corroborates
my conviction (already Þrmly based on so many other grounds) that
Manlevelt is not in any sense to be sided with the Buridan camp.
q.  again leans on the dierent ways of supposition ‘genus’ may have,
to explain the interrelationship between genus and species. A remarkable
feature of Manlevelt’s treatment of genus in its simple supposition (i.e.
genus as a universal as such), is that he sees a genus-species relationship
between ‘universale’ and ‘genus’ (i.e. ‘universale’ stands as the genus to
‘genus’ as one of the Þve lowest species, the other four being ‘species’,
‘dierentia’, ‘proprium’ and ‘accidens’) as well as between ‘genus’ and ‘this
or that genus’.
q.  a rms that if a species is rightly deÞned, genus forms part of its
deÞnition, while q.  holds that any deÞnition of species of which genus
forms no part, is not a right deÞnition.
q.  makes room for something other than the species specialis-
sima coming in a sense directly before the individuals, and that is ‘indi-
viduum’ – in its capacity as a sign, one may safely gather. And this again
may give the impression that individuum is accepted de facto if not de
jure as somewhat approaching the status of a sixth universal.155
q.  is in fact concerned with this matter. Every appellative term156
is a universal, so if ‘individuum’ in its strict sense (i.e. in its secondary
use) is to be reckoned an appellative term, it must indeed be accepted
as a universal. And it is just its non-appellative character that prevents
‘individuum’ from really being a universal.
e transcendent terms Þnd their treatment in q. . In line with
William of Ockham and the generally held Franciscan opinion since
John Duns Scotus’ ontological breakthrough, omas Manlevelt holds
 See Maierù .
 Manlevelt is, however, quite explicit about individuum not really being a universal
in the Þrst conclusion of q. , vb: ‘nullum individuum est universale’. On the
candidature of individuum as sixth predicable see also above, section . See also
Bos , .
 An appellative name (nomen appellativum), in contrast to a proper name (nomen
proprium), is used to refer to a class of things, instead of a single thing. In the course
of q.  Manlevelt is using appellative and proper terms and concepts in exactly this
sense.
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that ‘being’ – which is not a universal – is a univocal concept. Just like
the universals, the transcendent terms should be looked upon from a
semantical point of view as predicates.
In the sixth principal argument ofq.  one is presented with the opin-
ion that only the categories substance and quality exist in reality, which
opinion is attributed to ‘the moderns’. Of course, one can safely substi-
tute the name of William of Ockham and his followers for ‘moderns’ here.
Not only does Manlevelt willingly accept this reduction of the number
of real categories; in his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories he is even
willing to go a decisive step further, by questioning the very existence of
substance as well,157 so that it is le to the category of individual quali-
ties to make up reality in its entirety. is makes one wonder about the
status of concepts as mental qualities: they would not have a (mental)
substance either. In their second-intention use however, i.e. as categories
not of things in reality but of signs or names or predicates, Manlevelt in
a sense accepts the traditional number of ten as a starting point from
where to the lay bare the ine ciency of precisely this tenfold division of
the categories.158 In this procedure he is to be ranked with the Franciscan
 See above, section . of this Introduction, for our résumé of Robert Andrews’s
Þndings on this matter, and also for our author’s apparent shyness in the face of
his own drastic conclusions.
 Traditionally, the number of categories is taken to be ten, and no more or no
less than ten: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, posture, condition,
action, aection. Aer all, Aristotle said there were ten, specifying them as the
ten just mentioned (Categories iv, b–). e English terms are taken from the
translation by Ackrill. Apart from the consistent numbering of ten categories in the
little treatise of the same name, however, Aristotle does not seem to pay too much
attention to this exact number of ten in other works where the categories are brought
forward. True, the well-known list of ten from the Categories is taken over without
any ado in (or rather: from) the Topica (Topica i, , b–a). But in the
Analytica posteriora, for example, posture and condition are placed within another
category, so that there are only eight categories le (Anal. post. i, , b). In the
Þh book of the Metaphysics posture and condition are le out altogether (Metaphys.
v, a–), while time is le out as well in the eleventh book (Metaphys. xi,
, a), so that there are only seven categories le, just like in the Physics (Phys.
v, , a). An even shorter listed is given in the Nicomachean Ethics, where only
the Þrst six of the original categories are retained (Ethica Nicom. i, , a). But
Aristotle not only tends to shorten the list of categories now and then, at one point
at least he seems to lengthen the list of categories by one. In the seventh book of
the Metaphysics he rather carelessly includes motion in an informal list of categories
(Metaphys. vii, , b). Now in the Categories motion was treated among the
so-called post-predicamenta, but historically motion has tended to be promoted by
many a philosopher to the status of ‘eleventh category’. us Avicenna, who is one of
the medieval philosophers who originated the systematic discussion of the problem
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mainstream (John Duns Scotus;159 William of Ockham160). On the other
hand, his way of arguing is quite unlike John Buridan’s handling of the
matter.161 Note that the question concerning the number of the categories
is usually and quite naturally not treated in a commentary on the Isagoge,
but in a commentary on the Categories. is may rank as an added sign
that Manlevelt’s commentary on the Isagoge is really meant to be the Þrst
part of an integrated commentary on the whole of the old logic, of which
his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories forms the second part. In his
countering of the initial arguments Manlevelt again gives testimony of
his Ockhamist background, by sharply keeping apart the three levels of
language162 – spoken, written and mental – without putting them in the
usual hierarchical order. Over and over again omas Manlevelt stresses
the token-character of all linguistic items in mental or extramental
reality.
of the number of categories, in his commentary on the Physics concludes that motion
should be accepted as a category (Avicenna, iii. Physic. . and . cap. Cf. Avicenna
iii. Metaphys. ).
 On John Duns Scotus on this matter, as well as Albert the Great and omas
Aquinas, see Bos and Van der Helm . Especially from Duns Scotus onwards,
not only positive terms are studied, but also non-positive terms, such as ‘blindness’,
Þctional terms (for instance ‘chimera’), terms of second intention, negative terms
etc., which complicates the interpretation of the categories, and the establishing of
their number.
 Ockham takes a traditional stance when it comes to the number of categories. In
his commentary on the Categories, the only thing Ockham has to say about their
number is that it is di cult to prove that there are only ten categories (Ockham,
Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis, cap. , § (Opera Philosophica
pars ii, )). In the Summa logicae Ockham does not really say very much more:
there are held to be ten categories by all authors, but when it comes to interpreting
their views, there are dierences between his contemporaries as compared to the
classical authors. Ockham seems to approve the number of ten, following Averroes
in his interpretation of them, namely that they are the incomplex terms with which
to answer the diverse ways of posing questions about a substance or an individual
instance of substance (Summa logicae, i, cap.  (Opera Philosophica pars i, )).
e reference is to Averroes, In Aristot. Metaph., vii, t.  (ed. Iuntina, viii, f. v).
Even where Ockham is most explicit about this matter, in the Quodlibeta, he takes
the number of ten categories for granted, only stressing with ever so much insistence
that they are incomplex terms, and not real things in the extra-mental world
(Quodlibeta v, q.  (Opera Philosophica pars ii, )).
 On Buridan, see King .
 On the threefold division of language, see Spade , –. On Manlevelt’s
Ockhamist way of dealing with the supposed hierarchy between the three levels of
language, see above, section .. e starting point for all subsequent discussion on
this matter is right at the beginning of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione (a–), where
we are told that ‘spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written
words are the symbols of spoken words’ (tr. E.M. Edghill).
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In q.  the status of the highest genera as principles of things is
a rmed, but not without Manlevelt classifying the dierent senses in
which something can be called a ‘principle’.163
Not unimportant for a thinker so deeply occupied with the strictly
individual nature of extramental as well as mental reality is the a rma-
tively answered q. : whether we can have knowledge of things inÞnite.
Aer all, if we are to have knowledge of reality, which only exists of indi-
viduals; and if these individuals presumably are inÞnite in number; we
must have knowledge of things inÞnite. But what – one would be tempted
to ask omas Manlevelt – happens to the universal, all-embracing char-
acter of our knowledge, if this knowledge in its turn consists of individual
instances (tokens) of concepts, propositions and judgements, and if this
knowledge, moreover, is spread among so many individual minds, while
these minds are not even substances, but only some kind of amalgam of
individual mental qualities?164
 Manlevelt tends to treat the Þrst predicable, genus, in close connection with the
notion of ‘principium’. is is not surprising, considering that ‘principium’ (prin-
ciple) is the Latin translation of the Greek ‘γενoς’, which has a strong physicalistic
ßavour, not only in the pure biological sense, but also in the genealogical sense. And
of course there is the grammatical sense as well. In no less than three questiones Man-
levelt devotes distinctiones to a classiÞcation of the diverse types of principle. It turns
out that these classiÞcations are compatible. In the distinctio to q.  ‘utrum genus sit
equivocum’ (vb–ra), one learns that genus can be called ‘principle’ in two distinct
ways. First as the principium productivum (‘pater genus Þliorum’). Second as the
principium contentivum, which comes in two variations: cicumscriptivum (‘locus in
quo quis generatur vel producitur’) and predicativum (‘animal dicitur genus homi-
nis’). Two more types of principle are introduced in the distinctio to q.  ‘utrum
genus sit principium suarum specierum’ (rb). e principium compositivum (of
which there are two: matter and form) and the principium terminativum, which is the
formal cause. Now, if we are aware that the principium productivum is the e cient
cause of a thing (either in a universal or in a particular manner), the principium pro-
ductivum, the principium compositivum and the principium terminativum together
yield the four Aristotelian causes. e principium contentivum falls outside of this
scheme of Aristotelian physical causes. In the two distinctiones to q.  ‘utrum gen-
era generalissima sint principia rerum’ (rb–va), which basically are a working out
in detail of the classiÞcation in q. , the special status of the principium contentivum
is accentuated by its being called the principium logicale. In the second conclusion of
q.  (vb) the primum principium contentivum is subdivided in ‘per se’ (either quid-
itative or non-quiditative) and ‘per accidens’. e principium terminativum, on the
other hand, is subdividing into intrinsecum (with further subdivisions) and extrin-
secum (with further subdivisions). It might be worthwhile to compare this detailed
schematization of the diverse types of principle with the equally detailed schemati-
zation in a omistic mold, as to be found in Gredt , Volume i, .
 is breaking down, as it were, of the individual and the individual’s thinking is even
more remarkable in the light of the short philosophical history of dealing with the
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e relationship by which it can be said that individuals belong to
a species is subject matter of q. . With the help of the distinction
between actus exercitus and actus signiÞcatus,165 it is explained that the
proposition that several men are one man, which may be said to be true in
its transitive sense, is nevertheless false in its proper sense. In the course
of answering this question, individuals are presented by Manlevelt in
their bare individuality.
e proper way of concepts Þtting into a conceptual framework is
established in q. . In a large sense, every term can be predicated of any
other term (‘An animal is a man’). But in a strict sense, i.e. in the sense
that a term is truly a rmed of another term, a categorically lower term
can never be predicated of a categorically higher term, but only serve as
its subject (‘Man is an animal’). And that is why as a universal, a species is
‘part’ of a genus, such as stated (and qualiÞed) in q.  (man is an animal,
but horses are animals too).
e third universal, dierentia, is abundantly treated in no less than
thirteen separate questiones: –. Again Manlevelt’s preoccupation
with the individual is in the forefront. In this, his handling of the third
universal is a conÞrmation of the impression made by his handling of
the Þrst two universals. e very title of the Þrst of these questiones,
whether something can dier from itself (q. ), makes it clear that
to omas Manlevelt dierentia is more than just the third constituent
making up a proper deÞnition: Species = Genus + Dierentia. Other
questiones are just as out of the ordinary. Dierences between one indi-
vidual and the other are treated, whereby attention is paid to the role
of separable and inseparable accidents,166 respectively (q.  and q. ).
e speciÞc dierence gets its treatment in q.  and q. . From the
Þrst conclusion of q.  one can make up the strict sense of indi-
viduality employed by omas Manlevelt.167 On the other side of the
subject at all. Before omas Aquinas’s De unitate intellectus, philosophers never
seem to have shown much interest in the individual’s thinking at all. For a recent
reminder of this, in the context of review of a book on Averroes’s commentaries on
De anima, see Janssens , p. .
 On actus exercitus and actus signiÞcatus see Nuchelmans .
 e distinction between separable and inseparable accidents is introduced in the
Isagoge itself, immediately aer the deÞnition of what an accident is (v , around
line .), together with the enduring examples. To be asleep is a separable accident,
being black is an inseparable accident of the raven and the Ethiopian. On the way the
medieval commentators treated this aspect of Porphyry’s exposition, see Van Rijen
, .
 q.  concl.  rb: ‘Prima conclusio est ista quod aliquid facit per se dierre quod
. form and contents of this text 
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creational spectre, even God and His rationality get to be regarded from
the dierential point of view in q. .168 Not to mention the specimen of
Trinitarian syllogistic, a subject matter then popular in Parisian circles,
which is to be found in the second conclusion of q. .169
Of course, the more obvious questions are asked as well: concerning
the relationship of dierentia to genus and species, respectively (q. ),
and the role of the dierentia in making divisions (q. ) and deÞnitions
(q. ). Whether more and less are applicable to dierence in itself is
the subject matter of q. . e Porphyrian deÞnition of dierentia itself
and its possible alternatives are scrutinized in q.  and q. . e eighth
conclusion of q.  deserves attention. Manlevelt seems to imply here,
when stating that there can be more deÞnitions of one and the same
thing,170 that the traditional idea of one essential deÞnition applying to
one thing (along with several nominal deÞnitions) is to be abandoned.
e fourth universal, proprium, is treated in one questio only (q. ).
But within this limited space, Manlevelt neatly juxtaposes the ‘realistic’
common opinion holding that a proprium is a thing in reality, and the
modern (Ockhamist) view by which it is superseded, namely that a
proprium is not a thing but a term, and a second intention term at that,
just like all other universals.
To the last of the Þve universals, accidens – which had already been
given an important enough role in the treatment of the other four – four
questiones are dedicated. e Þrst of these, the traditionally asked ques-
tion whether an accident can come and go without its subject perishing
with it (q. ) is seized upon by Manlevelt to Þne-tune in an Ockhamist
manner our understanding of the various senses of ‘accidens’, ‘adesse et
abesse’ and ‘subiectum accidentis’ – discerning between thing and term;
Þrst and second intention; logic and reality.
non est dierentia speciÞca, quia omne quod est, facit seipsum ab alio per se dierre,
quia seipso a quocumque alio diert, et tamen non omne quod est, est dierentia
speciÞca.’
 q.  passim.
 On the subject of logic and trinitarian theology in Paris in the fourteenth century,
see Maierù . Maierù’s article centres on Pierre d’Ailly. Other thinkers mentioned
are Gregory of Rimini, and Henry Totting of Oyta, who around – gave
attention to paralogisms on material de divinis. e table of contents of this latter
philosopher’s Quaestiones in Isagogen Porphyrii were compared with Manlevelt’s
commentary in the foregoing subsection ...
 q.  concl. , va: ‘unius rei possunt esse plures di nitiones proprie dicte, utpote
di nitio naturalis et di nitio dialetica.’
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In the Þh conclusion Manlevelt seems to develop his own brand of a
double-truth theory.171 He does not shy away from discerning truth for
the natural philosopher from truth for the theologian – a Þrmness that
is somewhat mitigated again in the ninth conclusion.172
q.  presents us with an analysis of the diverse senses of ‘unity’,173
before deciding in what senses a subject and an accident can be said to be
 e infamous ‘double-truth theory’ holds that a proposition can at the same time
be true in theology and false in philosophy and vice versa. It is ascribed to Siger of
Brabant (see Krop’s introduction to Siger of Brabant ) and the Averroists, and
was condemned by the clerical authorities. Mahony ,  n. , however, holds
that Siger did not maintain this theory, and neither did any of his contemporaries.
De Rijk ,  points out that somewhat later Autrecourt and Mirecourt did
hold on to the view that certain truths of revelation are opposed to philosophical
propositions demonstrable by reason. Robert Holkot even dares to distinguish a
logic of faith (logica Þdei) from the natural logic (logica naturalis).
 q.  concl. , va: ‘Et multa istorum dicta sunt gratia exercitii et probabiliter
potius quam exercitive determinationis.’
 In the second distinctio to q.  (rb–va) Manlevelt makes a list of no less than ten
dierent types of unity. is list, however, is incomplete, ending as it does in an
‘etcetera’. And of the kinds of unity that Manlevelt does list not all are really discussed
in any detail. e items on the list which are more or less thoroughly examined by
Manlevelt, are subdivided into unities by itself, per se, and unities by accident. Of the
unity per se Manlevelt gives four types. First there is the unum essentialiter (matter
and form, among which he one is the potentiality of the other), second, there is the
unum secundum gradus accidentalis or gradualiter, which comes in two varieties,
depending on whether the oneness has extension or not. An example of the former
would be whiteness, the gradations of which, while mutually exclusive, take place
in exactly the same spot. Mind, the unity under consideration is that among the
shades of white, not between the white and its subject. An example of the latter
would be gladness, the mutually exclusive degrees of which are not to be localized
extensionally, but take place in an individual subject, that is, in our soul. It might
well be that Manlevelt is breaking new ground here, transferring his Þndings from
the external world to the internal world, trading the Þxed point in space for the
intellective soul, serving as an anchor for the gradual unity of a man’s happiness. For
my happiness might strengthen or diminish, but it nevertheless is my happiness.
Interesting enough, of course, is the pinpointing of the intellective soul as the non-
spatial individuating instance of a mental accident. In doing this, Manlevelt stresses
the boundaries between the non-spatial inner-world and the spatial outer-world. If
we take the example of Sortes, it must be conceded that the spatial body of Sortes
is the individual subject of his whiteness, and the non-spatial intellective soul of
Sortes is the individual subject of his happiness. Unfortunately, the commentary
on the Isagoge is not the place for Manlevelt to work out the apparent connection
between the spatial and the non-spatial unity of Sortes. One should rather look for
such a theory in a work Manlevelt refers to elsewhere in this manuscript, namely
his commentary on De anima. It would really be a pity, should a manuscript of
this commentary never turn up, seeing the importance Manlevelt attaches to the
individuality of the intellective soul. In fact the intellective soul comes in as an
honourable third in a short list of examples given by Manlevelt of the third kind
. form and contents of this text 
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‘one’. e third conclusion adds zest to the discussion by holding that in
one of the discerned senses, even God can be said to have His accidents.174
In q.  Manlevelt goes out of his way to show in what sense Porphyry
could justly hold that a raven can be understood to be white. In doing so,
Manlevelt gives an exposition of the way a thing understood (or believed,
or willed) and the understanding (or believing or willing) of the thing are
interrelated.
q.  is the rather spectacularly worded Þnal chord: whether an
accident is a substantial genus. e ‘natural’ tie between terms and things
is reßected upon in a critical manner; all terms, either substantial or
accidental, are downgraded to the status of accidents. e Þrst and last of
the Þve universals, genus and accidens, are thus contrasted and correlated
all the same. With which we seem to have touched upon the heart of
Manlevelt’s view on logic and reality: two realms only thinly connected
to each other on the humble level of the accident.
of unity per se: the one by indivisibility. Honourable, because the other examples are
God and an angel. e fourth kind listed as unity per se is the unum continuatione,
whether corporeal (as in the parts of a piece of wood) or incorporeal (as in the parts
of the sun). Lesser kinds of unity are the unity of place or subject (like the whiteness
and sweetness of milk have their unity) and the accidental unity in a strict sense, to
wit the aggregate of a subject and an accident. us the answer to the main question
‘utrum ex subiecto et accidente componatur aliquod per se unum’ is: no. Which is to
say that all the single individual things making up our extramental world, consisting
as they do of accidents inhering in a subject, do not possess so strong a unity aer
all. Further types of unity are hardly touched upon: unity of number, of species, of
genus, of deÞnition, ‘et cetera’.
 q.  concl. , va: ‘accidente isto modo accepto, scilicet, pro uno predicabili
accidentaliter, Deo potest competere aliquod accidens, quia: capiatur ista propositio
“Sortes sedet”, que tantum sit vera per unam horam, et vocetur A, tunc hoc accidens
“sciens A” competit Deo, quia hec est vera: “Deus est sciens A”, et hoc accidens potest
adesse Deo et potest abesse, sicud de se notum est.’
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chapter six
Description of the manuscript used
e only witness extant of the Commentary on the Isagoge attributed
to omas Manlevelt is the manuscript Erfurt, Bibl. Ampl. f. ra–va
(henceforward: siglum E). is manuscript is the basic text of the present
edition. It is a quite good manuscript. e text seems to have been written
by an able enough scribe, and is of good overall standard. Obviously,
however, the text is incomplete or corrupt in some places, and is thwarted
by self-repetition in other places, not to mention the minor mistakes and
cases of miswriting, apart from the occasionally le-out ‘non’.
I have for the present edition used E by working from a microÞlm,
without having the original manuscript at hand. So I could not attempt
to give anything approaching a full description of the codex. For such a
full description of the codex, the reader should consult the work done by
Schum and Markowski in their respective catalogues of the Amplonian
Library in Erfurt.1 Based on their work, however, the technicalities may
be summarized thus:
. paper with a watermark showing a pear with some foliage; bound
in wood with green leather back; two-column text in quarto, format
×mm.; middle or latter half of the fourteenth century; +
folios.
f. ra–va: omas Manlevelt (attr.), Questiones libri Porphirii. Inc.:
Queritur circa initium Porphirii, utrum necesse sit aliquem scire. Des.:
Expl. expliciat qui plus vult scribat. Expl. quest. libri Porph.
f. vb–vb: omas Manlevelt (attr.), Questiones super Predicamenta.
Inc.: Circa libr. pred. Ar. potest primo queri utrum aliquid sit equiv-
ocum. Des.: sicud per ipsam cras – ad argumentum vero in oppositum,
quid sit demonstrandum.
f. ra + : tabula questionum to both these commentaries.
e technicalities as given by Markowski, far more concise as they are,
do contain some additions as well as some corrections to the version that
is explicitly referred to by Schum. e main correction is in the Þxation
 Markowski , ; Schum , f.
 introduction
2011013 [Van der Helm] 01-Introduction-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 140
of the number of commentaries in this manuscript to only two, instead
of Schum’s three. Markowski’s limiting the number of commentaries to
only two: one on the Isagoge and the other on the Categories, is correct;
Schum’s including a commentary on the De interpretatione is incorrect.
As can be gathered from Schum, the manuscript of which the Ques-
tiones libri Porphyrii forms the Þrst entry used to have on the outside
a paper note saying ‘. loyce’, which is to say that it was listed as num-
ber  among the logical works in the Catalogus Amplonii, the catalogue
made by the collector Amplonius himself, and in which it was speciÞed:
‘Item, questiones optime ome Manlevelt super veteri arte, videlicet:
super ysagogis Porphirii, predicamentis Aristotelis et libris peryermenias
Aristotelis’.
ere is no doubt that the questiones on the Isagoge take up the Þrst
 folios of the manuscript, and that the questiones on the Categories
start from there. But Schum is certainly mistaken when he lets this com-
mentary on the Categories end on folio  with ‘ad argumentum in
oppositum dicitur, quod sententia Arist. est necessaria’, aer which the
questiones on the De interpretatione are supposed to begin with ‘Nunc
queritur consequenter circa capitulum de prius; primo queritur utrum
aliquid sit prius primo tempore’ and end on folio  with ‘sicud per
ipsam cras – ad argumentum vero in oppositum, quid sit demonstran-
dum.’ In fact there is no trace of a commentary on De interpretatione
in the manuscript. Markowski, not repeating the mistake made by his
predecessor, rightly divides the manuscript in two separate texts: the
questiones on the Isagoge taking up folio’s ra–va, the questiones on the
Categories taking up folio’s rb–vb.2 e portion of the manuscript
mistakenly identiÞed by Schum as being the commentary on De inter-
pretatione evidently starts o, as is already clear from the fragment of
text provided by Schum himself, with a discussion of one of the so-
called post-Predicamenta: prius. It is not clear whether the original
description of the text by Amplonius himself was wrong, or if Schum
was simply wrong in identifying his own manuscript number  with
the original Amplonian manuscript number . It is highly unlikely,
in any case, that the manuscript  is missing its latter part, which
should have contained the commentary on the De interpretatione, hinted
at by Amplonius. In fact the manuscript is neatly rounded o by a
 Markowski , . Kaczmarek , xx n.  wrongly follows Schum rather than
Markowski when it comes to the contents of Cod. Amplon. .
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2011013 [Van der Helm] 01-Introduction-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 141
complete listing of all foregoing questiones on the Isagoge and Categories,
suggesting that the two texts should be (or in any case were) read as a
whole.
Despite their punctual execution, the small, sharply-pointed letters
of the manuscript make rather hard reading. e beginning of a new
questio is marked by larger writing. e initials, which mainly toward
the end of the Questiones libri Porphirii are sometimes missing, are in
black, and rudimentarily decorated. ese decorations contain ßeurs-
de-lys protruding from the le end of the initial, and Þshscales Þlling
up the open space within the initial. Not mentioned by either Schum or
Markowski are the funny little drawings that are now and then inserted
between text blocks. ere is something looking like a warning Þnger
extending from the initial on folio v; in other instances there are two
blessing Þngers. ere is a Þsh for example on folio v. From folio v
onward, the initials are decorated with sombre, but comically executed
faces.3
ere was at least one hand at work in the manuscript apart from the
one that wrote the body of the text. At the top of the very Þrst folio there
is the remark, identiÞed by Schum as stemming from the late fourteenth
century, that is to say, a couple of decennia aer the completing of the text
itself: ‘Hec questiones fuerunt compilate per om. Manlevel Anglicum
doctorem solempnem.’4 e manuscript itself contains many variants,
erasings, corrections and scribblings in the margins, which at least in
some minor cases seem to be by another hand. But I cannot say this with
certainty.
In the course of the text there do occur some variations in the hand-
writing, but these are so minor that they do not justify however the
conclusion that one scribe took over the work from another. For example,
from the Þh questio onward, which runs from vb to ra, the text is
 I am not sure how much is to be made of these iconographical bits and pieces. e
Þsh and the Þshscales may be an all too general Christian reference. But one cannot
help but notice that the ßeur-de-lys as a heraldic symbol is particularly associated
with the French monarchy. And the hand with two extended Þngers may refer to
the royal scepter, which in France at least since the days of Louis ix, better known as
Saint Louis (–), was tipped with an open hand of benediction on the top,
known as the main-de-justice. is would give our manuscript a distinctive French
aspect. Which, of course, Þts in quite well with Manlevelt having spent an important
part of his career in Paris.
 If, however, Markowski is right in dating the body of the work to the thirteen
seventies, eighties or even nineties, there seems to be room to surmise that the added
remark is not from a later date aer all.
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written in a more spacious hand, that makes easier reading than the text
before that. e word ‘sicut’ here is written in full and ends in a ‘t’ instead
of the ‘d’ that rounded o the abbreviations before. is notwithstanding,
it seems improbable that another hand was at work here, seeing that
other typical characteristics as well as the overall character of the writing
remain unaltered.
Textual oddities remain constant throughout the text as well. Apart
from the alternation of ‘sicud’ and ‘sicut’, mention can be made of the
writing of ‘scit’ instead of ‘sit’, which is clearly meant, of ‘Scicero’ instead
of ‘Cicero’, and ‘sivitate’ instead of ‘civitate’. It is unclear what conclusions
(if any) may be drawn from such spelling about the geographical origin
of the manuscript.
In a frame under column vb is written ‘quia est eius principium’, which
is the beginning of the text of the next column: ra. is framed little
string of words should best be viewed upon as an ‘editorial’ device. Aer
all, four folios together made up one quarto. e framed little text may
thus have served either to help make sure that the text, once completed, is
bound in the right order of quarto’s, or as reminder for the scribe himself:
once the Þrst quarto is laid aside, the second quarto must begin thus
and so. Similar examples of pieces of texts announcing the continuation
of one quarto to the next are to be found at the bottom of vb, vb,
vb and vb – which, incidentally, suggests a grouping of quarto’s in
pairs.
Considering the number and the visual rather than aural character of
the clerical errors, the repeating and the omitting of lines, the transpo-
sition of words, the miswriting of certain words occasionally resulting
in the replacement of a nonsense word for a word having a superÞcial
resemblance to the nonsense word as well as sense in that given context,
one can hardly come to any other conclusion than that the text edited
here is a copy of another text.
e slight variations in text width, letter height and line spacing
suggest that the present text was not made without interruptions. Some
fragments seem to have been inserted at a later stage, at spaces le open
for this purpose.
In the catalogues by Schum and Markowski, no reasons are given why
this manuscript is supposed to originate from the middle or later half
of the fourteenth century. e guess however seems to be well-educated
nevertheless.
e writing material is paper, which indeed was already a common
material in the middle of the fourteenth century. e text is written
. description of the manuscript used 
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in two columns, and has a number of characteristics which, if I take
S.H. omson’s handbook on Latin Bookhands for my compass,5 leads
me to conclude that it may very well stem from the fourteenth century.
Schum’s estimation that it stems from the middle of the century can be
endorsed, if this is to include the sixties and seventies of the fourteenth
century. And Markowski’s estimation that it is from the seventies, eight-
ies or nineties is not really far o the mark, either.
Schum does not say anything about the place of origin of either the
manuscript or its scribe, and neither does Markowski. But Germany
seems to be a very likely candidate, taking into account omson’s
catalogue.
Bared of all aesthetic pretence, the rapid hand of this manuscript has
a more than superÞcial likeness to the various examples presented by
omson from the second half of the fourteenth and the Þrst decades
of the Þeenth century in Germany, especially that of a  collection
of various commentaries on Aristotle and other scholastic texts written,
probably, at Cologne. Like the  collection, this manuscript at least in
some places reveals great haste. omson links the scholastic hand to the
legal, with which it had many features in common, in ductus, ligatures,
shading, abbreviations and in the formation of individual letters.
Closer scrutiny reveals that some individual letters in the manuscript
have a form that came to characterize the German manuscripts from
the third quarter of the fourteenth century onwards. For example, the
initial ‘h’ has a straight last stroke which we may Þnd hereaer in German
scripts. While the Þnal ‘s’, which is a reversed ‘’, closed or almost closed at
the right, will appear consistently hereaer in German scholastic hands.
Other letters in the manuscript show a remarkable resemblance to
their counterparts in omson’s  example as well. In the one text as
well as in the other, only the lower loop of the letter ‘a’ is made in the Þrst
stroke; both the ‘o’ and the ‘e’ are made with two jabs and are frequently
hardly distinguishable; the letter ‘r’ shows a separation at the top, but the
horizontal stroke is connected to the vertical at the bottom.
e evidence, of course, is not conclusive. But a random look at the
book on medieval manuscripts by Arndt and Tangl6 leaves room for no
other conclusion than that the greatest resemblance of this manuscript
is to the reproduction therein of a text from .
 omson .
 Arndt and Tangl .
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So the hypothesis seems warranted that the manuscript used for this
edition stems from Germany, around the s or s.7 One conclu-
sion, then, to be drawn from this hypothesis is that this manuscript can
hardly be expected to be an autograph by the presumed author of this
commentary on Porphyry, if the addition ‘Anglicus’ to his name really
means that omas Manlevelt is an Englishman. As explained by om-
son, the geographical peculiarities of a manuscript say a lot about the
provenance of its scribe, and less about the place where it was written.
A scribe tends to retain the peculiarities of the environment where he
acquired his penmanship, no matter where in the medieval world he was
to practise his art later on. So an Englishman would not trade his English
way of writing, even when practising his art in Germany. If this text really
is Manlevelt’s and if Manlevelt really is an Englishman, the manuscript
must be reckoned on this evidence alone to be one that was not writ-
ten out by the author himself, but one that was written o by a German
scribe. In this case, if the s or s really are the periods around
which the manuscript was written, it is still possible that the original text
stems from a somewhat earlier time.
But let us not make too much out of this. Even if my educated guess
about the German hand is right, this does not necessarily mean that the
manuscript itself was written in Germany. It could as well be taken as an
indication that the scribe may have been a German. And this scribe may
or may not have been working in the German heartland; he might just
as well have been doing his job somewhere else. Or this scribe was not
a German at all, but one who merely took a German education and was
writing in a more or less ‘German’ hand.
Earlier on in this Introduction, I have brought forward some pieces of
circumstantial evidence suggesting that this particular text stems from
pre-university Louvain. As for now, it must be noted that my speculations
on the German hand of writing is anything but incompatible with the text
stemming from Louvain. e scribe may have been a German, working
in Louvain. Or the scribe was a Brabantian, writing in a German hand.
All geographical speculations set aside, the overall high quality of
the text, together with its obvious copy-character, suggests that the
present text is not too far distanced from the basis text; it may even
 Surmises about the probable time and place of origin of our manuscript may be
strengthened by comparison of this to other manuscripts as well. For now it must
su ce to compare our manuscript with the readily available, well-chosen examples
in the books by omson and by Arndt and Tangl.
. description of the manuscript used 
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be a copy of a Þrst-hand reportatio or rather, a Þrst-hand compilation
of Manlevelt’s Questiones libri Porphirii.8 But as long as this is the only
known manuscript of this particular text, no deÞnitive conclusions as to
its precise status can be drawn.
 On the diversity of texts captured under the general heading of ‘reportatio’, see
Hamesse . On the sense in which this text is to be taken as a compilation, see
above, section ..
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chapter seven
e editorial principles
In editing this text, the usual medieval orthography has been followed.1
Ambivalent spellings allowing adjectival as well as adverbial interpreta-
tions, such as in ‘vere’, and ‘maxime’, are thus le ambiguous.
e punctuation of the present edition is entirely the editor’s.2 e
numbering of the questiones is also my work, but is entirely warranted by
the simple succession of the questiones themselves, and moreover by the
listing of the questiones making up both this present commentary on the
Isagoge and, subsequently, the following commentary on the Categories,
at the very end of our manuscript.
e numbering of arguments, counter-arguments, conclusions etc.
within each questio is the editor’s work as well, but is usually warranted
not only by the inner logic of the text, but by textual devices employed by
the scribe in the manuscript itself as well, and the occasional numbering
added in the margins of the manuscript.
e numbering of the folios is in line with the handwritten numbers
written in the right hand upper corner of each successive folio.
e many references in the text to Porphyry’s Isagoge, etc. are traced in
the notes according to their standard, present-day editions. References to
Aristotle are complemented with the Latin text in the Aristoteles Latinus.
Where applicable, references to Aristotle are also complemented with a
reference to Hamesse’s  critical edition of the anonymous medieval
anthology Les Auctoritates Aristotelis.
 e obvious drawbacks notwithstanding, this is preferred to rather anachronistically
presenting this medieval text in classicized form. On the dilemma, compare De Rijk
, .
 A medieval text is always poorly punctuated, to such an extent that one wonders
time and again how people were able to seriously study such a text. Our text is no
exception.
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(?) lectio incerta editoris




Queritur circa initium Porphirii, utrum necesse sit
 aliquem scire quid genus sit et quid species etcetera
ad cognitionem predicamentorum habendam.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non,
quia: istud quod est impossibile sciri, non est necesse sciri; sed quid
sit genus, est impossibile sciri, igitur quid sit genus, non est necesse sciri.
 Maior videtur de se nota, et patet per equipollentias modalium et per
signiÞcationem terminorum. Et minor patet, quia quid sit genus nec est
verum nec falsum, igitur non est scibile, igitur non potest sciri, igitur
impossibile est sciri quid sit genus. Assumptum, videlicet quod ‘quid sit
genus’ nec est verum nec falsum, patet, quia non est oratio indicativa,
 quia est oratio interrogativa, igitur nec est vera nec falsa. Consequentia
patet per Aristotelem, primo Perihermeneias.1
〈.〉 Item, si necesse sit aliquem scire quid sit genus et quid species
etcetera, tunc scientia generis est necessaria ad scientiam predicamento-
rum. Ista consequentia videtur evidens, et consequens est falsum, igitur
 et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis demonstratur: nulla scientia gene-
ris est necessaria ad scientiam predicamentorum, igitur scientia generis
non est necessaria quoad scientiam predicamentorum. Ista consequen-
tia patet, quia arguitur ab universali ad suam indeÞnitam; et antecedens
patet inductive, quia ista scientia – demonstrata scientia Sortis – non est
 necessaria ad scientiam predicamentorum, quia sine ista scientia pre-
dicamentorum potest haberi, igitur ista scientia non est necessaria ad
 ] Hec questiones fuerunt compilate per om. Manlevel Anglicum doctorem solemp-
nem. add. Em (Schum: ‘Ueberschr. des späten . Jh.’)  igitur] istud add. necnon exp.
E
 Vel potius Aristoteles, De interpretatione, , a–: ‘Est autem oratio omnis quidem
signiÞcatiua non sicut instrumentum sed (quemadmodum dictum est) secundum
placitum; enuntiatiua uero non omnis sed in qua uerum uel falsum inest; non autem
in omnibus, ut deprecatio oratio quidem est sed neque uera neque falsa.’
 thomas manlevelt, questiones libri porphirii
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scientiam predicamentorum. Et consimiliter arguitur de quacumque alia
scientia generis, igitur nulla scientia generis est necessaria ad scientiam
predicamentorum.
〈.〉 Item, nullum est necesse scire quid sit genus ad scientiam pre-
dicamentorum, igitur non est necesse aliquem scire quid sit genus ad
scientiam predicamentorum habendam. Ista consequentia est evidens,
quia arguitur ab universali ad suam particularem; et antecedens patet
inductive, quia non est necesse istum scire quid sit genus ad scientiam
predicamentorum habendam, nec istum et sic de singulis. Et quod non
sit necesse istum scire quid sit genus ad scientiam predicamentorum
habendam, patet, quia non est necesse istum scire quid sit genus ad scien-
tiam predicamentorum habendam, quia arguitur a negatione superioris
ad negationem inferioris.
〈.〉 Item, ex opposito sequitur oppositum, nam sequitur: necesse est
istum scire quid sit genus ad scientiam predicamentorum habendam;
igitur necesse est istum aliquid scire.
〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum est Porphirius, sicut patet per istum
textum ‘cum sit necessarium Chrisaore etc’.2
〈distinctio prima〉 Prima distinctio istius questionis est ista, quod
‘scientia’ accipitur tripliciter: uno modo propriissime, scilicet pro notitia
causata demonstratione; alio modo accipitur largius, scilicet pro notitia
evidenti veri necessarii; tertio modo accipitur largissime, scilicet pro
rb notitia evidenti et probabili alicuius veri. | Et ista distinctio intelligitur
de notitia complexa, quia de ista ad presens intendimus.
Per primam notitiam cognoscuntur tantummodo conclusiones de-
monstrationum. Per secundam notitiam possunt sciri principia quamvis
demonstrabilia. Per tertiam sciuntur quecumque vera quamvis contin-
gentia. Et omnes iste notitie sive scientie presupponunt unam scientiam
incomplexam indivisibilem, qua tam complexa quam incomplexa omnia
cognoscuntur. Et ista scientia est prima scientia, scilicet, ipsemet Deus
qui est omnium prima causa.
 istum] quid add. necnon del. E  accipitur] dupliciter add. necnon del. E
 Isagoge, prooem.,  (, –): ‘Cum sit necessarium, Chrysaori, et ad eam quae
est apud Aristotelem praedicamentorum doctrinam, nosse quid genus sit et quid
dierentia quidque species et quid proprium et quid accidens, etc.’
questio  
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〈distinctio secunda〉 Secunda distinctio est ista quod necessitas est
duplex, scilicet complexa et incomplexa. Necessitas incomplexa est res
que non potest non esse. Complexa adhuc subdividitur, quia quedam est
absoluta sive categorica, et quedam conditionata sive hypothetica.
 Prima necessitas est propositio categorica necessaria. Secunda est
conditionalis vera, quia omnis conditionalis vera est necessaria in qua
coniunctio est nota consequentie, et non promissionis complende et
voluntatis exprimende 〈et〉 conservende.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista quod aliqua scientia est
 necessaria ad cognitionem predicamentorum habendam. Ista statim
patet, quia prima scientia que est prima causa est necessaria, et sine ipsa
nulla cognitio potest haberi.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod nulla scientia
que 〈non〉 est prima causa, est necessaria aliqua necessitate ad cogni-
 tionem predicamentorum habendam. Ista conclusio probatur inductive,
quia quacumcumque tali scientia demonstrata, sive sit scientia Sortis
sive Platonis sive alicuius alterius individui, sine ista potest cognitio pre-
dicamentorum haberi, quia sine scientia Sortis potest scientia predica-
mentorum haberi a Platone, et e converso. Igitur nulla 〈talis〉 scientia est
 necessaria aliqua necessitate ad cognitionem predicamentorum haben-
dam.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod non necesse est
habere cognitionem generis ad 〈cognitionem〉 predicamentorum haben-
dam. Istud probatur inductive, quia non istum necesse est, nec istum, et
 sic de singulis, quia non tamen istum necesse 〈est〉 scire aliquam scien-
tiam, igitur non istum necesse est habere aliquam scientiam generis
ad scientiam predicamentorum habendam. Ista consequentia patet per
rationes superius recitatas.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod possibile est ali-
 quem habere scientiam predicamentorum sine scientia generis. Ista sta-
tim patet, quia possibile est aliquem habere scientiam aliquorum predi-
camentorum sine 〈scientiam〉 aliquorum predicabilium, utpote aliqua-
rum substantiarum specialissimarum sine scientia generis.
Contra istam conclusionem instatur, quia genus et species sunt correla-
 tiva, igitur ad cognitionem unius sequitur cognitio alterius, et e converso.
 quia] quia iter. E  non] nullum E  est] scire aliquam add. necnon del. E
 non] tamen add. E
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Ista consequentia patet per Aristotelem in Predicamentis, capitulo de
relatione,3 ubi dicit quod 〈qui〉 di nite noverit unum relativorum, dif-
Þnite cognoscit et reliquum; et antecedens est textus Porphirii;4 igitur
videtur quod species non potest cognoci sine cognitione generis.
Ad istud dicitur quod species non potest cognosci perfecte sine cogni-
tione generis, quia species non potest cognosci nisi cognoscatur aliquid
aliud esse genus respectu talis speciei, sicud pater non cognoscatur esse
pater nisi cognoscatur habere Þlium, et sic intelligit Aristoteles in Predi-
camentis.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod ad perfectam
cognitionem predicamentorum habendam necesse est necessitate con-
va ditionata cognitionem generis et aliorum universalium | haberi. Et hoc
nihil aliud est dictum nisi quod talis conditionalis est vera: si predica-
menta perfecte cognoscuntur ab aliquo, ab eodem haberetur cognitio
generis et aliorum universalium. Ista conclusio statim patet, quia predi-
camenta non sunt alia quam universalia; ergo, quicumque cognoscit per-
fecte predicamenta, ipse cognoscit universalia. Ista consequentia est de
se nota, et antecedens etiam patet, quia predicamentum est coordinatio
predicabilium, et omne predicabile de pluribus univoce est universale,
sicud patet per di nitionem universalis, et omne universale est genus
vel species etcetera; igitur omne predicamentum componitur ex univer-
salibus, et per consequens predicamentum non potest perfecte cognosci
nisi cognoscantur universalia.
〈conclusio sexta〉 Ultima conclusio est quod ad perfectam cogni-
tionem predicamentorum habendam non est necesse necessitate abso-
luta cognitio universalium haberi. Ista statim patet, quia non est necesse
necessitate absoluta aliqua cognitio predicamentorum vel universalium
habere, quia nulla categorica est necessaria per quam signiÞcatur talem
cognitionem haberi primo et principaliter.
– conditionata] ad add. E  universalium] haberi. Et hoc nihil aliud est dicere
nisi quod talis conditionalis est vera si predicamenta perfecte cognoscuntur ab aliquo.
Ab eodem haberetur di nitio generis et aliorum universalium add. E. Iste textus iteratur
cum dierentiis paululis initio verso folio .  cognitio] coniunctio E  quam]
non E  sexta] universale add. E
 Aristoteles, Predicamenta, vi: a–: ‘si quis aliquid eorum quae sunt ad aliquid
deÞnite sciet, et illud ad quod dicitur deÞnite sciturus est’ – tr. Boethii.
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘Nosse autem oportet 〈quod〉, quoniam et genus alicuius est
genus et species alicuius est species, idcirco necesse est in utrorumque rationibus
utrisque uti.’
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Et si dicatur quod ista categorica est necessaria: ‘Deus est’, et ista signi-
Þcat scientiam universalium, quia signiÞcat Deum secundum que est
scientia necessaria omnium, ad istud dupliciter dicitur, primo quod con-
clusio intelligitur de scientia humana naturaliter generabili et acquiribili.
 Secundo dicitur quod, quamvis ista propositio ‘Deus est’ signiÞcaret
scientiam universalium esse, non tamen principaliter, quia voco ‘prin-
cipaliter signiÞcare’ istud propriis conceptibus, quibus corresponderent
proprii termini ad placitum, sicud ista propositio: ‘scientia universalium
est principaliter scientiam universalium esse’, quia propriis conceptibus
 vel proprio conceptu scientie, et voco ‘proprium conceptum scientie’
istum conceptum qui signiÞcat scientiam sic quod ipsam non signiÞ-
caret si non esset scientia, sed signiÞcat ipsam quia est scientia. Sed sic
non est de isto conceptu Deus, quia, quamvis signiÞcaret scientiam, quia
signiÞcat Deum qui est scientia, non tamen signiÞcat scientiam quia est
 scientia, et ideo non est proprius conceptus scientie.
Post hoc respondendum est ad rationes:
〈ad .〉 Ad primum dicitur concedendo maiorem et negando minorem.
Et ulterius negatur quod nihil potest sciri nisi sit verum vel falsum,
quia res extra sciuntur que nec sunt vere nec false veritate vel falsitate
 propositionali, quia ‘hominem scitur esse animal’, et ‘hominem esse
scitur aliquid’ nec est verum nec falsum. Et ulterius dicitur negando
istam ‘“quid sit genus” nec est verum nec falsum’, quia si supponat
personaliter, tunc ‘quid sit genus’ in ista propositione: ‘scio quid est genus’
signiÞcat istam propositionem vel consimilem ‘genus est universale’ vel
 ‘genus est istud quod predicatur de pluribus dierentibus specie in eo
quod quid’. Unde tantum est dictu, ‘scio quid est genus’, ‘scio quid genus
est universale’, et tunc li ‘quid’ non ponitur interrogative, sed ‘quid est
genus’ est oratio indicativa. Potest etiam ista oratio interrogativa ‘quid
est genus’ cognosci et sciri extendendo nomen ‘scientie’ ad quamcumque
 cognitionem sive intellectionem.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum argumentum dicitur concedendo quod necesse
vbest scire quid sit | genus ad scientiam predicamentorum perfecte haben-
dam necessitate conditionata, et non necessitate absoluta. Et ulterius,
tunc negatur consequentia: ‘igitur aliqua scientia generis est necessaria’,
 proprio] proprie E  ulterius] conceditur add. necnon del. E  quid sit] quod
est E  dictu] dictum E
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quia nulla scientia generis est necessaria, sicud probat articulum. Sed
bene sequitur: ‘igitur necesse est aliquam scientiam generis haberi’, po-
nendo li ‘scientiam’ post necesse, quia tunc stabit confuse tantum.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur concedendo hoc antecedens ‘nullum ne-
cesse est scire quid sit genus’, et ulterius, negando consequentiam ‘igitur
non est necesse aliquem scire’, et hoc ideo, quia arguitur a termino stante
confuse et distributive ad terminum stantem confuse tantum. Et ideo
non valet de forma, quia posito quod hec sit necessaria: ‘homo est’, tunc
ista consequentia non valet: ‘nullum hominem necesse est esse’, quia ibi
arguitur a sensu diviso ad sensum compositum, que consequentia non
valet, sicud satis patet in fallacia compositionis et divisionis. Et per hoc
patet ad residuum.
〈ad argumentum in oppositum〉 Ad argumentum in oppositum dici-
tur quod Porphirius nihil aliud vult 〈quod〉 talis conditionalis est neces-
saria: si ‘Chrysaorius debeat habere perfectam scientiam predicamento-
rum, oportet ipsum scire quid sit genus, quid species’, nec ex hoc sequitur
quod necesse est ipsum scire quid sit genus aliqua necessitate absoluta.
 nullum] nullum sup. lin. Ec  consequentiam] dicitur add. E  quod] in E
 absoluta] absolute E
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum scire quid sit genus
etcetera sit necesse ad divisionem faciendam.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non.
 Nam multi grammatici et addiscentes grammaticam faciunt diversas
divisiones grammaticales, ignorantes tamen quid sit genus et quid sit
species. Non 〈ergo〉 est necesse ad divisionem faciendam.
〈.〉 Item. Experientia haberetur quod multi logici in ydiomate nativo
faciunt divisiones diversas, qui tamen ignorant quid sit genus et quid sit
 species.
〈.〉 Item. Possibile est dividi genus in suas species ab aliquo ignorante
tale divisum esse genus, vel talia dividentia esse species; igitur non est
necesse sciri quid sit genus ad divisionem faciendam. Ista consequentia
est plana, et antecedens declaratur, quia possibile est quod aliquis faciat
 talem divisionem ‘animalium aliud rationale, aliud irrationale’, et quod
ipse ignoret quod animal est genus, et quod homo sit species, quia de
se notum est, et experientia satis potest haberi quod iste sunt taliter
distincte et disparate propositiones: ‘quoddam animal est rationale’ et
‘quoddam animal est irrationale’ et ‘animal est genus’, quia ipse due
 sciuntur a laycis; tertia non scitur nisi ab instructo in logica.
〈.〉 Item. Divisiones naturales, utpote forme a materia et partium inte-
gralium ab invicem, possunt Þeri sine scientia generis vel speciei generis;
igitur scientia generis non est necessaria ad divisionem faciendam.
ra〈.〉 Item. Sine scientia generis quecumque divisio potest Þeri;| igitur
 scientia generis non est necessaria ad divisionem faciendam. Ista conse-
quentia est plana, et antecedens patet inductive.
 Nam] nam add. necnon del. et exp. E  dividi] quid sit add. necnon del. et exp. E
 partium] antegralium add. necnon del. et exp. E
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〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum videtur quod sit textus Porphirii.1
〈distinctiones〉 In ista questione presupponuntur distinctiones posite
in precedenti questione. Et ulterius ponitur ista distinctio quod quedam
est divisio realis et quedam logicalis.
Realis divisio vocatur ista qua partes essentiales vel integrales alicuius
rei ab invicem separantur, quali divisione anima separatur a corpore et
una pars integralis linee ab alia parte.
Divisio vero logicalis vocatur ista qua aliquod signum commune con-
trahitur pro aliquibus signiÞcatis per aliquam dierentiam vel per ali-
quam suam speciem, sicud hoc signum commune ‘animal’, quando addi-
tur sibi hec dierentia irrationale, contrahitur ad standum pro aliis suis
signiÞcatis.
Et ista divisio subdividitur, quia quedam est essentialis et quedam
accidentalis.
Essentialis dicitur ista qua aliquod commune dividitur vel per suas
dierentias speciÞcas sive essentiales, vel per sua inferiora per se.
Prima divisio〈ne〉 potest 〈genus〉 dividi in suas species per suas dif-
ferentias speciÞcas. Secunda divisione, scilicet, per sua per se inferiora,
potest species specialissima de se dividi per sua supposita, sed non per
dierentiam speciÞcam, quia species specialissima non habet divisiones
speciÞcas divisivas, sed tantummodo constitutivas. Exemplum primi,
ut ‘animalium aliud rationale, aliud irrationale’; exemplum secundi, ut
‘hominum alius Sortes, alius Plato’.
Divisio vera accidentalis est ista qua aliquis terminus substantialis sive
accidentalis dividitur per aliquos terminos accidentales, ut ‘hominum
alius longus, alius brevis’, ‘alborum aliud dulce, aliud amarum’.
Et ex isto infertur unum correlarium, videlicet quod divisione acci-
dentali minus commune dividitur per communiora, quia clarum est
quod quilibet istorum terminorum ‘breve’ et ‘longum’ communior est
quam iste terminus ‘homo’.
 pars] integra add. E  vero] vere E | aliquod] aliqua E | signum] singnum (sic) E
– contrahitur] contrariatur E  aliquibus] sciendum add. E  Secunda] Sed
ista E | sua] specie add. necnon del. E  accidentalis] dividitur add. necnon del. E
| est ista qua] est ista qua mg. Ec  terminos] sive add. E | hominum] add.  litt.(?)
E  quam] quam iter. E
 Isagoge, prooem.,  (, –): ‘Cum sit necessarium, Chrysaori, (…) nosse quid genus
sit et quid dierentia quidque species et quid proprium et quid accidens, (…) ad ea
quae in divisione (…) sunt, etc.’
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〈conclusio prima〉 Istis habitis sequuntur alique conclusiones, quarum
prima est ista quod ad nullam divisionem realem faciendam est necesse
scire quid sit genus. Et patet conclusio ista de se.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod ad nullam
 divisionem logicalem faciendam est necesse scire quid sit genus. Ista con-
clusio declaratur, quia divisio essentialis qua dividitur genus per suas spe-
ciÞcas dierentias, potest Þeri sine hoc quod sciatur quid sit genus, quia
clarum est quod aliquis potest facere istas duas propositiones: ‘quoddam
animal est rationale’, ‘quoddam est irrationale’ et per consequens sic divi-
 dere: ‘animalium quoddam rationale et quoddam irrationale’ sine hoc
quod sciat istam ‘animal est genus’.
Divisio etiam qua species specialissima dividitur in sua per se inferiora
potest Þeri ab aliquo sine hoc quod talis sciat quid sit species, quia aliquis
potest scire istas duas propositiones ‘Sortes est homo’ et ‘Plato est homo’
 rbet per consequens sic dividere ‘hominum alius Sortes, alius Plato’ sine |
hoc quod sciat istam propositionem ‘homo est species’.
Item, aliquis potest scire quod homo est species sine hoc quod sciat
quid sit species, quia scire quid sit species, est scire speciem di nitive,
vel saltem scire aliquod predicatum veriÞcari de specie in quid, et hoc
 non oportet sciri ab aliquo qui s〈c〉it quod homo est species, quia iste
terminus ‘species’ non predicatur in quid de isto termino ‘homo’, nec e
converso. Et patet ista per predicta.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod necesse est scire
quid sit genus 〈necessitate〉 conditionata ad faciendam aliquam divisio-
 nem qua scit 〈talem〉 esse generis in suas species vel speciei in sua per se
inferiora. Et hoc nihil aliud est dictu quam quod talis conditionalis est
necessaria: ‘si aliquis scit quod aliqua est divisio generis in suas species
vel speciei in sua per se inferiora, ipse scit quid sit genus, quid species,
etcetera’. Ista conclusio declaratur, quia, si aliquis scit aliquam divisionem
 esse generis in suas species, ipse scit quod genus dividitur in suas species,
et per consequens ipse scit quod aliquid est genus, et aliquid species.
Contra istam conclusionem arguitur: possibile quod aliquis cui credis
dicat tibi ‘genus dividitur in suas species’ sine hoc quod tu scis quid
sit genus et quid species, et tamen tu scis quod genus dividitur in suas
 species, sicud tu scis quod Roma est pulchra civitas, quia tu credis
– dividere] di nire E  sua] suas E | inferiora] inferioras E  Plato]
Platonis E  quia] quorum E  ista] igitur E  genus] ad add. necnon del. et
exp. E  tamen] tunc E
 thomas manlevelt, questiones libri porphirii
2011013 [Van der Helm] 02-Edition-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 174
dicentibus; igitur ad faciendam aliquam divisionem generis in suas spe-
cies non est necesse scire quid sit genus, etcetera.
Ad istud dicitur breviter quod conclusio intelligitur de notitia distinc-
tiva, qua aliquis scit dividere genus in suas species, et qua scit tale divisum
esse genus et talia dividentia esse species.
Post hoc sequuntur responsiones ad rationes principales.
〈ad .〉 Ad quarum primam dicitur concedendo antecedens et conse-
quentiam, quia nesciunt se dividere genus in suas species sic quod sciant
tale divisum esse genus, et talia dividentia esse species, quia ad sic divi-
sum respondetur scire quid sit genus ad intellectum predictum.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum est idem, quia, quamvis logici faciunt divisio-
nem, nesciunt se artiÞcialiter dividere in suas species, vel speciem in sua
per se inferiora, sic quod sciant talia divisa esse genus vel species et talia
divisa esse genus vel species, et talia dividentia esse species vel per se
inferiora ad species, ad quem intellectum loquitur Porphirius.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertiam rationem similiter patet per predicta, quia conce-
ditur antecedens, quia clarum est quod aliquis potest dividere genus in
suas species et ignorare se dividere genus in suas species, sicut suppo-
nit argumentum. Et ulterius conceditur quod ad faciendam divisionem
generis in suas species non est necesse scire quid sit genus etcetera, sed
ad faciendam divisionem generis in suas species artiÞcialiter, sic quod
va dividens sciat talem | divisionem esse generis in suas species et talem
divisum esse genus et talia dividentia esse species, necesse est scire quid
sit genus etcetera, et sic intelligit Porphirius.
〈ad .〉 Ad aliam rationem dicitur quod Porphirius sic intelligit de
divisione logicali ad intellectum predictum, et non de divisione reali de
qua concludit argumentum.
〈ad .〉 Ad ultimum argumentum patet di nitive per predicta in
precedenti questione.
〈ad argumentum in oppositum〉 Qualiter argumentum ad oppositum
intelligitur, patet etiam 〈per〉 predicta.
 aliquis scit] quamvis sit E  esse] species add. necnon del. E  ad] per E
 reali] realiter E  Qualiter] etcetera add. E
2011013 [Van der Helm] 02-Edition-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 175
〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum noscere quid sit
genus sit necessarium ad assignationem di nitionum.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non.
 Non est necessarium aliquam di nitionem assignari; igitur nosci quid
sit genus, non est necessarium ad di nitionem assignandam. Conse-
quentia videtur evidens, et antecedens patet, quia si esset necessarium
aliquam di nitionem assignari, tunc impossibile esset aliquam di ni-
tionem non assignari. Ista consequentia patet 〈per〉 equipollentias moda-
 lium, et consequens est falsum, sicud de se notum; igitur et antece-
dens.
〈.〉 Item. Secundo, aliqua est di nitio quam non intrat genus, igitur
nosse quid sit genus, non est necessarium ad di nitionem asignandam.
Consequentia est de se nota; et antecedens declaratur, quia ista di nitio
 albi: ‘album est ens habens albedinem su cientem’ ad declarationem sui
non habet aliquod genus in se, quia ens non est genus, sicud patet per
Porphirium,1 nec aliquid est genus quia convertitur cum ente, nec albedo
est genus, sicud de se notum est.
〈.〉 Item. Di nitio entis non continet aliquod genus, quia ens non
 habet aliquod genus supra se veniens, cum sit transcendens.
〈.〉 Item. Di nitio generis generalissimi non habet aliquod genus,
quia: vel istud genus esset convertibile cum genere generalissimo, vel
superius, vel inferius ad ipsum. Non superius, quia genus generalissi-
mum non habet genus supra se. Nec convertibile, vel inferius, quia nihil
 genus per tale inferius di nitur, sicud animal non di nitur per ali-
quod genus inferius ad ipsum, vel per aliquod genus convertibile cum
ipso, quia di nitio debet dari per notiora. Sed convertibile, vel inferius
 quia] sic add. necnon del. E  non] non sup. lin. E  sicud] Aris(?) add. E
 istud] istud sup. lin. Ec  Nec] non add. E  genus per tale] per tale genus
transp. E. – per aliquod] aliquod per E
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘Neque enim est commune unum genus omnium ens nec
omnia eiusdem generis sunt secundum unum supremum genus (…)’
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eiusdem alterius non est notius ipso, sicud elici potest ab Aristotele primo
Physicorum,2 ubi vult quod noti〈or〉a nobis sint confusa magis.
〈.〉 Item. Si genus di nitur per genus, esset processus 〈in〉 inÞnitum,
quia oporteret genus di niri per aliud genus.
〈.〉 Item. Possibile esset aliquem assignare aliquam di nitionem qui
tamen non cognosceret quid esset genus; ergo noscere quid sit, non est
necessarium ad assignandam di nitionem. Consequentia est nota; et
antecedens patet de pueris qui formantur ad respondandum di nitive ad
multa interrogata, qui tamen ignorant quid sit genus, sicud patet de illis
vb qui instruuntur ad respondendum | di nitive talibus interrogationibus
‘quid est nomen?’, ‘quid est pronomen?’, ‘quid est verbum?’ etcetera.
〈ad oppositum, .〉 Ad oppositum est Porphirius in principio sui prohe-
mii,3 ut videtur.
〈ad oppositum, .〉 Item. Omnis bona di nitio datur per genus
ad dierentiam speciÞcam, ergo necesse est noscere quid sit genus ad
di nitum assignandam. Consequentia videtur evidens, et antecedens
per Aristotelem, tertio Topicorum.4
〈distinctiones〉 In ista questione presuppositis distinctionibus in que-
stionibus precedentibus declaratis additur una di nitio quid 〈rei〉 et una
quid nominis.
〈distinctio prima: diffinitio quid rei〉 Di nitio vero quid rei
accipitur dupliciter, quia quedam est que datur per essentialia, idest:
per terminos essentiales nihil extrinseca connotantes cuiusmodi sunt
genus di niti, et dierentia speciÞca, et vocatur di nitio propriissime
dicta. Alia est di nitio quid rei que datur per propria sive accidentalia
et per genus di niti, ut si homo di niretur: ‘homo est animal risibile’
vel ‘homo est animal recte sedens’, et vocatur per Aristotelem ‘di nitio
 assignandam] assignationem E  instruuntur] informantur E | ad] ins(?) add.
necnon del. E  una] est sup. lin. add. E  homo] est animal add. necnon del. et
exp. E
 Aristoteles, Physica i, , a–: ‘Sunt autem nobis primum manifesta et certa
que confuse magis’ – tr. vetus.
 Isagoge, prooem.,  (, –): ‘Cum sit necessarium, Chrysaori, (…) nosse quid genus
sit (…) ad deÞnitionum assignationem etc.’
 Vel potius Aristoteles, Topica vi, , b–: ‘si quidem oportet per genus et
dierentias di nire eum qui bene di nit’ – tr. Boethii. Auctoritates  (): ‘Omnis
bona deÞnitio debet constare ex genere et dierentiis, quia ista sunt priora et notiora
quam species quae deÞnitur.’ (Aristoteles, Topica vi, , b–).
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data per additamentum’,5 et a Boethio vocatur ‘descriptio’ sive ‘descriptiva
oratio’.6
〈distinctio secunda: diffinitioquidnominis〉 Di nitio vero quid
nominis vocatur oratio indicans quid nomen signiÞcat, convertibilis cum
 tali nomine, quam non oportet aliquod genus intrare.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista quod sine genere potest
di nitio quid nominis assignari. Ista conclusio patet inductive, quia sine
isto genere et sine isto et sic de singulis.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod nulla di nitio
 quid rei potest assignari sine omni genere vel sine genere istius. Ista
conclusio probatur: omnis di nitio quid rei declaratur per genus, et, si
non datur per genus, non est di nitio quid rei; ergo nulla di nitio quid
rei potest assignari sine genere. Ista consequentia patet, et antecedens
patet per predictam distinctionem.
 〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod, si sit notitia gene-
ris, omnis di nitio potest assignari, quia sub ista notitia generis et sine
ista nec de singulis.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Ex ista sequitur quarta conclusio, quod nulla
notitia †generis(?) humana sive e … a(?)† est necessaria ad aliquam
 di nitionem assignandam. Et ista similiter patet inductive.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est hec quod di nitio quid rei
potest assignari ab aliquo sine hoc quod sciatur quid sit genus di nitive
ab eodem. Ista declaratur, quia possibile est aliquem investigare naturam
hominis et eandem di nire ad hoc quod sciat hominem esse animal
 rationale mortale sine hoc quod sciat istu〈m〉 terminum ‘homo’ esse
raspeciem, vel aliquem | terminum esse speciem, et sine hoc quod sciat
aliquem terminum esse genus; impossibile est aliquam di nitionem
quid rei assignari ab aliquo sine hoc quod sciatur ab eodem quid sit
genus; 〈igitur〉 etcetera.
 di nitio] rei et add. E  genere] vel sine communi (sic) add. E (istius add. necnon
del. E) | istius] istius add. necnon del.(?) E  di nire] devinire E  terminum]
tantum E  terminum] tantum E | esse] hominem add. necnon del. et exp. E
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 Aristoteles, Metaphyica, vii, a–: ‘Palam itaque quia solius substantie est dif-
Þnitio. Nam et si aliarum cathegoriarum, necesse est ex additione esse.’ Auctoritates
 (): ‘DeÞnitio accidentium Þt per additamentum, scilicet substantiae.’ (Cf. S.
omas, In Metaphys., vii, lect. , n. . Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphys., Z, a–).
 Locus non inventus.
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Ista consequentia patet. Et antecedens patet, quia iste due propositio-
nes ‘homo est animal rationale mortale’ et ‘aliquis terminus est genus’, vel
‘aliquod est genus’ vel ‘genus est quod predicatur de pluribus specie dif-
ferentibus’ etcetera sunt omnino propositiones disparate vel in nullo ad
se invicem dependentes vel aliquam ordinem habentes; igitur una potest
sciri sine relinqua, et e converso, quia, si non, pari ratione dicerem quod
ista propositio ‘Deus 〈est〉’ non potest sciri nisi sciretur ista ‘Sortes currit’,
quia ita disparate sunt predicte propositiones sicud iste.
〈conclusio sexta〉 Sexta conclusio est ista quod necesse est necessi-
tate conditionata scientem se di nire di nitione quid rei scire quid sit
genus etcetera, et hoc nihil aliud est dictu nisi quod ista conditionalis
est vera: si aliquis di niat di nitione quid rei artiÞcialiter sic quod sciat
se di nire di nitione quid rei, ipse scit quid sit genus. Ista conclusio
declaratur, quia si talis taliter debeat di nire, ipse scit quid est di nitio
quid rei, et si scit quid di nitio quid rei sit, quod talis di nitio per genus
datur, et si sic di niat sciendo se di nire, ipse scit quid sit genus, quia,
si ignoret quod est genus, nec sciret utrum di niret per genus vel non.
Patet igitur conclusio predicta.
〈conclusio septima〉 Septima conclusio est ista quod possibile est
aliquem scire aliquam di nitionem dari per genus sine hoc quod talis
sciat quid sit genus di nitive, sicud patet de se, quia possibile est discipu-
lum credere magistro dicenti istam di nitionem ‘animal rationale mor-
tale’ per genus assignari, sine hoc quod sciat quid sit genus di nitive,
sicud de se patet.
〈alie conclusiones〉 Alie conclusiones circa istam materiam possent
hic poni, que satis faciliter ex precedentibus eliciuntur.
Ad rationes principales respondetur:
〈ad .〉 Ad primam dicitur concedendo consequentiam et consequens
loquendo de necessitate absoluta.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur concedendo antecedens, et consequens
ad intellectum iam dictum. Consequentia tamen in uno sensu posset
negari, sicud patet per penultimam conclusionem istius questionis, et
patet totum per superius dicta.
〈ad . et .〉 Ad tertium per idem, et etiam ad quartum.
 quia] quia iter. E  aliquis] alius E  potest] ?? add. necnon del. E  ista] alius
E  di nitio] per genus datur add. necnon del. et exp. E
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〈ad .〉 Ad quintum etiam patet, quia conceditur quod non omnis
di nitio datur per genus, sicud di nitio quid nominis, sed su cit quod
datur per aliquod notius sive communius.
〈ad .〉 Ad sextum dicitur totum concedendo, sed auctor intelligit
 talem esse indi nibilem: si quis debeat di nire di nitione quid rei
rbartiÞcialiter, | oportet ipsum cognoscere quid sit genus et quid species
etcetera.
〈ad . in oppositum〉 Ad primum in oppositum: patet per iam dicta
qualiter auctor intelligit.
 〈ad . in oppositum〉 Ad aliud dicitur: negando antecedens, quia
di nitio quid nominis est una di nitio, tamen non oportet aliquam
talem dari per genus. Si tamen intelligatur per veram di nitionem pro-
priissime dictam, et sic conceditur antecedens, et negatur consequentia
loquendo de necessitate absoluta, sicud superius dicebatur.
 Et sic est Þnis questionis.
 talem esse indi nibilem] tale est indi … Em E | quis] qns(?) E  ipsum] ipsam E
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum universale sit 〈in〉 intellectu.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non,
quia si esset 〈in〉 intellectu, 〈vel esset〉 ab intellectu causatum, vel ab
obiecto. Non primo, quia intellectus secundum Aristotelem, secundo1
et tertio2 De anima, est potentia passiva, et per consequens non causat
aliquid in genere cause e cientis.
〈.〉 Item. Si sic, sequeretur quod intellectus alteraret semetipsum cau-
sando in ipso universale, et per consequens moveret semetipsum. Quod
est contra Aristotelem, sexto Physicorum,3 ubi vult quod omne 〈quod〉
movetur, ab alio movetur. Ab hoc deducitur, cum non sit processus in
inÞnito, aliquod esse movens immobile.4
〈.〉 Item. Si sic, cum omne agens sit actu tale quale patiens est in
potentia et non actu, sicud patet primo De generatione5 et secundo De
anima,6 sequeretur quod intellectus idem numero esset aliquo modo actu
 Quod] non add. E  deducitur] deductus E
 Locus non inventus.
 Auctoritates  (): ‘Intellectus est pars animae. Intelligere est pati.’ (Cf. Aristo-
teles, De anima, Γ, a–, –.); Auctoritates  (): ‘Intellectus noster
est ens in potentia.’ (Cf. S. omas, In De anima, iii, lect. , n. ; Cf. Aristoteles,
De anima, Γ, b–).
 Vel potius Aristoteles, Physica vii, , b: ‘Omne quod movetur necesse est ab
aliquo moveri’ – tr. vetus. Auctoritates  (): ‘Omne quod movetur ab aliquo
movetur.’
 Aristoteles, Physica vii, , a–: ‘Neque in inÞnitum adibit, sed stabit alicubi
et erit aliquod quod primum causa erit motus’ – tr. vetus. Auctoritates  (): ‘In
moventibus et motis non est ire in inÞnitum et ergo necesse est devenire ad primum
motorem.’ (Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, Η, a–).
 Cf. Aristoteles De generatione et corruptione i, , b–: ‘Quo autem modo
existit generare entibus et facere et pati, dicamus accipientes principium dictum
multotiens. Si enim est hoc quidem potestate, hoc autem actu tale, innatum est
non tum quidem, tum autem non pati, sed ubique secundum quantum est tale,
magis autem et minus secundum quod tale magis et minus.’ Cf. Auctoritates 
(): ‘Agens et patiens sunt in principio dissimilia et in Þne sunt similia, similia in
genere, dissimilia in specie.’ (Aristoteles, De generatione et corruptione, Α, a–
, b–).
 Auctoritates  (): ‘Agens et patiens in principio sunt dissimilia, in Þne vero
similia.’ (Aristoteles, De anima, Β, a–; Cf. S. omas, In De anima, ii, lect.
, n. ).
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quale non esset actu, quod includit contradictionem. Nec potest dici
quod causaretur ab obiecto: primo, quia omne agens naturale agit per
contactum, sicud patet per Aristotelem, tertio7 et quinto8 Physicorum;
sed obiectum non tangit intellectum, cum intellectus sit indivisibilis, et
 per consequens intangibilis, ergo obiectum non potest aliquid causare in
ipso intellectu. Secundo quia universale frequenter est quando obiectum
non est, sicud conceptus universalis rose potest esse rosa non existente,
sicud in experiendo patet, et per consequens talis conceptus non causatur
a rosa, quia non ens nihil causat.
 〈.〉 Item. Nullum predicabile de pluribus est 〈in〉 intellectu; omne
universale est predicabile de pluribus; ergo nullum universale est 〈in〉
intellectu. Maior patet per di nitionem universalis, et minor probatur,
quia, si aliquod predicabile de pluribus esset 〈in〉 intellectu, cum omnis
predicatio sit in propositione, sequeretur quod propositiones essent 〈in〉
 intellectu vel saltem possent esse in quibus universale esset predicabile de
pluribus, et per consequens tales propositiones possint esse in intellectu:
‘omnis homo est homo’, ‘omnis homo est substantia’, et sic de aliis. Sed
consequens est falsum; igitur etcetera. Et quod consequens sit falsum,
declaratur primo quantum ad primam propositionem, secundo quan-
 tum ad secundam.
〈primo quantum ad primam propositionem〉 Si tales propositiones
essent in intellectu: ‘omnis homo est homo’, ‘omne animal est animal’, in
quibus idem predicatur de seipso, sequeretur quod due res eiusdem spe-
ciei specialissime non facientes per se unum possint simul esse in eodem
 subiecto, et per consequens due scientie eiusdem speciei specialissime,
vautpote due grammatice vel due logice, possunt simul esse | in eodem
subiecto, quod est contra Aristotelem in De sensu et sensato.9 Apparet
etiam ratione quod sit inconveniens, quia non alia ratione due logice
possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto quam tres vel quattuor, et sic in
 inÞnito.
 predicabile] corr. ex predicabilis E  per] per iter. E  sic] nec E
 consequens] genus E  Si] ?? add. necnon del. E  sic] nec E
 Aristoteles, Physica iii, , a–.
 Aristoteles, Physica v, , b(?). Cf. Aristoteles Physica vii, , a: ‘Simul
autem dico, quia nihil ipsorum medium est’ Cf. Auctoritates  (): ‘Movens et
motum simul sunt et inter ea non est dare medium.’ (Aristoteles, Physica, Η a–
).
 Cf. Auctoritates  (): ‘Unus sonus numero non potest pervenire ad aures
plurium, sed unus in specie.’ (S. omas, In De sensu …, i, lect. , n. ; Cf.
Aristoteles, De sensu et sensato, , b–).
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Item, pari ratione duo colores et due albedines non facientes per se
unum possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto, quod non videtur valere.
Item, in tali propositione non esset maior ratio quare unus conceptus
esset subiectum et alter predicatum quam e converso; igitur uterque est
subiectum, vel nullus; sed non uterque; igitur nullus. Quod non uterque,
probatur, quia cum subiectum in tali propositione confuse et distributive
supponat et predicatum confuse tantum, sequitur quod idem terminus
supponeret confuse et distributive, et confuse tantum. Et per consequens
sub eodem termino et respectu eiusdem predicati et copule continge-
ret descendere copulative et non contingeret descendere copulative. Ista
consequentia patet per di nitionem suppositionis confuse et distribu-
tive, et confuse tantum; sed consequens est impossibile et includens con-
tradictionem, ergo istud ex quo sequitur.
〈secundo quantum ad secundam propositionem〉 Pro secunda
propositione probatur predictum consequens esse falsum, nam, si tales
propositiones: ‘omne animal 〈est〉 substantia’, ‘omne animal est ens’ et
consimiles possunt esse in intellectu, sequeretur quod una et eadem pro-
positio numero respectu eiusdem signiÞcati esset necessaria 〈et〉 impos-
sibilis; sed consequens est falsum, igitur istud ex quo sequitur. Con-
sequentia demonstratur. Et vocetur hec propositio in intellectu ‘omnis
homo est substantia’ A, et ista propositio ‘omnis substantia est homo’ B,
tunc sic: quidquid est pars A, est pars B, et e converso, ergo A est B, quia
ex eisdem partibus resultat totum. Et antecedens est de se notum, et ultra:
ergo A est B, et A est propositio necessaria et B est propositio impossi-
bilis, et ultra, igitur una et eadem propositio respectu unius et eiusdem
signiÞcati, est necessaria et impossibilis.
〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum arguitur: omnis conceptus communis
univocus est 〈in〉 intellectu, aliquod universale est conceptus univo-
cus, ergo universale commune est in intellectu. Maior videtur evidens,
quia non potest inveniri aliquod subiectum primum ipsius conceptus; et
minor ab omnibus tenetur, quia omnes ponant quod sit universale men-
tale quod est per se et primo universale, quia est naturaliter universale.
 alter] alicuius E  sequitur] scitur E  quod] et E  et] est A add. E
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〈distinctio〉 Distinctio premittenda est hec quod duplex est universale,
quod quoddam est universale naturale sive per se, et quoddam est uni-
versale ad placitum sive per accidens.
Et quodlibet istorum membrorum subdividitur. Nam universale natu-
 rale est duplex quia: quoddam est universale naturale predicatione,
quoddam reale; primo modo predicatum vocatur universale logicale;
secundo modo vocatur universale physecum. Primum universale qui-
dem 〈est〉 conceptus predicabilis de pluribus si plura habeat supposita vel
posset habere plura supposita. Quod dico propter conceptum mundi et
 solis et lune et sic de consimilibus. Unde universaliter: omnis conceptus
appellativus posset dici isto modo universale, quia omne tale universale
est quoddam signum simplex vel compositum. Secundum vero univer-
sale 〈est〉 res sine qua pauci vel nulli eectus naturales in spera activorum
vbet passivorum possunt e ci, et talia universalia | sunt Deus et omnis cor-
 pora supercelestia.
Universale ad placitum sive per accidens est duplex: quoddam est ex
communi usu, scilicet, vocale et scriptum. Vocale est terminus appel-
lativus vocalis simplex vel compositus; scriptum est terminus scriptus
appellativus simplex vel compositus.
 Et de tali universali naturali predicatione et per se est principale
propositum, de quo ponende sunt alique conclusiones.
〈conclusio prima〉 Quarum prima est ista quod omne universale men-
tale est in intellectu subiective. Ista probatur sic: omnis conceptus men-
talis est in intellectu subiective; 〈sed omne tale universale est terminus
 mentalis; igitur etcetera〉. Maior est de se nota, quia omnis talis terminus
mentalis est conceptus simplex vel compositus, et omnis conceptus est in
intellectu subiective. Minor declaratur, quia omne universale mentale est
predicabile de pluribus, et omne predicabile de pluribus 〈est〉 terminus,
et nullum tale universale est terminus vocalis vel scriptus, ergo omne tale
 universale est terminus mentalis.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod duo universa-
lia mentalia possunt simul esse in eodem intellectu. Ista conclusio pro-
batur per experientiam, qua experimur nos habere talem propositionem
in mente nostra: ‘homo est animal’.
 si] per E | supposita] supponatur E  compositum] vel add. necnon del. E
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Item, quecumque duo accidentalia et non repugnantia possunt simul
〈esse〉 in eodem subiecto, in quo quodlibet eorum naturaliter potest
esse; sed talia duo accidentalia sunt subiectum et predicatum istius
conclusionis ‘homo est animal’, que sunt duo universalia, igitur aliqua
duo universalia possunt simul esse in eodem intellectu. Maior videtur
evidens, quia nulla ratio potest assignari quare talia duo accidentalia non
possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto, sicud lumen et vox, quia in nullo
repugnant quia possunt simul 〈esse〉 in aere, sicud dulcedo et albedo que
simul sunt in lacte, et sic de aliis.
Argumenta vero contra istam conclusionem magis valentia tangeban-
tur superius inter rationes principales, que inferius suo loco solventur.10
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod aliqua duo univer-
salia eiusdem speciei specialissime possunt simul esse 〈in〉 intellectu. Ista
declaratur, quia talis propositio mentalis: ‘homo est homo’, ‘animal est
animal’ potest tota simul esse 〈in〉 intellectu; et predicatum et subiectum
sunt duo universalia mentalia eiusdem speciei specialissime, igitur duo
universalia mentalia eiusdem speciei specialissime possunt simul esse in
intellectu. Maior videtur haberi per experientiam; minor nota est de se.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod universale inten-
sum et universale remissum possunt simul esse intellectu. Ista declara-
tur per experientiam, quia experimur nos frequenter addiscere aliquam
rationem de qua remisse arguamus, et simul cum hoc cogitare de aliqua
alia ratione intense.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod duo universalia
intensa non possunt simul esse in intellectu. Ista declaratur iam per
experientiam, quia experimur nos non posse distinctis cogitationibus
intense de distinctis rebus cogitare, sicud non possumus scribere et cum
hoc aliquam orationem intentissime dicere.
Contra istam conclusionem instatur, et videtur quod contrariatur pre-
dictis, nam talia duo universalia intensissima in nullo repugnant, igitur
possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto, circa quod habent Þeri.
Ad istud breviter dicitur quod causa quare non possunt simul esse in
eodem subiecto, non est repugnantia universalium, sed est repugnantia
 in eodem] in eodem iter. E  Argumenta] con add. necnon del. E  hoc]
hoc sup. lin. Ec | cogitare] cogitari E  ratione] re E; mis add. necnon del. E
 intentissime] detentissime E; cogi〈ta〉mus add. E  repugnant] repugnat E
 universalium] universalia E
 Videas infra, ad .
questio  
2011013 [Van der Helm] 02-Edition-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 185
raadvertentiarum ipsius | intellectus, qui non potest, saltem dummodo est
in corpore, advertere se intense distinctis advertentiis distinctis rebus.
Et si dicatur quod ista duo universalia que sunt subiectum et predi-
catum istius propositionis mentalis ‘homo est animal’, 〈sunt〉 simul in
 intellectu sicud supra positum est, ad istud breviter dicitur quod ista duo
universalia non sunt simul intensa, sicud postea suo loco planius pate-
bit.11
De aliis vero universalibus, in quibus sunt subiective, non oportet ser-
monem prolongari, quia clarum est quod universale vocale est in aere
 tamquam in subiecto, sicud omnis vox, secundum quod patet per Ari-
stotelem tertio De anima,12 et universale scriptum non est in aliqua sub-
stantia tamquam accidens in subiecto, quia est substantia vel substantie.
Alia vero possunt poni universalia ad placitum, quamvis ex com-
muni usu non ponantur, sicud signa communia ex consuetudine ali-
 quas res signiÞcantia appellative, sicud panniculus rubeus positus ante
tabernam signiÞcat vinum rubeum, et pannus glaucus signiÞcat vinum
de Garunna, et motus digiti secundum quod aliqui claustrales utuntur,
appellative signiÞcant sua signiÞcata. De quibus, quia non sunt in usu,
non dicetur.
 Postea dicitur ad rationes principales.
〈ad .〉 Ad primam dicitur quod ipsum universale causatur ab obiecto
in intellectu aliquando. Et ulterius dicitur quod ista propositio Aristotelis
‘omne agens naturale agit per contactum’13 intelligitur de agente tangi-
bili et de agente immediato. Modo, clarum est quod obiectum non est
 immediatum agens respectu causationis universalis, quia agit mediante
sua specie, nec etiam intellectus est patiens tangibile, et ideo auctori-
tas non est ad propositum. Quare autem intellectus sit potentia passiva
respectu aliquarum actionum et respectu aliquarum activa, di nitive
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 Cf. Aristoteles Physica vii, , a: ‘Simul autem dico, quia nihil ipsorum medium
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patebit suo loco, quia manifestum est quod secundum maiorem partem
modernorum nullam distinctionem ponentium inter animam et intellec-
tum et voluntatem, anima habet se active respectu aliquarum operatio-
num sicud respectu nutritionis et respectu motus animalis et sic de sin-
gulis. Sed su ciat ad presens quod satis Þat argumento qualiter, scilicet,
auctoritas supra quam fundatur predictum argumentum, sit intelligenda.
〈ad .〉 Et ulterius ad alia argumenta que probant quod intellectus non
causat ipsum universale, primo quia sic alteraret semetipsum et moveret
semetipsum et exueret seipsum: nec hoc est inconveniens in agentibus
ex proposito, sed agentibus et mobilibus naturalibus que non moventur
vel movent ex proposito, esset inconveniens, et hoc intelligit Aristoteles.
〈ad .〉 Et per hoc idem patet ad secundam propositionem, quia Ari-
stoteles intelligit eam de mobilibus et motibus naturalibus et incorpo-
rabilibus. Sed totum istud plane patebit in questione de actualitate et
passibilitate ipsius intellectus.14
〈ad .〉 〈ad probationem prime propositionis〉 Ad aliud breviter
dicitur concedendo quod tales propositiones ‘omnis homo est homo’ et
‘omne animal est animal’ possunt esse in intellectu. Et ulterius conceditur
quod due species specialissime possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto.
rb Et ulterius ad Philosophum dici〈tur〉 quod due tales res | faciunt per
se unum, sicud due albedines vel due colores. Et ulterius potest dici
ad Aristotelem quod ipse intelligit de duabus scientiis sive de duabus
grammaticis sive de duabus logicis non facientibus unum.
Ad aliud, uno modo potest dici negando istam consequentiam: ‘si
tales due res possunt esse simul in eodem subiecto, ergo tres et quat-
tuor et sic in inÞnitum’, sicud non sequitur: ‘Sortes potest portare duas
tales lapides, ergo potest portare tres’, quia maioris di cultatis est per
motum organorum 〈quam〉 intelligere pluribus conceptibus, sicud patet
per experientiam quod homo posset advertere se ad cogitandum de mul-
tis, et 〈ad〉 intelligendum cum tanto visu quod emitteret sudorem vel
aliquod 〈aliud〉, similiter organa corrumpuntur, et Þeret amens, sicud
patet de multis astronomis qui nimis voluerunt comprehendere de moti-
bus corporum celestium. Utrum vero sit dare maximam multitudinem
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talium conceptuum que potest simul in intellectu esse vel minimam que
non potest, alterius est speculationis.
Ad aliud dicitur negando istam quod non est maior ratio quare unus
talium conceptum est subiectum vel predicatum quam uterque, quia
 conceptus qui primo pona〈n〉tur esse propositiones in intellectu, causan-
tur successive, quia per servitium et obsequium sive motum organorum
corporalium, qui quidem motus Þunt successive.
Et si dicatur quod in intellectu non est resistentia respectu concep-
tuum, ergo nec erit ibi successio, quia omnis successio, ut videtur, est
 ratione alicuius resistentie, sicud elicitur ab Aristotele, quarto Physi-
corum,15 et a suo Commentatore, capitulo de vacuo,16 ad istud dicitur
rationabiliter negando istam consequentiam. Quidquid sit de veritate
antecedentis ‘nec est resistentia in intellectu respectu talium actuum,
ergo ibi nulla est successio’, sicud non sequitur: ‘in aere nec est resisten-
 tia respectu luminis recipiendi, igitur lumen non recipitur successive’,
〈nego,〉 quia antecedens est verum, et consequens falsum, sicud apparet
ad sensum, quod per successivum ascensum solis dies Þt. Et ad Ari-
stotelem et Commentatorem dicitur quod intellexerunt de motu locali
naturali secundum quod ‘naturale’ distinguitur contra ‘propositum’ sive
 ‘liberum arbitrium’. Est ergo primus conceptus causatus per subiectum,
et alius per predicatum secundario causatum, nisi sententia propositio-
nis requirat, sicud in talibus propositionibus patet: ‘omnem hominem
videt homo’, ‘animal est omnis homo’, in quibus ratione bonitatis intel-
lectus accipiuntur aliquando non de virtute sermonis, sed ad bonum
 intellectum et verum, secundum quod loquitur Aristoteles secundo Peri-
hermeneias,17 quando dicit quod nomina et verba transposita idem signi-
Þcant.
Unde in talibus propositionibus secundum aliquos id quod reddit
suppositum verbo secundum bonum intellectum, est subiectum, sive sit
 primus conceptus sive ultimus. Alii vero generaliter dicunt quod omnis
vaconceptus precedens copulam, sive reddat suppositum verbo | sive non,
est subiectum. Sed primum videtur melius dici.
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 Auctoritates  (): ‘Successio motus causatur ex resistentia medii, vel mobilis,
vel ex resistentia utriusque.’ (Averroes, In Phys., iv, com. , f.  A).
 Aristoteles, De interpretatione , b–.
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〈ad probationem secunde propositionis〉 Et ad probationem
secunde propositionis dicitur, negando istam: una et eadem propositio
respectu eius signiÞcati est necessaria et impossibilis. Et ad probatio-
nem dicitur admittendo: ista propositio ‘omnis homo est substantia’ sit
in intellectu, et vocetur A, et quod ista propositio ‘omnis substantia est
homo’ vocetur B, et ulterius negatur ista: quidquid est pars A est pars B,
quia nihil quod est pars A, est pars B, quia ille partes que constituunt
ipsum A causabantur certo ordine sicud prius dictum est quod primo
causabatur conceptus signi universalis et secundo conceptus subiecti et
tertio conceptus copule et quarto conceptus predicati. Et iste ordo causa-
tionis requiritur ad hoc quod tales conceptus constituant propositionem,
et quia ista propositio ‘omnis substantia est homo’ non causata per causa-
tionem ipsius A nec est in intellectu, quia A est in intellectu. Sed si debeat
esse in intellectu, oportet quod causatur de novo debito ordine, secun-
dum quod dictum. Et quod debitus ordo requiratur, hoc potest patere
aliqualiter per simile: et scribatur ista propositio ‘est homo animal omnis’,
et vocetur A, et alibi scribatur ista ‘omnis homo est animal’ et vocetur
B, tunc clarum est quod, quantum est de virtute sermonis, quod quam-
vis partes ipsius B constituant propositionem veram, et partes ipsius A
equivalent partibus ipsius B, ita quod sint eodem modo partes secundum
equivalentiam, tamen partes ipsius A nullam propositionem constituunt
nisi ex bonitate intellectus aliter accipiantur et ponantur. Patet ergo quod
non semper eodem modo partes vel equivalentes constituunt propositio-
nem equivalentem, et hoc nulla alia de causa est nisi quod deÞcit debitus
ordo partium, sed iste debitus ordo in propositionibus scriptis attenditur
penes situationem partium, sed in propositionibus mentalibus attenditur
penes causationem.
Alii dicunt aliter ad argumentum concedendo eandem propositionem
numero respectu signiÞcati esse necessariam et impossibilem, sed non
eodem modo acceptam. Unde ista propositio mentalis ‘omnis homo est
substantia’ accepta et situata ab aliquo in cuius intellectu existit secun-
dum quod li ‘omnis’ est adiectivum istius subiecti, ‘homo’ et secundum
quod li ‘homo’ est subiectum et secundum quod supponat confuse et
distributive, et quod iste conceptus substantia supponat confuse tantum,
est propositio vera; sed ista eadem propositio aliter accepta secundum
quod li ‘omnis’ est adiectivum istius subiecti ‘substantia’, est propositio
falsa. Nec reputatur hoc inconveniens quod una et eadem propositio
 et] est E | impossibilis] impossibili E  constituant] a add. E
questio  
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numero diversimode attenditur respectu eiusdem signiÞcati sit neces-
vbsaria et impossibile. | Sed primum dictum pluribus magis placet.
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum genus sit equivocum.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod sic,
quia hoc genus substantia est equivocum, ergo genus est equivocum.
Consequentia de se nota, et antecedens declaratur, quia equivoce signi-
Þcat hoc genus substantia substantiam que est terminus, et substantiam
que non est terminus, quia clarum est quod equivoce predicatur in istis
duabus propositionibus: ‘secunda substantia est substantia’ et ‘composi-
tum ex materia et forma est substantia’.
〈.〉 Item. Hoc genus animal est equivocum, ergo genus est equivocum.
Consequentia est 〈de se nota〉. Et antecedens probatur, quia hoc genus
animal predicatur de animali vivo et picto, et hoc equivoce sicut patet
per Aristotelem in Predicamentis in principio, ubi dicit quod animal est
equivocum ad animal vivum et ad animal pictum.1
〈.〉 Item. Iste terminus ‘genus’ est equivocum ad terminum, et ad mul-
titudinem descendentium ab aliquo uno principio, et ad tale principium;
ergo, genus est equivocum. Consequentia patet de se. Et antecedens patet
per Porphirium.2
〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum est Porphirius, qui dicit quod ens non
est genus, quia predicatur equivoce.3
〈distinctio prima〉 Prima distinctio est ista quod iste terminus ‘genus’
multipliciter accipitur. Uno modo pro principio, alio modo pro predi-
camento. Pro principio accipitur dupliciter: uno modo pro principio
 descendentium] descescendentium (sic) E | ab] aliquis add. necnon del. E  prin-
cipio] productivo add. necnon del. et exp. E
 Aristoteles, Predicamenta , a: ‘Aequivoca dicuntur quorum nomen solum com-
mune est, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa, ut animal homo et quod
pingitur.’ – tr. Boethii.
 Isagoge, i, – (, –. ).
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘Sed sint posita, quemadmodum in Praedicamentis, prima
decem genera quasi prima decem principia; vel si omnia quis entia vocet, aequivoce,
inquit, nuncupabit, non univoce.’
questio  
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productivo sive generativo, alio modo pro principio contentivo. Pro prin-
cipio productivo, sicud ‘Romulus fuit genus Romanorum’, ‘pater genus
Þliorum’, et sic de similibus. Pro principio contentivo adhuc dicitur uno
modo pro principio contentivo circumscriptive, alio modo pro principio
 contentivo predicative vel signiÞcative vel communicative, quod totum
reducitur ad idem. Exemplum primi, sicud ‘locus in quo quis generatur
vel producitur’ dicitur genus talis producti, quia est eius principium con-
tentivum circumscriptive. Exemplum secundi sicut iste terminus ‘ani-
ramal’ dicitur genus hominis | quia est eius principium predicative vel
 signiÞcative, quia predicatur de homine in quid et de aliis ab homine
dierentibus, et signiÞcat quidquid ‘homo’ signiÞcat, et aliquid plus, et
est communior quam iste terminus ‘homo’, et di nitur proprie, et ideo
dicitur eius principium di nitivum contentivum predicativum.
〈distinctio secunda〉 Secunda distinctio est ista quod iste terminus
 ‘equivocum’ accipitur multipliciter. Uno modo pro equivoco a casu, alio
modo pro equivoco a consilio. Et uterque istorum modorum accipitur
dupliciter, scilicet, uno modo pro equivoco equivocante, et alio modo
pro 〈equivoco〉 equivocato, et totum istud presuppono usque ad Questio-
nes de predicamentis. Sed quantum est ad oppositum: equivocum equi-
 vocans, idest, terminus equivoce signiÞcans, accipitur multipliciter: 〈i〉
uno modo strictissime prout distinguitur contra univocum strictissime
acceptum. Quod quidem univocum accipitur pro terminis qui mediante
unica impositione sive unico conceptu sive unica ratione di nitiva pre-
dicantur de pluribus in quid, et non perfectius neque prius de uno quam
 de alio, idest, non cum ista additione ‘perfectius’ predicatur de aliquo
illorum respectu alterius illorum, sicut homo predicatur de suis suppo-
sitis, quia Sortes non est perfectius homo quam Plato, nec quam Cicero.
〈ii〉 Secundo modo accipitur ‘equivocum’ pro illo quod predicatur de
pluribus in quid di nitive, quamvis non predicetur de eisdem pluribus
 unica impositione, 〈et〉 non unico conceptu. 〈iii〉 Tertio modo accipitur
‘equivocum’ pro aliquo quod predicatur de pluribus mediantibus diversis
conceptibus speciÞcis. Et totum istud diusius patebit infra,4 quamprop-
ter ad presens breviter intermitto.
 generatur] gen add. necnon del. E  hominis] quia est eius principium sub col. E; cf.
principium f. ra | quia] ex add. necnon del. E  signiÞcat] signiÞcant E  quam]
quod E
 omas Manlevelt, Questiones super Predicamenta, Erfurt sb Ampl. q  (xiv)
.rb–vb, qq. –, . vb–ra. Atque infra, q. .
 thomas manlevelt, questiones libri porphirii
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〈conclusio prima〉 Est igitur prima conclusio quod tota multitudo
hominum est genus. Que declaratur sic: omnis multitudo que descen-
debat ab aliquo mediate vel immediate ab aliquo uno predicabili in quo
habet aliquam denominationem distinctivam ab aliis multitudinibus,
est genus; sed tota multitudo hominum est eiusmodi, igitur tota multi-
rb tudo hominum est genus. Maior est de se nota hac | signiÞcatione vocali
posita a Porphirio;5 et minor declaratur, quia tota multitudo hominum
descendebat saltem mediate ab uno tamquam a principio materiali, a quo
principio habet istam denominationem ‘genus humanum’. Que quidem
denominatio est distinctiva ipsius multitudinis ab aliis multitudinibus,
utpote a multitudine asinorum et sic de aliis.
Et sic per idem potest probari quod quelibet multitudo habens talem
denominationem ab aliquo principio, sive productivo, sive contentivo,
sive contentivo circumscriptive, sive predicative, 〈sive signiÞcative,〉 est
genus. Et in ista signiÞcatione tota multitudo Romanorum dicitur genus
Romanorum vel Romanum a principio productivo, scilicet Romulus;
et tota multitudo Brabantiorum a principio contentivo circumscriptive,
scilicet Brabantia, et tota multitudo contentorum in predicato substantie
potest dici genus substantiale ab isto principio contentivo predicative sive
signiÞcative quod est substantia, et sic de aliis multitudinibus habentibus
aliquam denominationem distinctivam ab aliquo uno principio.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod isto modo
accipiendo ‘genus’ tota multitudo entium non est genus, quia, quamvis
descendat ab uno principio, scilicet, a primo ente, tamen ratione talis
principii non habet denominationem distinctivam ab aliis multitudini-
bus entium, sicud de se patet.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod omne principium
productivum, vel contentivum circumscriptive, vel predicative sive signi-
Þcative, a quo vel ratione cuius aliquod principiatum habet denomina-
tionem distinctivam ab alio predicamento, est genus. Ista conclusio patet
per distinctionem primam.
Et ex ista sequitur correlarie quod pater alicuius in aliqua signiÞ-
catione dicitur genus, et non tantum pater, sive causa e ciens, verum
pari ratione causa materialis vel formalis, sicut predictum est de genere
humano, quod sic denominatur ab ‘humo’ tamquam a principio mate-
riali. Hoc idem etiam patet de loco qui est principium contentivum cir-
 multitudo] intellectio E  multitudinibus] vellet add. necnon del. E
 Isagoge, i, .
questio  
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cumscriptive, et hoc intelligendum est de loco communi et non proprio,
vaquia a loco proprio non Þunt tales denominationes distinctive | sicut a
loco communi, utpote a patria vel a civitate vel a territorio aliquo.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod alius terminus
 est genus tamquam principium contentivum predicative sive signiÞca-
tive, et patet totum per dierentiam.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Ultima conclusio est ista que manifeste sequitur
ex predictis, quod genus est equivocum, et hoc sive accipiatur materiali-
ter, sive signiÞcative. Et patet totum, sed non accipiatur simpliciter, quia
 unus conceptus est equivocus sicud patebit in principio Predicamento-
rum.6
〈alie conclusiones〉 Ex predictis possunt elici diverse conclusiones,
scilicet, quod Sortes est genus et quod individuum est genus et quod res
que non est predicabilis de pluribus est genus, et sic quasi de inÞnitis aliis
 consimilibus que causa brevitatis aliis relinquuntur.
〈ad .〉 Ad primam igitur rationem patet per iam dicta, quia conceditur
antecedens, consequens et consequentia.
〈ad . et .〉 Consimiliter ad secundum dicitur totum concedendo, et
ad tertium.
 〈ad argumentum in oppositum〉 Et ad argumentum in oppositum
patebit infra suo loco, videlicet, qualiter intendit sic quod ens predicatur
esse et quare ens non est genus, quia hoc requirit unam questionem per
se. Et sic sit Þnis istius questionis.
 est] predicabilibus add. necnon del. et exp. E  sit] sint E
 omas Manlevelt, Questiones super Predicamenta, Erfurt sb Ampl. q  (xiv)
.rb–vb, q. : Utrum aliquis conceptus sit equivocus, . va–va.
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum genus sit cui supponitur species,
et hoc est querere utrum illa di nitio generis sit bene data.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non,
quia si sic, tunc aliquid posset esse genus, quamvis non haberet nisi
unam speciem sub se. Ista consequentia est per se nota, et falsitas conse-
quentis patet per textum Porphirii,1 qui dicit quod generi uni correspon-
dent plures species.
〈.〉 Item. Si sic, tunc sequeretur quod ens esset genus. Consequentia
patet, quia enti supponatur aliqua species tamquam per se inferius; et
falsitas consequentis patet per Porphirium,2 qui negat ens esse genus.
〈.〉 Item. Si sic, tunc sequeretur quod accidens esset genus. Ista con-
sequentia patet, quia accidenti supponitur aliqua species tamquam per
se inferius. Falsitas consequentis declaratur, quia, si sic, sequeretur quod
qualitas non esset genus generalissimum, cuius oppositum vult Aristo-
teles in Predicamentis.3
〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum est textus Porphirii,4 qui novit predic-
tam di nitionem generis tamquam ab antiquis philosophis positam et
probatam.
〈distinctio〉 In ista questione et in omnibus subsequentibus suppono
vb istam signiÞcationem ‘generis’, scilicet quod genus | accipitur pro princi-
 generi] consequentia E  accidens] antecedens E  accidenti] antecedenti E
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘… cumque sit genus unum, species vero plurimae – semper
enim in plures species divisio generis est.’
 Isagoge, ii,  (, ): ‘Neque enim est commune unum genus omnium ens (…).’
 Aristoteles, Predicamenta, , b–: ‘Eorum quae secundum nullam complexio-
nem dicuntur singulum aut substantiam signiÞcant aut quantitatem aut qualitatem
aut ad aliquid aut ubi aut quando aut situm aut habitum aut facere aut pati.’ – tr.
Boethii.
 Isagoge, i, – (, –): ‘Aliter autem rursus genus dicitur cui supponitur species
(…) Tripliciter igitur cum genus dicatur, de tertio apud philosophos sermo est;
quod etiam describentes assignaverunt genus esse dicentes quod de pluribus et
dierentibus specie in eo quod quid sit praedicatur, ut animal.’
questio  
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pio contentivo predicative cui supponitur 〈species〉. Addo istam distinc-
tionem quod ‘superpositio’ et ‘suppositio’ quantum est ad presens accipi-
〈un〉tur dupliciter: uno modo logicaliter, alio modo localiter. Locali-
ter sicud paries superponitur fundamento et fundamentum supponitur
 parieti. Logicaliter, sicud magis commune superponitur minus communi
et 〈minus〉 commune supponitur magis communi.
Et isto secundo modo accipi〈un〉tur suppositio 〈et superpositio〉 in
proposito.
〈conclusio prima〉 Quibus declaratis prima conclusio est ista quod non
 omne istud est genus cui supponitur species. Ista patet per Aristotelem,5
et iam patet de ente.6
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod non est genus
nisi habuerit sub se plures species actu. Ista conclusio patet per textum
superius declaratum,7 scilicet, quod ‘genere uno existente speciebus vero
 pluribus’.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod ista consequentia
est bona: ‘una species est, igitur alia species est’. Quod probatur sic: 〈i〉
una species est, igitur genus est; et genus est, igitur 〈ii〉 plures species
sunt; igitur, 〈iii〉 si una species est, alia species est. 〈i〉 Prima consequentia
 patet per hoc quod genus et species sunt relativa, et per consequens
posita se ponunt et perempta se perimunt. 〈ii〉 Secunda consequentia patet
per secundam conclusionem. 〈iii〉 Et ultima consequentia patet a primo
ad ultimum, quia, si ista consequentia est bona ‘una species est, igitur
plures species sunt’, ista consequentia erit bona: ‘una species est, igitur
 alia species est’.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod quodlibet genus
potest non esse genus, ipso existente in rerum natura. Que declaratur
 proposito] posito E  iam patet] iam factam(?)E  relativa] relative (del.?) E
 Aristoteles, Metaphys. iii,  b–: ‘Non est autem possibile genus existentium
unum esse neque unum neque ens. Nam necesse dierentias cuiuslibet generis et
esse et unam esse quamlibet, impossibile autem predicari aut species 〈generis de
propriis〉 dierentiis aut genus sine suis speciebus, quare si unum genus aut ens,
nulla dierentia nec unum nec ens erit.’ (Recensio Guillelmi). Auctoritates  ():
‘Ens et unum non sunt genera.’ (Aristoteles, Metaphys., b , b). Auctoritates
 (): ‘Dierentiae non sunt extra rationem generis.’ (St. omas, In Metaphys.,
iii, lect. , n. ; Aristoteles, Metaphys., b , b–).
 Videas infra: q. .
 Videas supra, .
 thomas manlevelt, questiones libri porphirii
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sic: quocumque genere accepto ipsum potest esse, quamvis nullus alius
terminus 〈sit〉, igitur ipsum potest esse quamvis nullam speciem sub se
habeat, igitur ipsum 〈poterit〉 non esse genus ipso existente in rerum
natura.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod iste terminus
‘genus’ de nullo predicatur per se. Ista declaratur ex precedenti conclu-
sione, quia si predicaretur de aliquo per se, istud non posset non esse
genus ipso manente in rerum natura.
Ex istis conclusionibus possunt inÞnite alie elici que satis extranee
ra apparent, | quas diligentie studentium derelinquo.
〈conclusio sexta〉 Sexta conclusio est ista quod omne illud est genus
cui immediate supponitur sua species. Ista statim patet quia omne istud
est genus cuius est aliqua species, igitur omne istud est genus cui imme-
diate supponitur sua species. Ista consequentia est de se nota. Et antece-
dens patet per illum textum Porphirii,8 qui dicit quod genus et species
sunt relativa, igitur posita se ponunt et perempta se perimunt, quia neu-
trum illorum includit verbum de possibili.
〈conclusio septima〉 Septima conclusio est ista quod aliquid est per
se superius ad aliud quod non est suum genus. Ista patet de ente, quod
est superius ad omnia genera; non est tamen genus eorum.
〈ad .〉 Ad primum igitur principale dicitur negando consequentiam,
quia nulli generi potest una species supponi nisi alia supponatur.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur negando consequentiam quando tamen
queritur de virtute sermonis, et negando aliud. Et ulterius dicitur quod
antiqui quamvis ita stricte non dixerunt, tamen voluerunt quod omne
istud est genus cui immediate supponitur species tamquam per se infe-
rius ad tale genus. Sed enti nulla species supponitur immediate, hoc est:
isto termino ‘enti’.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur negando consequentiam precipue secun-
dum illam opinionem9 que tenet quod omne ens est substantia vel quali-
 accepto] accipitur E  ipsum] ipsum mg. Ec  precedenti] presenti E
 extranee] extranie E  quod omne illud est genus] quod omne illud est genus
iter. E  est] est iter. E | est] species add. necnon del. E – immediate] nota
add. necnon del. et exp. E – antecedens] aliud E  illum] illum sup. lin. Ec
 nisi] ordo add. E  quando] quam E  negando] nota E
 Isagoge, vii,  (, –): ‘Commune autem est et perempto genere vel dierentia
simul perimi quae sub ipsis sunt (…)’
 Videtur omas Manlevelt referre ad opinionem Guillelmi de Ockham.
questio  
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tas, quia sic qualitas non supponitur accidenti, sed potius e contra, quia
omne accidens est qualitas et non omnis qualitas est accidens. Sed de istis
longior Þet sermo in Predicamentis ad Aristotelem.10
〈ad argumentum in oppositum〉 In oppositum patet per predicta
 qualiter videlicet predicta descriptio intelligatur.
Et sic est Þnis questionis.
 omas Manlevelt, Questiones super Predicamenta, Erfurt sb Ampl. q  (xiv)
.rb–vb, q. : Utrum omnis qualitas sit accidens, . vb–rb.
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum genus
sit principium suarum specierum.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non.
Omne principium est intrinsecum vel extrinsecum, sed genus non
est principium intrinsecum nec extrinsecum, ergo nullo modo est prin-
cipium. Maior patet per Aristotelem, primo1 et tertio2 Physicorum, et
rb quinto Metaphysice.3 Et minor declaratur, nam | genus non est princi-
pium intrinsecum quia non est materia nec forma, sicud genus animal
non est materia vel forma istius speciei homo; nec principium extrinse-
cum, quia non est e ciens nec Þnis, sicud patet.
〈.〉 Item. Omne principium est prius principiato, sed genus non est
prius specie, igitur genus non est principium speciei. Maior elicitur
ab Aristotele, primo Physicorum,4 et minor patet per Porphirium,5 qui
dicit quod genus et species sunt relativa et per consequens sunt simul
naturaliter.
〈.〉 Item. Genus est species, igitur genus non est principium speciei.
Consequens apparet evidens, quia nihil est principium sui ipsius, et
antecedens patet per Porphirium,6 qui ponit quod idem est genus et
species respectu diversorum subalternorum sicut genus subalternum.
 nullo] nihil E  non] non sup. lin. Ec  sicud] declaratur add. E
 naturaliter] naturalia E  principium] sui ipsius add. necnon del. et exp. E
 Locus non inventus.
 Locus non inventus.
 Aristoteles, Metaphysica v, , b–a.
 Aristoteles, Physica i, , a–: ‘Oportet enim principia neque ex alterutris esse
neque ex aliis, et ex his omnia’ – tr. vetus. Auctoritates  (): ‘Principia non
Þunt ex aliis neque ex alterutris, sed ex his Þunt omnia alia.’ (Aristoteles, Phys. Α,
a–).
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘Nosse autem oportet 〈quod〉, quoniam et genus alicuius est
genus et species alicuius est species, idcirco necesse est et in utrorumque rationibus
utrisque uti.’
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘Ea vero quae in medio sunt extremorum, subalterna vocant
genera et species, et unumquodque ipsorum species esse et genus ponunt, ad aliud
quidem et ad aliud sumpta.’
questio  
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〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum est Porphirius7 dicens ‘etiam principium
quoddam est suarum specierum genus’.
〈distinctio〉 In ista questione premittitur una distinctio que talis est
quod ‘principium’ accipitur multipliciter, sicud ex predictis potest elici,
 nam: uno modo accipitur pro principio productivo, 〈sicud〉 pro causa
e ciente, universali vel particulari; alio modo accipitur pro principio
compositivo sicud pro materia vel forma, ex quibus equales res com-
ponuntur tamquam ex principiis; tertio modo accipitur pro principio
terminativo, sicud pro causa formali; quarto modo accipitur pro prin-
 cipio contentivo, et hoc dicitur uno modo circumscriptive, sicut locus
est principium vel patria, sicut patet ex textu Porphirii;8 alio modo pre-
dicative vel signiÞcative sicut pro predicabili in quid de pluribus specie
dierentibus, quod quidem continet unam predicationem vel signiÞca-
tionem 〈sicud〉 sua per se inferiora.
 〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista quod genus est principium
contentivum suarum specierum predicative. Et ista conclusio patet 〈per〉
iam dicta.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod genus est
principium compositivum suarum specierum. Ista declaratur, quia 〈i〉
 hoc genus animal est principium compositivum istius speciei que est
animal rationale mortale, et per consequens predicaretur in quid et in
quale. 〈ii〉 Item, omne 〈pari ratione〉 predicatur in quid ratione generis
quam in quale ratione dierentie, et per consequens, si predicetur in
vaquid, et predicatur in quale, et si predicetur in quale, | non est species. Ista
 consequentia patet per textum Porphirii,9 qui ponit quod species per hoc
distinguitur a dierentia quod dierentia predicatur in quale et species
non.
 particulari] principia vel in universali tantum add. E  principiis] termino add. E
 iam] per add./transp. E  mortale] esset species add. E  Item] vero add. E;
seq. lac.  litt. E
 Isagoge, i,  (, –): ‘Etenim principium quoddam est huiusmodi genus earum
quae sub ipso sunt specierum (….)’
 Isagoge, i,  (, –): ‘Dicitur autem et aliter rursus genus, quod est uniusciuiusque
generationis principium (…) a loco in quo quis genitus est. (…) etenim patria
principium est uiniusciuiusque generationis (…)’
 Isagoge, xvi,  (, –): ‘Proprium autem dierentiae quidem est in eo quod
quale sit praedicari, speciei vero in eo quod quid est (…)’
 thomas manlevelt, questiones libri porphirii
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〈ad i〉 Ad primum istorum breviter dicitur concedendo quod ista dif-
Þnitio est speciei, quia pari ratione animal rationale mortale est species
animalis quam corpus animatum sit species corporis, ut patet per textum
Porphirii.10 Item, corpus animatum est genus et non est genus generalis-
simum, igitur genus subalternum, et per consequens est species.
Et si dicatur quod, si esset species corporis, et consimiliter, si hoc
totum animal rationale mortale esset species, tunc esset species istius
generis animal, et per consequens ista genera predicentur de istis specie-
bus in quid, quia omne genus predicatur in sua specie in quid. Sed hoc
consequens est falsum. Quod declaratur sic: non convenienter respon-
detur ad questionem factam per quid de istis speciebus per ista genera,
igitur ista genera non predicantur de istis speciebus in quid. Consequen-
tia patet per textum,11 et antecedens declaratur: nulla responsio est con-
veniens que non est apta nata removere dubium interrogantis; sed talis
responsio est huiusmodi; igitur talis responsio non est conveniens. Maior
videtur de se nota, quia ideo reponsio dicitur conveniens vel non conve-
niens. Minor patet, quia qui querit: ‘Quid est animal rationale?’ bene scit
quod illud de quo queritur est animal; igitur respondendo ‘Animal ratio-
nale est animal’ non removetur dubium interrogantis, nec poterit etiam
per talem responsionem removeri, igitur talis responsio non est conve-
niens, quia non est apta nata removere dubium interrogantis.
Ad istud dicitur quod corpus animatum sit species corporis, et animal
rationale species animalis. Et ulterius dicitur distinguendo de predica-
tione in quid, eo quod poterit accipi. Accepta extendit se ad omnem
predicationem quidditativam non connotativam sive ad omnem predi-
cationem non connotativam que est per se, et isto modo potest concedi
quod predicta genera predicantur de predictis speciebus in quid.
Et ulterius dicitur negando istam consequentiam: ‘Si predicte species
essent species predictorum generum, tunc ista genera predicarentur de
eis in quid’, quia nunquam haberetur quod omne genus predicetur 〈in
quid de suis subiectis〉.
 speciei] species E  rationale] mortale add. necnon del. et exp. E  se] per add.
E – in quid de suis subiectis] quibus sua subiecta in quid. E
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘(…) animatum corpus species quidem est corporis (…)
rationale animal species quidem est animalis (…)’
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘(…) species est quod ponitur sub genere et de qua genus in
eo quod quid sit praedicatur.’
questio  
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〈ad ii〉 Ad aliud dicitur negando istam: ista di nitio ‘animal rationale
mortale’ non predicatur in quid, et ulterius negatur: ista di nitio predi-
vbcatur in quid et in quale, ergo non predicatur in quid et | in quale, ergo
non predicatur in quid, et ulterius conceditur quod predicatur in quale.
 Et ad Porphirium dicitur quod ipse non negat speciem predicari in
quale, sed dicit speciem per hoc dierre a dierentia quod species predi-
catur in quid et dierentia in quale, et cum 〈hoc〉 stat quod predicetur in
quid et quod predicetur in quale, sicut homo diert ab asino per ratio-
nale, et cum hoc stat quod sit sensibilis sicud asinus. Ista materia plus
 patebit infra.12
Ad rationes principales.
〈ad .〉 〈Ad primam〉 dicitur concedendo istam quod omne princi-
pium est intrinsecum vel extrinsecum; et ulterius 〈negatur〉 minor, scili-
cet genus non est principium intrinsecum vel extrinsecum speciei, quia
 genus est principium extrinsecum contentivum speciei, sicud patet per
primam conclusionem, et 〈est〉 principium intrinsecum speciei, sicut
patet per secundam conclusionem. Verumtamen genus 〈est〉 principium
extrinsecum contentivum suarum specierum, sed non est principium
intrinsecum compositum omnium suarum specierum, sicut patet per
 predicta.
Et ulterius negatur ista consequentia: ‘genus non est causa e ciens vel
formalis speciei, igitur genus non est principium extrinsecum speciei’,
quia pluribus modis dicitur ‘principium extrinsecum’, sicut patet per
distinctionem questionis.
 Et ad totum residuum maior patet.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur concedendo quod principium sit prius
principiato prioritate naturali sicud causa prior eectu. Non tamen opor-
tet quod sit prius prioritate temporis. Et primo modo genus aliqua sua
specie est prius, et cum hoc stat simultas que requiritur ad relationem,
 scilicet simultas temporis.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur negando consequentiam, et ulterius ad
probationem dicitur concedendo quod nihil est principium sui ipsius
proprie loquendo et primo. Nec probatur ista propositio quod genus non
 predicatur] predicuntur E | di nitio] consequentia E  sensibilis] scencibilis E
– scilicet] si iste E  sicud] sed E  hoc] hac E | relationem] relatio E
 ulterius] dicitur add. E  propositio] ad quam add. E
 Videas infra, q. .
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est principium speciei, que quidem species est ipsum genus, sed cum hoc
stat quod sit principium alterius speciei. Sed animal non est principium
istius speciei que est animal, sed istius speciei que est animal rationale.
〈ad argumentum in oppositum〉 Ad argumentum in oppositum patet
quid sit dicendum per predicta.
 quidem] quedam E
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum genus
predicetur de pluribus dierentibus specie.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non.
 raNullum genus predicatur | de pluribus dierentibus specie, igitur
‘genus’ non predicatur de pluribus dierentibus specie. Consequentia est
nota. Et antecedens probatur, quia, si aliquod genus predicetur etcetera,
sicut gratia exempli hoc genus animal, tunc sic ‘animal’ predicatur de
pluribus pro se vel pro suo signiÞcato. Non pro se, sicud de se notum est,
 quia sic sequitur quod ipsummet esset illa plura de quibus predicatur;
nec pro suo signiÞcato predicatur de pluribus, quia pro nullo suo signi-
Þcato predicatur de pluribus, sicut probatur inductive; et quod non pro
hoc signiÞcato predicetur de pluribus, patet, quia sic sequeretur quod
hoc suum signiÞcatum esset illa plura vel signiÞcata illorum plurium de
 quibus predicatur. Quod est falsum.
〈.〉 Item. Nulla dierunt specie, igitur genus non predicatur de plu-
ribus dierentibus specie. Consequentia nota. Et antecedens probatur:
nulla eiusdem speciei dierunt specie, sed omnia sunt eiusdem speciei,
igitur nulla dierunt specie. Maior nota de se; minor declaratur, quia
 omnia sunt in aliqua specie qualitatis utpote in specie naturalis potentie
vel impotentie, quia omne quod est, est naturaliter potens aliquid faciliter
faciendi vel patiendi; non autem patiendi, igitur videtur quod omnia sunt
in illa specie, quia Deus est naturaliter potens faciliter aliquid faciendi,
et conceptus mentis est naturaliter potens faciliter aliquid faciendi vel
 patiendi, utpote faciendi corruptionem vel remissionem vel intentionem
vel aliquid huiusmodi. Item. Deus est qualis, et omne quale est alicuius
speciei illius generis, et non potest poni in aliqua alia specie nisi in specie
naturalis potentie vel impotentie.
 dierentibus] specie. Consequentia est nota add. necnon del. et exp. E  animal]
genus add. necnon del. E  vel] vel sup. lin. Ec; et ad. Necnon del. E | signiÞcato]
materiali add. necnon del. et exp. E  potentie] potentia E  non autem] autem
non E
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〈adoppositum〉 Ad oppositum est Porphirius.1 Hic ponit quod predicari
de pluribus dierentibus specie competit omni generi.
〈distinctio〉 Distinctio istius questionis est ista quod ‘aliquid predi-
cari de pluribus’ intelligitur dupliciter, scilicet secundum actualitatem
vel secundum aptitudinem, idest, actualiter vel aptitudinaliter. Secundo
modo ‘predicari’ accipitur in opposito per totum.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista quod omne genus predica-
tur de pluribus pro se vel pro suo simili vel equivalenti, quia patet totum
rb quod omne genus habet plures species | de quibus predicatur, igitur etce-
tera.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod omne genus
materialiter acceptum predicatur de pluribus stantibus materialiter in tali
propositione. Ista patet, quia omnes iste propositiones sunt vere: ‘iste
terminus scriptus “animal” est animal’, ‘iste terminus prolatus “animal”
est animal’, et sic de aliis. Similiter ‘iste terminus “genus” est genus’ et
‘iste terminus “genus” est genus’, et sic de aliis. Et patet totum.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod omne genus predi-
catur de pluribus stans signiÞcative in tali propositione, quia omnes tales
sunt vere: ‘Sortes est animal’, ‘Plato est animal’, etcetera.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod nullum genus
predicatur de pluribus pro se. Ista patet per argumentum principale.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod nullum genus
predicatur de pluribus pro aliquo suo signiÞcato. Et patet ista conclusio
per argumentum principale.
〈conclusio sexta〉 Sexta conclusio est ista quod omne genus predica-
tur de pluribus pro aliquo suo signiÞcato. Ista declaratur, quia hoc genus
animal predicatur de Sorte pro aliquo suo signiÞcato, et predicatur de
Platone pro aliquo suo signiÞcato, igitur de pluribus predicatur pro ali-
quo suo signiÞcato, et tamen de istis pluribus non predicatur pro aliquo
suo signiÞcato nec de istis pluribus predicatur pro aliquo suo signiÞcato
 se] et add. necnon del. E  pluribus] et patet add. necnon del. et exp. E  Sexta]
septima E  pluribus] et patet add. necnon del. et exp. E
 Isagoge, i,  (, –): ‘(…) genus esse dicentes quod de pluribus et dierentibus
specie in eo quod quid sit praedicatur (…)’ Videas Aristoteles, Topica. i,  a–
: ‘Genus autem est quod de pluribus et dierentibus specie in eo quod quid est
praedicatur.’ (tr. Boethii).
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quocumque demonstrato, sed de istis pluribus predicatur demonstratis
Sorte et Platone, et de isto suo signiÞcato et pro isto suo signiÞcato.
〈conclusio septima〉 Septima conclusio est ista quod, si naturalis
potentia vel impotentia sit una species in predicamento qualitatis, tunc
 nullum genus predicatur de pluribus dierentibus specie. Et patet ista
conclusio per argumentum principale, sed que veritatis sit, patebit suo
loco,2 quia hoc non est ad propositum.
〈conclusio octava〉 Octava conclusio est ista quod omne genus
predicatur de pluribus specie dierentibus. Et patet ista conclusio per
 di nitionem generis.
〈ad .〉 Ad argumentum principale dicitur negando antecedens. Et ad
probationem dicitur negando istam conditionalem: si predicatur de plu-
ribus, vel igitur pro se predicatur de pluribus, vel pro suo signiÞcato
predicatur de pluribus; sed conceditur ista quod predicatur de pluribus
 pro se vel pro suo simili et predicatur de pluribus pro aliquo suo signiÞ-
cato, et si queritur quid est istud quod facit ibi suppositionem confusam
vatantum, dicitur quod hoc | totum ‘predicari de pluribus’, propter multi-
tudinem inclusam.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum argumentum dicitur concedendo consequen-
 tiam, et ad antecedens: patebit suo loco.3
〈ad argumentum ad oppositum〉 Ad Porphirium dicitur quod ipse
intelligit per istam: ‘genus predicatur de pluribus dierentibus specie’
quod genus predicatur de pluribus specie dierentibus, quia auctores
non ita stricte loquebantur.
 Et sic est Þnis questionis.
 specie] speciei E  veritatis] pe add. necnon del. E  hoc] seq. lac.  litt. E
| propositum] oppositum E
 omas Manlevelt, Questiones super Predicamenta, Erfurt sb Ampl. q  (xiv)
.rb–vb, q. : Utrum naturalis potentia vel impotentia sit secunda species
qualitatis, . va–ra.
 omas Manlevelt, Questiones super Predicamenta, Erfurt sb Ampl. q  (xiv)
.rb–vb, q. : Utrum naturalis potentia vel impotentia sit secunda species
qualitatis, . va–ra.
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum omne genus predicatur in quid.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non,
quia si sic, tunc sequeretur quod predicatur 〈in〉 quid de suis speciebus.
Consequentia est nota, et consequens falsum, igitur illud ex quo sequi-
tur. Falsitas consequentis declaratur, quia si sic, sequeretur quod hoc
genus corpus predicetur in quid de ista specie corpus animatum. Con-
sequens est falsum, quia, si queratur ‘Quid est corpus animatum?’, non
convenienter respondetur quod sit corpus, quia hoc scit querens, et per
consequens dubium querentis per talem responsionem non removetur.
〈.〉 Item. Si sic, sequeretur quod hoc genus animal predicetur in quid
de ista specie animal rationale; sed falsitas consequentis patet sicut prius.
〈.〉 Item. Si sic, sequeretur quod predicetur de se ipso in quid. Conse-
quentia probatur: omne quod predicatur, predicatur aliqua specie predi-
camentorum, scilicet in quid vel in quale vel in quantum vel in quotiens
vel in ubi et sic de aliis speciebus predicamentorum; sed genus non pre-
dicatur in quale vel in quantum vel in ubi et sic de aliis predicationibus
intentionalibus. Relinquitur igitur quod genus predicatur in quid de se
ipso; sed falsitas consequentis declaratur quia, si queratur: ‘Quid est ani-
mal?’, non convenienter respondetur quod sit animal; igitur animal non
predicatur de animali in quid.
〈.〉 Item. Genus predicatur in quale, igitur genus non predicatur in
quid. Consequentia apparet evidens, et antecedens probatur, quia hoc
genus coloratum predicatur in quale, igitur genus predicatur in quale.
〈.〉 Item. Iste terminus ‘genus’ predicatur in quale, igitur genus pre-
dicatur in quale. Ista consequentia est evidens, et antecedens declara-
tur, quia, si queratur ‘Qualis est iste terminus “animal”?’, convenienter
respondetur quod sit genus.
〈.〉 Item. Iste terminus ‘animalis’ predicatur in quale, igitur ‘animal’
vb | predicatur in quale. Consequentia declaratur, quia sunt synonyma;
et antecedens patet, quia si queratur ‘Qualis est homo?’, convenienter
respondetur quod sit animalis.
 de] de sup. lin. E  synonyma] senonyma E
questio  
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〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum est Porphirius in multis locis,1 qui dicit
quod genus predicatur in quid.
〈distinctio prima〉 Prima distinctio istius questionis est ista quod ‘pre-
dicari in quid’ accipitur dupliciter: uno modo pro predicatione absoluta,
 alio modo pro predicatione dubii remotiva ad questionem factam per
‘quid?’.
〈distinctio secunda〉 Secunda distinctio est ista quod ‘predicari in
quid’ vel ‘predicari in quale’ accipitur dupliciter: uno modo primo, idest,
non ratione alicuius partis, alio modo non primo, quia ratione alicuius
 partis.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista quod omne genus predica-
tur in quid de aliquo. Ista patet per di nitionem generis.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod aliquod genus
predicatur in quale primo, sicut patet de hoc genere coloratum, quod
 predicatur in quale de substantia.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod non omne genus
predicatur in quid primo de quacumque sua specie predicatione dubii
remotiva. Ista conclusio patet de isto genere corpus et de ista specie corpus
animatum.
 〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod omne genus sim-
plex substantie predicatur in quid de se ipso accipiendo ‘predicationem
in quid’ pro predicatione absoluta. Ista patet quia ista non est predicatio
connotativa: ‘animal est animal’, et tali predicatione predicatur de quo-
cumque subiecto suo individuo, sicud patet de talibus: ‘hoc animal est
 animal’, ‘hoc corpus est corpus’.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod nullum genus
predicatur in quid de quocumque suo individuo predicatione dubii
remotiva. Ista declaratur, quia quodlibet genus habet aliquod indivi-
duum quod est compositum ex ipso genere et pronomine demonstrativa,
 et de nullo tali predicatur in quid predicatione dubii remotiva, sicud
patet in talibus predicationibus ‘hoc animal est animal’, ‘hoc coloratum
est coloratum’ et sic de similibus.
 generis] conclusio add. necnon del. E  quale] in add. E  absoluta] quia add.
sup. lin. E
 Isagoge, i,  (, –); i,  (, –); i,  (, –) et cetera.
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ra Et si queratur que est causa quare potius genus | predicetur in quid
de una specie vel de uno individuo quam de alio, ad istud dicitur quod
causa est quia aliqua sua species componitur ex tali genere et aliquo
addito, et per consequens non potest haberi tales conceptus speciÞcos
nisi habeatur conceptus generis, et ita per conceptum generis non remo-
vetur dubium querentis in quid de tali specie, et eadem est causa de
aliquo individuo.
〈alie conclusiones〉 Ex istis conclusionibus possunt quasi inÞnite
elici, videlicet quod aliquod genus predicatur in quale de sua specie
quamvis non primo, et quod 〈si〉 aliquod genus predicatur in quid de
sua specie, de eadem predicatur in quale, et sic de aliis quas ad presens
delinquo.
〈ad .〉 Ad primum igitur argumentum dicitur concedendo quod hoc
genus corpus predicatur in quid de ista specie corpus animatum, quamvis
non predicatione in quid dubii remotiva, nec hoc sequitur, scilicet, quod
quodlibet genus tali predicatione de quacumque specie predicatur.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum patet per idem.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur concedendo quod genus predicatur in
quid de se ipso large accipiendo ‘predicationem in quid’, scilicet, pro
predicatione absoluta, sed non predicatur de se ipso predicatione in quid
dubii remotiva, nec hoc oportet.
〈ad .〉 Ad quartum dicitur concedendo antecedens, quia genus pre-
dicatur tam in quid quam in quale de suis propriis speciebus, sicut hoc
genus corpus animatum, sicut patet per predicta. Predicatur etiam genus
in quale accidentale quamvis non de suis speciebus.
Ad Porphirium dicitur quod ipse intelligit quod genus non predicatur
in quale primo de suis per se contentis.
〈ad .〉 Ad quintum dicitur concedendo quod genus materialiter
sumptum, scilicet, pro isto termino ‘genus’, predicatur in quale, quam-
vis non de aliquo suo contento per se. Et totum patet.
〈ad .〉 Ad sextum dicitur negando quod ‘animal’ et ‘animalis’ sunt
rb synonyma quia ‘animalis’ potest dici omne | illud quod ad animal perti-
net sive illud sit accidens sive proprium quodcumque aliud extrinsecum
sive intrinsecum.
 individuo] indeviduo E  specie] etiam add. necnon del. E  hoc] hoc sup. lin.
E  synonyma] senonyma E – pertinet] petinet E  proprium] sup. lin. E
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〈ad argumentum ad oppositum〉 Ad Porphirium dicitur ipsum simili-
ter concedendo de virtute sermonis quia omne genus predicatur in quid
de aliqua sua specie primo, non primo predicatione dubii remotiva, sicut
patet de ista genere corpus animatum, quia, si queratur ‘quid est animal?’,
 respondetur dubium querentis removendo quod sit corpus, vel quod sit
corpus animatum.
 primo] nihil add. necnon del.(?) E  querentis removendo] querentis removendo
mg. E
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum genus dierat ab individuo.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non.
Nullum individuum diert ab individuo; omne genus est individuum;
igitur nullum genus diert ab individuo. Maior patet quia, si aliquod
individuum dierret ab individuo, sequeretur quod aliquod individuum
esset quod non esset individuum, quod includit contradictionem. Con-
sequentia patet per exponentes ipsius ‘dierre’. Minor rationis probatur
inductive, quia omne ens est individuum, omne genus est ens, igitur etce-
tera.
〈.〉 Item. Hoc genus substantia non diert ab individuo, igitur genus
non diert ab individuo. Consequentia est evidens, et antecedens est de
se nota, quia hoc genus substantia est singulare, sicud demonstratum.
〈.〉 Item. Nullum sensibile vel existens in subiectis sensibilibus diert
ab individuo, sed omne genus est huiusmodi, igitur nullum genus diert
ab individuo. Maior patet, quia omne tale est res singularis. Et minor
patet quia omne genus vocale vel scriptum est sensibile, et omne genus
mentale est existens in re sensibili.
〈.〉 Item. Si genus dierret ab individuo, hoc esset, quia genus predi-
catur de pluribus et individuum de uno solo. Sed hoc non potest esse,
quia individuum etiam predicatur de pluribus, utpote de se et sibi simi-
libus, et hoc univoce, quia iste terminus ‘Sortes’ predicatur univoce de
omnibus consimilibus terminis.
〈. ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum dicitur: si genus non dierret ab indi-
viduo, tunc genus esset individuum. Tunc sic: omne individuum conti-
netur ab aliqua specie; aliquod genus generalissimum est individuum;
va aliquod genus generalissimum | continetur ab aliqua specie, et per con-
sequens genus generalissimum esset inferius ad aliquam speciem.
〈. ad oppositum〉 Item. Sequeretur quod supremum in coordina-
tione predicabili esset inÞmum eiusdem coordinationis. Consequentia
 subiectis] subiectum(?) E  individuo] ad E  omne] omnes E
 continetur] sub(?) add. necnon del. E  eiusdem] eiusdem iter. E
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patet, quia in omni coordinatione predicatorum genus generalissimum
est supremum, et individuum est inÞmum.
〈. ad oppositum〉 Item. Si sic, tunc genus generalissimum non predi-
caretur de pluribus, quia nullum individuum predicatur de pluribus. Et
 conÞrmatur per textum Porphirii,1 qui dicit genus diere ab individuo
per hoc quod genus predicatur de pluribus et individuum de uno solo.
〈distinctio〉 Distinctio premittenda est ista quod iste terminus ‘indivi-
duum’ potest accipi dupliciter, scilicet, large vel stricte. Large secundum
quod est nomen prime intentionis, signiÞcans re〈m〉 materialiter existen-
 tem sive istud sit signum sive res que non est signum. Stricte secundum
quod est nomen secunde intentionis, signiÞcans signum quod signiÞca-
tive sumptum non predicatur de pluribus saltem univoce. Et sic accipit
Porphirius individuum quando dicit quod individuum est quod predica-
tur de uno solo.
 〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista quod genus non diert ab
individuo large accipiendo ‘individuum’, quia genus non diert ab ente
et individuum taliter acceptum convertitur cum ente.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod omne genus
continetur ab aliqua specie tamquam signiÞcatum alicuius speciei, non
 tamen tamquam inferius ad illam speciem. Ista declaratur, quia omne
individuum signiÞcatur per aliquam speciem, omne genus est indivi-
duum, igitur omne genus signiÞcatur per aliquam speciem. Maior vide-
tur de se nota, quia omne ens est alicuius speciei. Minor patet per prece-
dentem conclusionem.
 〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod aliquod genus
generalissimum est pars individui stricte accipiendo ‘individuum’. Et
patet ista conclusio de hoc individuo ‘hec substantia’ demonstrando hoc
genus generalissimum ‘substantia’ quod quidem genus est substantia
secunda.
 〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod aliquod genus
generalissimum est per se inferius ad aliud genus generalissimum. Quod
vbdeclaratur sic: omne istud est inferius | ad aliud quod aliquod eius signiÞ-
catum signiÞcat vel pro aliquo eius signiÞcato stat eodem modo quo stat
 signiÞcans] enin add. E
 Isagoge, i,  (, –): ‘(…) de pluribus praedicari dividit genus ab his quae de
uno solo eorum quae sunt individua praedicantur (…)’.
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suum superius, et non pro quolibet suo signiÞcato; sed taliter se habet
aliquod genus generalissimum, igitur etcetera. Maior videtur de se nota,
quia ideo homo dicitur per se inferius ad animal quia pro aliquo signi-
Þcato animalis stat eodem modo quo animal stat pro eodem signiÞcato
et non pro omni signiÞcato animalis stat. Et dico ‘eodem modo’, idest
absolute vel connotative. Et minor declaratur, et vocetur ista propositio
‘Hec substantia est’ A, in qua demonstraretur hoc genus generalissimum
substantia, et ista propositio ‘Substantia est’ B, tunc clarum est quod in A
iste terminus ‘substantia’ stat pro aliquo signiÞcato substantie absolute,
vel saltem eodem modo quo pro eodem stat iste terminus ‘substantia’ in
B, et in A non stat pro omni signiÞcato substantie, igitur iste terminus
‘substantia’ in A contractus per hoc pronomen demonstrative〈m〉 ‘hec’
est inferius ad istum terminum ‘substantia’ in B, et iste terminus ‘substan-
tia’ que est in A, est genus generalissimum, et consimiliter iste terminus
‘subsantia’ que est in B; igitur unum genus generalissimum est inferius
ad aliud.
Et si dicatur quod sic sequitur quod iste terminus ‘substantia’ esset
inferius ad istum terminum ‘substantia’, et sic idem esset inferius ad se
ipsum, dicitur negando consequentiam, et concedendo antecedens, quia
iste terminus ‘substantia’ in A diert numero ab isto termino in B.
Item. Quod iste terminus ‘substantia’ in A est inferius ad istum termi-
num ‘substantia’ in B, adhuc probatur, quia ab isto termino ‘substantia’
in A ad istum ‘substantia’ in B est consequentia subsistendi et non e
converso, igitur iste terminus ‘substantia’ in A est inferius ad istum ‘sub-
stantia’ in B. Ista consequentia patet per Aristotelem Postpredicamentis,
capitulo de prius,2 et antecedens declaratur, quia sequitur ‘hec substan-
ra tia est, igitur substantia est’, ita quod A sit antecedens | et B consequens,
et non sequitur e converso, quia non sequitur ‘substantia est, igitur hec
substantia est’, sicud de se notum est.
Et ex istis possunt elici plurime alie conclusiones mirabiles quas inge-
niosis dimitto.
 subsistendi] ?? add. necnon del. E
 Aristoteles, Predicamenta,xii, a–: ‘(…) quod non convertitur secundum sub-
sistendi consequentiam, ut unus duobus prius est (cum enim duo sint, consequitur
mox unum esse, cum vero sit unum non est necesse duo esse); quare non convertitur
ab uno consequentia alterius subsistentiae’ – tr. Boethii.
questio  
2011013 [Van der Helm] 02-Edition-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 213
〈ad .〉 Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo conclusionem,
accipiendo ‘individuum’ primo modo, quia sic terminus ‘genus’ diert ab
individuo sicut probat ad argumentum.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum igitur patet per idem quia quidquid sit de
 consequente, quia consequens sit verum accipiendo primo modo.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium patet per idem.
〈ad .〉 Ad quartum dicitur quod genus diert ab individuo secundo
modo accepto per hoc quod genus personaliter sumptum predicatur de
pluribus univoce personaliter sumptis; quod non est verum de individuo
 secundo modo accepto, quia, quamvis predicatur de pluribus univoce
materialiter acceptum, non tamen predicatur de pluribus personaliter
acceptum.
〈ad . ad oppositum〉 Ad primum in oppositum dicitur quod ‘conti-
neri ab aliqua specie’ potest intelligi dupliciter, scilicet, vel 〈tam〉quam
 〈superius〉 vel tamquam inferius, et utroque modo conceditur quod
genus generalissimum continetur sub quadam specie, sicut potest elici
ex ultima conclusione.
Et si dicatur quod tunc genus generalissimum continetur tamquam
inferius sub genere generalissimo, quod est contra Porphirium,3 qui
 dicit quod genus generalissimum sic est genus quod non potest esse
species, vel quod non habet genus supra se veniens, ad istud dicitur
breviter quod Porphirius intelligit de generalissimo non restricto per
〈de〉monstationem vel obligationem ad tempus vel ad aliud huiusmodi.
〈ad . ad oppositum〉 Ad aliud dicitur negando consequentiam, quia
 genus generalissimum non est individuum quod est inÞmum coordina-
tionis, quia istud individuum est individuum representative univocum.
Verumptamen, quamvis aliquis concederet sub diversa ratione, nullum
esset inconveniens, quia nihil plus sequitur nisi quod aliquod quod alicui
esset genus generalissimum, scilicet illi cui non esset restrictum, alicui
 esset individuum inÞmum talis coordinationis, scilicet, illi cui est restric-
rbtum ad aliquod unum | suppositum vel signatum talis generis precise.
 idem] quia add. E  tertium] secundum E  suppositum] subpositum E
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘Est autem generalissimum quidem super quod nullum
ultra aliud sit superveniens genus (…)’ Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘Determinant ergo
generalissimum ita, quod cum genus sit, non est species, et rursus, supra quod non
est aliud superveniens genus (…)’
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Unde satis probabiliter potest concedi quod idem diversis modis accep-
tum posset esse supremum et inÞmum alicuius coordinationis.
〈ad . ad oppositum〉 Ad ultimum dicitur negando consequentiam,
et ad probationem dicitur quod genus generalissimum per hoc diert
ab individuo quod ipsum personaliter sumptum predicatur de pluribus
personaliter sumptis univoce, quod non facit individuum.
Pro ista questione et pro omnibus consequentibus et subsequentibus se
argumentis est notandum quod nihil determinative, sed tantummodo
exercitative dicitur in eisdem, et hoc ad istum Þnem ut aliqua inveniantur
quia multum sit inventum quia iste est modus inveniendi, sicut patet in
universitate Ocsonienti in qua plura nova inveniuntur quam in aliquo
alio studio generali.
Et sic est Þnis questionis.
 sumptum]  litt.? add. necnon del. E  sumptis] ind add. necnon del. E  sub-
sequentibus] supsequentis E  Þnem] Þne E  sit] sunt E  Ocsonienti] in
universitate Ocsonienti add. mg. E; alio studio(?) add. necnon del. E
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum
individuum predicetur de uno solo.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non.
 De quolibet predicatur individuum, igitur non tantum de uno solo.
Consequentia est nota, et antecedens patet, quia omne ens 〈est〉 indivi-
duum, sicud patet ex questione precedenti.
〈.〉 Item. Hoc individuum ‘Sortes’ predicatur de pluribus univoce, igi-
tur non tantum de uno solo. Consequentia nota, et antecedens declaratur,
 quia hoc individuum ‘Sortes’ predicatur de pluribus, scilicet de omnibus
similibus in voce vel in scripto, quia hec vox ‘Sortes’ est Sortes, et sic de
aliis. Et quod predicatur univoce de eis, patet, quia mediante unitate con-
ceptiva vel eadem ratione.
Et si dicatur quod primo predicatur de pluribus univoce, non tamen
 signiÞcative sumptum, sed materialiter vel simpliciter, quod non intelli-
git Porphirius, contra hoc arguitur, quia hec vox ‘Sortes’ signiÞcat hoc A
(littera nostra) et omnem similem, et non naturaliter, igitur ex imposi-
tione ad placitum. Ergo quando stat pro talibus vocibus, stat 〈pro〉 illis
quibus imponebatur ad signiÞcandum, et per consequens stat signiÞca-
 tive sive personaliter.
〈.〉 Item. Iste terminus ‘individuum’ predicatur de pluribus univoce,
igitur individuum predicatur de pluribus univoce. Consequentia apparet
evidens, et antecedens etiam patet, quia quod predicatur de pluribus, de
se notum est, et quod univoce, patet, quia mediante eadem ratione sicud
 mediante ista ratione qua predicatur de uno solo tantum univoce, sicud
omnes tales predicationes sunt univoce: ‘Sortes est individuum’, ‘Plato est
individuum’, et sic de aliis.
〈.〉 Item. Omne superius predicatur de pluribus univoce, vel saltem
est predicabile de pluribus univoce; hoc individuum Sortes est quoddam
 superius, igitur hoc individuum Sortes etcetera. Maior de se nota, quia
 quolibet] qualibet E; supponit add. E – individuum] Sortes predicatur de pluribus
univoce add. necnon del. E – non tamen signiÞcative sumptum] non signiÞcative
sumptum iter. E  hoc] Aristotelem? add. necnon del. E | hec] habet sed expunctum
E
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omne superius respectu aliorum inferiorum dicitur ‘superius’ de quibus
univoce predicatur. Et minor declaratur, quia hoc individuum Sortes est
superius ad hoc individuum ‘iste Sortes’, nam sequitur ‘iste Sortes est,
va igitur Sortes est’, | et sequitur e converso ‘Sortes est, igitur iste Sortes est’.
〈.〉 Item. Hoc individuum ‘iste homo’ predicatur de pluribus univoce,
igitur individuum predicatur de pluribus univoce. Consequentia nota,
et antecedens declaratur quia hec pars ‘homo’ predicatur de pluribus
univoce, et hec pars ‘iste’ predicatur de pluribus univoce, quia Sortes est
iste, et quia Plato est iste, et sic de aliis, igitur istud totum ‘iste homo’
predicatur de pluribus univoce.
〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum est Porphirius,1 qui dicit quod eorum
que predicantur, alia de uno solo dicuntur, sicud individuum, ut Socrates,
〈et〉 hic et hoc et hoc.
〈distinctio〉 In ista questione presupponitur distinctio 〈in〉 questione
〈precedenti〉.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima igitur conclusio est ista quod omne indivi-
duum predicatur univoce de pluribus, sicut probat primum argumen-
tum, et hoc accipiendo ‘individuum’ stricte.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod esset conce-
denda in aliquo sensu quod individuum non est individuum, quia iste
terminus ‘individuum’ non est nomen proprium, nec nomen commune
sumptum cum pronomine demonstrativo, igitur non est individuum.
Consequentia patet per textum Porphirii iam allegatum.
Et si dicatur: ‘nulla propositio verior est illa in qua idem predicatur de
se ipso’, secundum Boethium in primo sui commenti super Periherme-
neias,2 ita nulla propositio falsior est illa in qua idem negatur a se ipso, ad
istud breviter dicitur quod Boethius intelligit quod ‘nulla propositio est
verior illa in qua idem predicatur de se ipso’ uniformiter accepto, et cum
hoc stat quod idem potest a se ipso negari diormiter accepta, et sic est in
ista illa propositione: ‘individuum non est individuum’, quia subiectum
accipitur materialiter, et predicatum personaliter.
 predicatur] predicatur iter. E  Ad oppositum] Ad oppositum mg. E  et] ut
E  precedenti] subposita E  est] individuum add. necnon del. E
 Isagoge, i,  (, –): ‘Eorum enim quae praedicantur, alia quidem de uno dicuntur
solo, sicut individua sicut Socrates et hic et hoc (…)’
 Boethius, In librum De interpretatione. Locus non inventus.
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〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod ‘individuum’ large
acceptum est transcendens. Ista statim patet quia ‘individuum’ sic accep-
tum convertitur cum ‘ente’.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod ‘individuum’
 large acceptum est superius ad genus generalissimum, et patet ex tertia
conclusione.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod ‘individuum’
strictissime et propriissime acceptum predicatur de pluribus univoce
personaliter sumptis. Que declaratur sic: et 〈i〉 capiatur hoc individuum
 mentale ‘iste homo’ demonstrando Sortem vel Platonem, et 〈ii〉 vocetur
totus Sortes A, et Sortes preter digitum B, et vocetur individuum men-
tale Sortes C, tunc sic: 〈iii〉 C predicatur univoce de A et de B, igitur C
predicatur de pluribus, et C est individuum propriissime acceptum, igi-
tur individuum propriissime acceptum predicatur de pluribus. Et quod
 vbC predicatur univoce de A et de B, declaratur, quia hec est vera: ‘A est |
iste homo, et B est iste homo’, quia idem est conceptus proprius absolu-
tus ipsius A et ipsius B. Quod declaratur sic: nam concipiat Sortes ipsum
A conceptu proprio. Quo conceptu manente in Sorte, auferatur digitus
ipsius A, tunc Sortes experitur seipsum eodem conceptu concipere istud
 quod remanet post ablationem digiti, et istud quod prefuit.
Et si dicatur quod Sortes non hoc experitur, quamvis videatur sibi hoc
experiri, contra: ex hoc sequeretur quod nullus potest se experiri intelli-
gere vel concipere aliquam rem divisibilem 〈tam〉quam totalitatem, quod
videtur esse falsum. Patet igitur quod idem est conceptus proprius ipsius
 A et ipsius B, et per consequens talis conceptus proprius personaliter
acceptus predicatur de A et de B, et per consequens individuum vocale
vel scriptum tali conceptui correspondens personaliter acceptum predi-
catur de pluribus personaliter acceptis univoce.
Sed contra istam consequentiam instatur:
 〈i〉 A est iste homo, et B est idem homo eodem demonstrato, igitur iste
homo est A, et iste homo est B; igitur B est A, et B est pars A; igitur pars
est totum illius cuius est pars.
〈ii〉 Item, si B sit A, B et A non sunt plura, quia nihil cum se ipso facit
pluralitatem, et per consequens per hoc quod C predicatur de A et de
 B, non potest probari quod predicetur de pluribus saltem non univoce,
secundum quod intelligitur conclusio.
 et] c add. interl. E  propriissime] proprium E  Sorte] manente in Sorte iter.
E; sine sectu(?) Sortes add. E  A1] B E; lac.  litt. E  univoce] sinorum (?) E
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〈ad i〉 Ad primum istorum dicitur concedendo quod B est A non
primo. Et ad istum intellectum loquitur Aristoteles primo Physicorum,3
ubi querit, si pars sit eadem toti vel totum parti, ubi vult quod in aliquo
sensu est ut sic, scilicet, quod totum est idem parti, scilicet, non primo, et
in aliquo sensu est ut non, scilicet, quod totum non est idem parti, quia
totum non est idem parti.
ConÞrmatur etiam ratione, quia clarum est quod maior distinctio
est inter ista que totaliter distinguuntur quam inter ista que partiali-
ra ter distinguuntur; sed omne quod est minus tale, est minus tale per |
admixtionem sui contrarii, sicud expresse habetur ab Aristotele, quinto
Physicorum.4
Si igitur inter ista que partialiter distinguuntur, minor Þt distinctio
vel diversitas hec per admixtionem sui contrarii, scilicet, identitatis,
igitur aliqualis identitas est inter totum 〈et partem〉, et per consequens
in aliquo sensu hec est vera: ‘totum est pars’ vel ‘pars est totum’; et
hoc precipue de parte et de toto que habent precise eandem formam
ultimatam quacumque alia forma remota; sed B et A habent precise
eandem animam ipso digito remoto. Sed sic non est de A et de digito, quia
A et digitus non habent eandem animam ipso B remoto. Potest igitur
probabiliter concedi quod ista pars hominis que includit omnes partes
virtuales vitales sive necessarias sive ad retentionem anime intellective
est totus homo cuius est pars quamvis non primo.
〈ad ii〉 Ad secundum dicitur quod, si A esset B primo, tunc A et B
non facerent plura, quia nihil facit pluralitatem cum se ipso quod est
ipsummet primo, sed bene cum hoc stat: aliquid bene facit pluralitatem
cum se ipso quod non est ipsummet primo.
〈conclusio sexta〉 Sexta conclusio est ista quod individuum pro-
priissime acceptum predicatur de pluribus univoce personaliter acceptis
mediante conceptu composito. Ista conclusio declaratur, et ponatur quod
sint tres homines quorum quilibet vocatur ‘Sortes’, scilicet, A et B et C;
tunc hoc individuum Sortes predicatur de A et B et C mediante isto con-
ceptu composito res que vocatur Sortes, igitur aliquod individuum pro-
prie acceptum predicatur de pluribus totaliter distinctis vel pro totaliter
distinctis supponentibus personaliter acceptis mediante unico conceptu
composito. Et totum patet.
 parti] primo add. E  identitatis] adenti-tas E; scilicet add. necnon del. E
 totum] lac.  litt. E  pars] in aliquo add. necnon del. E
 Aristoteles, Physica i, , b–.
 Aristoteles, Physica v, , b–a. Locus non inventus.
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〈conclusio septima〉 Septima conclusio est ista quod individuum
proprie acceptum non predicatur de pluribus totaliter distinctis perso-
naliter acceptis mediante unico conceptu simplici precise. Et patet ista
conclusio satis ex predicta, quia quilibet talis conceptus est uni proprius.
 Et ad istum intellectum loquitur Porphirius.
〈ad .〉 Ad primam igitur rationem principalem dicitur concedendo con-
clusionem accipiendo ‘individuum’ secundum quod est transcendens,
sicud accipit argumentum.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur concedendo conclusionem, scilicet,
 quod ‘Sortes’ predicatur de pluribus materialiter acceptis, sicud probat
argumentum, et ulterius conceditur quod predicatur de pluribus signi-
Þcative acceptis. Et ulterius potest negari ista consequentia ‘igitur pre-
dicatur de pluribus personaliter acceptis’, quia probabiliter potest poni
rbdistinctio inter suppositionem signiÞcativam | et personalem tamquam
 superius et inferius, quia omnis suppositio personalis est signiÞcativa et
non e contra, quia ad hoc quod aliqua suppositio signiÞcativa sit, su cit
quod terminus supponat pro illo cui imponitur ad signiÞcandum, sive
istud signiÞcatur a signo signiÞcante et a suo simili, sive non; sed ad hoc
quod aliquid supponat personaliter, oportet quod supponat pro aliquo
 alio a se vel a suo simili, si istud esset. Unde in ista propositione ‘omnis A
est littera’, supposito quod A non imponatur ad signiÞcandum nisi talem
litteram, subiectum supponit signiÞcative, et etiam pro isto cui impone-
batur ad signiÞcandum, non tamen supponit personaliter. Sed secus est
de subiecto ipsius propositionis ‘qualitas est vox’, et patet per totum.
 〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur concedendo conclusionem, nec est hoc
contra Porphirium, quia ipse intelligit de nomine proprio vel de termino
communi cum pronomine demonstrativo, et ita Aristoteles non est ad
oppositum.
〈ad .〉 Ad quartum dicitur concedendo quod omne superius predi-
 catur de pluribus non mediante conceptu simplici. Utrum tamen iste
terminus ‘Sortes’ et consimiles sint proprie individua, patebit in proxima
questione. Ideo ad istud argumentum ad presens non dico.
〈ad .〉 Ad quintum dicitur negando quod hec pars ‘iste’ predicatur de
pluribus univoce, saltem mediante conceptu simplici in istis propositio-
 quia] pro pl. prop(?) add. necnon del. E | probabiliter] probabiliter mg. E  signi-
Þcatur] signiÞcatur Ec  ita] ?? add. necnon del. E; Aristoteles non est ad oppositum
mg. Ec  mediante] concep utrum(?) add. necnon del. E  patebit] precedit E
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nibus ‘Sortes est iste’, ‘Plato est iste’, et sic de aliis. Hoc pronomen ‘iste’ si
correspondeat conceptui simplici demonstrativo, tunc predicatur equi-
voce, vel si univoce, tunc ex forma imposita quod supponeret pro aliquo.
〈ad argumentum ad oppositum〉 Ad argumentum in oppositum patet
per superius dictum.
Et sic est Þnis questionis.
 tunc] ex forma imposita quod supponeret pro aliquo add. mg. E
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum aliquod
individuum sit terminus communis.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod sic.
 Omne convertibile cum termino communi est terminus communis;
aliquod individuum est convertibile cum termino communi; igitur ali-
quod individuum est terminus communis. Maior istius rationis patet ex
hoc, quod cuicumque competit unum convertibilium, et reliquum, et per
consequens, cum terminus communis competat pluribus, et ideo dicatur
 commune, omne convertibile cum eo competit pluribus, et pari ratione
dicetur terminus communis. Maior declaratur, quia hoc individuum Sor-
tes convertitur cum isto termino communi ‘res que vocatur Sortes’.
〈.〉 Item. Ponatur quod sint nisi tres homines quorum quilibet vocatur
Sortes, scilicet, A, B. Tunc sic: hoc disiunctum ‘A vel B vel C’ est terminus
 communis, et cum isto disiuncto convertitur hoc individuum Sortes; igi-
tur hoc individuum Sortes est terminus communis. Consequentia patet
sicud prius, et prima particula antecedentis patet, quia hoc disiunctum
vere predicatur de A, et vere predicatur de B, et vere predicatur de C; igi-
tur hoc disiunctum competit pluribus; igitur est terminus communis. Et
 secunda particula antecedentis patet, quia, quidquid est Sortes, est A vel
vaB vel C, et quidquid | est A vel B vel C, est Sortes; igitur hoc disiunctum
convertitur cum hoc individuo Sortes.
〈.〉 Item. Omne superius est terminus communis; hoc individuum
Sortes est superius; igitur hoc individuum Sortes est terminus communis.
 Maior videtur evidens, quia omne superius continet plura inferiora sub
se, quibus univoce competit; igitur omne superius est commune. Minor
etiam patet, quia hoc individuum Sortes e〈s〉t superius ad A, et est
superius ad B, et est superius ad C, nam sequitur ‘A est, igitur Sortes est’,
et non sequitur e converso; igitur Sortes est superius ad A, et consimiliter
 probatur quod sit superius ad B et ad C.
〈.〉 Item. Scribatur ista propositio in pariete: ‘Sortes currit’. Tunc
videns talem propositionem et intelligens concipit aliquid complexive
per istam propositionem, et per consequens habet propositionem men-
talem correspondentem tali propositioni scripte; que quidem propositio
 mentalis vocetur D: tunc subiectum ipsius D vel est terminus communis,
 thomas manlevelt, questiones libri porphirii
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vel proprius. Si communis, habetur propositum, quia omnis terminus
vocalis vel scriptus correspondens conceptui communi est terminus
communis, et per consequens, si istud individuum ‘Sortes’ correspon-
deat termino mentali communi, hoc individuum ‘Sortes’ erit terminus
communis. Nec potest dici secundum, quod sit terminus proprius quia
non maiori ratione erit conceptus proprius ipsius A quam conceptus pro-
prius ipsius B, vel ipsius C, et non erit conceptus compositus ex omnibus
istis. Conceptus proprius igitur nullo modo erit conceptus proprius. Et
conÞrmatur, quia: volo quod lateat videntem quot sunt homines quorum
quilibet vocatur Sortes, tunc clarum est quod talis homo non habet con-
ceptum proprium cuiuslibet hominis qui vocatur Sortes, quia si haberet,
per hoc posset experiri quot essent homines quorum quilibet vocatur
Sortes, quod de se patet esse falsum.
〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum arguitur: nullum proprium est com-
mune; omne individuum est proprium; igitur nullum individuum est
vb commune. Maior videtur de se nota, | quia ideo aliquid dicitur proprium
sive terminus proprius secundum quod in proposito accipitur, quia uni
competit, et non pluribus. Commune vero dicitur quod pluribus compe-
tit, sicud patet per Donatum.1 Modo, non competere pluribus et compe-
tere pluribus sunt contraria, et per consequens non possunt eidem simul
competere. Et minor satis elicitur a Porphirio,2 qui vult quod individuum
uni soli competat, et non pluribus.
〈distinctio prima〉 In ista questione premittitur una distinctio commu-
nis, quod ‘commune’ est duplex, scilicet, commune univocum et com-
mune equivocum.
〈commune univocum〉 ‘Commune univocum’ dicitur istud quod
competit pluribus mediante eodem conceptu, sive simplici sive compo-
sito, eque primo, ita quod, si sit conceptus compositus, non competit uni
ratione unius partis talis conceptus et alteri ratione alterius partis, sed
utrique competit ratione cuiuslibet partis talis conceptus compositi; et
talis conceptus compositus est di nitivus quia competit cuilibet suppo-
 istis] istis: sup. lin. Ec  posset] quot add. necnon del. E – sed utrique] an
utricumque? E  talis] con … add. necnon del. E  quia] que E
 Donatus, Ars grammatica. Locus non inventus.
 Isagoge, i,  (, –): ‘Eorum enim quae praedicantur, alia quidem de uno dicuntur
solo, sicut individua sicut Socrates et hic et hoc (…)’
questio  
2011013 [Van der Helm] 02-Edition-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 223
sito sive di nito ratione cuiuslibet sue partis, sicud ista di nitio ‘animal
rationale mortale’ non tantum competit Sorti ratione ‘animalis’, sed etiam
ratione ‘rationalis’ et ‘mortalis’.
〈commune equivocum〉 ‘Commune equivocum’ dicitur istud quod
 competit pluribus ratione diversorum conceptuum, sive isti conceptus
sint simplices, sive compositi, ita videlicet quod istud commune compe-
tit uni mediante uno conceptu simplici, et alteri mediante alio, et tertio
mediante tertio, quamvis ex istis conceptibus unus conceptus compona-
tur.
 〈distinctio secunda〉 Alia distinctio est ista quod univocorum
quoddam est complexum et quoddam incomplexum, et similiter equi-
vocorum: complexum sicud hoc disiunctum: ‘Sortes vel Plato’, incom-
plexum sicud iste terminus ‘Sortes’ diversa signiÞcans proprie et non
appellative.
 ra〈distinctio tertia〉 Tertia distinctio est ista, quod univocorum |
quoddam est primo univocum, idest non ratione alicuius sue partis
precise, sed ratione totius; et quoddam est univocum non primo, quia
est univocum ratione alicuius sue partis, et non totius vel cuiuslibet
partis.
 Exemplum primi: iste terminus ‘homo’ est univocus primo modo, quia
non ratione alicuius sue partis precise, et similiter iste terminus com-
plexus ‘animal rationale mortale’. Exemplum secundi sicud iste terminus
complexus ‘res existens Sortes’ est terminus univocus ratione istius par-
tis ‘res existens’ et 〈non〉 ratione istius termini ‘Sortes’, et similiter iste
 terminus ‘substantia existens Sortes’ sive ‘substantia que vocatur Sortes’.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista quod aliqui duo termini
absolute convertuntur, quorum unus est univocus et alius equivocus.
Ista patet de istis duobus terminis ‘Sortes’ et ‘res que vocatur Sortes’
vel ‘substantia existens Sortes’. Et clarum est quod iste terminus ‘Sortes’
 supposito quod signiÞcet pluribus impositionibus mediantibus diversis
conceptibus, sicud ad presens supponitur, est terminus equivocus et iste
terminus ‘substantia existens Sortes’ est terminus univocus, saltem non
primo.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod aliquis ter-
 minus proprius convertitur cum aliquo termino communi. Ista patet de
 cuiuslibet] sive add. necnon del. ratione E – competit] competat E  uno]
unitate(?) E | conceptu] concepti E – partis precise] parte precisa E
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eisdem terminis, quia iste terminus ‘Sortes’ est terminus proprius, et iste
terminus ‘substantia existens Sortes’ est terminus communis, quia com-
petit pluribus univoce.
Sed contra istam conclusionem instatur: si iste terminus ‘substantia
existens Sortes’ competeret pluribus univoce, hoc esset mediante eodem
conceptu. Consequentia nota, et falsitas consequentis declaratur, quia
mediante uno conceptu veriÞcatur de A, scilicet, conceptu proprio ipsius
A, et mediante alio verÞcatur de B, et mediante alio de C, et istud dicitur
concedendo quod iste terminus ‘substantia existens Sortes’ competit
pluribus mediantibus diversis conceptibus partialibus, sive partis, et
rb competit etiam eisdem mediante uno conceptu partiali | ratione cuius
dicitur univocum non primo, quia ratione istius conceptus partialis
substantia que vocatur vel substantia existens competit pluribus, et ideo
sicud dictum est, ratione eiusdem conceptus dicitur univocum non
primo, et ratione aliorum conceptuum correspondentium in diversis
propositionibus tali termino ‘Sortes’, potest etiam iste idem terminus dici
equivocum non primo.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod aliquis terminus
proprius est commune equivocum. Et ista patet de se.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod aliquis terminus
proprius habet inferius. Ista patet sic: omne commune habet inferius; ali-
quis terminus proprius est communis; igitur aliquis terminus proprius
habet inferius. Maior nota, et minor patet per precedentem conclusio-
nem.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod aliqua proposi-
tio est singularis in qua subicitur terminus communis sine signo. Que
declaratur sic: omnis propositio est singularis cuius subiectum est termi-
nus proprius; aliqua propositio in qua subicitur terminus communis sine
signo est propositio cuius subiectum est terminus proprius; igitur aliqua
propositio in qua subicitur terminus communis sine signo est proposi-
tio singularis. Maior patet per di nitionem propositionis singularis, et
minor patet de ista propositione ‘Sortes est homo’, in qua subicitur iste
terminus communis ‘Sortes’ sine signo.
〈conclusio sexta〉 Sexta conclusio est ista quod nulla propositio est
singularis cuius subiectum est terminus communis univocus primo sine
signo et sine pronomine demonstrativo. Ista statim patet, quia omnis
talis est indeÞnita. Et si dicatur quod ex predicta conclusione ista esset
 partiali] ratione add. necnon del. E  subicitur] sine signo add. necnon del. E
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indeÞnita: ‘Sortes est homo’ per di nitionem propositionis indeÞnite,
quia in ista subicitur terminus communis sine signo, ad istud breviter
quod ista di nitio intelligitur de termino communi uni〈vo〉co.
〈conclusio septima〉 Septima conclusio est ista quod aliqua est pro-
 positio singularis cui nulla mentalis eque simplex correspondet conver-
tibiliter. Ista declaratur, et capiatur ista vocalis ‘Sortes est homo’, posito
quod multi sint homines quorum quilibet vocatur ‘Sortes’, et capiatur
mentalis sibi correspondens qui vocetur A, tunc subiectum ipsius A vel
est simplex vel compositum. Si est simplex, vel est proprius vel commu-
 nis. Si proprius, tunc tantum competit isti Sortes vel isti, et sic de singulis,
vacum sit conceptus proprius, et per consequens | non correspondet con-
vertibiliter isti termino ‘Sortes’, quiquidem terminus vocalis, per casum,
correspondet isti Sorti, et correspondet isti Sorti, et isti, et sic de singu-
lis. Si vero sit terminus communis, cum nullus conceptus sit commune
 equivocum, sequitur quod sit commune univocum, et per consequens
non corespondet isti termini vocali ‘Sortes’. Si sit terminus compositus,
tunc est eque simplex sicut iste terminus vocalis ‘Sortes’. Patet igitur quod
nulla propositio mentalis eque simplex correspondet convertibiliter isti
vocali ‘Sortes est homo’.
 〈conclusio octava〉 Octava conclusio est ista quod aliqua mentalis
sibi correspondet convertibiliter, quamvis non sit eque simplex, sicut ista
res que vocatur Sortes.
Ex predictis igitur patet quid sit dicendum ad titulum questionis.
〈ad .〉 Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo maiorem et
 etiam minorem et conclusionem, videlicet quod iste terminus ‘Sortes’
est terminus communis equivocus. Sed si accipiatur in maiori quod
omne quod convertitur cum termino communi univoco est terminus
communis univocus, tunc esset maior neganda.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur concedendo conclusionem, scilicet,
 quod hoc disiunctum ‘A vel B vel 〈C〉’ esset convertibiliter cum isto
termino vocali, et ulterius dicitur quod, sicud iste terminus ‘Sortes’ est
terminus communis equivocus, ita hoc disiunctum ‘A vel B vel C’, quia
hoc disiunctum predicatur de A ratione istius conceptus A, et predicatur
de B ratione istius conceptus B, et de C ratione istius conceptus C, et ita
 predicatur de pluribus mediantibus diversis conceptibus.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur concedendo maiorem, quod omne superius
est terminus communis equivocus vel univocus, et consimiliter concedi-
 thomas manlevelt, questiones libri porphirii
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tur conclusio. Et si dicatur quod secundum Porphirium3 sub individuis
non contingit descendere, ad hoc respondetur tripliciter: primo quod ipse
intelligit quod sub individuo non contingit descendere univoce; secundo
potest dici quod ipse intelligit de individuo mentali sibi correspondenti
vb convertibiliter; tertio potest dici quod ipse | intelligit de individuo pro-
priissime accepto. Et quelibet istarum responsionum evacuat argumen-
tum.
〈ad .〉 Ad quartum dicitur quod subiectum ipsius D est terminus
communis complexus univocus, scilicet, iste terminus ‘res que vocatur
Sortes’ qui convertitur cum isto termino ‘Sortes’. Ex hoc tamen non
sequitur quod iste terminus ‘Sortes’ sit terminus univocus.
〈ad argumentum ad oppositum〉 Ad argumentum ad oppositum dici-
tur concedendo istam ‘nullum proprium est commune univocum’ acci-
piendo ‘proprium’ pro nomine proprio, sicud in proposito accipitur.
Cum hoc tamen stat quod sit commune equivocum. Unde talis termi-
nus dicitur proprius, non quia non competit pluribus, sed quia nullus
conceptus simplex cui tale proprium nomen correspondet, competit plu-
ribus suppositionaliter sive totaliter distinctis.
 proprium] propria E
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –) (sed non ad verbum): ‘(…) individua autem quae sunt
post specialissima, inÞnita sunt. Quapropter usque ad specialissima a generalissimis
descendentem iubet Plato quiescere (…)’
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum proprietas
unius individui inveniatur in altero.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod sic.
 Ista proprietas risibile competit cuilibet homini, et ista proprietas
risibile est proprietas alicuius individui; igitur proprietas unius individui
competit alteri individuo. Ista consequentia est de se nota. Et prima
particula antecedentis, scilicet, quod ista proprietas sive istud proprium
risibile competit cuilibet homini, patet de se, et per Porphirium,1 quia
 quilibet homo naturaliter est risibilis. Et secunda particula, scilicet, quod
sit proprietas alicuius individui, declaratur, quia est proprietas hominis,
et omnis homo est individuum; igitur est proprietas individui.
〈.〉 Item. Si aliqua esset proprietas unius individui que non posset
competere alteri individuo, ista videtur maxime esse ista proprietas quod
 est predicari de uno solo; sed hoc competit omni individuo; igitur pro-
prietas unius individui competit alteri individuo.
〈.〉 Item. Omnis 〈proprietas〉 unius individui competit alteri indi-
viduo; igitur proprietas unius individui competit alteri individuo. Ista
consequentia est de se nota, quia arguitur ab universali ad suam indeÞ-
 nitam sive a toto universali vel a toto in quantitate ad suam partem sive
rasub〈iecti〉|vam. Et antecedens declaratur inductive, quia ista proprietas
que est esse Sophronisci Þlius competit vel saltem potest competere alteri
individuo, quia suppositus potest habere plures Þlios. Similiter ista pro-
prietas esse in isto loco, esse in isto instanti, esse istius longitudinis, esse
 istius longitudinis, esse istius coloris, et sic de quacumque alia proprie-
tate individuali, potest competere pluribus aliis individuis. Ergo videtur
quod nulla sit proprietas unius individui quin poterit competere alteri
individuo.
 altero] corr. ex aliquo E  Sophronisci] Subfronisi passim E  istius] compe(?)
E
 Isagoge, iv (, –): ‘〈Quod〉 soli et omni et semper 〈accidit〉, quemadmodum
homini esse risibile.’
 thomas manlevelt, questiones libri porphirii
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〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum est Porphirius, capitulo de specie,2 ubi
dicit: ‘Individuum autem dicitur ut Sortes et hoc album et hoc veniens
et hic Sophronisci Þlius, et sequitur individua autem dicuntur huiu-
smodi quoniam ex proprietatibus consistit unumquodque eorum, col-
lectio numquam in alio in eodem erit. Sortis enim proprietas numquam
erit in alio particularium.’
〈distinctio〉 In ista questione presuppono di nitionem proprii posi-
tam a Porphirio in textu, capitulo de 〈proprio〉,3 cui addo distinctionem
talem, quod preter istas modos predictos de individuo in precedentibus
questionibus positos, potest ‘individuum’ adhuc accipi dupliciter, quia
quoddam dicitur individuum ut nunc, et quoddam simpliciter. Indivi-
duum ut nunc potest istud dici quod pronunc non competit alicui nisi
uni soli, ita quod non competat pluribus, quamvis sine nova imposi-
tione posset pluribus competere, et talia individua sunt omnes termini
habentes tantum unum suppositum. Et ad istum intellectum loquitur
Porphirius quando dicit quod Þlius Sophronisci sit individuum, idest,
iste terminus ‘Þlius Sophronisci’, si solus sit ei Socrates Þlius. Individuum
vero simpliciter dicitur istud quod non potest univoce pluribus compe-
tere sine nova impositione, sicud ‘Socrates’ et ‘hoc album’ et ‘hoc veniens’,
etcetera.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista quod proprietas individua-
lis, accipiendo ‘proprietatem’ sive ‘proprium’ primo vel secundo vel tertio
modo quo accipit Porphirius ‘proprium’,4 potest competere pluribus indi-
rb viduis. Ista | statim patet per primum argumentum principale, quia non
oportet quod talis proprietas convertitur cum isto cuius est proprietas.
 de] seq. lac.  litt. E
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘Individuum autem dicitur Socrates et hoc album et hic
veniens, ut Sophronisci Þlius, si solus ei sit Socrates Þlius. Individua ergo dicuntur
huiusmodi, quoniam ex proprietatibus consistit unumquodque eorum, quorum
collectio numquam in alio eadem erit. Socratis enim proprietates numquam in alio
quolibet erunt particularium (…).’
 Isagoge, iv (, –): ‘〈Quod〉 soli et omni et semper 〈accidit〉, quemadmodum
homini esse risibile.’
 Isagoge, iv (, –): ‘(…) et 〈〉 id quod soli alicui specie accidit, etsi non omni,
ut homini medicum esse vel geometrem, et 〈〉 quod omni accidit, etsi non soli,
quemadmodum homini esse bipedem, Et 〈〉 quod soli et omni et aliquando, ut
homini in senectute canescere (…)’.
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〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod proprietas
individualis accipiendo quarto modo ‘proprium’,5 scilicet, secundum
quod convertitur cum isto cum quo est proprietas unius individui, num-
quam potest univoce alteri individuo competere. Ista conclusio statim
 patet de se, quia, si convertitur cum aliquo individuo, non potest alicui
alteri competere, quia, si posset, tunc cum tali individuo non converte-
tur, quia hoc vocatur ‘converti cum aliquo’, quando alteri ab ipso vel a suo
convertibili vel a suo contento non potest competere univoce.
〈ad .〉 Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo quod risibile
 est proprietas individui, quia istius individui quod est iste terminus
‘homo’. Et iterum conceditur quod est proprietas individui accipiendo
‘individuum’ pro proprio nomine alicuius, quia est proprietas Sortis
et non Platonis, sed non quarto modo, quia non est proprietas Sortis
convertibilis cum Sorte, et ita diverso modo accipiendo ‘individuum’
 diversi mode possunt ist argumenta in proposito concedi et negari. Et
totum patet.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur negando assumptum, quia ista est pro-
prietas convertibilis cum ‘individuo’ proprie accepto, idest, cum isto ter-
mino ‘individuum’ proprie accepto.
 〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur concedendo consequentiam, et negando
antecedens. Et ad probationem dicitur negando quod aliquod aliud indi-
viduum a Sorte, est istius longitudinis demonstrando longitudinem Sor-
tis, et hoc proprie loquendo. Sed transsumptive loquendo bene potest
concedi, et tunc stat loco istius ‘est equalis longitudinis vel consimi-
 lis longitudinis’. Et ulterius etiam dicitur quod esse istius complexio-
nis ratione simpliciter et compunctabiliter consimilis complexionis cum
Sorte aliquid aliud individuum secundum Avicennam, primo Cano-
num, capitulo de complexione6 est impossibile. Sed quidquid sit de pos-
sibilitate, numquam inveniabantur, nec invenientur aliqua duo indivi-
 dua compu〈nc〉tabiliter et totaliter consimilis complexionis vel consi-
milis proportionis membrorum quin aliqualis dissimilitudo fuerit. Et
 conclusio] patet add. necnon del. E  quando] i add. necnon del. E  lon-
gitudinis] demonstrato de add. necnon exp. E – vel consimilis longitudinis]
vel consimilis longitudinis superscr. E  istius] competi(?) add. necnon del. E
– complexionis] e add. necnon del. E
 Isagoge, iv (, –): ‘quantum vero, in quo concurrit et soli et omni et semper,
quemadmodum homini esse risibile.’
 Avicenna, Canon medicinae. Locus non inventus. Fortasse l. i, .?
 thomas manlevelt, questiones libri porphirii
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consimiliter dicitur de aliis proprietatibus naturalibus, ut proprie lo-
quendo quod nullum aliud individuum a Sorte est istius bonitatis, quam-
vis sit consimile.
va De ista proprietate individuali que est | ‘esse in isto loco’ dicitur quod
non est proprietas Sortis nisi ut nunc, et non simpliciter.
〈ad argumentum ad oppositum〉 Ad argumentum in oppositum patet
per predicta, quid sit dicendum et qualiter Sophronisci Þlius sit indivi-
duum.
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum species
sit res distincta a termino sive a signo.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod sic.
 Nihil dignum imperio est terminus vel signum; aliqua species est
digna imperio; igitur aliqua species non est terminus vel signum. Maior
est de se nota, et minor patet per textum Porphirii,1 quo dicitur quod
‘species Priami digna est imperio’.
〈.〉 Item. Nulla forma substantialis est terminus vel signum; aliqua
 species est forma substantialis; igitur aliqua species non est terminus vel
signum. Maior est de se nota; et minor patet secundum istum textum
Porphirii,2 quo dicitur: ‘species autem dicitur de uniuscuiusque forma’.
〈.〉 Item. Nulla species in qua conveniunt Sortes et Plato, est terminus
vel signum; sed aliqua est species in qua conveniunt Sortes et Plato; igitur
 aliqua est species que non est terminus vel signum. Maior declaratur,
quia nullo termino vel signo existente adhuc Sortes et Plato conveniunt
〈in〉 specie, et Sortes et albedo dierunt; sed nullo termino existente
Sortes et Plato non conveniunt in aliquo termino; igitur species in qua
conveniunt Sortes et Plato, non est terminus vel signum. Et minor patet
 de se, videlicet, quod aliqua sit species in qua conveniunt Sortes et Plato,
quia sunt eiusdem speciei specialissime.
〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum arguitur: omne universale est terminus
vel signum; omnis species est universalis; igitur, omnis species e〈s〉t
terminus vel signum.
 Maior videtur evidens, precipue secundum modernos, et satis apparet
ratione, quia omne predicabile de pluribus est terminus vel signum, quia
omne tale est aptum natum esse pars propositionis, et omne aptum
 dicitur] dicit E  arguitur] ??  litt. add. necnon del. E  omnis] omne E
 evidens] propter add. necnon del. E
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –, ): ‘(…) “Priami quidem species digna est imperio”.’ (Porphy-
rius adfert locum Euripidis, Aeolus, fr. ., Van Looy-Jouan.)
 Isagoge, loc. cit.: ‘Species autem dicitur quidem et de uiuscuiusque forma (…)’
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natum esse pars propositionis est terminus vel signum, saltem proposi-
tionis usitate, magis loquendo secundum intentionem Boecii supra pri-
vb mum Perihermeneias,3 | ubi vult quod omnis propositio sit vocalis, men-
talis vel scripta. Et intelligitur de propositionibus communiter usitatis,
quia in rei veritate aliqua est propositio mentalis qua quidam claustrales
utuntur exprimendo mentis conceptum complexe per motum digito-
rum. Et minor predicte rationis, videlicet, quod omnis species sit uni-
versale, patet, quia est species et predicatur de pluribus.
Ad istam partem possunt Þeri multa argumenta, que probant aliquam
naturam in communi que non est signum vel terminus, esse universale,
sed quia talia argumenta in pluribus locis inveniuntur, et ista opinio est
ita usualis quod a nullo modernorum reputatur recitatione digna. Ideo
omnia ista que ad istam materiam pertinent, diximus omittenda.
〈distinctio〉 Distinctio premittenda est ista quod ‘species’ accipitur
multipliciter: uno modo pro pulchritudine; secundo modo pro forma;
tertio modo pro di nitione; quarto modo pro similitudine representa-
tiva; quinto modo pro quoddam universali. Et omnes isti modi pluries
pate〈n〉t in diversis locis philosophie.
Nam primo modo accepta manifeste patet per textum et per istam
propositionem Sacre scripture4 qua dicitur: ‘species non decepit te, idest:
pulchritudo’.
Secundo modo accipitur ab Aristotele, secundo Physicorum,5 et primo
De anima,6 et in quampluribus aliis locis.
Tertio modo accipitur etiam ab Aristotele, primo Posteriorum.7
Quarto modo accipitur ab Aristotele, secundo De anima,8 ubi vult
quod sensus sit susceptivus specierum rerum sensibilium sine materia.
 terminus] a(?) add. necnon del. E
 Boethius, In librum De interpretatione Editio secunda, i,  d (pl ).
 Dan. , 
 Aristoteles, Physica ii, , b–: ‘Quare alio modo natura utique erit habendium
in se ipsis motus principium forma et species, que non separata est sed aut secundum
rationem’ – tr. vetus.
 Vel potius Aristoteles, De anima iii, , a; Auctoritates  (): ‘Intellectus est
species specierum, id est formarum’? Cf. Aristoteles, De Anima iii, , b–a.
Auctoritates  (): ‘Lapis non est in anima sed species ejus.’
 Cf. Aristoteles, Analytica Posteriora i, , a–.
 Aristoteles, De anima ii, , a–. Auctoritates  (): ‘Omnis sensus est
susceptivus omnium specierum sensibilium sine materia, sicut cera suscipit Þguram
sigilli auri sine auro.’ Aristoteles De anima ii, , a–.
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Et quinto modo accipitur a Porphirio.9
〈conclusio prima〉 Et secundum quemlibet istorum modorum ponen-
rade sunt alique conclusiones. Quarum prima est ista | quod aliquod
signum est species primo modo accepta, quia signum scriptum pulchri-
 tudine et proportionalitate est pulchritudo, et per consequens est species
primo modo accepta; sed nullum signum vocale vel mentale proprie
loquendo est aliqua talis species. Et patet totum.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod non omnis
species isto modo accipiendo ‘speciem’ est signum vel terminus. Et patet
 ista conclusio de se, quia multe res sunt pulchritudines reales que non
sunt signa.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod aliqua species
secundo modo accepta est terminus vel signum, quia aliqua species
secundo modo accepta, scilicet, pro forma, est quoddam signum mentale
 vel vocale, que quidem signa sunt forme accidentales.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod non omnis spe-
cies taliter accepta est signum, quia non omnis forma est signum.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod omnis species
tertio modo accepta est signum vel signa, quia omnis di nitio est oratio,
 sicud patet per Aristotelem, sexto Topicorum10 〈et〉 per Petrum Hispa-
num, capitulo de locis,11 qui dicunt quod di nitio est oratio indicans
essentiam rei; sed omnis oratio est signum vel signa; igitur omnis talis
species est signum vel signa.
〈conclusio sexta〉 Sexta conclusio est ista quod aliqua species quarto
 modo accepta est signum vel terminus, quia conceptus lapidis que est
similitudo representativa lapidis, est terminus mentalis de quo dicit
Aristoteles, tertio De anima,12 quod lapis non est in anima, sed species
lapidis.
 ista] quod aliquod signum add. E; idem textus invenitur intio f. ra; sequitur textus
scriptus sub columna, eadem manu, sed inverso modo cordis mente mente cordissive
mente secis E – Petrum Hispanum] Petrum Inspanum E  Sexta] Octava E
 Isagoge, passim.
 Aristoteles, Topica vi, passim.
 Petrus Hispanus, Summulae logicales: tractatus quintus: de locis, ed. De Rijk 10:
‘Di nitio est oratio quid est esse signiÞcans.’
 Aristoteles, De anima iii, , b–a. Auctoritates  (): ‘Lapis non est in
anima sed species ejus.’ (Aristoteles, De anima iii, , b–a).
 thomas manlevelt, questiones libri porphirii
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〈conclusio septima〉 Septima conclusio est ista quod omnis spe-
cies quinto modo accepta est signum simplex vel compositum. Et patet
statim, quia omnis talis est predicabilis de pluribus; igitur omnis talis
species est signum.
〈conclusio octava〉 Ex predictis ulterius sequuntur alique conclu-
siones. Sequitur igitur quod proprie loquendo nullo signo existente ali-
qua sunt eiusdem speciei accipiendo ‘speciem’ pro forma, quia aliqua
sunt que precise habent eandem formam substantialem. Ista patet secun-
rb dum illos qui ponunt quod tota | anima est in toto corpore et in qualibet
eius parte, et per consequens capud et pes sunt eiusdem speciei, quia pre-
cise eandem formam habent.
〈conclusio nona〉 Nona conclusio est ista quod nullo signo existente
Sortes et Plato proprie loquendo secundum communem opinionem non
sunt eiusdem speciei, quamvis forte secundum opinionem Commen-
tatoris13 qui posuit unum intellectum esse in omnibus, possent dici in
aliquo sensu ‘eiusdem speciei’, quia eiusdem intellectus. Ista conclusio
patet, quia Sortes et Plato sunt eiusdem forme.
〈conclusio decima〉 Decima conclusio est ista: transsumptive lo-
quendo nullo signo existente Sortes et Plato sunt eiusdem speciei, idest:
Sortes et Plato habent consimiles formas ultimatas.
〈contra conclusionem decimam, i〉 Sed contra istam conclusionem
instatur, et probatur quod ista conclusio non sit ab aliquo asserenda,
sed potius dubitanda, quia propter nullam aliam rationem ponendum
est quod Sortes et Plato habent forma〈s〉 ultimatas eius〈dem〉 speciei
vel omnino consimiles nisi quia eorum ultimate operationes que sunt
intelligere, etcetera, sunt omnino consimiles. Sed ex hoc non sequitur,
quia, si sic, tunc Deus et angelus et anima dicitur esse eius〈dem〉 speciei,
quia perfectissima operatio Dei est intelligere, et perfectissima 〈operatio〉
angeli est intelligere, et perfectissima operatio anime intelligere; sed
clarum est quod ista non sunt eiusdem speciei specialissime. Sequitur
igitur quod predicta ratio non valet.
〈contra conclusionem decimam, ii〉 Item, nulli duo angeli sunt
eiusdem speciei; igitur nulle due anime sunt eiusdem speciei. Conse-
 igitur] ?  litt. add. necnon del. E  omnibus] tunc add. E | possent] possent E
 ultimatas] seq. lac. fere  litt. E  non] non sup. lin. E  etcetera] scilicet E
 Auctoritates  (): Commentator super tertium De anima: ‘Intellectus est omni-
bus communis (…)’. Averroes, In De anima, iii, com. , p. , l. – (ed.
F.S. Crawford ): ‘(…) cum intellectus sit communis omnibus, cognitio autem
non’.
questio  
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quentia videtur evidens, quia non videtur maior ratio ex una parte quam
ex alia. Et antecedens patet communiter per theologos et specialiter
per omam in prima parte Summe,14 ubi vult quod nulli duo angeli
sunt eiusdem speciei, quia intellectio individuorum eiusdem speciei Þt
 ratione materie et non ratione forme, quia forma est que distinguit et
facit dierentiam speciÞcam.
〈contra conclusionem decimam, iii〉 Item, non habemus, ut vide-
vatur, maiorem certitudinem, quamvis forte poteremus habere maiorem |
apparentiam, quare ultimata forma Sortis et ultimata forma Platonis sunt
 eiusdem speciei quam quod ultimata forma Sortis et ultimata forma ara-
nee sint eiusdem speciei, et ultimata forma asini, quia videmus manifeste
quod aranea subtilius quam aliquod ingenium humanum posset attin-
gere cum ponit rete suum, et hoc, ut videtur ex proposito, quia ad certum
Þnem, scilicet ut capiat muscas.
 〈contra conclusionem decimam, iv〉 ConÞrmatur hoc idem per
multas aves, que nutrite inter homines diversas 〈h〉istorias didicerunt,
et diversa in absentiis, eisdem presentibus narraverunt.
〈contra conclusionem decimam, v〉 ConÞrmatur etiam per diversa
animalia que videntur diversis factis prenoscitare futura, sicud corvi
 cantando prenoscitant pluviam, et cigni cantando prenoscitant mortem,
et porci portando stramen prenoscitant tempestatem, utpote pluviam
vel ventum, et sic quasi de inÞnitis, ex quibus potest elici evidentia
iudicium rationale inesse aliis animalibus ab homine. ConÞrmatur etiam
per asinum Balaam qui ordinate et discrete ipsi, Balaam loquebatur.15
 〈ad argumentum contra conclusionem decimam, i〉 Ad primum
istorum dicitur quod ista conclusio est asserenda et non dubitanda
utendo radice Aristotelis primo Physicorum,16 ubi elicitur quod plura-
litas sive diversitas non est ponenda sine ratione cogente; igitur ubicum-
que non est ratio cogens manifeste probans pluralitatem vel diversitatem
 aranea] arania E; subtilissime verum add. E – attingere] adtingere E
 didicerunt] e add. E  absentiis] seu in absentiis quod(?) add. E | eisdem] eisdem
E  cantando] cantando iter. necnon del. E
 omas Aquinas, Summa eologiae, ia, ,: ‘Si ergo angeli non sunt compositi
ex materia et forma, ut dictum est supra, sequitur quod impossibile sit esse duos
angelos unius speciei.’
 Num., , 
 Aristoteles, Physica i, , a–: ‘Dignius autem est minora et Þnita recipere,
quod vere facit Empedoclis’ – tr. vetus; Auctoritates  (): ‘Melius est ponere
principia Þnita quam inÞnita, ex quo habetur quod peccatum est Þeri per plura quod
potest Þeri per pauciora.’ Aristoteles., Physica, i, , a–.
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speciÞcam naturalem, talis diversitas non est ponenda, quia inter ulti-
matam formam Sortis et ultimatam formam Platonis non apparet ratio-
nabiliter diversitas speciÞca. Asserendum est istos specie non dierre.
Ad probationem in oppositum dicitur quod ista est una ratio, scilicet,
vb quod ultimata | operatio Sortis et ultimata operatio Platonis sint omnino
consimiles et aliunde non apparet diversitas. Quod non est verum de Deo
et de angelis et de anima, quia, quamvis ultimata operatio Dei et ultimata
operatio 〈anime〉 et ultimata operatio angeli sit intelligere, tamen aliunde
apparet diversitas speciÞca precipue inter Deum et animam, et inter
Deum et angelum, quia, sicud probat Aristoteles, octavo Physicorum,17
Deus est virtus inÞnita, et angeli sunt virtutes Þnite, et per consequens
dierunt speciÞce.
Sed contra hoc instatur quia: capiantur duo ligna eiusdem speciei
specialissime sive duo longitudines, tunc, si una illarum in inÞnitum
procedetur, non dieret specie ab alia. Et consimiliter, ut videtur, sicut
est de extensione, ita de intensione, quia, si una albedo in inÞnitum
intenderetur, non magis dierret specie a remissa albedine quam remissa
albedo vel albedo minus intensa. Ita, ut videtur, quamvis prima causa sit
virtus inÞnita et angelus et anima sint virtutes Þnite, propter hoc non
debent diere specie.
Et conÞrmatur, quia magis et minus non variant speciem.
Pro istis breviter dicitur quod duplex est ‘intentio’ quia quedam est
intentio que Þt per simile semper, sicud, si cera protrahitur in longitu-
dinem, vel una longitudo qualitercumque per simile augmentatur, vel
una albedo intenditur per novam albedinem supervenientem, et talis
intentio, vel remissio, si in inÞnitum crescat, non variat speciem, quia Þt
ra semper per simile. Sed sic non | 〈est〉 in proposito, quia Deus non inten-
ditur per aliquod simile, nec e〈x〉cedit proprie loquendo in natura sua
aliquam aliam virtutem, quia omne e〈x〉cedens est divisibile in excedens
et in id quod exceditur. Quod non contingit Deo, quia est una res indi-
visibilis inÞnite perfectionis; angelus vero et anima sunt etiam virtutes
indivisibiles Þnite, et ideo ista dierunt specie, non solum quia ista vir-
tus est Þnita et ista inÞnita, sed quia ista inÞnitas consistit 〈in〉 indivisibili
et ista Þnitas similiter.
 operatio] opp app add. necnon del. E  anime] seq. lac.  litt. E  simile] e add.
necnon exp. E | si] sera add. necnon del. E  simile] acnimetur E  intenditur]
intendatur E | novam] novem E  remissio] vel add. necnon del. E
 Aristoteles, Physica, viii, . Sed non ad verbum.
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Per hoc patet ad conÞrmationem, quia istud dictum intelligitur de
maioritate que Þt per additionem similis, et de minoritate que Þt per
subtractionem similis. De angelo vero et de anima probabiliter potest
dici quod propter aliquam rationem naturalem non est asserendum
 ipsos dierre specie, quamvis ob reverentiam doctorum istud tenentium
teneatur.
〈ad argumentum contra conclusionem decimam, ii〉 Ad secun-
dum dicitur negando consequentiam quantum est ad sensum naturalem,
quia per nullam rationem naturalem potest probari nullos duos ange-
 los fore eius〈dem〉 speciei. Et ad omam dicitur quod, qui vult, potest
credere, vel qui non vult, potest dimittere, quia ratio quam adducit, nemi-
nem cogit. 〈Ad〉 ultimam dicitur quod forma est que facit dierentiam
speciÞcam, sed cum hoc stat quod forma sit que facit speciÞcam conve-
nientiam, quod satis patet de animabus separatis quas nullus ponit specie
 dierre.
〈ad argumentum contra conclusionem decimam, iii〉 Ad ter-
rbtium dicitur quod non haberemus maiorem | demonstrativam, sed unde
veniat ista superioritas aranee ad apes, alibi suo loco patebit, quia non
est presentis speculationis, nisi valde per 〈accidens〉, sed breviter dicitur
 ‘instinctu nature cum fantasia indeterminata’ de quo apparebit tertio De
anima.18
〈ad argumentum contra conclusionem decimam, iv〉 Per hoc
idem, patet ad quartum, quia multa talia Þunt cum fantasia indetermi-
nata et instinctu nature mote per mutationes superiores, et per idem patet
 ad conÞrmationem.
〈ad argumentum contra conclusionem decimam, v〉 Et ad ulti-
mum dicitur quod accidit miraculose, et per consequens non debet
ascribi talis locutio asini alicui forme naturali.
〈conclusio undecima〉 Undecima conclusio est ista quod, sive spe-
 cies accipiatur pro re que non est signum, sive pro signo, Sortes et
Plato sunt eiusdem speciei. Quia, si accipiatur pro aliqua re que non est
signum, tunc sunt eiusdem speciei secundum intellectum quem ponit
decima conclusio, et si species accipiatur pro signo, tunc est conclusio de
se manifesta, quia Sortes et Plato concipiuntur unico conceptu speciei
 naturalem] dubitur E; negando consequentiam quantum est ad sensum naturalem iter.
E mg.  Ad] sed E  ponit] dif add. necnon del. E  accidens] accipitur E
 omas Manlevelt videtur ibi referre ad commentarium eius Questiones super De
anima, iii. Textum invenire non potui.
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specialissime, et hoc est Sortem et Platonem esse eiusdem speciei logice
loquendo.
〈ad .〉 Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo conclusionem,
videlicet quod aliqua species non est signum, sicut diuse patet per
conclusiones iam positas.
〈ad .〉 Per idem patet ad secundum, quia conceditur conclusio.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur negando maiorem, istam scilicet, quod
nulla species in qua conveniunt Sortes et Plato est terminus vel signum,
va quia conceptus speciÞcus in quo | conveniunt Sortes et Plato, idest,
terminus vel signum, quia conceptus speciÞcus in quo conveniunt Sortes
et Plato, scilicet, quo simul Sortes et Plato est terminus vel signum. Et ad
probationem dicitur quod argumentum probat quod aliqua species in
qua conveniunt Sortes et Plato non est terminus vel signum, et cum hoc
stat quod aliqua species in qua conveniunt Sortes et Plato, sit terminus
vel signum, quia ista sunt subcontraria et possunt simul stare in veritate.
Verumptamen ista propositio ‘aliqua species in qua conveniunt Sortes et
Plato non est terminus vel signum’ in sensu proprio non est vera, si ista
a rmativa implicetur ‘aliqua est species in qua conve〈niunt〉 Sortes et
Plato, et ista non est signum vel terminus’, quia in nulla anima sive forma
conveniunt Sortes et Plato, quia nulla est una forma Sortis et Platonis.
Sed transsumptive loquendo potest concedi ad istum intellectum quod
Sortes et Plato habent duas formas maxime similes, vel qualem formam
habet Plato, talem similem substantialem habet Sortes.
〈ad argumentum ad oppositum〉 Ad argumentum igitur in opposi-
tum dicitur concedendo quod omne universale logicale est terminus vel
signum, et hoc extendendo terminum et signum tam ad signum com-
plexum quam incomplexum. Sed universale naturale non oportet quod
sit terminus vel signum, cuiusmodi universale est Deus vel prima causa
et omnes alie cause universales. Et in primo sensu conceditur conclusio.
 diuse] diuse -om(?) E – signum, quia conceptus speciÞcus in quo conveniunt
Sortes et Plato, idest, terminus vel signum, quia conceptus speciÞcus in quo conveniunt
Sortes et Plato, scilicet, quo simul Sortes et Plato est terminus vel signum] signum, quia
conceptus speciÞcus in quo conveniunt Sortes et Plato, scilicet, quo simul Sortes et Plato
est terminus vel signum mg. E  Sortes et Plato] Sortes et Plato sup. lin. E
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum homo sit species animalis.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non.
Nullius animalis est homo species, igitur homo non est species anima-
 lis. Consequentia nota, et antecedens patet inductive.
vb〈.〉 Item. Si homo esset species animalis, cum genus et sua | species
dicantur relative ad invicem, sequeretur quod homo et animal essent
relativa sibi invicem. Sed falsitas consequentis patet de se, quia homo
non est animalis homo, nec animal hominis animal.
 〈.〉 Item. Si sic, sequeretur quod animal esset genus hominis. Con-
sequentia nota de se. Et quod consequens sit falsum patet, quia animal
non predicatur in quid de homine, quamvis ‘animal’ predicatur in quid
de homine, igitur animal non est genus hominis.
〈.〉 Item. Nullus homo est species animalis, igitur homo non 〈est〉 spe-
 cies animalis. Consequentia videtur evidens quia arguitur ab universali
ad suam indeÞnitam. Et antecedens patet inductive.
〈.〉 Item. Animal potest esse sine homine, igitur animal non est genus
hominis. Ista consequentia patet ex hoc quod genus non potest esse sine
sua specie. Et antecedens patet ex textu Porphirii1 quia per hoc probat
 quod genus est prius sua specie.
〈.〉 Item. Si homo esset species animalis, sequeretur quod homo
mortuus esset species animalis. Consequentia patet, quia homo mortuus
in aliqua signiÞcatione est homo. Falsitas consequentis patet, quia sic
sequeretur quod homo mortuus esset animal et per consequens esset
 substantia animata et igitur substantia viva, ergo non esset mortuus.
〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum est Porphirius qui frequenter ponit
animal esse genus hominis, et hominem esse speciem animalis.
 dicantur] dicuntur E
 Isagoge, x,  (, –): ‘Et species quidem cum sit, est et genus, genus vero cum
sit, non omnino erit et species.’ Cf. Isagoge, vii,  (, –): ‘(…) si non sit animal,
non est equus neque homo.’
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〈distinctio〉 In ista questione presupponitur distinctio de suppositione
materiali et personali et simplici.
〈conclusio prima〉 Qua presupposita prima conclusio est ista quod
homo est species animalis. Que declaratur sic: animal est per se superius
ad istum terminum ‘homo’, igitur iste terminus ‘homo’ est species vel
ra individuum | eius, et non individuum, igitur species.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod homo est
species animal. Et patet ex prima quia est species istius termini ‘animal’.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod hec est conce-
denda: ‘omne “homo” est species animalis’, quia omnis talis terminus
‘homo’ est species animalis, et per consequens omne homo, quia homo
materialiter positum, ut communiter dicitur, est neutri generis, ergo etce-
tera.
Sed contra hoc instatur: ‘omne homo est species animalis, igitur istud
homo est species animalis’. Consequentia est bona, et tamen istud homo
est individuum, et sic sequeretur quod aliquod individuum esset species
animalis.
Ad istud breviter dicitur concedendo quod istud ‘homo’ sit species
animalis quocumque tali termino demonstrato. Et ulterius conceditur
quod individuum individualitate existentie est species animalis, sed non
individuum representationis.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod nulla species
que est homo, nec aliquod genus quod est animal dicuntur relative ad
invicem. Ista conclusio patet, quia sic sequeretur quod homo et animal
dicerentur relative. Falsitas consequentis patet de se.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod species et genus
que veriÞcentur de homine et animali, dicuntur relativa ad invicem, quia
isti duo termini ‘species’ et ‘genus’.
〈ad .〉 Ad primum igitur principale dicitur distinguendo antecedens eo
quod iste terminus ‘animalis’ potest accipi materialiter vel personaliter.
Si personaliter, vera est, sicut patet per eius probationem. Si vero mate-
rialiter, adhuc distinguenda est eo quod potest supponere materialiter
eo modo quo aliquid supponit pro se, et sic adhuc est vera, quia iste ter-
rb minus sive iste obliquus ‘animalis’ non est genus hominis. | Vel potest
supponere materialiter eo modo quo obliquus supponit materialiter pro
 tali] tali Ec  individuum] re add. E  relativa] relative E
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suo recto, et sic antecedens est falsum, quia homo est species animalis,
idest: istius termini ‘animal’.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur negando consequentiam, quia ista pro-
positio ‘genus et species sunt relativa sibi invicem’ est vera secundum
 quod isti duo termini ‘genus’ et ‘species’ supponant materialiter, et non
personaliter.
Et si tunc arguatur sic: omne genus dicitur relative ad suam speciem;
animal est genus; igitur animal dicitur relative ad suam speciem, ad istud
dicitur negando maiorem, quia iste terminus ‘genus’ quamvis sit genus,
 tamen propter penuriam nominum non videtur habere aliquam speciem
ad quam dicitur relative.
Sed si tunc argueretur sic: omne genus dicitur universale ad speciem,
dicitur concedendo; si sit subiectum, supponit materialiter, quia iste ter-
minus ‘genus’ dicitur relative ad speciem, et omnis terminus consimilis.
 〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur negando istam consequentiam ‘igitur ani-
malis est genus hominis’, quia, quamvis in ista propositione ‘homo est
species animalis’, iste genitivus ‘animalis’ ex communi consuetudine
loquendi supponit materialiter pro suo recto, hoc tamen non est vera
in ista propositione ‘animalis est genus hominis’, quia non est talis con-
 suetudo loquendi, et tamen consuetudo maximam vim habet in modo
loquendi.
〈ad .〉 Ad quartum dicitur concedendo antecedens et consequens in
sensu in quo sequitur ex antecedente, et hoc est in sensu in quo suppo-
nit personaliter. Cum hoc tamen stat quod homo est species animalis,
 scilicet quod ly homo supponit materialiter, et tunc est indeÞnita istius
universalis ‘omne homo est species animalis’ accipiendo istum terminum
‘homo’ materialiter et per consequens universaliter.
〈ad .〉 Ad quintum dicitur quod animal potest esse sine homine,
et negando ulterius consequentiam, si ly ‘animal’ stat materialiter. Et
 ad probationem dicitur concedendo quod genus non potest esse sine
sua specie, non de virtute sermonis, sed ad istum intellectum quod
genus non potest esse genus sine sua specie, et hoc est dictu quod ista
vapropositio est impossibilis: | ‘genus est et nulla species est’. Et ulterius ad
Porphirium dicitur quod iste accipit in ista propositione ‘genus est prius
 sua specie’2 istum terminum ‘genus’ personaliter, et non materialiter
ad istum intellectum quod iste terminus ‘animal’ est prior quam iste
 non] non sup. lin. Ec
 Isagoge, x,  (, –): ‘priora sunt naturaliter genera.’
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terminus ‘homo’, sed non quod iste terminus ‘genus’ est prior isto termino
‘species’.
〈ad .〉 Ad sextum dicitur quod probabiliter potest dici quod, sicut
‘homo’ accipitur equivoce pro homine vivo et mortuo, ita ‘animal’, et ideo,
sicut iste terminus ‘homo’ acceptus pro homine vivo est species istius ter-
mini ‘animal’ accepti pro animali vivo, ita iste terminus ‘homo mortuus’
vel ‘homo pictus’ est species istius termini ‘animal’ accepti in tali signi-
Þcatione, scilicet pro animali mortuo vel picto, et pro tali signiÞcatione
non veriÞcatur de animali ista di nitio sive ista ratio ‘substantia animata
sensibilis’ secundum quod elicitur ab Aristotele in primo Predicamento-
rum,3 ubi vult quod iste terminus ‘animal’ sit equivocus ad animal verum
et ad animal pictum, et non secundum eandem rationem veriÞcatur de
utroque.
〈ad argumentum ad oppositum〉 Ad argumentum ad oppositum patet
per iam dictam.
 Aristoteles, Predicamenta , a: ‘Aequivoca dicuntur quorum nomen solum com-
mune est, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa, ut animal homo et quod
pingitur.’ – tr. Boethii.
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum genus
et species sint sibi invicem relativa.
〈.〉 Arguitur primo quod non.
 Omnia relativa sunt simul natura, sed genus et species non sunt simul
natura, igitur genus et species non sunt sibi invicem relativa. Maior est
Aristotelis in Predicamentis, capitulo de relatione.1 Et minor patet per
Porphirium qui dicit quod genus est prior specie,2 ex quo sequitur quod
genus et species non sunt simul natura.
 〈.〉 Item. Si genus et species essent relativa sibi invicem, cum non
maiori ratione unum genus vel species quam aliud genus vel species,
sequeretur quod omne genus et species essent relativa sibi invicem. Et per
consequens hoc genus substantia et species essent relativa sibi invicem;
sed consequens falsum, igitur istud ex quo sequitur. Falsitas consequentis
 patet, quia substantia ad nullum refertur relative.
〈.〉 Item. Si essent relativa sibi invicem, sequeretur quod ista conse-
quentia esset bona ‘genus igitur alicuius specie genus’; sed consequens
vbfalsum, | igitur et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis declaratur, quia iste
terminus 〈‘genus’〉 est genus, et tamen nullius speciei est genus, sicut
 potest probari inductive. Et quod iste terminus ‘genus’ est genus, patet
quia est ipsummet. Item, iste terminus ‘genus’ vere vocatur genus, igitur
iste terminus ‘genus’ est genus.
〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum est textus Porphirii qui dicit quod genus
et species sunt relativa sibi invicem, quia dicit sic: ‘noscere autem oportet
 quoniam et genus alicuius est genus et species alicuius est species, ideo
necesse est in utrorumque rationibus utrisque uti.’3
 genus] lac.  litt. E
 Aristoteles, Predicamenta , b: ‘Videtur autem ad aliquid simul esse natura.’ – tr.
Boethii.
 Isagoge, x,  (, –): ‘priora sunt naturaliter genera.’
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘Nosse autem oportet 〈quod〉, quoniam et genus alicuius est
genus et species alicuius est species, idcirco necesse est in utrorumque rationibus
utrisque uti.’
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〈Distinctio〉 In ista questione premitto conclusiones que in precedentibus
questionibus premittebantur.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista quod non omne genus,
accipiendo ‘genus’ materialiter, est alicuius speciei genus. Et patet ista
consequentia de isto termino ‘genus’.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod aliquod genus
est species specialissima. Ista patet de isto termino ‘genus’ qui, quamvis
vocetur ‘genus’, est tamen species specialissima istius generis quod est
universale.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio que sequitur ex istis, quod ali-
qua coordinatio generalissimi et specialissimi 〈est〉 sine speciebus subal-
ternis mediis, sicut patet de ista coordinatione: ‘universale genus, hoc
genus’.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod non omne genus
et species sunt sibi invicem relativa. Ista conclusio patet ex predictis de
isto termino ‘genus’ accepto pro seipso.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod omne genus est
alicuius speciei genus, si ly ‘genus’ supponat personaliter, et omnis species
est aliciuius generis species, si ly ‘species’ supponat personaliter. Et ex hoc
sequitur ista indi nita quam intelligit Porphirius, et saltem quam vult
intelligere ‘genus est alicuius genus, species est alicuius species’.4
〈ad .〉 Ad primum igitur principale 〈dicitur〉 concedendo conclusionem
quod genus et species non sunt simul natura, quia indi nita est, et vera,
sicut patet per predictas conclusiones. Et cum hoc stat quod genus et
species sunt simul natura.
ra Pro quo est notandum quod ‘aliquid esse genus’ potest intelligi |
dupliciter: vel quia vocatur vere ‘genus’, vel quia est divisibilis. Primo
modo iste terminus ‘genus’ est genus, et non secundo modo, et ideo
non oportet in primo sensu acceptus iste terminus ‘genus’ quod relative
dicetur, sed secundo modo, et sic intelligit Porphirius. Et ulterius dicitur
concedendo quod genus est prius specie subiecto et predicato stantibus
personaliter et non materialiter, et hoc intelligit Porphirius.
 omnis] omnes E  ista] istarum (?) E  primum] d add. necnon del. E
 intelligit] intelligitur E  subiecto] subiectum E
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘(…) et genus alicuius est genus et species alicuius est species.’
questio  
2011013 [Van der Helm] 02-Edition-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 245
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur negando istam quod non maiori ratione
unum genus et species sunt relative quam aliud genus et species. Et hoc
patet in presenti questione et in ista.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur quod ista consequentia 〈est〉 bona: ‘aliquod
 genus est genus, ergo alicuius speciei genus’, et e converso, istis terminis
‘genus’ et ‘species’ stantibus personaliter, et hoc su cit ad hoc quod sint
relatva ad invicem.
Ad ultimum dicitur concedendo quod iste terminus ‘genus’ est genus
primo modo acceptum non secundo modo.
 〈ad argumentum ad oppositum〉 Ad argumentum in oppositum patet
per iam dicta.
 presenti] sunt relativa add. necnon del. E
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum in
di nitione speciei sit necesse poni genus.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non.
Quia ista est di nitio speciei magis ab omnibus approbata: ‘species
est que predicatur de pluribus dierentibus numero in eo quod quid
est’,1 sed in ista di nitione non ponitur genus, igitur non est necesse in
di nitione speciei poni genus. Prima particula antecedentis patet per
Porphirium, qui dicit quod hec quidem assignatio speciei specialissime
est et que solum 〈species〉 est, alie vero erunt non specialissimarum,2
igitur videtur quod ista di nitio sit magis specialis et magis distincta.
Et secunda particula antecedentis patet de se.
〈.〉 Item. Omne quod debet poni in di nitione alicuius, debet esse
notius di nito; sed genus non est notius specie, igitur genus non debet
poni in di nitione speciei. Maior videtur ex hoc evidens quod omne
istud quod ponitur in di nitione alicuius, ponitur di nitivum, et omne
notiÞcans notius est notiÞcato, quia omnis notiÞcatio Þt per notiora quia
aliter non notiÞcaret. Et minor etiam patet, videlicet quod genus non sit
notius specie, quia genus et species sunt relativa, et unum relativorum
non est notius reliquo, ex eo quod unum non potest cognosci sine
rb reliquo, | sicud patet per Aristotelem, capitulo de relatione,3 ubi dicit
sic: ‘Ex his ergo manifestum est quod, si quis aliquid eorum que sunt
ad aliquid distincte sciret, istud ad quod dicitur distincte sciturus est.’
 notiÞcato] notiÞcata E  notiÞcaret] notiÞcarent E | patet] scilicet add. necnon
del. E  notius] notius iter. E | unum] unum sup. lin. E; omne add. necnon del. E
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘(…) species est quod de pluribus et dierentibus numero in
eo quod quid sit praedicatur.’
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘Sed haec quidem assignatio specialissimae est et quae solum
species est, aliae vero erunt etiam non specialissimarum.’
 Aristoteles, Predicamenta , a: ‘Ex his ergo manifestum est quod, si quis aliquod
eorum quae sunt ad aliquid deÞnite sciet, et illud ad quod dicitur deÞnite sciturus
est.’ – tr. Boethii.
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〈.〉 Item. Species ponitur in di nitione generis, igitur genus non
debet poni in di nitione speciei. Ista consequentia patet per Aristote-
lem, secundo Posteriorum,4 et sexto Topicorum,5 in quibus locis videtur
reprobare di nitionem circularem.
 〈.〉 Item. Species potest di niri sine hoc quod genus ponatur in eius
di nitione, igitur non est necesse poni genus in di nitione speciei.
Consequentia est de se nota, et antecedens declaratur, quia species potest
esse quamvis non sit genus, igitur species di nitur sine eo.
〈ad oppositum, .〉 Ad oppositum est Porphirius,6 qui dicit: ‘idcirco
 necesse est in utrorumque utrisque uti.’
〈ad oppositum, .〉 Item. Genus et species sunt relativa sibi invicem,
et unum relativorum non potest distincte cognosci sine reliquo, igitur
necesse est genus poni in di nitione speciei. Prima particula anteceden-
tis patet per textum Porphirii in precedenti questione allegata.7 Secunda
 particula patet per auctoritatem Aristotelis, capitulo de relatione, iam
allegatam.8
〈distinctio prima〉 In ista questione premittitur prima distinctio quod
‘di nitio’ accipitur tripliciter, scilicet, large, stricte et strictissime, hoc
dictu est: communiter, proprie et propriissime.
 Di nitio large accepta extendit se ad quemcumque connotationem,
sive convertibilem, sive non convertibilem cum di nito.
Di nitio stricte accepta non extendit se ad connotationem, sed ad
descriptionem sive di nitionem datam per additamentum, et talis di -
nitio datur per genus et per proprium et aliquando per plura accidentia,
 sive per plures terminos accidentales qui simul compositi faciunt unum
accidens convertibile cum di nito, sicut patet in ista di nitione ‘homo
est animal et bipes, recte intendens’.
 genus] genus sup. lin. E | particula] patet per add. necnon del. E  questione]
pret add. necnon del. E  connotationem] vocale add. E
 Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora ii, , a–b.
 Aristoteles, Topica vi, , a.
 Isagoge, ii,  (, ): ‘(…) necesse est in utrorumque rationibus utrisque uti.’
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘Nosse autem oportet 〈quod〉, quoniam et genus alicuius est
genus et species alicuius est species, idcirco necesse est in utrorumque rationibus
utrisque uti.’ Videas supra, q. , ad opp.
 Aristoteles, Predicamenta , a: ‘Ex his ergo manifestum est quod, si quis aliquod
eorum quae sunt ad aliquid deÞnite sciet, et illud ad quod dicitur deÞnite sciturus
est.’ – tr. Boethii. Videas supra, .
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Di nitio vero strictissime accepta vocatur illa que componitur ex gene-
re di niti et dierentia speciÞca cum di nito convertibili, sicut patet de
ipsa di nitione ‘substantia animata sensibilis’.
〈distinctio secunda〉 Secunda distinctio est ista quod quedam est
notiÞcatio remissa et quedam perfecta et quedam perfectior et quedam
perfectissima.
Remissa vero generat aliqualem notiÞcationem utrum quid signiÞca-
tur per terminum vel per notitiam confusam. Que quidem notiÞcatio
habet multos sensus.
NotiÞcatio perfecta est illa qua scitur de aliqua re aliquas suas proprie-
va tates | accidentales sibi inesse.
NotiÞcatio perfectior est illa qua scitur proprietates propriissimas ali-
cuius rei secundum aliquid inesse.
NotiÞcatio perfectissima est illa qua scitur res di nire propriissime
et proprie et communiter, hoc est qua cognoscitur dierentia speciÞca
convertibilis rei inesse, et qua cognoscuntur proprietates rei inesse, et
etiam qua cognoscitur accidens talis rei sibi inesse, et per consequens
ista notitia est composita ex pluribus notitiis vel saltem est plures notitias
supponens.
Et de omnibus istis notitiis essent ponende diverse conclusiones, sed quia
prius in pueri instrumentis iste questiones co〈m〉pilantur, igitur di -
cilioribus conclusionibus omissis pauce faciliores ad titulum questionis
directe pertinentes ad presens sunt ponende.
〈conclusio prima〉 Quarum prima est ista quod non cuiuslibet rela-
tivi prima notitia qua cognoscitur quid tale relativum signiÞcat, est eius
notitia di nitiva per suam correlarium. Ista demonstratur, et ponitur
gratia exempli quod Sortes ignorat quid pater signiÞcat et quid Þlius
signiÞcat; tunc clarum est: si dicetur Sorti ‘pater est istud quod habet
Þlium’, ex hoc Sortes ignorat quid iste terminus ‘Þlius’ signiÞcat. Adhuc
non noscitur quid iste terminus ‘pater’ signiÞcat saltem distincte. Ideo
oportet quod, si Sortes debeat cognoscere quid iste terminus ‘pater’ signi-
Þcat per istam di nitionem ‘pater est istud quod habeat Þlium’, oportet
ipsum precognoscere quid iste terminus ‘Þlius’ signiÞcat aliqua alia noti-
tia a notitia di nitiva istius termini ‘Þlius’, quia, si queratur ‘quid est
Þlius?’ et si respondeatur quod Þlius est istud quod habet patrem, adhuc
 substantia] est add. necnon del. E | animata] est add. necnon del. et exp. E  cogno-
scuntur] rei add. necnon del. E  si] sic E
questio  
2011013 [Van der Helm] 02-Edition-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 249
〈quis〉 ignorat quid est pater, ignorat etiam quid est Þlius. Igitur non cuiu-
slibet relativi prima notitia qua scitur quid tale relativum signiÞcat, est
notitia di nitiva.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod prima noti-
 tia alicuius relativi qua scitur 〈quid〉 tale relativum signiÞcat, causatur
per aliquam informationem non di nitivam sed potius narrativam. Ista
conclusio quodam modo patet per conclusionem iam positam, et decla-
ratur exemplariter, nam, si Sortes ignoraret quid signiÞcat pater et Þlius,
tunc, si quereret ‘quid est Þlius?’, oportet quod narretur quod Þlius est
 res que habet animam sensitivam cuius causa generativa existit in rerum
natura, et quia ista oratio est longior, quamvis convertitur cum isto ter-
mino ‘Þlius’, ideo proprie non est di nitio, cum secundum Aristotelem,
sexto Topicorum,9 di nitio sit oratio compendiosa indicans quid sit 〈in〉
re.
 〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod possibile est pri-
mam notitiam 〈esse〉 di nitivam. Ista declaratur quia: ponatur quod
vbSortes sciat nar|rative quid iste terminus ‘Þlius’ signiÞcat et ignoret quid
signiÞcat iste terminus ‘pater’, sicut possibile, tunc, si Sortes quereret
‘quid est pater?’ et respondeatur scilicet quod pater est istud quod habeat
 Þlium, tunc Sortes primo scit quid iste terminus ‘pater’ signiÞcat per
notitiam di nitivam, quia per istam orationem compendiosam ‘istud
quod habet Þlium’.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod omnis notitia
informativa ab homine vel a libero presupponit credulitatem addiscentis.
 Ista conclusio declaratur, quia tento casu priori quod Sortes sciat narra-
tive scilicet quid Þlius signiÞcat, et querat ab aliquo ‘quid est pater?’, qui
sibi respondeat ‘pater est istud quod habet Þlium’, si Sortes non sibi cre-
dat, tunc Sortes adhuc non scit quid est pater. Et ideo dicit Aristoteles
quod oportet addiscentem credere.10
 〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod possibile est ali-
quem scire quid relativum signiÞcat principale sine hoc quod sciat quid
signiÞcat suum correlarium. Ista conclusio potest probari ex predictis,
quia possibile est aliquem scire quid signiÞcat principaliter istud relati-
vum ‘Þlius’ per orationem narrativam, ut, si quis dicat cui credit quod
 quis] ex E – notitia] ali add. necnon del. E  quid] qua E  Þlius] ratio
proprie add. necnon del. E  homine] seq. lac.  litt. E
 Aristoteles, Topica vi. Vel potius i, , b; vii, , a.
 Cf. Aristoteles, Topica viii, , a–.
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Þlius est res que habet animam sensitivam cuius rei causa particularis
eectus existit in rerum natura, quamvis ignoret quid signiÞcat iste ter-
minus ‘pater’.
〈conclusio sexta〉 Sexta conclusio est ista quod impossibile est ali-
quem scire di nitive quid relativum signiÞcat principaliter et connotat
nisi sciat quid signiÞcetur per suum correlarium. Ista patet, quia impos-
sibile est aliquem scire quid iste terminus ‘pater’ signiÞcat per istam dif-
Þnitionem ‘istud quod habet Þlium’ nisi sciat quid iste terminus ‘Þlius’
signiÞcat. Et patet totum ex predictis, et hoc supposito quod ista sit dif-
Þnitio patris sicut in rei veritate suppono quod sit ad presens.
〈conclusio septima〉 Septima conclusio est ista quod necesse est
necessitate conditionata genus poni in di nitione speciei ad istum intel-
lectum quod hec sit vera: si species bene di nitur, genus poni〈tur〉 in eius
di nitione. Ista consequentia patet per textum Porphirii allegatum.11
〈conclusio octava〉 Octava conclusio est ista quod ista di nitio
speciei: ‘species est quod predicatur de pluribus numero dierentibus in
esse quod quid’ non est bona, sed de ista conclusione erit specialis questio
immediate sequens.12
〈ad .〉 Ad primum igitur principale dicitur sicut iam innuit ultima
〈conclusio〉, quod ista di nitio speciei non est bona, sicut patebit infra.13
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur concedendo quod omne quod ponitur
ra in di nitione alicuius notiÞcante ipsum | aliqua notitia, debet esse
notius, sicut patet ex predictis, sed non oportet quod sit notius notitia
di nitiva. Et ulterius dicitur quod quamvis genus et species sint relativa,
tamen possibile est unum istorum aliqua notitia notius esse reliquo
quamvis non notitia di nitiva. De ista materia plenius pertractabitur
suo loco.14
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur negando consequentiam. Et ad Aristotelem
dicitur quod ipse intelligit de di nitione propriissime dicta, quia talis
est semper alicuius absoluti, ideo non debet esse circularis et tali di -
 quod] quod sup. lin. E  oportet] ? del. E; oportet sup. lin. E
 Isagoge, ii,  (, ): ‘(…) necesse est in utrorumque rationibus utrisque uti.’ Videas
supra, ad opp., .
 Videas infra, q. .
 Videas infra, q. .
 omas Manlevelt, Questiones super Predicamenta, Erfurt sb Ampl. q  (xiv)
.rb–vb, q. : Utrum unum relativorum poterit distincte cognosci ab aliquo
licet reliquum ab eodem distincte non cognoscatur, . vb–vb.
questio  
2011013 [Van der Helm] 02-Edition-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 251
nitione non di nitur aliquod relativum. Unde non est 〈in〉conveniens
di nitionem relativorum esse circularem, sed potius est necessarium.
〈ad .〉 Ad quartum dicitur negando antecedens. Et ad probationem
dicitur negando quod species potest esse sine hoc quod sit genus, quam-
 vis tamen ista sit vera de virtute sermonis, sed negatur ad istum intellec-
tum in quo frequenter accipitur a multis, quod adhuc sit possibile species
〈esse〉 sine genere. Et patet ista responsio ex textu Porphirii.15
〈ad argumentum ad oppositum〉 Ad argumentum in opposito patet
satis per predicta.
 esse] est E
 Isagoge, x,  (, –): ‘Et species quidem cum sit, est et genus, genus vero cum sit,
non omnino erit et species.’
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum ista di nitio
speciei ‘Species est que predicatur de pluribus
numero dierentibus in eo quod quid sit’, sit bona.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non.
Ista di nitio non convertitur cum di nito, igitur non valet. Conse-
quentia patet per Aristotelem, sexto Topicorum,1 et antecedens probatur,
nam ista di nitio competit enti, quod est unum transcendens et quod
nec est genus nec species.
〈.〉 Item. Competit enti generalissimo quod nullo modo est species,
quia genus generalissimum predicatur de pluribus speciei dierentibus,
et per consequens numero dierentibus.
〈.〉 Item. In ista di nitione non ponitur genus, sed genus et species
sunt relativa, igitur ista di nitio non est bona. Consequentia patet per
hoc quod necesse est in di nitione unius relativi reliquum poni, ut patet
per textum Porphirii in ipso illegatum.2 Et antecedens notum est de se.
〈.〉 Item. Individuum predicatur de pluribus numero dierentibus in
eo quod quid, et individuum non est species, igitur predicta di nitio
rb non est bona. Consequentia videtur | evidens, et antecedens declaratur:
posito quod ‘Sortes’ signiÞcet duos homines diversis impositionibus,
tunc: ‘iste homo est Sortes, et iste homo est Sortes’ demonstratis illis
duobus, igitur etcetera.
Pro istis argumentis dicunt aliqui supponendo di nitionem quod dif-
Þnitio debet sic suppleri: ‘species est que predicatur de pluribus numero
dierentibus, et non specie, in eo quod quid’. Per istam suppletionem
nituntur excludere argumenta prius facta.
Sed contra hoc arguitur, quia, quamvis possent excludere quedam
argumenta, non tamen omnia, quia non istud argumentum: unde posito
 Ista] igitur E  generalissimo] lac.  verb. E  argumentum] generale(?) add. E
 Aristoteles, Topica vi, , b–: ‘Si vero aliquid eorum quae sunt in di nitione
non omnibus insit quae sunt sub eadem specie, impossibile est totam di nitionem
propriam esse; non enim conversim praedicabitur.’
 Isagoge, ii,  (, ): ‘(…) necesse est in utrorumque rationibus utrisque uti.’
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quod nullum esset in rerum natura, adhuc iste terminus ‘homo’ predi-
caretur de pluribus numero dierentibus et non specie in eo quod quid,
et tamen iste terminus ‘homo’ non esset tunc species, per illum textum3
quo dicitur ‘species ergo alicuius generis species’.
 〈adoppositum〉 Ad oppositum videtur textus Porphirii,4 qui dicit de ista
di nitione quod ipsa est specie specialissime.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista quod probabiliter potest
teneri quod predicta di nitio, etiam cum suppletione, non est bona,
sicut probant argumenta ad hoc facta.
 〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod ista di nitio
‘species est que immediate ponitur sub genere’ est bona di nitio, quia
est brevis oratio convertibilis cum di nito indicans quid signiÞcatur in
di nito, et hoc su cit ad bonitatem talium di nitionum.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod di nitio speciei
 specialisime debet sic suppleri: ‘species specialissima est que ponitur
immediate sub genere et que de pluribus numero dierentibus et non
specie univoce predicatur in eo quod quid’.
Et si queratur quare istam di nitionem non posuit Porphirius, dico
quod Porphirius loquebatur sicut diversi alii auctores solent loqui, sci-
 licet aliqua exprimendo et aliqua subintelligendo tamquam prius dicta,
sicut Aristoteles di niens ‘nomen’ primo per istas subintelligit aliquas
particulas di nitiones quas postea plane declarat; et ita Porphirius5
in proposito aliquam particulam subintelligit tamquam prius dictam,
vaistam scilicet ‘species est que immediata | ponitur sub genere etce-
 tera’.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod, si cui placeat,
probabiliter potest teneri predictam di nitionem sine ista particula ‘que
immediate ponitur sub genere’ esse bonam.
〈ad argumentum ad oppositum〉 Et ad argumentum in oppositum
 potest dici negando istam consequentiam ‘species, ergo alicuius generis
 predicta] predicte E  di nito] di nitum E  teneri] tenere E
 Videas infra, ad opp.
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘Sed haec quidem assignatio specialissimae est et quae solum
species est (…)’
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘Assignant ergo et sic speciem: species est quod ponitur sub
genere (…)’
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species’, sed bene sequitur ‘ergo alicuius individui species’, nec Porphi-
rius6 dicit ‘species, ergo alicuius generis species’, sed dicit ‘species, ergo
alicuius species’.
Sed contra hoc arguitur, scilicet quod hoc non sit intentio Porphirii7
per istum textum qui sequitur ‘necesse est in utrorumque rationibus
utrisque uti’, et ideo melior est opinio antedicta, scilicet quod genus et
species sint sibi invicem relativa secundum intentionem Porphirii.
Verumtamen posset dici quod ‘species’ accipitur aliquando relative
respectu generis, et sic competit sibi ista di nitio ‘species est que poni-
tur immediate sub genere’; aliquando accipitur relative respectu alicuius
individui, et sic competit sibi ista di nitio ‘species est que predicatur
de pluribus etcetera’, et hoc forte intelligit Porphirius8 quando dicit ‘sed
species quidem individuorum velut ea continens, species autem superio-
rum velut ea que ab eis continetur’, et ita species non secundum eandem
rationem dicitur ‘species superioris’ et ‘species inferioris’, sed secundum
diversas rationes, et per consequens equivoce et secundum hoc compe-
tunt sibi diverse di nitiones.
〈ad rationes principales〉 Ad rationes principales satis patet per pre-
dicta.
 Isagoge, ii,  (, ): ‘(…) species alicuius est species (…)’
 Isagoge, ii,  (, ): ‘(…) necesse est in utrorumque rationibus utrisque uti.’
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘(…) sed species quidem individuorum velut ea continens,
species autem superiorum, velut quae ab eis continetur.’
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum omne quod
est ante individua, sit species specialissima.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non.
 Quia si sic, sequeretur quod genus generalissimum est species specia-
lissima, quia est ante individua, cum sit per se superius ratione indivi-
duorum. Ad hoc breviter dicitur quod Porphirius intelligit quod imme-
diate sit ante individua.
〈.〉 Sed contra hoc arguitur et probatur quod non omne istud quod
 immediate est ante individua, erit species, quia sic sequeretur quod iste
terminus ‘Sortes’ esset species specialissima. Consequens falsum, sicut
de se patet, quia nullum individuum est species specialissima, ut patet
ex textu Porphirii;1 sed Sortes est individuum, sicut patet ex eodem
textu Porphirii.2 Et consequentia declaratur, quia Sortes est immediate
 ante individua, sicut posito quod decem sint homines quorum quilibet
vbvocatur proprie conceptu Sortes, tunc sequitur ‘iste homo est, | ergo
Sortes est’ demonstrato aliquo istorum decem et non sequitur e converso,
igitur Sortes est superius ad hoc individuum quod est iste homo.
〈.〉 Item. Si sic, sequeretur quod hoc disiunctum Sortes vel Plato
 esset species specialissima. Falsitas consequentis patet ex hoc quod sic
sequeretur, quod homo non esset species specialissima, cuius oppositum
vult Porphirius.3 Consequentia patet, quia sequeretur immediate ‘Sortes
est, ergo Sortes vel Plato est’, et non e converso.
〈.〉 Item. Si sic, sequeretur quod homo esset species specialissima.
 Consequentia videtur evidens, quia, ut patet per textum Porphirii,4 ho-
mo immediate dicitur individua, et per consequens est immediate ante
 patet] patet sup. lin. E
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘(…) homo, cum sit species post quam non sit alia species
neque aliquid eorum quae possunt dividi, sed solum individuorum – individuum
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individua. Falsitas consequentis decleratur, quia, si homo esset species
specialissima, tunc prediceretur in quid de suis individuis. Consequentia
patet per di nitionem speciei specialissime, et falsitas consequens decla-
retur, quia ista predicatio non est in quid: ‘igitur homo est homo’, quia
non convenienter respondetur, si queratur ‘quid est iste homo?’ respon-
dendo quod sit homo, quia talis responsio non est apta nata removeri
〈dubium〉 querentis quod habet de tali questione, quia quicumque que-
rit ‘quid est iste homo?’ sit verum quod sit homo.
〈.〉 Item. Si sic, sequeretur quod albus esset species specialissima, quia
est immediate ante ista individua hoc album. Sed falsitas consequentis
declaratur sicut in proxima ratione.
〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum est Porphirius in textu iam allegato,5 qui
dicit: ‘omne quod est ante individuum proximum species erit sola, et non
genus’.
〈distinctio〉 In ista questione premittitur distinctio de anterioritate reali
et logicali, et quod ‘anterioritas’ in proposito accipitur brevitatis gratia
pro ‘superioritate per se’.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista quod omne quod est pro-
xime et univoce ante individua, est 〈species〉 specialissima, si illud imme-
diate et per se supponitur generi. Ista conclusio patet per auctoritatem
Porphirii,6 ad oppositum questionis allegatam.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod sub specie
specialissima nihil continetur nisi individuum, et hoc secundum quod
est species specialissima, quia, si aliunde esset genus, utpote secundum
aliam signiÞcationem, tunc secus esset. Ista conclusio patet satis diuse
ra per textum Porphirii,7 | in quo declarat quod genus generalissimum est
istud supra quod non est aliud genus superveniens, et species specialis-
sima est quod sic est species quod nullo modo genus, et sub qua non est
aliqua alia species.
 queratur] sicut add. necnon del. et exp. E  premittitur distinctio] premissa
distinctiones E  species] secunda E  secus] secus sup. lin. E
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –, ): ‘Et omne quod ante individua proximum est, species erit
solum, non etiam genus.’
 Ibid.
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘Determinant ergo generalissimum ita, (…) supra quod
non est aliud superveniens genus, specialissimum vero, (…) quod cum sit species,
numquam dividitur in species (…)’
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2011013 [Van der Helm] 02-Edition-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 257
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod aliquid est per se
ante individua proxime quod non est species specialissima, nec genus,
sed individuum. Ista conclusio patet de propriis nominibus plura proprie
et diversim signiÞcantibus que sunt autem pronomina demonstrativa,
 quamvis equivoce, ut supposito quod Sortes signiÞcet decem homines
diversim mediantibus propriis earum conceptibus; sequitur enim tunc
‘iste est’ demonstrato aliquo eorum decem, ‘igitur Sortes est’, et non
e converso, ergo Sortes est superior et prior, et ante ista pronomina
demonstrativa.
 Sed contra conclusionem instatur probando quod Sortes sit commune
univocum, nam quod sit commune, patet per argumentum iam factum,8
et quod sit univocum, persuadetur sic: posito quod scribitur ista propo-
sitio in pariete ‘Sortes currit’ quam videat Plato et intelligat, tunc ex tali
visi resulta〈t〉 aliquod complexum in mente Platonis, quod vocetur A;
 tunc capiatur subiectum ipsius A, et quero utrum sit conceptus proprius
vel 〈appellativus〉; si sit conceptus appellativus, habetur propositum, quia
tunc tali conceptui correspondet iste terminus vocalis ‘Sortes’, nam, sicut
tota vocalis correspondet toti mentali, ita pars parti, utpote subiectum
subiecto, predicatum predicato, et omnis terminus correspondens uni
 conceptui appellativo est commune univocum; Sortes est huiusmodi,
igitur etcetera. Nec potest dici quod subiectum ipsius A sit conceptus
proprius, quia non maiori ratione unius individui signiÞcati per ‘Sortes’
quam alterius, sed non omnes conceptus proprii individuorom signiÞca-
torum per ‘Sortes’ sunt subiecta ipsius A, igitur nullus conceptus proprius
 signiÞcatus per ‘Sortes’ est subiectum ipsius A.
Ad istud dicitur breviter sicut prius quod ‘Sortes’ est commune equivo-
rbcum9 et non univocum saltem respectu | talium individuorum quorum
est nomen proprium mediantibus propriis eorum conceptibus. Et ulte-
rius dicitur quod in mente Platonis resultat unum complexum cuius
 subiectum non est aliquod subiectum simplex appellativum vel pro-
prium, sed est quoddam compositum ex pluribus conceptibus, utpote
tale compositum: aliquid quod vocatur ‘Sortes’.
 proxime] proximo E  factum] et add. necnon del. et exp. E  et quod sit
univocum] et quod sit univocum sup. lin. E  capiatur] Sortes(?) add. necnon del. et
exp. E  appellativus] appalicativus E | habetur] haberetur E  tunc] tunc sup.
lin. E  signiÞcatus] signiÞcati E  proprium] ??  litt. del. E  vocatur]
vocatur sup. lin. E | Sortes] De isto adhuc plenius proprium. add. E
 Videas supra, q. , concl. .
 Videas supra, q. , concl. .
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〈ad .〉 Ad primum principale sicut superius dicebatur.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur negando consequentiam ‘Sortes est ante
individua immediate, igitur est species specialissima’, sed oportet addere
‘per se et univoce’, et sic intelligit Porphirius.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur negando consequentiam, et ulterius dicitur,
sicut iam dictum est, quod hoc disiunctum Sortes vel Plato non est ante
individua univoce, sed equivoce.
〈ad .〉 Ad quartum conceditur quod sic species specialissima sit quod
predicatur de individuis in quid proprissime; verumtamen dicendum est
quod individuum est duplex, scilicet purum et impurum. ‘Purum et sim-
plex’ dicitur nomen proprium vel pronomen demonstrativum; ‘impu-
rum’ est compositum ex pronomine demonstrativo et nomine appel-
lativo ut ipso subiecto. De primo intelligit Porphirius. Unde, quamvis
per ‘hominem’ non convenienter respondetur ad istam questionem ‘quid
est iste homo?’, tamen convenientissime respondetur ad istam questio-
nem ‘quid est iste?’ demonstrato aliquo individuo homine; et de istis
individuis puris exempliÞcat Porphirius,10 quando dicit: ‘individua sunt
ut Socrates, ut hic, et hic, et hoc’. De individuis 〈impuris〉 exempliÞcat,
quando dicit: ‘individuum enim dicitur ut “hoc album” et “hoc veniens”
et “Sophronisci Þlius”, si solus sit ei Socrates Þlius’.11 Unde inter individua
va non pura adhuc sunt diversi gradus | sicut ex hoc dicto potest elici.
〈ad .〉 Ad quintum dicitur concedendo quod album sit species spe-
cialissima, et quod predicatur in quid de suis individuis puris.
Et si dicatur contra: hoc non convenienter 〈respondetur〉 per ‘album’,
si queratur, ‘quid est hoc?’ demonstrato albo, sed si queratur, ‘quale est
hoc?’, ad istud dicitur quod intellectibus deÞciunt nobis nomina propria
individuorum, et ideo oportet nos uti pronominibus demonstrativis loco
illorum convenientissime signiÞcantibus, sicut talia propria nomina, si
essent, connotative signiÞcarent, et ideo, quia talia pronomina demon-
strativa taliter possunt accipi equivoce, utpote absolute et connotative,
respondens debet interrogare interrogantem, utrum accipit hoc prono-
men demonstrativum ‘hoc’ absolute vel connotative, quia, si accipiatur
 dicendum] dicendum sup. lin. E; dictum add. necnon del. Et exp. E  ut] et E
 impuris] nonpo add. necnon del. E; purus E  hoc veniens] hoc veniens mg. E
 Sophronisci] et su cit add. necnon del. E  adhuc] adhunc E  quod] hoc
add. necnon del. Et exp. E  est] sit E  nos] nos sup. lin. E  respondens]
respondens sup. lin. E
 Isagoge, i,  (, –): ‘(…) sicut individua sicut Socrates et hic et hoc (…)’
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘Individuum autem dicitur Socrates et hoc album et hic
veniens, ut Sophronisci Þlius, si solus ei sit Socrates Þlius.’
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absolute, tunc est individuum substantie et non qualitatis, et secundum
hoc aliter respondendum est. Si vero accipiatur secundum quod est indi-
viduum qualitatis, tunc convenienter respondetur si queratur ‘quid est
hoc?’, dicendo ‘hoc est album’ vel ‘hoc est calidum’.
 〈ad argumentum ad oppositum〉 Ad argumentum in oppositum patet
iam dicta.
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum
individuum sit nomen appellativum.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod sic.
Istud nomen ‘Sortes’ est individuum, istud est nomen appellativum,
igitur nomen appellativum est individuum. Maior nota, quia est nomen
proprium. Patet etiam ex textu.1 Minor probatur, quia convenit pluribus
per appellationem posito, sicut ad presens supponitur, quod istud nomen
‘Sortes’ signiÞcet plura mediantibus diversis eorum conceptibus.
〈.〉 Item. Omne istud quod convertitur cum nomine appellativo,
est appellativum; Sortes est huiusmodi; igitur etcetera. Maior apparet
evidens. Et minor declaratur, quia convertitur cum isto ‘aliquo istorum’
demonstratis illis quorum quibilibet vocatur ‘Sortes’, nam quidquid est
aliquid istorum, est Sortes, et e converso.
〈.〉 Item. Omne istud quod correspondet tamquam signum subordi-
vb natum conceptui, | est appellativum; Sortes est huiusmodi; igitur etce-
tera. Maior elicitur satis ab Aristotele, primo Perihermeneias,2 ubi dicit
quod voces sunt note earum passionum que sunt in anima. Ex quo eli-
citur quod accidentia grammaticalia nominum vocalium capiunt origi-
nem ab accidentibus grammaticalibus nominum mentalium. Unde vox
omnis dicitur nomen, etcetera, quia correspondet conceptui nominali,
et pari ratione non dicetur appellativus nisi quia correspondet concep-
tui appellativo. Et minor declaratur: posito quod ista propositio ‘Sortes
scribit’ scribitur in pariete quam videat Plato, tunc capiatur complexum
quod resultat in mente Platonis; et queritur de subiecto illius complexi,
et probetur quod sit appellativum sicut in precedente questione argue-
batur.3
 nomen] est add. E  scribit] scribit iter. E
 Isagoge, i,  (, –): ‘(…) individua sicut Socrates et hic et hoc (…)’; Isagoge,
ii,  (, ): ‘(…) individuum enim est Socrates (…)’; Isagoge, ii,  (, –):
‘Individuum autem dicitur Socrates (…)’
 Aristoteles, De interpretatione, , a–: ‘Ea quae sunt in voce sunt earum quae
sunt in anima passionum notae.’
 Videas supra, q. , concl. .
questio  
2011013 [Van der Helm] 02-Edition-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 261
〈.〉 Item. ‘Sortes’ simpliciter convertitur cum isto termino communi
sive appellativo ‘res que vocatur Sortes’, quia quidquid est Sortes, est res
que vocatur Sorte, et e converso: quidquid est res que vocatur Sortes, est
Sortes.
 〈ad oppositum .〉 Ad oppositum arguitur, quia sic sequeretur quod
individuum esset universale, non tantum individuum existentie quia hoc
nullum esset inconveniens, sed potius necessarium, sed etiam indivi-
duum predicationis.
〈ad oppositum .〉 Sequeretur etiam quod prima substantia esset
 secunda, quia proprium nomen esset, vel species.
〈distinctio prima〉 In ista questione presupponitur primo quod ‘indi-
viduum’ semper accipitur pro individuo individualitate predicationis et
non existentie.
〈distinctio secunda〉 Secundo presuppono quod omnis terminus
 appellativus sit universale.
〈conclusio prima〉 Quibus presuppositis prima conclusio est ista quod
nullum individuum est nomen appellativum. Ista conclusio statim sequi-
tur ex iam dictis suppositionibus, quia: nullum individuum est univer-
sale; omnis terminus appellativus est universale, igitur nullum terminus
 appellativus est individuum, et ultimum, igitur nullum individuum est
appellativum.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod nullum indi-
viduum correspondet conceptui appellativo absolute, primo et principa-
raliter. Ista | conclusio patet, quia si sic, sequeretur quod tale individuum
 esset appellativum per argumentum superius positum.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod aliquod indivi-
duum quod est nomen proprium, correspondet conceptui appellativo
connotative sive accidentaliter, secondario et ex consequenti. Ista conclu-
sio declaratur, quia visa ista propositione scripta a Platone scilicet ‘Sortes
 currit’, tunc clarum est quod ex tali visione resultat in mente Platonis
aliqua propositio que vocatur B. Tunc non potest dici quod subiectum
istius B sit conceptus proprius, quia non maiori ratione esset concep-
tus proprius unius signiÞcati per ‘Sortes’ quam alterius et tale subiec-
tum non est omnis conceptus proprius signiÞcati per istum terminum
 sic] nea add. E
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‘Sortes’; igitur nullus conceptus proprius signiÞcati per ‘Sortes’ est subiec-
tum ipsius B. Nec potest dici quod omnis conceptus communis absolutus
sit subiectum ipsius B, quia non conceptus hominis vel animalis, et sic de
aliis conceptibus absolutis communibus in coordinatione predicamen-
tali substantie. Relinquitur igitur quod aliquis conceptus connotativus
sit subiectum ipsius B, utpote talis conceptus aliquis conceptibilis res que
vocatur Sortes; sed iste conceptus correspondet isto termino ‘Sortes’, quia,
sicut tota propositio vocalis correspondet toti mentali, sic pars principa-
lis parti principali, utpote subiectum subiecto, et predicatum predicato.
Et iste terminus vocalis ‘Sortes’ non est correspondens tali conceptui con-
notativo primo et principaliter, igitur ex consequenti et secundario.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod iste terminus
‘res que vocatur Sortes’ est terminus accidentalis, non substantialis. Ista
patet ex predictis, quia nullus terminus connotativus est in predicamento
substantie, sed iste terminus ‘res que vocatur Sortes’ est terminus conno-
tativus alicuius extrinseci, igitur non est in predicamento substantie et
per consequens non est terminus substantialis.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Ex ista conclusione sequitur correlarie hoc,
rb quod iste terminus ‘res que vocatur | Sortes’ est in predicamento qua-
litatis. Quia: non est in predicamento substantie, sicut iam dictum est,4
nec est in aliquo alio predicamento accidentali a predicamento qualitatis,
quia ad nullum interrogativum alicuius alterius predicamenti, conve-
nienter respondetur per istum terminum de individuo, sicut patet. Relin-
quitur ergo quod sit in predicamento qualitatis, ex quo ulterius sequitur
correlarie quod si queratur ‘qualis est ista res?’ demonstrato Sorte, con-
venienter respondetur quod ‘hec res est res que vocatur Sortes’.
〈conclusio sexta〉 Sexta conclusio est ista quod aliquod individuum
sive nomen proprium convertitur cum termino appellativo, sicut patet
de isto individuo Sortes et de isto termino ‘aliquis istorum’ demonstratis
illis quorum quilibet vocatur ‘Sortes’.
〈ad .〉 Ad primum principale igitur dicitur negando minorem, et ad
probationem negatur consequentia, scilicet: ‘convenit pluribus per appel-
lationem, igitur est appellativum’. Sed oportet addere quod convenit plu-
ribus univoce.
 conceptus] B add. necnon del. E  per] conen add. necnon del. E  predica-
mento] corr. ex predicamentis E
 Videas supra, concl. .
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〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur quod patet per ultimam conclusionem,
scilicet quod maior est falsa; sed omne quod convertitur univoce cum
termino appellativo est appellativum. Unde, quamvis ‘Sortes’ convertitur
cum nomine appellativo, non tamen univoce, sed equivoce.
 〈ad .〉 Ad tertium negatur maior, sed oportet addere quod omne
istud quod correspondens est conceptui appellativo primo et principali-
ter, est appellativum; sed sic non facit ‘Sortes’, quia, si correspondet con-
ceptui appellativo, hoc est secundarie, et ex consequenti, ex 〈h〉abilitate
accipientis. Qui capit ex tali propositione ‘Sortes currit’ – posito casu
 presenti – propinquum sensum quem potest habere. Et ideo, quia visa
tali propositione ‘Sortes currit’ non potest videns propinquum sensum
habere quem talem ‘aliquid quod vocatur Sortes, currit’, ideo ex conse-
quenti et per accidens valde iste terminus ‘Sortes’ correspondet concep-
tui appellativo.
 〈ad .〉 Ad quartam patet per predicta, quia quamvis convertatur, istud
non est univoce, sed equivoce, et ideo non oportet quod sit appellativum.
〈ad argumenta ad oppositum〉 Ad argumenta in oppositum: qualiter
concludunt, patet per predicta.
 quod] est add. necnon del. E  accipientis] excipientis E  sensum] quee add.
necnon del. E  oppositum] qualiter add. necnon del. E
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〈questio 〉
va Consequenter queritur | utrum unum sit
genus omnium; hoc est querere, utrum talia
transcendentia aliquid, res, ens, sint genera.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod sic.
Ens est universale, et non est species vel dierentia etcetera, ergo
e〈s〉t genus. Conclusio videtur evidens, quia omne universale est genus
vel species vel dierentia 〈etcetera〉, sicut satis vult Porphirius in textu.1
Et prima particula probatur, scilicet quod ens sit universale, quia ens
predicatur de pluribus univoce, igitur ens est universale. Consequentia
patet per Aristotelem, primo Perihermeneias,2 ubi sic deÞnit universale.
Et antecedens patet, quia ‘ens’ predicatur univoce de Sorte et de Platone
et de asino et de equo et sic de aliis individuis substantie. Et secunda
particula antecedentis, scilicet quod ens non 〈sit〉 species, patet de se.
〈.〉 Item. Omne istud quod predicatur de pluribus specie dierentibus
in eo quod quid, est genus; ens est huiusmodi; igitur etcetera. Maior patet
per di nitionem generis. Et minor declaratur, nam quod ‘ens’ predicatur
de pluribus specie dierentibus, de se notum est; et quod predicatur
in quid, declaratur posito quod Sortes dubitet de Platone, utrum sit in
rerum natura vel non, tunc, si Sortes querat, quid sit Plato, et aliquis cui
queret respondeat quod Plato sit ens, tunc dubium querentis 〈removetur〉
per talem responsionem, igitur responsio fuit conveniens, igitur ‘ens’
predicatur in quid.
〈.〉 Item. Si queratur ‘quid est substantia?’ convenienter respondetur
quod sit ens per se subsistens, igitur ens predicatur in quid. Consequentia
nota, quia omne istud predicatur in quid per quod convenienter respon-
detur ad questionem factam per ‘quid?’, sicut patet per textum. Et ante-
cedens patet, quia convenienter respondetur ad questionem factam per
 unum] unum Ec  Porphirius in textu] Porphirius in textu E mg.  equo]
Platone E  species] seq. lac.  litt. E –. per quid] per quid sup. lin. E
 Isagoge, proem. (, –): ‘Cum sit necessarium (…) nosse quid genus sit et quid
dierentia quidque species et quid proprium et quid accidens’ et passim.
 Vel potius Aristoteles, De interpretatione, vii, a–: ‘Universale est quod aptum
natum est praedicari de pluribus (…)’
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quid de aliquo per eius di nitionem, sicut patet inducendo per singula,
ut si queratur, quid sit homo, convenienter respondetur quod sit animal
rationale mortale, et si queratur quid sit animal, convenienter responde-
tur quod sit substantia animata sensibilis; igitur, pari ratione, si queratur
 quid est substantia, convenienter respondetur quod sit res per se existens,
quia ista est di nitio substantie.
vb〈.〉 Item. | Ista est conveniens interrogatio, igitur sibi correspondet
conveniens responsio et non alia quam illa, igitur ista est conveniens
reponsio. Assumptum probatur, quia, si per aliquam reponsionem que-
 rentis posset responderi, detur ista.
〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum videtur quod sit Porphirius in textu, qui
dicit quod non est unum 〈genus〉 omnium sicut est unus pater omnium,
et specialiter facit mentionem de ente, negando ipsum esse genus.3
In ista questione breviter recitande sunt alique opiniones, secundo po-
 nende sunt alique conclusiones, et tertio solvende sunt principales ratio-
nes.
〈opinio prima〉 Est igitur una opinio que fuit Porphirii et aliquorum
antiquorum, scilicet quod ens non est genus, quia predicatur equivoce
de aliquibus suis contentis, sicut de substantia et accidente. Et ad hoc
 conÞrmandum Porphirius4 allegat textum Aristotelis, qui dicit: ‘si quis
omnia entia enuntiet, equivoce nuncupabit’.
Sed quamvis ista opinio posset esse vera quantum ad conclusionem
principalem, scilicet quod ens non sit genus, non tamen est vera quan-
tum ad rationem dictam, scilicet quod ens non predicatur univoce de
 subiecto et accidente. Quod probatur sic: omne istud predicatur uni-
voce de aliquibus de quibus aliquid predicatur secundum nomen et
secundum eandem rationem; sed sic predicatur ens de substantia et acci-
dente; igitur predicatur de illis univoce. Maior patet per Aristotelem in
 responsio] corresponsio E  omnium] annum E | omnium] annum E  fuit]
fuiat E
 Isagoge, ii,  (, ): ‘Neque est commune unum genus omnium ens (…)’
 Isagoge, ii,  (. ): ‘(…) si omnia quis entia vocet, aequivoce (…) nuncupabit, non
univoce.’ Porhyrius videtur referre ad Aristotelem, Metaphysica vii, , a–.
Cf. Aristoteles Metaphysica iv, , a–: ‘Ens autem multis quidem dicitur
modis, sed ad unum et ad unam aliquam naturam et non equivoce’ – rec. et tr.
Guillelmi de Moerbeka.
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principio Predicamentorum.5 Et minor patet, quia predicatur de eis se-
cundum hoc nomen ‘ens’, et secundum istam rationem quo exisit in
rerum natura, sive sit per se sive in alio.
〈opinio secunda〉 Item. Aliqui arguunt sic: quandocumque alique
tres propositiones sic se habent quod in dubio sunt due, et tertia certa
sive 〈s〉cita, et quod habent idem subiectum, tunc aliud est predicatum
propositionis scite a predicato propositionis dubie; sed sic se habent
ra iste tres propositiones: ‘ista quantitas est substantia’, | ‘ista quantitas
est accidens’, ‘ista quantitas est ens’, nam prima et secunda alicui sunt
dubie, et tertia est eidem scita; igitur aliud est predicatum in mente
propositionis scite a predicato alicuius aliarum propositionum. Et per
consequens unus est conceptus entis distinctus a conceptu substantie et
conceptu accidentis.
Sed ad istud nituntur aliqui dicere conceptum entis non esse simpli-
cem sed compositum, disiunctum ex conceptus substantie et accidentis,
ita quod isti predicato 〈enti in hac propositione〉 ‘hec quantitas est ens’
correspondet hoc disiunctum substantia vel accidens.
Sed istud videtur multiplicare dictum, quia intantum experitur con-
ceptum entis esse simplicem sicut conceptum substantie vel conceptum
accidentis.
〈opinio tertia〉 Item. Si dicatur quod ens sit equivocum analogice
sicut multi dicunt, quia per prius predicatur de substantia et per posterius
de accidente,
tunc quero quid intelligunt per ‘prius’. Et non possunt intelligere ali-
quam prioritatem nisi prioritatem perfectionis, utpote quod substantia
sit perfectius ens quam accidens. Sed talis equivocatio non impedit ali-
quid esse genus, quia hoc genus animal tali prioritate per prius competit
homini quam asino, eo quod homo sit per prius animal quam asinus.
Et consimiliter hoc genus substantia, eo quod Deus sit perfectior sub-
stantia in inÞnitum quam aliqua alia substantia. Et hoc est etiam quod
 est] sit E  istud] aliud E
 Aristoteles, Predicamenta i, a–: ‘Univoca vero dicuntur quorum et nomen
commune est et secundum nomen eadem substantiae ratio, ut animal homo atque
bos.’ – tr. Boethii.
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Aristoteles dicit septimo Physicorum,6 quod in genere latent multe equi-
vocationes.
Teneo igitur ad presens quod ens in sua maxima communitate accep-
tum sit univocum univocatione nominis et rationis et univocatione con-
 ceptus; non tamen nego quin ens posset aliter accipi, secundum quam
acceptionem esset equivocum sicut forte antiqui dixerunt.
〈opinio quarta〉 Alia est opinio tenens quod ens sit universale tran-
scendens, et hoc propter argumentum prius factum de predicatione uni-
rbvoca ipsius entis; | sed tamen ex hoc, ut dicunt, non sequitur quod sit
 genus vel species vel dierentia, quia ista divisio non est universalis tran-
scendentis, sed universalis non-transcendentis. Et causa quare ens non
sit genus quamvis sit universale, est quia non predicatur in quid.
Sed quamvis ista rationabilior sit precedenti, videtur tamen dicere
preter intentionem Porphirii et Aristotelis, qui videntur secundum eos in
 hoc diminuti. Nunquam faciunt mentionem de universali transcendente,
cum tamen materia de universalibus esse〈t〉 ab eis diusius pertractata,
et precipue a Porphirio.
Item, equaliter possunt salvare quod ens non sit universale, quia, sicut
dicunt quod ens non es〈t〉 genus, quia non predicatur in quid, ita possunt
 dicere quod ens non sit universale, quia non predicatur de pluribus in
aliqua interrogativa.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est quod ens non est universale,
quia non est genus nec species etcetera, et alia numquam ponebantur
universalia ab aliquo.
 Circa istam conclusionem tamen nota quod ponitur tamquam proba-
bilis et non tamquam necessaria, precise cum argumentum ab auctoritate
negative non tenet. Quamvis inducat evidentiam, non tamen necessario
concludit.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod aliquid pre-
 dicatur de pluribus univoce quod non est universale. Ista sequitur ex
precedenti, quia ‘ens’ predicatur de pluribus univoce, non tamen est
– equivocationes] teo add. necnon del. E  universali] universale E
 Aristoteles, Physicavii, , a–: ‘Et signiÞcant ratio hec quod genus non unum
aliquod, sed iuxta hec latent multa, suntque equivocationum alie quidem multum
distantes, alie quidem habentes quandam similitudinem, alie autem proxime aut
genere aut similitudine, unde non videntur equivocationes esse cum sint.’ – tr. vetus.
Auctoritates  (): ‘Aequivocationis latent in generibus.’ (Aristoteles, Physica,
Η, a–).
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universale. Item, omne universale predicatur in aliquo interrogativo; sed
aliquid quod predicatur de 〈pluribus〉 univoce, non predicatur in aliquo
interrogativo; igitur aliquid quod predicatur de pluribus univoce, non est
universale. Maior elicitur ex textu Porphirii7 quo dicitur omnem predi-
cationem universalem esse in quid vel in quale; cum communia (?) aliter
se habea〈n〉t, per hoc innuens predicationes aliorum interrogativorum,
utpote istorum ‘quotiens’, ‘ubi’, ‘quando’, etcetera.
〈conclusio tertia〉 tertia conclusio est ista quod ‘ens’ est pars ali-
cuius predicati quod predicatur in quid, quia istius predicati ‘ens per se
subsistens’.
〈conclusio quarta〉 quarta conclusio est quod ens est pars generis,
quia pars istius predicati quod est ‘ens per se subsistens’. Et quod hoc sit
va genus patet, quia predicatur de pluribus specie dierentibus in eo | quod
quid, sicut iste terminus ‘substantia’.
〈ad .〉 Ad primum principale in oppositum dicitur quod antecedens est
falsum. Ad probationem: negatur consequentia, scilicet ‘ens’ predicatur
de pluribus univoce, igitur ‘ens’ est universale; sed oportet addere quod
‘predicatur de pluribus in aliqua interrogativa’; vel posset dici quod
‘predicari univoce’ stricte accipiendo ly ‘univoce’ includit ‘predicari in
aliqua interrogativa’, et secundum hoc posset negari quod ens predicatur
univoce.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum negatur quod ‘ens’ predicatur in quid. Ad pro-
bationem: ‘quod dubium alicuius removetur per aliquam responsionem’
potest intelligi dupliciter, scilicet primo et per se, vel secundario et ex
consequenti. Modo, ita est quod in casu argumenti removetur dubium
querentis per talem responsionem non primo et per se, sed ex conse-
quenti et secundario, quoniam quesito ‘quid est?’, secundum Aristote-
lem, secundo Posteriorum,8 presupponit questionem ‘si est?’. Et ideo talis
 presupponit] si est add. necnon del. E
 Exempli causa Isagoge, i,  (, –): ‘A dierentia vero et ab his quae communiter
sunt accidentibus diert genus quoniam, etsi de pluribus et dierentibus specie
praedicantur dierentiae et communiter accidentia, sed non in eo quod quid sit
praedicantur, sed in eo quod quale quid sit.’ Isagoge, xiv,  (, –): ‘Et genera
quidem in eo quod quid sit praedicantur de his quae sub ipsis sunt, accidentia vero
in eo quod quale aliquid sit vel quomodo se habeat unumquodque.’
 Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora ii, , a, b–: ‘impossibile enim est scire quid
est, ignorantes si est’ – tr. Iacobi; Auctoritates  (): ‘Impossibile est quod quid
est scire et ignorare, si est ipsius quod quid est, non est demonstratio’ (Aristoteles,
Analytica posteriora, b, a, b–).
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responsio non removet dubium Sortis ratione sui ipsius, sed ratione illius
quod supponit. Et ideo propter hoc non oportet quod predicetur in quid
ad intentionem Porphirii.
〈ad.〉 Ad tertium dicitur quod concesso quod hoc predicatum ens per
 〈se〉 subsistens predicatur in quid, non tamen sequitur quod ens tantum
〈predicatur〉 in quid, quia est pars predicati, et non totum predicatum.
Et ulterius dicitur quod, quamvis conclusio superius posita sit quod hoc
predicatum predicatur in quid,9 posset tamen probabiliter dici quod non
predicatur in quid proprie, sed large; sed potius predicatur in quid et in
 quale, sicut alie di nitiones in argumento recitato. Nihilominus eque
probabiliter potest teneri quod predicatur in quid large accipiendo ‘pre-
dicare in quid’, sicut iam dictum est. Et ulterius dicitur quod substantia
proprie non habet di nitionem quid rei, eo quod non habet genus supra
se quo poterit habere di nitionem quid nominis.
 〈ad .〉 Ad quartum patet per iam dicta.
 subsistens] existens E
 Videas supra, concl. .
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum tantum sint
decem genera et non plura, neque pauciora.
vb 〈.〉 Et arguitur | primo quod sint plura.
Quia sunt decem genera generalissima mentalia et decem vocalia et
decem scripta.
〈.〉 Item. Secundo. Sunt plura quam decem scripta, sicut de se notum
est. Quod hoc genus substantia pluries quam decens scribitur, de se patet.
Et consimiliter alia genera generalissima scripta.
〈.〉 Item. Hoc idem declaratur de generibus generalissimis vocalibus
et de generibus generalissimis mentalibus, quia plures quam decies pro-
ferunt〈ur〉, et concipiuntur.
〈.〉 Item. Universale est genus generalissimum, et tamen non est genus
generalissimum quantitatis vel qualitatis et sic de singulis; igitur plura
sunt genera generalissima quam decem. Consequentia nota de se. Et
antecedens patet, quantum ad primam particulam, quia iste terminus
‘universale’ predicatur de pluribus specie dierentibus in eo quod quid,
quia, si queratur ‘quid est genus quantitatis?’, respondetur quod sit uni-
versale.
〈.〉 Item. Quale est genus generalissimum, et non aliquod genus gene-
ralissimum ab Arsistotele in Predicamentis1 enumeratum; igitur plura
sunt genera generalissima quam decem. Consequentia nota. Et antece-
dens patet, quia cuilibet conceptui mentali correspondet unum genus
generalissimum, quia aliter esset in coordinatione predicamentali pro-
cessus in inÞnitum, quod reprobat Aristoteles primo Posteriorum;2 igitur
 decens] deciens E | scribitur] sciretur E  quia] quilibet add. necnon del. E
 Aristoteles, Predicamenta, , b–: ‘Eorum quae secundum nullam complexio-
nem dicuntur singulum aut substantiam signiÞcat aut quantitatem aut qualitatem
aut ad aliquid aut ubi aut quando aut situm aut habitum aut facere aut pati.’ – tr.
Boethii.
 Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora i, , a–: ‘neque in sursum neque in deorsum
inÞnita predicantia contingit esse in demonstrativis scientiis’ – tr. Iacobi. Auctorita-
tes  (): ‘Non contingit ire in inÞnitum in praedicamentis, nec ascendendo, nec
descendendo, sed utrobique est status.’ (Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, a, b,
questio  
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in ista coordinatione hoc album, album, coloratum, quale correspondet
aliquod genus generalissimum, et non aliud quam hoc genus generalis-
simum quale, igitur etectera. Et quod non aliquod aliud genus, patet, quia
non hoc genus qualitas, quia hec est falsa: ‘album est qualitas’, precipue
 accipiendo ‘qualitatem’ concretive.
〈.〉 Item, quod sint pauciora genera generalissima, probatur: omne
quod est, aut continetur in predicamento substantie vel in predicamento
qualitatis; igitur superßuunt alia genera generalissima a genere generalis-
simo substantie, et a genere generalissimo qualitatis. Consequentia vide-
 tur evidens, qui talis diversitas oritur ex diversitate rerum. Et antecedens
patet secundum modernos, qui ponunt omnem rem esse substantiam vel
qualitatem.
〈.〉 Item. Coordinationes accidentales habent unum signum eis cor-
respondens, scilicet hoc genus accidens; igitur non sunt decem genera-
 lissima. Consequentia videtur evidens. Et antecedens patet, quia omne
istud quod est, est substantia vel accidens, et accidens predicatur in quid
raet univoce de | omnibus residuis generibus a substantia. Quia, si queratur
‘quid est qualitas?’, convenienter respondetur quod sit accidens, et consi-
militer ‘quid est quantitas?’, et sic de aliis novem generibus accidentium.
 〈.〉 Item. Accidens est universale, quia predicatur de pluribus in ali-
quo interrogativo, et non est aliud universale quam genus generalissi-
mum, quia non potest dici quod sit species, nam sic esset inferius ad
aliud genus, quod videtur falsum. Et probatur falsitas per Aristotelem
primo Posteriorum,3 qui vult quod talis 〈est〉 immediata ‘nulla substantia
 est accidens’, quod non esset verum si accidens haberet aliquod supe-
rius quod posset esse medium probandi predictam negativam, ut si sic
argueretur: ‘nulla qualitas est substantia, omne accidens est qualitas,
 univoce de] omnibus residuis E. mg. [scripta intra angulum quadratum, cf. prima
verba f.  ra – probatio pennae?]. Sequitur textus scriptus sub columnis, eadem manu,
sed inverso modo quod a a o omnis homo †india sem-ro senie-a-† univoce dicens sic:
quidquid est homo univoce singularius [singularibus?] simpliciter dicitur, ponendo quod
omnis homo currit dicens E.  genus] quod(?) add. E  predictam] prodictam E
a–).
 Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora i, , b–: ‘Amplius quod non de subiecto dicitur
alio quodam, ut ambulans, cum alterum quoddam sit ambulans at album, substantia
autem, et quecumque hoc aliquid signiÞcant, non alterum aliquid sunt quod vere
sunt’ – tr. Iacobi. Auctoritates  (): ‘Item per se sunt quae non dicuntur de
quodam alio subjecto, ut substantia.’ (Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, i, , b–,
); cf. Auctoritates  (): ‘Principium demonstrationis est propositio immediata.’
(Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora i, , a).
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igitur nullum accidens est substantia; igitur nulla substantia est acci-
pienda’. Tunc clarum est quod ista non est immediata: ‘nullum accidens
est substantia’, nec etiam ista: ‘nulla substantia est accidens’.
〈.〉 Item. Coordinationi actionis et coordinationi passionis corre-
spondet unum genus generalissimum, igitur non sunt decem genera.
Consequentia videtur evidens, et antecedens declaratur, quia iste termi-
nus ‘motus’ correspondet illis duabus conceptibus, et est per se superius
ad actionem et passionem, quia omnis actio est motus et non e converso,
similiter omnis passio est motus, et non e converso, et predicatur de eis
in quid, quia, si queratur ‘quid est actio?’, convenienter respondetur quod
sit motus; consimiliter, de passione. Igitur, ut videtur, motus est genus
generalissimum ad actionem et ad passionem.
〈.〉 Item. Predicamento ubi non correspondet aliquod genus gene-
ralissimum, nec predicamento quando, nec predicamento situs, nec pre-
dicamento habitus, sive ipsius habere, etcetera; igitur non sunt decem
genera generalissima. Consequentia est de se nota. Et antecedens vide-
tur evidens, quia, si istis correspondere〈n〉t aliqua genera generalissima,
dentur illa.
〈ad oppositum .〉 Ad oppositum videtur esse Porphirius in textu, quo
dicit quod sunt prima decem genera sicut prima decem principia,4 et
alibi: ‘decem quidem generalissima sunt, specialissima vero in numero
quodam sunt, non tamen inÞnito’.5 Ex quo textu videtur intentio Porphi-
rii esse quod sunt tantum 〈decem〉 genera generalissima et non plura,
neque pauciora.
rb 〈ad oppositum .〉 Item. Aristoteles | in Antepredicamentis6 enun-
tiat decem et non plura, et postea prosequitur determinando de istis
decem, de aliis nullam mentionem faciendo, nec etiam pauciora pre-
cise ponendo, igitur videtur quod sint tantum decem et non plura, neque
pauciora.
 est] esse E  genera] generalissima add. necnon del. et exp. E  intentio]
intentionem E  non] non Ec
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘sed sint posita (…) prima decem genera quasi prima decem
principia (…)’
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘Decem quidem generalissima sunt, specialissima vero in
numero quidem quodam sunt, non tamen inÞnito (…)’
 Aristoteles, Predicamenta , b–: ‘Eorum quae secundum nullam complexio-
nem dicuntur singulum aut substantiam signiÞcat aut quantitatem aut qualitatem
aut ad aliquid aut ubi aut quando aut situm aut habitum aut facere aut pati.’ – tr.
Boethii.
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〈distinctio prima〉 Prima distinctio quod duplex est ‘predicamentum’:
quoddam est predicamentum prime intentionis, et quoddam secunde
intentionis. ‘〈Predicamentum〉 prime intentionis’ vocatur istud quod
componitur ex coordinationibus primarum intentionum, cuiusmodi
 sunt ista decem de quibus pertractat Aristoteles in Predicamentis. ‘Pre-
dicamentum secunde intentionis’ vocatur coordinatio secundum sub et
supra composita ex terminis secunde intentionis, cuiusmodi e〈s〉t talis
coordinatio: ‘hoc genus’, ‘genus universale’, et sic de consimilibus coordi-
nationibus.
 〈distinctio secunda〉 Secunda distinctio est ista quod aliqua pos-
sunt dici ‘eadem’ vel ‘plura’ multipliciter, scilicet numero vel specie vel
genere, vel secundum equivalentiam. Unde aliqua sunt eadem secundum
equivalentiam que dierunt genere, sicut signum vocale et signum scrip-
tum.
 〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista quod ista exclusiva ‘tan-
tum sunt decem predicamenta’ in omni suo sensu est falsa, quia, si ly
‘tantum’ excludat alietatem, tunc sunt iste exponentes: ‘decem sunt predi-
camenta et non alia quam decem sunt predicamenta’. Quarum exponen-
tium ultima est falsa, sicut de se notum est, quia duo sunt predicamenta
 que sunt alia a decem. Si vero ly ‘tantum’ excludat pluralitatem, sic adhuc
est falsa, quia iste sunt exponentes ‘decem sunt predicamenta et 〈non〉
plures quam decem sunt predicamenta’, quarum exponentium ultima est
falsa qualitercumque accipiatur ibi ‘pluralitas’, quia plura sunt predica-
menta quam decem, et hoc secundum equivalentiam, quia adminus sunt
 decem predicamenta prime intentionis que recitat Aristoteles, et unum
secunde intentionis, cuius genus generalissimum est iste terminus ‘uni-
versale’. Patet igitur conclusio.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod plura sunt
predicamenta prime intentionis quam decem. Ista patet per predica-
 mentum qualis, quod est aliud predicamentum quam predicamentum
qualitatis, quia habet alia〈s〉 coordinationes secundum sub et supra, et
aliud genus generalissimum, et per consequens 〈est〉 aliud predicamen-
tum.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod aliquod genus est
 superius per se ad aliquod genus generalissimum. Ista patet quia hoc
 dierunt] f add. necnon del. E  Prima] particula add. necnon del. E  predi-
camenta] quia add. necnon del. E
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genus universale est per se superius ad genus generalissimum, quia omne
va genus | est universale et non e converso.
Et si instatur quod sic sequeretur genus generalissimum non esse
genus generalissimum, quia genus generalissimum non habet genus
supra se, ad istud dicitur breviter distinguendo istam: ‘genus generalis-
simum non est genus generalissimum’, eo quod subiectum poterit accipi
materialiter vel personaliter. Si materialiter, vera est, si predicatum acci-
pitur personaliter, quia iste terminus ‘genus generalissimum’ non est
genus generalissimum si predicatum istius accipitur personaliter, et hoc
concludit argumentum. Si vero accipitur personaliter, tunc propositio
falsa, et sic non sequitur ex conclusione, quia non sequitur: ‘iste terminus
“genus generalissimum” habet per se superius genus, igitur iste terminus
“substantia” habet per se superius genus’.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod iste terminus
‘accidens’ non est per se superius ad qualitatem, sed e converso, precise
secundum opinionem modernorum, que ponit quod omnis res sit sub-
stantia vel qualitas. Ista patet, quia omne accidens est qualitas, et non e
converso, quia non omnis qualitas est accidens, quia Þgura non est acci-
dens secundum opinionem modernorum quam ad presens reputo veram,
que ponit quod Þgura non est res distincta a re Þgurata.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod iste terminus
‘motus’ non est per 〈se〉 superior ad actionem, sed e converso, quia
omnis motus est actio, vel instrumentalis, vel principalis, et non omnis
actio est motus, quia non actio prime cause; que quidem actio non
distinguitur a prima causa isti〈us〉 motus. Et quod actio que est prima
causa, non sit motus, patet per Aristotelem, octavo Physicorum,7 ubi
ponit primam causam omne movens immobile, et quod omnis motus
sit actio patet, quia, si omnis motus est istud quo movens agit immobile,
et per consequens est actio instrumentalis.
〈conclusio sexta〉 Sexta conclusio est ista quod omnis motus est pas-
sio, et per consequens motus non est per se superior ad passionem. Ista
conclusio patet, nam omnis motus est in mobili tamquam in subiecto, et
 esse] esset E  se] genus add. necnon del. E  est] sic add. necnon del.
E  modernorum] quod add. necnon del. E  vel] ?? add. necnon del. E
| instrumentalis] instrumentalis mg. Ec  est] poss add. necnon del. E  superior]
superius E
 Aristoteles, Physica, viii, , a–: ‘primum immobilium perpetuum cum
sit erit principium aliis motus’ – tr. vetus. Auctoritates  (): ‘Primus motor
omnino est immobolis per se et per accidens.’ (Aristoteles, Physica, Θ, a–).
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per consequens omne mobile in quo est talis motus, patitur tali motu;
igitur omnis motus est in passivo. Primum antecedens patet per Aristo-
telem, tertio Physicorum.8
Et si instetur quod sic sequeretur quod omnis passio esset actio, et per
 consequens non essent predicamenta distincta, et quod hoc sequeretur,
probatur, nam omnis motus est actio, omnis passio est motus, igitur
omnis passio est actio; maior patet per precedentem conclusionem,
et minor patet per Aristotelem, tertio Physicorum,9 ad istud breviter
vb| dicitur quod duplex est passio, scilicet principalis et instrumentalis.
 Principalis dicitur istud quod patitur, et instrumentalis dicitur istud quo
aliud patitur. Conceditur igitur quod omnis passio instrumentalis sit
actio instrumentalis.
De distinctione predicamenti actionis et predicamenti passionis ple-
nius patebit in suo loco.10
 〈ad .〉 Ad primum principale dicitur concedendo quod sunt plura
predicamenta quam decem pluralitate numerali et pluralitate speciÞca
et pluralitate generis et pluralitate equivalentis, sicut satis di nite patet
per conclusiones supra dictas.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur concedendo quod sunt plura predica-
 menta substantie tam pluralitate numerali quam speciei quam etiam
generis, sed non pluralitate equivalentie, quia predicamentum substantie
vocale, 〈mentale〉 et scriptum equivalent in signiÞcando, et non in modo
signiÞcandi, et consimiliter plura predica〈men〉ta substantie equivalent.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium patet per idem.
 〈ad .〉 Ad quartum dicitur concedendo quod universale sit genus
generalissimum, et sibi correspondet predicamentum secunde intentio-
nis, sicut iam dictum est.11 Forte et si quis diligenter vellet inquirere, inve-
niret plura predicamenta et plura genera generalissima secunde intentio-
nis.
 primum] dicitur add. necnon del. E  predicamenta] prima add. necnon del. E
 quam] plurale add. necnon exp. E  mentale] materiale E  substantie]
vocalia add. E
 Aristoteles, Physica, iii, , b–: ‘neque doctio cum doctrina neque actio cum
passione idem proprie est, sed cui insunt hec, motus est; hoc enim huius in hoc
et huius actum esse alterum ratione est’ – tr. vetus. Auctoritates  (): ‘Actio
et passio sunt unus motus et in passo sicut in subjecto.’ (Aristoteles, Physica, Γ,
b–).
 Ibid.
 omas Manlevelt, Questiones super Predicamenta, Erfurt sb Ampl. q  (xiv)
.rb–vb, qq. –.
 Videas supra, concl. .
 thomas manlevelt, questiones libri porphirii
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〈ad .〉 Ad quintum conceditur quod predicamentum concretorum
qualitatis distinguitur a predicamento abstractorum, sed Aristoteles in-
tendens brevitati coniunctim determinat de utroque, numquam tamen
negando ista esse predicamenta distincta, sed quia maiorem convenien-
tiam habent ad invicem quam aliqua alia predicamenta, ideo coniunctim
de utroque determinat, sicut iam dictum est.12
〈ad .〉 Ad sextum dicitur negando consequentiam, quia uni rei cor-
respondent diversi conceptus et diversi modi predicandi, et ideo non
sequitur, quamvis omnis res sit substantia vel qualitas, quod propter hoc
non sint plura predicamenta, quia predicamenta distinguuntur penes
diversitatem predicamentorum secundum diversa interrogativa predica-
mentalia.
〈ad .〉 Ad septimum dicitur negando antecedens, et ulterius dicitur
quod iste terminus ‘accidens’ non est supremum, quia continetur sub
qualitate, sicut predictum est.13
〈ad .〉 Ad octavum dicitur concedendo quod accidens sit universale,
ra et quod sit species, et ulterius | dicitur quod hec est immediata: ‘nulla
substantia est accidens’, quia per nihil communius potest probari quod a
substantia potest negari.
Et quando arguitur sic: ‘nulla qualitas est substantia’, dicitur negando
istam secundum modernos, quia: omnis Þgura est qualitas, quedam
substantia est Þgura, igitur quedam substantia est qualitas, et ultra, igitur
quedam qualitas est substantia. Et hoc totum dico supponendo quod
omnis res Þgurata sit Þgura.
〈ad .〉 Ad nonum dicitur negando antecedens. Ad probationem: patet
per superius dicta,14 quia hec est falsa: ‘omnis actio est motus’, propter
actionem prime cause. Sed de hoc plus patebit suo loco, sicut prius
dictum est.15
〈ad .〉 Ad decimum dicitur negando antecedens. Et que sunt ista
genera generalissima, que illis positis correspondent, in propriis questio-
nibus istorum predicamentorum dicebuntur.16
 predicamenta] et add. necnon del. E  potest] ?? add. necnon del. E
 Videas supra, concl. .
 Videas supra, concl. .
 Videas supra, concl. .
 Videas supra, concl. , ubi auctor refert ad omam Manlevelt, Questiones super
Predicamenta, Erfurt sb Ampl. q  (xiv) .rb–vb, qq. –.
 omas Manlevelt, Questiones super Predicamenta, Erfurt sb Ampl. q  (xiv)
.rb–vb, qq. –.
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〈ad . argumentum in oppositum〉 Ad argumentum in oppositum,
quod Porphirius intelligit de predicamentis prime intentionis compre-
hendendo predicamentum qualitatis et predicamentum qualis sub uno
predicamento, sicut Aristoteles coniunctim determinat de eisdem, et
 forte quia tempore Porphirii non Þebat ita stricta inquisitio de numero
predicamentorum, sicut nunc. Et ideo Aristoteles multa que dicit in Pre-
dicamentis, dicit potius exercitative quam determinative, et ideo in Þne
capituli de relatione dicit ‘dubitare autem de singulis non erit inutile’.17
〈ad . argumentum in oppositum〉 Per idem patitur ad secundum
 argumentum.
 non] et add. necnon del. E
 Aristoteles, Predicamenta, , b–: ‘dubitare autem de singulis non erit inutile’ –
tr. Boethii. Auctoritates  (): ‘Dubitare de singulis non est inutile.’ (Aristoteles,
Predicamenta, , b–).
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum genera
generalissima sint principia rerum.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non.
Nullum generalissimorum est principium intrinsecum vel extrinse-
cum; igitur nullum generalissimorum est principium. Consequentia
nota, quia omne principium vel est intrinsecum, vel extrinsecum. Et
antecedens patet quia nullum generalissimorum est materia vel forma;
igitur nullum generalissimorum est principium intrinsecum. Conse-
quentia patet per Aristotelem et Commentatorem, primo Physicorum1 et
quinto Metaphysice.2 Et antecedens est de se notum, quia nullus terminus
est materia vel forma; omne genus generalissimum est terminus, igitur
nullum genus generalissimum est materia vel forma. Et quod nullum
generalissimum sit principium extrinsecum patet, quia nec est causa e -
ciens, nec Þnalis; igitur nullum genus generalissimum est aliquo modo
principium.
〈.〉 Item. Omne principium presupponitur a principiato; nullum ge-
nus generalissimum presupponitur a principiato; igitur nullum genus
rb generalissimum est principium. | Maior patet per Aristotelem et Com-
mentatorem, primo Physicorum.3 Et minor patet per Aristotelem tertio
De Anima,4 ubi vult quod universale aut nihil est aut per posterius, et
nihil quod est per posterius presupponitur.
 Cf. Auctoritates  (): ‘Tria sunt principia naturae, scilicet materia, forma et pri-
vatio.’ (Aristoteles, Physica, a, a–); Auctoritates  (): ‘(…) per elementa
intelligit materiam et forma.’ (Averroes, In Physic., com. , f. a–c).
 Auctoritates  (): ‘Tot modis dicitur principium, quot modis dicitur causa, quia
omnes causae sunt principia, sed non e converso.’ (Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, ∆,
a–); Auctoritates  (), Commentator: ‘Quotiens dicitur principium,
totiens dicitur terminus, et adhuc amplius, quia quod principium est terminus
initialis, et non e converso.’ (Aristoteles, Metaphys., ∆, a–:); Auctoritates
 (): ‘Quattuor sunt causae, scilicet materialis, formalis, e ciens et Þnalis.’ (Cf.
Aristoteles, Metaphys., Α, a–).
 Aristoteles, Physica i, , a–: ‘oportet enim principia neque ex alterutris esse
neque ex aliis, et ex his omnia.’
 Aristoteles, De anima iii, b–. Vel potius Averroes, Commentarius magnus in
Aristotelis De anima libros, i , 1–6: ‘Vivum autem universale aut nichil est, aut
postremum est’ (Ed. F.S. Crawford). Vel De anima i, , b–.
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〈.〉 Item. Nulla secunda substantia presupponitur a prima substantia;
sed aliquod genus generalissimum est secunda substantia; igitur aliquod
genus generalissimum non presupponitur a prima substantia, et per
consequens non est principium prime substantie. Maior videtur evidens,
 quia aliter sequeretur quod secunda substantia esset prior quam prima
substantia, quod videtur falsum. Et minor est de se nota, quia omne
genus predicamenti substantie est secunda substantia, sicut patet ex textu
Aristotelis, capitulo de substantia.5
〈.〉 Item. Si genus generalissimum esset principium alicuius, tunc
 esset principium speciei sub tali genere contente. Consequens videtur
falsum; igitur et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis declaratur: nullum
principiatum potest esse sine suo principio; sed omnis species potest
esse sine suo genere; igitur nullum genus est principium sue speciei.
Maior videtur evidens, quia nullum compositum potest esse sine suis
 componentibus, nec aliquis eectus sine suis causis, sicut elicitur ab
Aristotele, secundo Physicorum.6 Et minor declaratur, quia clarum est
quod ista species homo potest esse sine isto genere animal.
〈.〉 Item. Nullum genus est principium compositivum speciei, nec
principium eectivum; igitur nullo modo est principium speciei. Con-
 sequentia patet per su cientem divisionem. Et antecedens patet quia
nullum genus est principium intrinsecum vel extrinsecum sue speciei,
sicut prius dictum est.
〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum est textus Porphirii, quo dicitur: ‘sed
sunt posita, quemadmodum in Predicamentis dictum est, prima decem
 genera sicut prima decem principia’.7
〈distinctio prima〉 In ista questione prima distinctio est ista, quod
‘principium’ accipitur multipliciter, scilicet pro principio contentivo, et
principio eectivo, sive pro principio compositivo.
Principium contentivum vocatur principium logicale, quod propter
 suam communitatem tamquam superius continet sub se sua inferiora.
 eectus] aectus E
 Aristoteles, Predicamenta , a–: ‘Secundae autem substantiae dicuntur, in
quibus speciebus illae quae principaliter substantiae dicuntur insunt, hae et harum
specierum genera.’ – tr. Boethii.
 Locus non inventus.
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘Sed sint posita, quemadmodum in Praedicamentis, prima
decem genera quasi prima decem principia (…)’
 thomas manlevelt, questiones libri porphirii
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Et de tali prioritate sive principalitate loquitur Aristoteles, quod tale
principium dicitur principium in Postpredicamentis,8 capitulo de prius,
va ubi dicitur quod ‘prius’ dicitur istud a quo non | convertitur subsistendi
consequentia.
Principium vero compositivum dicitur ex quo res componitur, quod
quidem principium est pars rei et manet in rei, sicut vult Aristoteles,
primo Physicorum,9 et tale est principium naturale intrinsecum, sicut
materia et forma.
Principium vero eectivum dicitur causa e ciens, quod quidem dici-
tur principium extrinsecum, et est similiter principium naturale sive
reale. Finis vero propinquus rei, quia coincidit cum forma, sicut vult Ari-
stoteles, secundo Physicorum,10 ideo est principium intrinsecum, sicud
forma.
〈distinctio secunda〉 Verumtamen potest addi quartum membrum
divisionis, scilicet principium terminativum, et istud subdividitur in
principium terminativum intrinsecum et extrinsecum.
‘Intrinsecum’ dicitur pars rei vel essentialis, ut forma, que est pars
generationis, vel pars quantitativa, que est pars magnitudinis vel termi-
nans magnitudinem, sive initians continuationem et successionem, quod
dico pro principio initiativo vel successivo, de quo alibi diusius patet,
utpote in Questione de tempore sive quarto Physicorum.11
Principium vero terminativum sive initiativum ‘extrinsecum’ est causa
e ciens, vel Þnis remotus rei et hoc essentialiter loquendo; sed quantita-
tive loquendo, tunc istud a quo res incipit exclusive vel ad quod termina-
tur, dicitur principium vel terminus, sicut si aliquod longum extendatur
ab isto pariete ad ostium, tunc iste paries est principium extrinsecum
illius extensionis, et ostium est terminus extrinsecus, vel e converso,
secundum diversam considerationem diversorum.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista, quod omne genus est prin-
cipium contentivum. Ista patet, quia omne genus est per se superius
 quia] quo incidit add. necnon del. E  ostium] hostium E  ostium] hostium
E  secundum] secundam E
 Aristoteles, Predicamenta, , a–: ‘prius autem videtur esse illud a quo non
convertitur subsistentiae consequentia.’ – tr. Boethii.
 Aristoteles, Physica i. Locus non inventus.
 Aristoteles, Physica ii. Locus non inventus.
 omas Manlevelt, Questio de tempore sive quarto Physicorum. Textum invenire non
potui.
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aliquarum suarum specierum sub eo per se contentarum. Ista conclusio
satis patet ex signiÞcatione vocabuli in primo membro divisionis supe-
rius posite. Et antecedens patet ex diversis textibus Porphirii.12
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista, quod omne genus
 generalissimum sit primum principium. Ista declaratur, nam quod omne
genus generalissimum sit principium, patet per precedentem conclusio-
vbnem.13 Et quod sit primum, probatur: nullum | genus generalissimum
habet aliquod genus prius supra se veniens; igitur omne genus generalis-
simum est primum principium.
 Sed contra istam conclusionem instatur: nullum genus generalissimum
est primum principium contentivum; igitur nullum genus generalissi-
mum est primum principium. Consequentia nota, quia non posset esse
aliquod aliud principium quam contentivum, sicut probant argumenta
antecedentia. Et antecedens patet, quia omne genus generalissimum
 habet supra se per se superius ipsum continens, sicut istud superius ‘ens’
quod est per se superius ad omne genus.
Item. Quodlibet istorum decem de quibus loquitur Porphirius, con-
tinetur sub isto genere generalissimo ‘universale’; igitur nullum istorum
est primum principium contentivum. Consequentia videtur evidens. Et
 antecedens patet, quia ipse loquitur de decem generibus generalissimis
prime intentionis, sicut patet per istum textum ‘sunt posita quemadmo-
dum in Predicamentis’.14
Ad primum istorum dicitur quod duplex est ‘primum principium
contentivum’, scilicet per se et per accidens. Et primum principium
 contentivum per se adhuc subdividitur, scilicet in primum principium
per se quiditative, et in primum principium non-quiditative. Conceditur
igitur quod ens est primum contentivum per se, sed non quiditative,
quia non predicatur in quid, sicut patet ex precedentibus questionibus.15
Sed genus generalissimum est per se primum principium contentivum
 et quiditative, et sic intelligit Porphirius.
Ad secundum dicitur quod universale est superius per accidens, et
non per se, ad omne genus generalissimum, sicut patet ex precedenti
 eo] concedit add. E  quam] communi add. necnon del. E
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –) et diversis aliis textibus.
 Videas supra, concl. .
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘Sed sint posita, quemadmodum in Praedicamentis, prima
decem genera quasi prima decem principia (…)’
 Videas supra, q.  ad .
 thomas manlevelt, questiones libri porphirii
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questione.16 Et ideo non est primum principium quiditativum per se,
sed per accidens respectu generalissimorum prime intentionis, de quibus
loquitur Porphirius.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Ad superius dictorum evidentiam est tertia con-
clusio, quod genus generalissimum est primum principium compositi-
vum. Ista conclusio patet, quia genus generalissimum primo ponitur in
di nitionum compositione sue immediate speciei, quia sicut vult Ari-
ra stoteles, sexto Topicorum:17 omnis species di nitur per suum | proxi-
mum. Sicut patet de ista specie corpus, que sic di nitur: ‘corpus est sub-
stantia composita ex materia et forma’, in qua di nitione hoc genus gene-
ralissimum substantia est primum principium compositivum et intrin-
secum.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod genus generalis-
simum est aliquando principium eectivum, quia audita ista voce ‘sub-
stantia’ vel viso isto termino scripto ‘substantia’ e citur, saltem instru-
mentaliter, unus conceptus in mente audientis vel videntis.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod genus genera-
lissimum 〈est〉 primum principium initiativum sive terminativum, sicut
patet in talibus propositionibus: ‘substantia est ens’, ‘corpus est substan-
tia’, in quarum prima genus generalissimum est principium initiativum,
et in secunda est principium terminativum.
〈ad .〉 Ad 〈primum〉 igitur principale dicitur negando antecedens. Et
ulterius dicitur quod est primum principium initiativum materiale dif-
Þnitionum, sicut logicus accipit ‘materiam’, sicut expresse patet per Por-
phirium.18 Et hoc su cit ad propositum.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur quod omne principium compositivum
presupponitur a principiato, ad istum intellectum quod tale principiatum
non potest esse nisi sit tale principium.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur concedendo maiorem ad intellectum iam
datum. Et ulterius negatur consequentia, scilicet quod igitur secunda
substantia non potest esse principium rei prime substantie, quia sicut
 unus conceptus] unum conceptum E | mente] ad add. necnon del. E
 Videas supra, q. , concl. .
 Aristoteles, Topica vi, , a: ‘in proximum genus ponendum’ – tr. Boethii. Auc-
toritates  (): ‘In deÞnitione cujuslibet rei non debet poni genus propinquum et
remotum, quia in genere propinquo Þt.’ (Cf. Aristoteles, Topica z, a–).
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –).
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iam dictum est,19 aliquod potest esse principium contentivum alicuius,
quamvis sit posterius eo in esse.
〈ad .〉 Ad quartum patet per iam dicta.
〈ad .〉 Ad quintum dicitur negando antecedens quia est principium
 compositivum di nitionum ipsius speciei vel di nitionis, que secun-
dum aliquos est species. Et ulterius dicitur negando consequentiam, quia
non omne principium est principium compositivum vel di nitionum,
sicut patet per superius dicta,20 quia potest esse principium contentivum
et terminativum extrinsecum.
 〈ad argumentum in oppositum〉 Et ad argumentum in oppositum:
qualiter debeat intelligi, patet per iam dicta.
 posterius] in add. necnon del. E
 Videas supra, concl. .
 Videas supra, dist.  et .
2011013 [Van der Helm] 02-Edition-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 284
〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum inÞnita relinquenda sint ab arte.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non.
rb Nulla de quibus | est ars et scientia, relinquenda sunt ab arte; sed
inÞnita sunt huiusmodi; igitur inÞnita non sunt relinquenda ab arte.
Maior est de se nota. Minor patet per Aristotelem, tertio Physicorum,1 ubi
facit 〈mentionem〉 de inÞnitis tradendo diversas conclusiones scientiÞcas
de eisdem.
〈.〉 Item. Individua non sunt relinquenda ab arte; individua sunt inÞ-
nita; igitur etcetera. Maior patet, quia de individuis est ars et scientia
et conclusiones scientiÞce secundum quod elicitur ex textu Porphirii,
qui ponit diversas conclusiones de individuis, utpote quod individuum
est unum numero, quod individuum predicatur de uno solo, et quod
individuum diert ab universali, et sic de aliis conclusionibus artiÞcia-
libus;2 igitur individua non sunt relinquenda ab arte. Et minor patet per
Porphirium,3 qui dicit: ‘individua autem que sunt prius specie, inÞnita
sunt’.
〈.〉 Item. De quantitate continua est ars et scientia; sed omnis quan-
titas continua est inÞnita; igitur de inÞnitis est ars et scientia, et per
consequens inÞnita non sunt relinquenda ab arte. Maior est de se nota,
quia tota geometria que est scientia terminativa, et tota astronomia, sunt
scientie de quantitate continua. Et minor patet quia omnis quantitas
habet inÞnitas partes, quia est divisibilis in inÞnitum, secundum Aristo-
 Item] o add. mg. E  Item] o add. mg. E  continua] continuo mg. Ec
 Sicut Aristoteles, Physica iii, , a–; , a–; , b–, –. Aucto-
ritates  (): ‘InÞnitum habet rationem partis et non totius et habet rationem
materiae et non formae.’ (Aristoteles, Physica iii , a–, –), cf. ibid., ,
, , , .
 Isagoge, passim.
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘(…) individua autem quae sunt post specialissima, inÞnita
sunt.’
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telem, primo Physicorum4 et primo De generatione.5 Et per consequens
secundum istam opinionem que ponit quod totum est omnes partes
simul sumpte, omnis quantitas continua est inÞnita, quia est inÞnite par-
tes.
 〈.〉 Item. De quocumque habetur aliqua conclusio scientiÞca et artiÞ-
cialis, de isto est ars et scientia; sed de inÞnito habetur conclusio scienti-
Þca et artiÞcialis; igitur de inÞnitis est ars et scientia. Maior videtur plana
de se. Et minor patet, quia de inÞnitis habetur ista conclusio artiÞcialis
et scientiÞca, scilicet de inÞnitis non est scientia.
 〈.〉 Item. De quibuscumque universalibus est scientia; igitur de inÞ-
nitis est scientia. Antecedens patet per Aristotelem, primo Metafysice,6
qui dicit quod ex multis experimentis colligitur unum universale, et ex
multis singularibus una scientia. Et consequentia declaratur, quia tales
vauniversales sunt inÞnite. Utrumque istorum | est ens demonstratis duo-
 bus singularibus sive individuis.
〈.〉 Item. Scientia universalis presupponit scientiam singularium sive
individuorum, quia ex multis individuis inducitur unum universale,
sicut patet per propositionem iam allegatam, scilicet ‘ex multis experi-
mentis etcetera’.
 〈.〉 Item. Omnis notitia scientiÞca incipit a notitia individuorum; igi-
tur de individuis est ars et scientia. Consequentia videtur evidens. Et
antecedens patet per istam propositionem Aristotelis, primo Posterio-
rum,7 ubi vult quod ‘omnis nostra cognitio ortum habet a sensu’; sed
 Physicorum] et quarto add. E; ?? add. necnon del. E  Item] o add. mg. E
 Item] o add. mg. E  Item] o add. mg. E  Item] o add. mg. E
 Aristoteles, Physica, i, , b–: ‘in inÞnitum enim divisibile est continuum’ –
tr. vetus. Auctoritates  (): ‘Continuum est divisibile usque ad inÞnitum.’ (Ari-
stoteles, Physica, A, b–).
 Aristoteles, De generatione i, , a–: ‘Actu enim nichil est inÞnitum, potestate
autem in divisione’ – tr. vetus.
 Aristoteles, Metaphysica, i, , a–: ‘experientia quidem singularium est cog-
nitio, ars vero universalium, actus autem et omnes generationes circa singulare
sunt’ – rec. Guillelmi. Auctoritates  (): ‘Experientia est cognitio singularium;
ars vero universalium.’ (Aristoteles, Metaphys., Α, a–).
 Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora i, , b–: ‘sentire necesse est hoc aliquid
et ubi et nunc’ – tr. Iacobi. Cf. Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora ii, , a–:
‘Ex sensu quidem igitur Þt memoria, sicut diximus, ex memoria autem multotiens
facta experimentum. Multe enim memorie numero experimentum est unum. Ex
experimento autem aut ex omni quiescente universali in anima, uno preter multa,
quodcumque in omnibus unum sit illis idem est, artis principium et scientie, si
quidem est circa generationem, artis est, si vero circa esse, scientie’ – tr. Iacobi.
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omne quod sentitur est individuum aut singulare, secundum istam pro-
positionem ‘universale dum intelligitur, singulare vero dum sentitur’.8
〈ad oppositum, .〉 Ad oppositum est Porphirius,9 qui dicit: ‘inÞnita,
inquit, relinquenda sunt, neque enim posse Þeri eorum disciplinam’.
〈ad oppositum, .〉 Item. Aristoteles, tertio Physicorum,10 dicit quod
inÞnitum inquantum inÞnitum est ignotum; igitur de inÞnito non est
notitia, et per consequens neque ars neque scientia.
〈distinctio prima〉 Prima distinctio est ista quod iste terminus ‘inÞni-
tum’ accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo sincategorematice, alio modo cate-
gorematice.
〈infinitum sincategorematice acceptum〉 Sincategorematice ac-
cipitur quando tenetur distributive sive divisive, et tunc reddit proposi-
tionem universalem, ut patet in talibus ‘inÞnite dies precesserunt diem
istam’, ‘inÞniti homines fuerent ante istum hominem’, ‘in inÞnitum con-
tinuum est divisibile’. Et tunc debent tales propositiones sic exponi: ‘plu-
res homines precesserunt hunc hominem’, vel ‘plures dies precesserunt
istum diem’, et non tot quin plures; et tunc tales sunt singulares: ‘isti
duo homines precesserunt hunc hominem’, et iste terminus ‘et sic in inÞ-
nitum’ semper demonstrando homines in tali minori qui precesserunt
hunc hominem. Cum hoc tamen stat quod omnis multitudo hominum
que precessit hunc hominem sic accepta, sit Þnita. Et consimiliter est
de ista propositione cuius universales iste sunt singulares: ‘in istas duas
partes continuum est divisibile’, et ‘in istas tres partes continuum est
vb divisibile’, et sic in | inÞnitum. Cum hoc tamen stat quod omnes par-
tes in quas continuum est divisibile, sunt Þnite, quia due sunt Þnite et
tres sunt Þnite et quattuor sunt Þnite, et sic in inÞnitum. Et ideo multi
 oppositum] oppositum add. mg. E  Item]  add. mg. E  distinctio] distinctio
add. mg. E  in] ??  litt. E  inÞniti] inÞniti mg. Ec – precesserunt istum
diem] precesserunt istum diem sup. lin. Ec  sic] sic Ec
 Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, i, , b–: ‘sentire enim necesse est singulari-
ter, scientia autem est in cognoscendo universale’ – tr. Iacobi. Auctoritates  ():
‘Sensus est singularium, scientia vero universalium.’ (Aristoteles, Analytica poste-
riora, a, b–).
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘(…) inÞnita, inquit, relinquenda sunt; neque enim horum
posse Þeri disciplinam.’
 Aristoteles, Physica, iii, , a–: ‘Unde ignotum est in quantum est inÞnitum’ –
tr. vetus. Auctoritates  (): ‘InÞnitum secundum quod hujusmodi est ignotum.’
(Aristoteles, Physica, Γ, a–).
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logici non negant istam ‘continuum est divisibile in inÞnitum’ ponendo
ly ‘in inÞnitum’ a parte predicati. Et tunc, ut dicunt, stat categorematice
sive collective, quod idem est. Et tunc ad veritatem talis requiritur quod
continuum posset esse actu divisum in aliquam multitudinem inÞnitam
 discrete, quod Aristoteles, 〈primo〉 Physicorum,11 dicit esse impossibile,
quamvis aliqui theologi hoc concedunt, quod non est presentis specula-
tionis.
〈infinitum categorematice acceptum〉 InÞnitum vero categore-
matice acceptum accipitur multipliciter.
 〈〉 Uno modo privative tantum, et sic tantummodo signiÞcat privatio-
nem Þnis, et isto modo omne istud quod non habet Þnem vel terminum,
est inÞnitum. Et sic omne indivisibile est inÞnitum, quodcumque fuerit.
〈〉 Alio modo accipitur non tantum privative, sed etiam includit
a rmationem alicuius magnitudinis vel molis vel corporis vel virtutis.
 Et sic adhuc accipitur multipliciter secundum quod innuit Aristoteles,
tertio Physicorum:12
〈.〉 Quia quod est ‘inÞnitum intensive’ utpote virtualiter, sicut prima
causa dicitur inÞnita in sua virtute et potentialitate, quia non est dare
〈aliquid〉 quod non potest.
 〈.〉 Alio modo dicitur aliquid ‘inÞnitum durative’, quia durabit et
non erit Þnis sue durationis.
〈..〉 Tertio modo dicitur aliquid ‘inÞnitum extensive’, si aliquod tale
esset, scilicet quod extendetur et non habebit Þnem sue extentionis. Et
istud adhuc subdividitur.
 〈..〉 Quia aliquid potest dici ‘inÞnitum extensive’, quia extenditur
et non habet Þnem extrinsecum sue extensionis, et isto modo longitudo
gyrativa alicuius continui est inÞnita extensive.
〈..〉 Alio modo quod extenditur et non habet Þnem sue extentionis
intrinsecum, et isto modo nihil est inÞnitum, nec potest esse, secundum
 aliquos.
〈.〉 Quarto modo adhuc capitur ‘inÞnitum successive’, quali inÞni-
ratate tempus et motus | celi dicuntur inÞniti, de quibus est tractatum,13 sed
 primo] primo Physicorum (?) add. necnon del. E  sic] res(?) add. necnon del. E
 vel] ??  litt. add. necnon del. E  est] in add. necnon exp. E  extensive] quia
exte add. necnon del. et exp. E  non] non sup. lin. E  motus] nota de inÞnito
add. sub columna alia manu E | inÞniti] inÞnita E
 Locus non inventus.
 Locus non inventus.
 Videas infra, concl. .
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ista ad presens hic ponuntur ne juvenes dampnum incurrant ignorantia
terminorum.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista, quod de quolibet inÞnito
qualitercumque accipitur et de qualibet parte inÞniti est di nitiva et
notiÞcativa scientia sive notitia et certissima. Ista patet, quia prima causa
distinctissime et certissime noscit quamque rem et quamque partem
rei. Et quamvis ista conclusio posset manifeste declarari, cum quasi ab
omnibus conceditur et quia est alterius speculationis, ideo de ipsa ad
presens amplius non dicatur.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod de inÞnitis
sive de inÞnito intensive est scientia humana. Ista patet quia homo habet
scientiam a Deo qui est inÞnitus in virtute, sicut patet per Aristotelem,
octavo Physicorum,14 et homo habet scientiam de forma intensibiali et
remissibili, que quidem forma est inÞniti gradus, igitur ars et scientia
humana habetur de inÞnitis.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod de inÞnitis conti-
nuatione sive extensione est ars et scientia humana, quia de quantitatibus
continuis que sunt inÞnite partes est certissima scientia geometrica, et
de longitudinibus gyrationis que sunt inÞnite quodammodo extensive,
habentur multe conclusiones scientiÞce, sicut patet in questione tertii
Physicorum De inÞnito.15
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est quod de inÞnitis duratione
est ars et scientia humana, quia de anima et de celo et de multis aliis
perpetuis habentur multe conclusiones scientiÞce; et de 〈in〉Þnito suc-
cessione, quia et de motu et de potentia; et de inÞnito divisibilitate, quia
scientia humana probat omne continuum inÞnitum esse divisibile. Patet
igitur expresse quod, qualitercumque accipiatur inÞnitum sive inÞnita,
de inÞnitis sive de inÞnito est ars et scientia humana.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod de inÞnito non
est ars et scientia humana, sic videlicet quod ipsum inÞnitum secun-
 ad presens] ad presens sup. lin. E  inÞnito] qualibet add. necnon del. et exp. E
 notiÞcativa] notiÞcativa Ec; noticiaÞcativa del. E  declarari] sed add. necnon del. E
 sive de inÞnito intensive] intensive sive de inÞnito E  et] et Ec; est add. necnon
del. et exp. E  inÞnitis] individuis E  inÞnitis] individuis E  inÞnitis]
indeÞnitis E  continuum] esse add. necnon del. E  accipiatur] excipiatur E
 non] non Ec
 Aristoteles, Physica viii, , a: ‘quodque movetur, ut homo aut deus’ – tr. vetus.
 omas Manlevelt, Questio de inÞnito sive tertio Physicorum. Textum invenire non
potui.
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dum se et secundum quamlibet sui proportionalitatem et secundum
quamlibet sui partem distincte ab homine qui non est Deus, cognoscitur.
Ista conclusio patet experimento, quia experimur nos non habere noti-
rbtiam distinctam cuiuscumque potentie | divine, quam distincte sciamus.
 Omne istud quod Deus potest facere, experimur etiam nos non habere
notitiam distinctam et propriam cuiuslibet partis alicuius continui vel
cuiuslibet gradus alicuius forme intensibilis et remissibilis, vel cuiuslibet
divisionis possibilis Þeri in continuo, vel cuiuslibet longitudinis gyratio-
nis, vel cuiuslibet individui existentis in rerum natura. Hoc idem patet
 per Porphirium,16 qui dicit talia inÞnita esse relinquenda ab arte, nec
eorum posse Þeri disciplinam, et hoc ad intellectum iam datum. Hoc
idem vult Aristoteles, primo et tertio et sexto et septimo Physicorum17
et in multis aliis locis, ubi vult quod inÞnitum inquantum inÞnitum est
ignotum, idest: non est notum secundum quod inÞnitum, sic videlicet
 quod ipsum secundum se et secundum quamlibet eius partem et secun-
dum quamlibet eius proprietatem sit di nitive et distincte et proprio
conceptu cognitum ab aliquo alio a Deo.
〈ad .〉 Ad primum igitur rationem principalem dicitur concedendo
quod de inÞnito sive de inÞnitis est scientia, et quod Aristoteles tradit
 multas conclusiones scientiÞcas de inÞnito et de inÞnitis; sed hoc facit ad
intellectum superius datum; nec hoc vult Porphirius negare, sed tantum-
modo vult dicere, sicut prius dictum est,18 quod de inÞnitis non est ars vel
scientia, sic videlicet quod de quolibet inÞnitorum sit distincta scientia
et notitia propria humana, accipiendo ‘notitiam humanam’ pro notitia
 hominis qui non est Deus. Et hoc experimur sicut prius dictum est,19
videlicet quod non habemus distinctam et propriam notitiam cuiuslibet
– notitiam] non add. necnon exp. E  quam] quod E  forme] et add. necnon
del. E | vel] quod add. necnon del. E  cuiuslibet] longis add. necnon del. E  ad]
ad sup. lin. E  igitur] prin add. necnon del. E
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘(…) inÞnita, inquit, relinquenda sunt; neque enim horum
posse Þeri disciplinam.’
 Aristoteles, Physica i , b: ‘inÞnitum quidem secundum quod est inÞnitum
ignotum est’ – tr. vetus. Aristoteles, Physica iii , a–: ‘Unde ignotum est
in quantum est inÞnitum’ – tr. vetus. Auctoritates  (): ‘InÞnitum secundum
quod hujusmodi semper est ignotum.’ (Aristoteles, Physica i , b); Auctoritates
 (): ‘InÞnitum secundum quod hujusmodi est ignotum.’ (Aristoteles, Physica
iii , a–). Aristoteles, Physica vi: non inventus. Aristoteles, Physica vii: non
inventus.
 Videas supra, concl. .
 Videas supra, concl. .
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partis continui nec alicuius alterius contentis virtualiter vel potentiona-
liter vel successibiliter vel extensive in Þnito.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur simpliciter concedendo quod conclusio
concludit ad intellectum predictum. De individuis non tamen est ars vel
scientia, sic quod de quolibet eorum habeamus distinctam et propriam
notitiam.
〈ad .〉 Et per idem ad tertium, quia, quamvis de quantitate continua
sit scientia, non tamen de qualibet eius parte habetur propria notitia sub
conceptu proprio talis quantitatis.
〈ad .〉 Ad quartum dicitur quod de inÞnitis habetur ista scientia vel
ista conclusio scientiÞca quod de inÞnitis non est scientia, sic videlicet
quod de quolibet illorum habeatur propria notitia a nobis.
va 〈ad .〉 Ad quintum dicitur quod de quibuscumque universalibus | est
scientia, quamvis non distincta vel propria, sicut iam dictum est.20
〈ad .〉 Ad sextum dicitur concedendo quod scientia universalium
presupponit scientiam singulorum, et hoc distinctam et propriam, sal-
tem aliquorum, sed non cuiuslibet. Verbi gratia, ad hoc quod ista univer-
salis ‘omnis urtica est acuta substantia’, requiritur quod distincte sciatur
ab aliquo de aliqua urtica singulari mediante sua notitia propria, quod
ipsa sit acuta. Et non tantum de una urtica, verum etiam de pluribus,
et tunc quod cum intellectus nusquam invenerit mediante sensu accep-
tam concludit istam universalem, scilicet quod omnis urtica sit acuta. Ad
cuius notitiam non requiritur cuiuslibet urtice experientia, sed su cit
indierenter plurium sine expressione quarumcumque circumstantia-
rum sive locationum sive colorum sive temporum, et sic de aliis circum-
stantiis.
〈ad .〉 Per idem patet ad septimum argumentum.
〈ad argumentum in oppositum〉 Ad argumentum vero in oppositum
satis declaratum est per ista que dicta sunt.
 contentis] continentis E  universalium] propter add. necnon del. E  singu-
lorum] singularem E  patet] per E
 Videas supra, concl. .
2011013 [Van der Helm] 02-Edition-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 291
〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum participatione
speciei plures homines sunt unus homo.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod sic.
 Sortes et Plato sunt unus homo; Sortes et Plato sunt plures homines;
igitur plures homines sunt unus homo. Discursus videtur evidens, quia
arguitur expositorie. Maior patet, quia Sortes est unus homo et Plato
est unus homo, igitur Sortes et Plato sunt unus homo. Ista consequentia
patet, quia omnes isti termini sunt substantiales et in talibus valet con-
 sequentia a divisis ad coniuncta, et a coniunctis ad divisa.
〈.〉 Item. Supposito quod Sortes signiÞcet totum unum hominem pre-
ter manum dexteram, et Plato totum eundem hominem preter manum
sinisteram, tunc clarum est quod Sortes et Plato sint unus homo. Et
minor in isto casu patet, scilicet quod Sortes et Plato sint plures homi-
 nes, quia Sortes est homo et Plato est homo et Sortes non est Plato, quia
aliquid est pars Sortis quod non est pars Platonis; igitur Sortes et Plato
sunt plures homines.
〈.〉 Item. Sortes et Plato sunt unus homo in communi; igitur Sortes
et Plato sunt unus homo. Consequentia videtur evidens. Et antecedens
 declaratur, quia uterque istorum demonstrando Sortem et Platonem,
est homo, et non uterque istorum est homo qui est Sortes, nec uterque
vbistorum est homo qui est | Plato, nec uterque istorum est homo qui
est Cicero, et sic de quocumque alio discreto, igitur uterque eorum est
homo in communi, igitur Sortes et Plato sunt homines in communi. Et
 conÞrmatur per istam auctoritatem Porphirii, scilicet ‘collectivum enim
multorum in una natura species est’,1 igitur multa individua colliguntur
in una natura speciÞca. Et per consequens multi homines colliguntur in
natura humana, igitur multi homines sunt in natura humana et non in
aliqua 〈alia〉 natura humana quam in natura que est unus homo; igitur
 multi homines sunt unus homo. Et quod multi homines sunt una natura
 et] sicud add. necnon del. E
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘Collectivum enim multorum in unam naturam species
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humana, patet per communem locutionem precipue theologicam, qua
dicitur quod tota natura humana per primum parentem fuit infecta
et postea per Christum redempta, que non potest aliter intelligi quam
quod tota multitudo hominum fuit primo per parentem infecta et postea
eadem multitudo fuit per Christum redempta, igitur tota multitudo
hominum est una natura humana, et per consequens plures homines
sunt una natura, et per consequens plures homines sunt unus homo.
〈.〉 Item. Expresse patet per textum Porphirii quo dicitur quod parti-
cipatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo.2
〈ad oppositum, .〉 Ad oppositum arguitur: quandocumque aliqua duo
sunt eadem alicui tertio, ipsa sunt idem inter se; si igitur plures homi-
nes, utpote Sortes et Plato, essent idem alicui tertio, essent idem inter
se, et per consequens Sortes esset Plato, et e converso. Maior patet, quia
est communis omni concipienti, et patet per Aristotelem, primo Physi-
corum,3 ubi probat quod totum non est idem parti.
〈ad oppositum, .〉 Item. Si plures homines essent unum homo, vel
essent unus homo singularis vel unus homo universalis. Primum non
potest dici, quia sic sequeretur quod singulare esset commune, quod
est contra Porphirium. Nec secundum potest dici, quia, cum omnis
talis homo in communi sit signum universale, sequeretur quod plures
homines essent unum signum, quod de se patet esse falsum.
〈distinctio prima〉 In ista questione presupponitur una distinctio,
ra quod duplex est ‘actus logicalis’, | scilicet actus exercitus et actus signiÞ-
catus. Actus exercitus est propositio, cuius copula sive verbum principale
est hoc verbum ‘est’, sicut patet 〈in〉 talibus propositionibus ‘homo est
animal’, ‘Sortes est homo’, ‘albedo est color’, et sic de aliis. Actus signiÞ-
catus est propositio cuius copula sive verbum principale est hoc verbum
‘predicatur’ vel aliquid sibi equivalens, cuiusmodi sunt talia: ‘competit’,
‘inest’, ‘dicitur’, ‘veriÞcatur’, et similia. Et tales propositiones sunt huiu-
smodi: ‘animal predicatur de homine’, ‘animal dicitur de homine’, ‘ani-
mal competit homini’, ‘predicatum inest subiecto’, ‘animal veriÞcatur de
homine’, et consimiles. Et vocatur primus actus ‘exercitus’ et secundus
‘signiÞcatus’, quia per primum exercitur predicatio que per secundum
 idem] eadem E  communis] et(?) add. necnon del. E  exercitus] acercitus
E (sic semper)  in]  litt. add. necnon del. E
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signiÞcatur, sicut patet per istam: ‘animal predicatur de homine’, signiÞ-
catur ista prima que exercetur in ista propositione: ‘homo est animal’.
〈distinctio secunda〉 Secunda distinctio est ista quod ista propositio
‘plures homines sunt unus homo’ est distinguenda eo quod poterit accipi
 in sensu proprio vel in sensu transsumptivo. Sensus proprius est actus
exercitus, qui accipitur ex virtute sermonis et ex constructione gramma-
ticali, sicut termini iacent. Sensus vero transsumptivus sive improprius
est actus signiÞcatus, scilicet iste: de pluribus hominibus, hoc est, de plu-
ribus nominibus hominum predicatur unus homo. Qui actus signiÞcatus
 debet sic exerceri: ‘iste homo est homo, et iste homo est homo, et sic de
singulis’, vel sic: ‘Sortes est unus homo, Plato est unus homo, et sic de
singulis’.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista quod ista propositio ‘plures
homines sunt unus homo’ est vera in sensu proprio precipue tenendo
 quod partes nihil aliud sint quam suum totum. Istam conclusionem
probat secundum argumentum ad principale.4
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod plures homi-
nes totaliter distincti non sunt unus homo, et per consequens ista propo-
sitio est falsa in sensu proprio. Ista conclusio est de se nota, quia omne
 istud quod est unus homo, est Sortes vel Plato, etcetera; sed nulli plures
homines totaliter distincti sunt Sortes et Plato, etcetera; igitur nulli plures
homines totaliter distincti sunt unus homo. 〈Maior〉 apparet inductive. Et
minor est de se nota.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod ista propositio
 ‘plures homines sunt unus homo’ est vera in sensu transsumptivo. Ista
rbpatet, quia de | pluribus hominibus predicatur unus homo, ad intellectum
prius datum.5
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod uterque isto-
rum – demonstrando Sortem et Platonem – est unus homo singularis, et
 per consequens est unus homo sensibilis, et unus homo non-universalis,
et unus homo capiendus et sic de quibuscumque aliis conditionibus indi-
viduantibus. Et ista conclusio patet inductive.
 improprius] improprie E  ista] pli add. necnon del. E  argumentum] ad add.
E
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Sed contra istam conclusionem instatur:
〈i〉 ‘uterque istorum est homo singularis; igitur uterque istorum est
Sortes, vel uterque istorum est Plato’; sed consequens est falsum, sicut de
se notum est.
〈ii〉 Item, ‘uterque istorum est singularis homo capiendus’; capiatur
igitur homo qui est uterque eorum, et non invenitur aliquis talis; igitur
hec, ut videtur, est falsa: uterque istorum est singularis homo capiendus.
〈ad i〉 Ad primum istorum dicitur negando consequentiam, sed bene
sequitur ‘uterque istorum 〈est〉 homo singularis; et omnis homo singu-
laris est Sortes vel Plato; igitur uterque istorum est Sortes vel Plato’, acci-
piendo consequens de disiuncto predicato. Sed propter hoc non oportet
quod sequatur in sensu quo est disiunctiva, et causa quare prima est vera,
est quia iste terminus disiunctus ‘Sortes vel Plato’ supponit confuse tan-
tum, propter signum universale a rmativum mediate precedens.
〈ad ii〉 Ad secundum dicitur concedendo quod uterque istorum est
homo capiendus etcetera, et ulterius quando dicitur ‘capiatur’, queren-
dum est ab arguente ‘quid debet capi?’; si dicit quod istud est capiendum
quod est ‘uterque istorum’, respondetur quod nihil est tale. Per talem
modum respondendi non habet arguens aliquod inconveniens quod
concludat.
〈ad .〉 Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo quod Sortes
et Plato sunt plures homines, si ista propositio capitur de copulato
subiecto. Et conÞrmatur etiam quod Sortes et Plato sunt unus homo, si
ista propositio accipiatur in sensu copulativo, ut sic loco istius ‘Sortes
est unus homo, et Plato est unus homo’. Et ulterius dicitur negando
quod discursus sit expositorius, quia hoc copulatum ‘Sortes et Plato’,
va si accipiatur in sensu | copulativo, non facit discursum expositorium.
Et ulterius dicitur quod in propositionibus per se valet consequentia
a divisis ad coniuncta ex parte predicati exceptis casibus quos ponit
Aristoteles, secundo Perihermeneias,6 sed non oportet in talibus semper
consequentiam valere ex parte subiecti.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum patet per superius dicta,7 quia conceditur quod
plures homines non totaliter disiuncti sed tantummodo particulariter
sint unus homo.
 est] ??  litt. add. necnon del. E  ab] ad E  copulativo] sed add. Ec
| discursum] excursum E
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〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur negando istam ‘Sortes et Plato sunt homo in
communi’, quia ‘homo in communi’ nihil aliud est quam terminus uni-
versalis, sicut diusius in tractatu De suppositionibus8 est declaratum. Et
clarum est quod Sortes et Plato non sunt aliquis talis terminus. Et ad
 probationem dicitur quod uterque istorum est homo, et etiam concedi-
tur quod non uterque istorum est Sortes, nec uterque istorum est Plato,
et sic de ceteris singularibus. Cum hoc tamen stat quod quilibet istorum
sit homo singularis, quia iste terminus ‘homo singularis’ supponit con-
fuse tantum. Et ideo concedendum est quod uterque istorum sit Sortes
 vel Plato, et negandum est quod uterque istorum sit Sortes, et uterque
istorum sit Plato. Et ad conÞrmationem dicitur quod Porphirius intelli-
git per istam auctoritatem ‘collectionem logicalem speciei’. Que quidem
collectio facit appellationem speciei, facit signiÞcationem, ita quod ista
auctoritas ‘collectivum enim multorum in unam naturam species est’, stat
 loco istius ‘species est appellative signiÞcativa multorum individuorum
eiusdem speciei, scilicet consimilium formarum ultimarum’. Et ulterius
dicitur concedendo quod in una signiÞcatione hoc quod dicitur ‘tota
humana’ signiÞcat totam multitudinem hominum, sed ex hoc non sequi-
tur quod plures homines totaliter disiuncti sint unus homo.
 〈ad .〉 Ad ultimum patet per superius dicta, scilicet qualiter ista pro-
positio sit intelligenda, quia Porphirius ponit actum exercitum pro actu
signiÞcato, sicut in questionis secunda distinctione satis fuit declaratum.9
vb|
 conÞrmationem] conformationem E  collectio] que quidem add. E | facit
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum
inferiora predicentur de superioribus.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non.
Quia si sic, tunc ista propositio esset vera: ‘animal est homo’. Conse-
quentia est de se nota. Falsitas consequentis declaratur, quia hec est falsa:
‘omne animal est homo’, et ista ‘animal est homo’ sibi equivalet; igitur ista
‘animal est homo’ est falsa. Et quod ista sibi equivalet, probatur, et vocetur
ista ‘omne animal est homo’ A et ista ‘animal est homo’ B. Tunc sic: quan-
documque subiecta aliquarum duarum precise supponunt pro eisdem et
predicata similiter, si una istarum sit vera, et reliqua, et consimiliter, si
una falsa, et reliqua; sed sic se habent A et B; igitur si A est falsum, B
est falsum. Maior videtur de se nota. Minor declaratur, quia subiectum
ipsius A supponit pro omni animali, et non pro alio ab animali, sicut
de se notum est. Et subiectum ipsius B similiter supponit pro omni ani-
mali, quia respectu copule supponit pro omni animali, igitur supponit
pro omni animali et non supponit pro alio animali, igitur subiectum A
et subiectum B precise supponunt pro eisdem. Et quod predicata suppo-
nunt pro eisdem satis patet.
〈.〉 Item. Capiatur ista propositio mentalis ‘animal est homo’, et capia-
tur subiectum eius, tunc sic: istud subiectum pro quocumque supponit,
pro isto naturaliter supponit, et quodcumque signiÞcat sive representat,
istud naturaliter representat; igitur manente tali natura et manentibus
omnibus rebus extra, non poterit A 〈non〉 supponere pro isto pro quo
supponit, et per consequens, cum naturaliter supponit pro omni animali,
quia est naturale signum omnis animalis, non potest non supponere pro
quolibet animali; igitur in ista propositione mentali ‘animal est homo’,
subiectum supponit pro omni animali, igitur ipsa est falsa, sicut ista
‘omne animal est homo’.
〈.〉 Item. Quandocumque alicui competit aliqua proprietas ex sua
natura per aliquod extrinsecum sibi additum, poterit ista proprietas ab
 hec] hac E  subiecta] S E | duarum] presup add. E | supponunt] et add. E
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raeo removeri; sed ista proprietas, scilicet repre〈senta-〉|-re omne compe-
tit alicui conceptui, scilicet subiecto istius propositionis mentalis ‘ani-
mal est homo’; igitur per hoc extrinsecum predicatum homo non poterit
talis proprietas ab eo removeri. Maior videtur evidens, quia per nihil
 extrinsecum additum speculo bene disposito potest Þeri quin speculum
representet suum obiectum sibi proportionabiliter et debito modo pre-
sentatum. Et minor patet de se, quia passiones anime non ex impositione
sed naturaliter representant quidquid representant, sicud elicitur ab Ari-
stotele, primo Perihermeneias.1
 〈.〉 Item. Porphirius2 dicit expresse quod omnia superiora predican-
tur de inferioribus; sed inferiora non predicantur de superioribus. Hoc
idem patet per istam auctoritatem, capitulo de specie,3 quo dicit: ‘Oportet
autem equa de equis predicari, ut hinnibile de equo, aut maiora de mino-
ribus, ut animal de homine, minora de maioribus minime’ et sequitur:
 ‘neque enim animal dicis esse hominem quemadmodum hominem dicis
esse 〈animal〉’.
〈ad oppositum .〉 Ad oppositum arguitur: si inferiora non predicaren-
tur de superioribus, tunc non semper universalis a rmativa convertitur
per accidens. Falsitas consequentis patet per Aristotelem, primo Prio-
 rum.4 Consequentia declaratur, quia ista propositio ‘omnis homo est
animal’ convertitur sic per accidens: ‘aliquod animal est homo’, in qua
inferius predicatur de suo superiori; igitur, si omnis talis propositio esset
falsa, sequeretur quod predicta conversio non valeret.
〈ad oppositum .〉 Item. Si hec sit falsa: ‘aliquod animal est homo’,
 igitur sua contradictoria erit vera, ista scilicet: ‘nullum animal est homo’.
Tunc sic: ‘nullum animal est homo; omne risibile est animal; ergo nullum
risibile est homo’. Consequentia falsa, sicut de se notum est, et non minor,
 quemadmodum] dicis add. necnon del. E  animal] hominem E
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igitur maior, et per consequens hec est falsa: ‘nullum animal est homo’,
igitur hec est vera: ‘aliquod animal est homo’. Igitur inferius predicatur
de suo superiori.
〈ad oppositum .〉 Item. ‘Omne animal preter animal irrationale est
homo.’ Ista propositio est vera, quia sue exponentes sunt vere, scilicet iste:
‘omne animal aliud ab irrationali est homo’ et ‘nullum animal irrationale
est homo’. Et in ista exceptiva inferius predicatur de suo superiori, igitur
etcetera.
〈distinctio〉 Distinctio premittenda in ista questione est ista, quod
‘predicare’ accipitur dupliciter, scilicet large et stricte. Large extendit
se ad omnem predicationem, sive negativam, sive veram, sive falsam,
rb sive universalem, sive particularem, sive indeÞnitam, sive singularem. |
Stricte accipitur tantummodo pro predicatione a rmativa vera, ita quod
convertitur cum isto termino ‘veriÞcare de aliquo’.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista quod large accipiendo ‘pre-
dicari’ quilibet terminus de quolibet termino predicatur vel saltem est
predicabilis, nam quilibet terminus respectu alterius termini potest esse
predicatum in propositione, igitur quilibet terminus de quolibet termino
est predicabilis. Consequentia est de se nota. Et antecedens patet induc-
tive. Nam iste terminus ‘asinus’ respectu cuiuscumque alterius terminus
potest esse predicatum tam vere quam false, quia negative vere et a rma-
tive false, sicut patet in talibus propositionibus ‘nullus homo est asinus’,
in qua ‘asinus’ predicatur de ‘homine’ negative et vere, et ‘omnis homo
est asinus’, in qua ‘asinus’ predicatur de ‘homine’ a rmative et false.
Ex ista conclusione correlarie sequitur quod isto modo accipitur non
tantum superiora de inferioribus predicari, verum etiam inferiora de
superioribus predicari, tam universaliter quam non-universaliter, sicut
patet de ista propositione ‘omne animal est homo’, in qua inferius, sicut
patet, predicatur de suo superiori universaliter, quamvis a rmative et
false.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est quod inferius predi-
catur de suo superiori; quod quidem superius stat confuse et distribu-
tive, sicut patet in ista propositione ‘animal est homo’, cuius subiectum
respectu istius copule ‘est’ supponit confuse et distributive, quia non
maiori ratione pro uno suo signiÞcato quam pro alio.
 sive] in add. E  est] h add. necnon del. E  inferioribus] verum add. necnon
del. E  tam] quam E | non-universaliter] non sup. lin. E
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〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod accipiendo ‘predi-
cari’ pro ‘a rmative de aliquo veriÞcari’, sicut accipit communiter Por-
phirius predicari, 〈inferius predicatur de suo suoeriori〉, sicut patet in ista
propositione ‘animal est homo’, in qua inferius a rmative veriÞcatur de
 suo superiori, sicut plane probant argumenta quedam superius posita ad
principale.5
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est quod nullum inferius pre-
dicatur de suo superiori universaliter, hoc est: nullum inferius predicatur
de suo superiori stante confuse et distributive respectu talis inferioris.
 Ista conclusio patet inductive. Unde quamvis in ista propositione ‘animal
est homo’ subiectum supponit confuse et distributive mobiliter respectu
istius copule ‘est’, non tamen respectu predicati, respectu cuius, si arta-
retur, stare〈t〉 confuse et distributive, per additum alicuius signi univer-
salis communis omnibus suppositis termini distributi, statim redderetur
 va| propositio falsa, sicut patet in ista propositione ‘animal est homo’. Et
dico signiÞcanter ‘signi universali communis omnibus suppositis termini
distributi’ ad excludendum signa universalia que non artant terminum
stare pro omnibus suis suppositis, cuiusmodi est hoc signum ‘uterque’,
quia respectu istius signi inferius predicatur de suo superiori universali-
 ter, sicud patet in ista propositione ‘utrumque animal istorum animalium
est homo’, demonstratis duobus hominibus.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod alique due pro-
positiones possunt sic se habere quod subiecta earum precise supponunt
pro eisdem, et predicata similiter, quarum tamen una esset vera et reliqua
 esset falsa, sicut declaratur de istis propositionibus ‘animal est homo’ et
‘omne animal est homo’, quarum subiecta precise supponunt pro eisdem,
et predicata similiter, ut patet ex dictis,6 et tamen una est vera, et reliqua
falsa.
〈ad .〉 Ad primum principale dicitur negando istam consequentiam:
 ‘hec est falsa “omne animal est homo”, igitur hec est falsa “animal est
homo”’. Et negatur quod iste equivalent. Et ad probationem dicitur
negando istam ‘quandocumque alique propositiones sic se habent quod
 accipit] Po add. necnon del. E  sicut] sicut †ex … bus† E  superiori] suo add.
necnon del. E – artaretur] talem confu add. necnon del E.  signiÞcanter]
signiÞcantis E  utrumque animal] utrumque animal iter. E
 Videas supra ., ., .
 Videas supra, concl. .
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subiecta earum precise supponunt pro eisdem, et predicata similiter,
etcetera’, quia oportet addere quod ista subiecta respectu cuiuscumque
predicati positi in talibus propositionibus supponant precise pro eisdem,
quod non est verum in proposito, quia quamvis subiectum istius ‘ani-
mal est homo’ respectu copule supponat pro omni animali, non tamen
respectu predicati, respectu cuius subiectum istius ‘omne animal est
homo’ artatur per signum universale sibi additum ad supponendum pro
omni animali.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur negando istam consequentiam ‘hoc
subiectum pro quocumque supponit, naturaliter supponit, igitur manen-
te tali natura et manentibus rebus extra non potest non supponere pro
illis pro quibus supponit’, quia talis consequentia precipue in materia
de representatione non valet, quia, sicut in representationibus de sen-
sibus ratione appositorum sive diverse positionis diversorum varian-
tur representationes, ut patet in questione de ista materia super secun-
dum De anima,7 ita etiam in representationibus intellectualibus ratione
aliquorum extrinsece appositorum sumuntur diverse representationes
vb respectu | diversorum. Et ideo dico quod, quamvis conceptus animalis
respectu copule representaret intellectui omne animal, apposito tamen
conceptui hominis, non representabit intellectui respectu eiusdem con-
ceptus omne animal, sed tantummodo omne animal rationale.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium negando argumentum precipue in ista materia,
quia conceptus animalis naturaliter representat omne animal. Si sibi
tamen additur ista dierentia mentalis rationalis, representabit animal
rationale. Et ulterius ad exemplum dicitur quod, quamvis speculum
naturaliter representat aliquod obiectum, tamen per aliquod extrinse-
cum sibi additum posset Þeri quod non representat istud obiectum tota-
liter, sed tantummodo partialiter, sicut alibi diusius patet.8
〈ad .〉 Ad ultimum, scilicet ad dictum Porphirii, qualiter sit intelli-
gendum, satis patet per predicta.
 precipue] presipue E | in] ??  litt. add. necnon del. et exp. E – sensibus]
sensibusbus E  materia] de add. necnon del. E  respectu] respondatur(?)
eadem manu add. mg. E  naturaliter] ??  litt. add. necnon del. E
 omas Manlevelt videtur referre ad commentarium eius Questiones super De
anima. Textum invenire non potui.
 Locus non inventus. Fortasse omas Manlevelt ibi refert ad commentarium eius
Questiones super Predicamenta.
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum species sit pars generis.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non.
Nullum genus componitur ex speciebus; igitur species non 〈est〉 pars
 generis. Consequentia videtur evidens, quia totum componitur ex par-
tibus. Et antecedens declaratur, quia, si aliquod genus componeretur ex
speciebus, cum non maior ratio sit de uno quam de reliquo, sequeretur
quod hoc genus animal componitur ex speciebus. Consequentia nota. Et
falsitas consequentis declaratur, quia, cum hoc genus animal sit species
 subalterna, sequeretur quod aliqua species componeretur ex speciebus,
quod est contra Porphirium,1 qui dicit: ‘species vero ex specie non com-
ponitur’.
〈.〉 Item. Pari ratione qua species esset pars generis, individuum esset
pars speciei. Et per consequens omnia individua speciei hominis essent
 pars eiusdem, et cum omnis partes simul sumpte sint suum totum,
sequeretur quod omnia individua speciei hominis sive speciei humane
essent species humana. Tunc sic: omnis species predicatur de pluribus
dierentibus numero in eo quod quid; omnia individua speciei humane
sunt species; igitur omnia individua speciei humane predicantur de
 pluribus. Conclusio falsa, sicut patet per Porphirium,2 qui dicit quod
individuum predicatur de uno solo, et non de pluribus. Et non maior,
igitur minor, scilicet ista quod omnia individua speciei humane sunt
species; igitur istud ex quo sequitur, est falsum, scilicet quod individuum
sit pars speciei.
 ra〈.〉 Item. Si individuum esset pars speciei, vel species pars | gene-
ris, sequeretur quod ista consequentia esset vera: ‘homo non est, igitur
animal non est’, et ista similiter: ‘Adam non est, igitur homo non est’. Con-
sequentia videtur evidens, quia ad negationem partis sequitur negatio
totius, sicut sequitur ‘fundamentum non est, igitur domus non est’. Fal-
 sitas consequentis declaratur, quia oppositum consequentis potest stare
 cum] con E | sint] sunt E  omnis] omne E  pluribus] et esse add. necnon
del. E
 Isagoge, xvi,  (, –): ‘(…) species vero speciei non componitur (…)’
 Isagoge, ii,  (, ): ‘(…) individuum autem de uno solo particulari.’
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cum antecedente, sicut ista possunt simul stare: ‘omne animal est’ et
‘nullus homo est’; similiter ista possunt simul stare: ‘omnis homo est’, et
‘Adam non est’. Et si dicatur quod Adam non est pars speciei quia non
est in rerum natura, hoc non potest valere, quia capiatur aliquod indivi-
duum quod est, tunc demonstrando tale individuum adhuc ista conse-
quentia non valet: ‘iste homo non est, igitur homo non est’, quia oppo-
situm consequentis staret cum antecedente, et per consequens poterit
stare sicut cum iste homo fuerit corruptus. Tunc antecedens erit verum
et consequens falsum.
〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum est Porphirius,3 qui dicit: ‘totum enim
quiddam est genus, individuum autem pars, species vero et totum et pars,
sed pars quidem alterius, totum autem non alterius, sed aliis; partibus
enim totum est.’
〈distinctio〉 In ista questione distinctio est ista quod ‘totum’ et ‘pars’
dicuntur multipliciter, nam quoddam est 〈totum〉 integrale, et 〈quod-
dam〉 est totum universale 〈vel subiectivum, et quoddam est totum essen-
tiale〉, et similiter quedam est pars integralis, et quedam pars universalis
vel subiectiva, et quedam est pars essentialis.
‘Pars vero essentialis’ dicitur ista, que cum aliquo componit aliquod
totum essentiale, quod non excedit in quantitate talem partem essentia-
lem. Unde pars essentialis addita parti essentiali non facit totum maius
quantitative, vel remota non facit totum minus, sicut patet de forma
niville, que separata ab nivilla non diminuit quantitatem niville. Consi-
militer forma adveniens materie non facit totam magis extensum quam
sit ipsa materia vel ipsa forma.
‘Pars vero integralis’ vocatur ista ex qua cum aliis partibus integralibus
integratur totum componens. Que quidem pars addita parti facit unum
totum integrale maius quantitative aliqua sua parte, sicut pes vel manus
rb facit ipsum | totum cui additur maius quantitate. Et talis pars integra-
lis adhuc subdividitur, quia: quedam est pars continuativa, et quedam
aggregativa, et quedam multiplicativa, et quedam ordinativa, et sic de
aliis.
 multipliciter] dupliciter E | et] vel E  totum] in add. necnon del. E  dimi-
nuit] deminuit E  aliis] aliis mg. E
 Isagoge, ii,  (, –): ‘Totum enim quiddam est genus, individuum autem pars,
species vero et totum et pars, sed pars quidem alterius, totum autem non alterius,
sed aliis; partibus enim totum est.’
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‘Pars vero subiectiva’ accipitur potius in logica, et dicitur semper
‘inferius respectu sui superioris’, quia subicitur in propositione in qua Þt
predicatio directa, et quia signiÞcat partem sui totius signiÞcati per suum
superius, sicut homo signiÞcat aliquid quod animal signiÞcat, et non
 signiÞcat istud quod animal signiÞcat, et ideo dicitur ‘pars subiectiva’
respectu animalis et ‘totum universale’ respectu Sortis et Platonis et de
aliis individuis.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista quod aliqua species est pars
integralis generis. Ista declaratur, quia hoc genus compositum corpus
 animal componitur ex genere et specie tamquam ex partibus integra-
libus, et quod hoc compositum sit genus, probatur, quia predicatur de
pluribus specie dierentibus in eo quod quid. Quia, si queratur quid
sit homo, convenienter respondetur quod sit corpus animal; et consi-
militer, si queratur quid sit asinus, convenienter respondetur quod sit
 corpus animal; igitur hoc compositum corpus animal predicatur de plu-
ribus specie dierentibus in eo quod quid, igitur est genus. Et quod ibi
non sit improprietas loquendi impermissibilis patet per grammaticos,
qui ponunt quod duo substantiva possunt in mente copulari, quando
istud quod est communius istorum precedit, et reliquum sequitur tam-
 quam determinativum precedentis.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod aliquod genus
est pars integralis speciei specialissime. Ista statim patet, quia hoc genus
animal est pars integralis istius speciei specialissime animal homo. Et
quod compositum animal homo sit species, probatur, quia predicatur de
 pluribus dierentibus numero in eo quod quid. Nam, si queratur, quid sit
Sortes, convenienter respondetur quod sit animal homo, et consimiliter
si queratur, quid sit Plato, etcetera.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est: nullum genus absolutum
componitur, tamquam ex partibus integralibus, ex pluribus speciebus
 vaabsolutis precipue | eque communibus. Ista conclusio patet inductive,
discurrendo per quodlibet genus.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est quod nulla species spe-
cialissima componitur, tamquam ex partibus integralibus, ex pluribus
speciebus specialissimis absolutis. Ista conclusio videtur etiam patere
 inductive discurrendo per singulas species specialissimas.
 subicitur] subiciatur E  impermissibilis] pars add. necnon del. E  ponunt]
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Et si instetur de isto composito Sortes vel Plato quod videtur predicari
de pluribus numero dierentibus in eo quod quid, quia, si queratur
‘quid est iste homo?’, convenienter respondetur quod sit Sortes vel Plato,
quia per talem responsionem posset dubium querentis removeri, ad
hoc dicitur dupliciter: primo quod hoc compositum Sortes vel Plato non
predicatur de pluribus univoce quoad hoc quod aliquod sit species, quia
de Sorte predicatur mediante conceptu Sortis, et de Platone predicatur
mediante conceptu Platonis. Secundo dicitur quod non predicatur in
quid di nitive, quod requiritur ad hoc quod aliquod sit species vel
genus.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod aliquod species
specialissima componitur, tamquam ex partibus integralibus, ex pluribus
speciebus 〈specialissimis〉 non-absolutis. Ista declaratur, quia: capiatur
hoc compositum album musicum, quod videtur esse species specialis-
sima quia predicatur de pluribus numero dierentibus in eo quod quid,
vel saltem est predicabile de individuis que possunt imponi connotative
ad taliter signiÞcandum individua qualiter hec species album musicum
connotative signiÞcat, igitur aliqua species specialissima componitur ex
pluribus speciebus specialissimis connotativis.
〈conclusio sexta〉 Sexta conclusio est quod species est pars subiec-
tiva generis et individuum speciei, quia sunt per se inferiora ad genus et
ad speciem. Et patet totum de se.
〈conclusio septima〉 Septima conclusio est quod aliqua species est
pars essentialis generis, sicut istius generis mentalis corpus aliqua spe-
cies mentalis est pars essentialis, sicut ista species animal, que est species
subalterna, quia ipsa cum aliqua sua parte componit unum terminum
totum, quod non excedit quantitative aliquam suam partem, et tales par-
tes, sicut declaratum fuit in distinctione, vocantur ad presens essentiales,
quamvis non ita proprie sicut materia et forma.
vb Ex istis conclusionibus possunt alie elici quas causa brevitatis | inge-
niosis relinquo.
〈ad .〉 Ad primum principale dicitur negando antecedens. Et ad pro-
bationem dicitur concedendo quod hoc genus animal componitur, tam-
quam ex partibus integralibus, ex pluribus speciebus, quia quelibet littera
est una species quantitativa, sicut hec littera a que signiÞcat univoce et
 quia] hoc add. necnon del. E  individua] indivisibilia E  signiÞcat]
appellative add. E  corpus] ‘animal’ add. E
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appellative omnes tales Þguras. Et ad Porphirium dicitur quod intelligit
quod nulla species specialissima mere absoluta componitur ex pluribus
speciebus specialissimis mere absolutis.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum conceditur quod individuum sit pars speciei.
 Et ulterius conceditur quod omnia individua speciei humane sint par-
tes speciei humane, non integrales, sed subiective. Et de talibus partibus
subiectivis non oportet concedere quod omnes partes simul sumpte sint
earum totum universale, quamvis posset concedi quod omnes tales par-
tes simul sumpte essent earum totum aggregationum vel multitudinum
 quia sunt una multitudo. Verumtamen accipiendo ‘speciem’ sive ‘natu-
ram humanam’ in alia signiÞcatione quam logici communiter accipiunt,
posset concedi quod omnia individua humana sint una natura humana,
et una species humana, secundum quod theologi loquuntur, quando
dicunt quod ‘Christus redemit totam naturam humanam’, ‘primus parens
 infecit totam speciem humanam’, sed talis locutio non est in logica con-
sueta.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur negando istam consequentiam: si species
esset pars generis, et individuum pars speciei, tunc ista consequentia
esset bona: ‘homo non est, igitur animal non est’, quia arguendo a parte
 subiectiva ad suum totum destructive non valet. Non oportet quod valeat,
sed intelligitur de parte integrali ad suum totum, sive de nomine partis
integralis ad nomen totius integralis.
〈adargumentum inoppositum〉 Et qualiter Porphirius debeat intelligi,
patet per predicta.
 posset] cu add. necnon del. E
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum aliquid dierat a seipso.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod sic.
ra Sortes diert | a se puero; igitur Sortes diert a seipso. Ista consequen-
tia apparet evidens, quia arguitur ab inferiori ad superius. Et quod sic
arguitur, patet quia: quidquid est Sortes puer, est Sortes, et non quidquid
est Sortes, est Sortes puer; igitur Sortes est superius, etcetera. Et antece-
dens patet per textum1 quo dicitur quod Sortes diert a se, vel puero, vel
iam viro.
〈.〉 Item. Totus Sortes diert a Sorte, et totus Sortes est Sortes; igitur
Sortes diert a seipso. Maior probatur quia: quelibet pars Sortis diert a
Sorte, igitur totus Sortes diert a Sorte. Et minor declaratur quia: totus
Sortes est aliquid, et non est aliquid 〈aliud〉 a Sorte; igitur, totus Sortes
est Sortes.
〈.〉 Item. De quocumque veriÞcatur unum contradictoriorum, diert
ab ipso de quo veriÞcatur alterum contradictoriorum; sed de Sorte
veriÞcatur unum contradictoriorum, et de eodem veriÞcatur alterum
contradictoriorum; igitur, Sortes diert a seipso. Maior videtur de se
nota, quia contradictoria non possunt competere eidem precipue sine
aliqua dierentia. Et minor declaratur, quia hec est vera: Sortes erit
quando nihil erit Sortes. Tunc sic: quandocumque Sortes erit, Sortes erit
aliquid; sed Sortes erit quando nihil erit Sortes; igitur Sortes erit aliquid
quando nihil erit Sortes. Tunc sic: Sortes erit aliquid, quando nihil erit
Sortes; igitur Sortes erit aliquid; igitur Sortes erit aliquid, quando Sortes
non erit aliquid. Et quod Sortes erit, quando nihil erit Sortes, probatur
quia: iste partes erunt, quando nihil erit Sortes; iste partes sunt Sortes;
igitur Sortes erit, quando nihil erit Sortes. Et si ponatur aliqua instantia
vel cautela de partibus Sortis, capiantur partes ligni, et arguitur sicut
prius, igitur de Sorte verÞcatur unum contradictoriorum, et de Sorte
veriÞcatur reliquum contradictoriorum, igitur Sortes diert a se ipso.
Item, hoc lignum erit quando non erit hoc lignum, igitur etcetetra. Et
arguatur sicut prius.
 cautela] cautelia E | ligni] lingni E
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘Diert enim Socrates (…) a se vel puero vel iam viro (…)’
questio  
2011013 [Van der Helm] 02-Edition-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 307
〈ad oppositum .〉 Ad oppositum arguitur: si sic, sequeretur quod con-
tradictoria sibi invicem contradictoria respectu illius signiÞcati respectu
cuius sunt contradictoria, essent simul vera. Sed hoc est impossibile,
sicut patet per Aristotelem in Postpredicamentis, capitulo de oppositis,2 et
 quarto Metaphysice.3 Et consequentia patet quia: de quibuscumque die-
rentibus veriÞcantur contradictoria, sicut patet discurrendo per singula
rbdierentia. Si igitur | 〈aliquid〉 dierant a seipso, de eodem veriÞcantur
contra〈dicto〉ria. Et per consequens contradictoria essent simul vera.
〈ad oppositum .〉 Item. Omnis dierentia vel est realis, vel rationis;
 sed idem non diert a se realiter, sicut probatum est, nec per rationem,
quia ratio non facit identitatem, vel dierentiam in rebus extra, sicut
patet de se; igitur nihil diert a seipso.
〈distinctio〉 Distinctio est quod ‘aliquid dierre ab alio’ potest intelligi
dupliciter, scilicet primo, vel non primo sed secundum partem. Primo
 quando aliquod totum diert ab isto a quo diert secundum se et secun-
dum quodlibet sui partem, sicut Sortes diert a Platone. Non primo sed
secundum partem quando aliquid diert ab aliquo a quo diert secun-
dum aliquam sui partem, et secundum quamlibet sui partem ab isto non
diert, sicut Sortes diert a sua manu dextera secundum suam manum
 sinistram, vel pedem, et non diert a sua manu dextera secundum suam
manum dexteram. Et istum modum loquendi sive istam distinctionem
possumus elicere ab Aristotele, primo Physicorum,4 ubi loquitur de iden-
titate totius et partis, et de dierentia. Potest etiam quodammodo elici
ab Aristotele, quarto Physicorum,5 ubi vult quod idem sit in se ipso, non
 primo et per se, sed secundum partem, sicut amphora vini secundum
vinum est in amphora vini, non secundum amphoram.
 veriÞcantur] de add. necnon exp. E  identitatem] ad add. necnon del. E
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 Aristoteles, Predicamenta, , a–: ‘si Socratem sanum esse et Socratem aegro-
tare contrarium est, et non contingit simul eidem utraque inesse, numquam contin-
git, cum alterum contrarium sit, reliquum esse; nam cum sit sanum esse Socratem,
non erit aegrotare Socratem.’ – tr. Boethii.
 Aristoteles, Metaphysica iv, , b–: ‘contraria vero est opinio opinioni que
contradictionis, palam quod impossibile simul existimare eundem esse et non esse
idem’. – recensio Guillelmi.
 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica i, , a–; , a–.
 Aristoteles, Physica iv, , a–: ‘Amphora quidem igitur non erit in se ipsa,
neque vinum; vini autem amphora erit; quodque namque est et in quo est, utraque
eidem partes sunt. Sic quidem igitur contingit idem aliquid in se ipso esse, primum
autem non contingit’ – tr. vetus.
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〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista, quod nihil diert ab aliquo.
Que probatur sic: omne quod est, est aliquid; igitur nihil diert ab aliquo.
Antecedens est de se notum. Et consequentia declaratur, quia oppositum
consequentis non potest stare cum antecedente, scilicet quod aliquid
diert ab aliquo, et quod omne quod est, sit aliquid. Nam sequitur:
aliquid diert ab aliquo, igitur aliquid est et istud non est aliquid. Ista
consequentia patet, quia arguitur ab exposita ad exponentes. Sed ista sunt
manifeste contradictoria: ‘omne quod est, est aliquid’, et ‘aliquid non est
aliquid’, igitur nullo modo stant simul.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est quod nihil diert ab
alio. Que declaratur sic: nihil diert a seipso; omne quod est, est aliud;
igitur nihil diert ab alio. Ista consequentia patet, quia omne quod est,
est aliquid.
Item, si aliquid dierat ab alio – sit, gratia exempli, istud: Sortes – ,
va tunc sic inducitur: Sortes diert ab alio; | igitur Sortes diert ab hoc alio,
et Sortes diert ab hoc alio, et sic de singulis. Consequentia patet, quia
arguitur a termino stante confuse et distributive ad eius supposita pro qui-
bus distribuitur. Et falsitas consequentis declaratur, quia sic sequeretur
quod Sortes diert ab hoc alio demonstrato Sorte, et Sortes sit aliud.
Patet, quia Sortes est aliud a Platone, igitur Sortes est aliud.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est quod nihil quod est, diert
ab aliquo, et quod omne quod est, ab alio diert. Et patet ista conclusio
inductive, quia hoc quod est, ab alio diert, et hoc quod est, ab alio
diert, et sic de singulis. Similiter hoc quod est, non diert ab aliquo
et hoc quod est, non diert ab aliquo, et sic de singulis.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est quod nihil diert a se. Et
patet inductive.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est quod omne quod est, dif-
fert a se quod non est. Que probatur sic: omne quod est, est, et nihil quod
est, est ipsummet quod non est; igitur omne quod est, diert a se quod
non est. Ista conclusio patet, quia arguitur ab exponentibus ad expositam.
Ex ista conclusione eliciuntur quasi correlarie multe conclusiones
speciales, utpote quod omne quiescens diert a se currente, quia omne
quiescens est et non est ipsum currens; omnis stans diert a se sedente;
omnis puer diert a se sene; omne senex diert a se puero; et generaliter:
omne ens diert a non ente, et omnis terminus cum alio termino a quo
vere negatur, vere predicatur de seipso mediante hoc verbo ‘diert’, sicut
 dierat] dieraret (sic) E
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si ‘senex’ vere negatur a Sorte, tunc hoc est vera: Sortes diert a Sorte
sene, et sic de quocumque alio termino qui vere de Sorte negatur.
〈ad .〉 Ad primum igitur principale dicitur negando consequentiam:
‘Sortes diert a se puero, igitur Sortes diert a se’. Et ad probationem:
 quod, quamvis arguitur ab inferiori ad superius, hoc tamen est mediante
verbo includente negationem, proposito inferiori et superiori. Et ita
arguitur ab inferiore ad superius cum distributione negative, quam con-
sequentiam non oportet valere.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur quod ibi committitur fallacia equivoca-
 tionis, quia in maiori iste terminus ‘totus’ accipiter syncategorematice,
et in minori categorematice. Et sic equivocatur, nam in maiori stat loco
vbistius propositionis ‘quelibet pars Sortis diert a Sorte’, et in minori | stat
loco istius ‘Sortes qui est omnes sue partes, vel Sortes compositus ex
omnibus suis partibus, vel Sortes cui nihil pertinens ad eius essentiam
 deest, vel ad eius compositum esse etcetera, est Sortes’.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur negando maiorem, quia omne quod est, est
istud de quo veriÞcatur unum contradictoriorum, et de quo veriÞcatur
reliquum contradictoriorum, quia quodlibet contradictoriorum est reli-
quum contradictoriorum. Sed tunc ulterius ad propositum quo probatur
 quod de Sorte veriÞcantur contradictoria sibi invicem contradictoria,
dicitur concedendo gratia forme quod Sortes erit quando nihil erit Sor-
tes, et quod lignum erit quando nihil erit hoc lignum, idest: nullum unum
ens unitate continuitatis, vel unitate essentie vel unitate aggregationis vel
magnitudinis. Et ulterius dicitur negando istam uniformiter loquendo
 ‘quando Sortes erit, Sortes erit aliquid’, precipue accipendo ly ‘aliquid’,
sicut iam dictum est, pro aliquo uno continuative vel essentialiter.
Et per hoc patet quid sit dicendum ad hoc quod dicebatur.
〈ad argumenta in oppositum〉 Argumenta vera ad oppositum conclu-
dunt verum, et ideo ad ista non est aliter 〈dicendum〉.
 proposito] proposito E  cum distributione] con distinctione E  pertinens]
pertinnens E  gratia forme] ergo forte E  essentie] essentialis E | vel] non E
 dicitur] ned add. necnon del. E  quando] quandoque E
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum aliqua
substantia dierat ab alia separabili accidente.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non.
Nullo signo sive termino diert aliqua substantia ab alia; aliquod sepa-
rabile accidens est signum sive terminus; igitur aliqua separabili acci-
dente non diert una substantia ab alia, et non maiori ratione una sepa-
rabili accidente non diert quam alia; igitur nullo separabili accidente
una substantia diert ab alia. Maior videtur de se nota, quia nullo signo
existente non magis vel minus dierunt res inter se quam prius. Et minor
patet, quia iste terminus ‘sedens’ est accidens separabile, sicut patet in
textu.1
〈.〉 Item. Nulla substantia diert ab alia; igitur nulla substantia diert
ab alia separabili accidente. Consequentia videtur evidens, quia arguitur
a superiori ad inferius distributive. Et antecedens patet in proxima que-
stione precedenti.2
〈.〉 Item. Omne quod ab aliquo diert seipso vel sua parte ab eodem
diert; igitur nulla substantia ab alia diert separabili accidente. Conse-
quentia apparet evidens, quia nullum sensibile accidens est substantia vel
ra pars substantie. Et antecedens declaratur, quia Sortes diert | a Platone
seipso vel aliqua sua parte et non aliqua accidente, quia omni accidente
Sortis remoto non minus adhuc Sortes diert a Platone, quia adhuc dif-
fert numero.
〈.〉 Item. Si aliqua substantia ab aliqua alia dierret separabili acci-
dente, sequeretur quod tantum dierret quantum tale accidens faceret
dierre; sed tale accidens facit dierentiam speciÞcam, sicut sedere Sor-
tis diert a stare Platonis; igitur videtur quod, si Sortes dierret a Platone
ratione illius accidentis, tunc dierret specie a Platone.
 diert] a Platone seipso add. mg. E; idem textus invenitur initio f. ra. – sicut
sedere Sortis diert a stare Platonis] sicut accedere Sortis diert a Platone Sortis E
 Sed non ad verbum. Isagoge, i,  (, ): ‘accidens ut album, nigrum, sedere’; v, 
(, ): ‘dormire est separabile accidens’; vi,  (, –): ‘moveri (…) est accidens
separabile’.
 Videas supra, q.  conclusiones.
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〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum videtur quod sit Porphirius,3 qui vult
quod aliquid dierat a seipso vel ab alio alteritate quadam, et exempliÞ-
cans de separabi〈li〉 accidente, sicut Sortes sedens diert a seipso stante
per hoc separabile accidens quod est sedens, sicut patet in isto syllogi-
 smo: omne sedens diert a Sorte stante; Sortes est sedens; igitur Sortes
diert a seipso stante. Hoc patet quia per hoc accidens separabile sedens
probatur Sortes dierre a Sorte stante.
〈distinctio prima〉 Prima distinctio est ista quod aliquid ab alio potest
dierre dupliciter: uno modo proprie et stricte, sicut Sortes diert a Pla-
 tone per semetipsum et per eius partem; alio modo transsumptive, sicut
dicimus quod Sortes si sit sedens diert a Platone stante per hoc sepa-
rabile accidens, scilicet sedens, quod stat loco istius propositionis Sortes
concluditur dierre ab Platone syllogistice per hoc medium sedens, igitur
Sortes diert a Platone ita quod ista propositio Sortes per hoc separabile
 accidens sedens diert a Platone. Et est distinguende penes amphibo-
liam: in sensu proprio falsa est; in sensu transsumptive secundum quod
iam expositum est, est vera. Et ista distinctio in ista materia maxime est
necessaria, quia Porphirius et alii doctores in ista materia loquitur trans-
sumptive potius quam proprie.
 〈distinctio secunda〉 Secunda distinctio 〈est〉 quod duplex est ‘sepa-
rabile’, sive duplex est ‘separabile accidens’, scilicet realis et logicalis.
Realis est que Þt ex parte rei alicuius accidentis in subiecto cui realiter
inheret, sicud quando caliditas separatur a ligno, vel ab aliquo.
Logicalis est ista quando aliquis terminus accidentalis vere negatur a
 subiecto, sicut patet in ista propositione: ‘Sortes non est sedens’, posito
rbquod Sortes | prius fuit sedens et nunc non sit sedens.
Et secundum hoc duplex est ‘separabile’, scilicet reale et logicale. Reale,
quod realiter inheret alicui subiecto et potest non inherere manente
subiecto. Logicale, quod a rmatur de aliquo subiecto et potest negari
 ab eodem subiecto signiÞcative sumpto. Et patet per exempla predicta.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est quod accipiendo ‘dierentiam’
secundum quod Porphirius accipit et etiam secundum quod logici
 quia] qualibet E  subiecto] ex parte add. necnon del. E  a] subiecto add.
necnon del. E | vel] a add. E  a] sa(?) add. E
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘Diert enim Socrates Platone alteritate, et ipse a se puero
vel iam viro vel faciente aliquid vel quiescente et semper in aliquo modo habendi
alteritatibus.’
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accipiunt, scilicet pro termino qui predicatur in quale, per quid tamquam
per medium syllogisticum potest vere syllogisari aliquid ab alio dierre,
nihil aliud a termino ab alio diert per aliquam dierentiam proprie
accipiendo ‘dierre’. Ista conclusio patet inductive, quia clarum est quod
Sortes non diert a Platone proprie per aliquem terminum, quia nullo
termino assistente Sortes non minus diert a Platone.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod omne quod
ab aliquo diert, ab eodem diert per accidens separabile logicale acci-
piendo ‘dierre’ transsumptive. Ista conclusio etiam patet inductive, quia
omne quod ab alio diert, potest concludi ab eodem dierre per aliquod
medium, quod est accidens separabile. Et hoc precise verum est in mate-
ria naturali; quod dico propter personas in divinis in quibus forte ista
conclusio non haberet locum. Sed captis quibuscumque duabus rebus
naturalibus aliquis terminus sive aliquod accidens separabile logicale de
uno veriÞcatur quod non veriÞcatur de reliquo, sicut patet discurrendo
per singula, et per consequens tale accidens potest esse medium conclu-
dendi unam istarum rerum ab alia dierre.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est quod omnis dierentia ab
alio diert per dierentiam proprie accipiendo ‘per aliquid dierre’. Ista
patet, quia omnis dierentia proprie se ipsa ab alio diert, quia omne
quod est seipso a quacumque alia re a seipsa proprie diert.
〈ad .〉 Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo quod nulla
substantia ab alia diert separabili accidente accipiendo proprie ‘dierre’,
et accipiendo ‘substantiam’ pro substantia que non est signum. Cum hoc
tamen stat quod aliqua substantia ab alia diert separabaili accidente, et
hoc transsumptive loquendo, sicut predictum est.4
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum conceditur consequentia et consequens quan-
tum est de virtute sermonis, sicut predictum est.5 Verumtamen secun-
dum communem modum loquendi et secundum communem intellec-
tum potest antecedens negari, quia per istam ‘nulla substantia diert ab
alia’ intelligitur ita: ‘nulla substantia diert ab alia a se’.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium patet per predicta, quia argumentum concludit de
‘dierre per aliquid’ proprie, et non transsumptive.
 separabile] g add. necnon del. E  naturalibus] materialibus E
 Videas supra, dist. .
 Videas supra, dist. .
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〈ad .〉 Ad quartum conceditur quod omne istud quod diert per
vaaliquod accidens, | tantum diert quantum istud accidens ipsum facit
dierre, ut si A per aliquid dierat a B, tunc A tantum diert a B quantum
istud accidens facit ipsum A dierre a B. Sed non sequitur: igitur A diert
 a B tantum quantum istud accidens facit dierre, quia istud accidens facit
seipsum ab alio dierre speciÞce, quod non oportet de A, scilicet quod
dierat speciÞce a B per suum accidens. Sed de ista materia patebit infra.6
〈ad argumentum in oppositum〉 Et Porphirius intelligit transsumptive
‘〈dierre〉 per aliquid’ ad intellectum superius datum.7
 infra] infra mg. E  Porphirius] po add. necnon del. E
 Videas infra, q. , distinctiones.
 Videas supra, dist. .
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum aliquid
ab alio dierat inseparabili accidente.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non.
Nihil ab alio diert per istud quo remoto non minus diert; sed huius-
modi est inseparabili accidente; igitur nihil ab alio diert inseparabili
accidente. Maior videtur de se nota. Et minor patet, quia quocumque
accidente Sortis circumscripto sive realiter, sive per intellectum, non
minus Sortes a quocumque alio diert.
〈.〉 Item. Si aliquid ab alio dierret inseparabili accidente, vel igitur
dierret per tale accidens numero vel specie vel genere; sed nullum
istorum potest dici; igitur nullo modo diert. Maior est de se nota, quia
pluribus modis, ut videtur, 〈aliquid〉 ab alio potest dierre, sicut potest
elici ab Aristotele, quinto Metaphysice.1 Et minor declaratur, quia: quod
non dierat numero per tale accidens, patet quia, sicut iam dictum est,2
remoto tali accidente vel circumscripto, adhuc dierre〈t〉 numero. Nec
etiam specie, quia secundum Porphirium3 sola dierentia speciÞca facit
se dierre. Et secundum eundem intellectum inseparabile accidens est
dierentia speciÞca.
〈.〉 Item. De se patet quod nullum accidens facit Sortem dierre
specie, et per consequens nec genere.
〈adoppositum .〉 Ad oppositum est Porphirius,4 qui ponit quod aliquid
ab alio diert inseparabili accidente.
 inseparabili] in sup. lin. E  aliquid] nihil E  inseparabile] in sup. lin. E
 Aristoteles, Metaphysica v, , a–: ‘Dierentia vero dicuntur quecumque
diversa sunt idem aliquid entia, et non solum numero sed aut specie aut genere aut
proportione. Amplius quorum diversum genus, et contraria, et quecumque habent
in substantia diversitatem’ – rec. Guillelmi.
 Videas supra, q.  concl. .
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘Magis proprie dierre alterum altero dicitur, quando
speciÞca dierentia distiterit (…)’
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘Proprie autem dierre alterum altero dicitur, quando
inseparabili accidenti altero diert.’
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〈ad oppositum .〉 Item. Omne compositum ex aliquibus partibus
ab aliquo diert per aliquam suam partem; sed aliquod aggregatum
est compositum ex substantia et inseparabili accidente; ergo aliquod
aggregatum ab isto diert per inseparabile accidens. Tam maior quam
 minor patet de se.
〈ad oppositum .〉 Item. Inseparabile accidens ab alio diert seipso;
igitur aliquid ab alio diert inseparabili accidente. Consequentia est de
se nota. Et antecedens patet per dicta in precedentibus questionibus.5
〈disinctio prima〉 In ista questione primo premittitur distinctio de acci-
 dente reali et de accidente logicali, non quod sic diert, scilicet quod nul-
vblum accidens logicale | sit accidens reale scilicet realiter alicui subiecto
inherens, sed quod accidens logicale accipiatur tantummodo pro ter-
mino qui accidentaliter predicatur, et reale pro re que accidentaliter inhe-
ret alicui subiecto, de quo plus dicitur capitulo de accidente.6
 〈distinctio secunda〉 Secundo presupponitur distinctio de insepa-
rabilitate logicali et reali, quia logicalis est ista qua non potest veriÞcari
per aliquam negationem, sicut dicimus quod propria passio est insepara-
bilis a suo subiecto, hoc est, non potest vere negari a suo subiecto primo;
realis est que Þt realiter sine aliqua propositione, scilicet quando due res
 non possunt a se invicem dividi sive separari. De quo etiam diusius
dicetur in questionibus 〈de〉 accidente.7
〈distinctio tertia〉 Tertio presupponitur distinctio superius data de
‘dierre per aliquid’ proprie et transsumptive.
〈distinctio quarta〉 Quarta superadditur ista distinctio quod ali-
 quid ab alio potest dierre tripliciter: uno modo primo et per se, quando
scilicet aliquid ab alio diert secundum se et secundum quamlibet sui
partem; alio modo non primo sed per se, scilicet quando aliquid ab alio
diert secundum aliquam sui partem et non secundum quamlibet; ter-
tio aliquid ab alio diert nec primo nec per se, sed tantum secundum
 accidens, quia tali 〈modo〉 ab eo diert secundum suum accidens.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima igitur conclusio est ista quod aliquid ab
alio diert proprie, primo et per se inseparabili accidente. Ista statim
 accipiatur] lo(?) add. E  questionibus] pre(?) add. necnon del. E  tantum]
tantum sup. lin. E
 Videas supra, qq. –.
 Videas infra, q.  dist.
 Videas infra, qq. , –.
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patet, quia inseparabile accidens ab aliquo diert seipso et secundum
quamlibet sui partem, igitur ab alio diert proprie, primo et per se.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod aliquod indi-
viduum alicuius speciei ab alio individuo eiusdem speciei diert per
accidens. Ista patet, quia Sortes secundum accidens est alterius speciei
a Platone, quia Sortem secundum suum accidens esse alterius speciei a
Platone nihil aliud est quam accidens Sortis esse alterius speciei a Pla-
tone. Unde ista propositio: ‘Sortes secundum suum accidens, vel Sortes
per accidens est alterius speciei a Platone, vel specie diert a Platone’
debet sic exponi: ‘Sortes est, et accidens Sortis est alterius speciei a Pla-
tone’.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod aliquid ab alio
diert transsumptive inseparabili accidente. Ista statim patet, quia ali-
quod accidens inseparabile logicaliter loquendo est medium syllogisti-
cum concludendo aliquid ab alio dierre, sic arguendo: omnis sciturus
vel omne scitum diert a Platone aquilino; Sortes est sciturus; igitur
ra Sortes diert a Platone aquilino. In isto syllogismo | hoc accidens inse-
parabile sciturus vel scitum est medium concludendi Sortem dierre a
Platone aquilino.
Sed hic instatur de hoc quod dicitur, quod scitum est accidens inse-
parabile: nihil est accidens inseparabile quod vere a subiecto per nega-
tionem potest separari; sed scitum per negationem vere potest separari
a subiecto; igitur etcetera. Maior videtur nota, quia ideo dicitur aliquod
accidens inseparabile logicaliter, scilicet quia non potest a subiecto vere
separari per negationem. Et minor patet, quia hec est vera: Plato aquili-
nus non est sciturus. Ad istud breviter dicitur quod accidens non dicitur
ideo inseparabile quia non potest ab aliquo subiecto vere negari, sed
quia ab aliquo subiecto signiÞcative sumpto tale accidens signiÞcative
sumptum non potest vere negari. Et sic est de isto accidente scitum, quia,
quamvis ab aliquo subiecto potest vere negari, tamen ab aliquo subiecto
non potest vere negari. Et per hoc patet ad formam argumenti.
Et si dicatur quod si hoc accidens sit inseparabile, igitur est non sepa-
rabile, igitur non-separabile, dico quod ista propositio ‘hoc accidens est
inseparabile’ in communi locutione stat loco istius ‘hoc accidens ab ali-
quo subiecto est inseparabile’, et ideo, si cui placeat, potest distingui
secundum amphiboliam, et dici in sensu propria et in sensu transsump-
 speciei] se add. E – inseparabile] vel add. necnon del. E  logicaliter] logice
E  dicitur] ideo add. necnon del. E
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tivo vera secundum quod iam declaratum.8 Et totum intelligitur cum
constantia subiecti, scilicet quod aliquod accidens ab aliquo subiecto non
potest vere negari, dummodo hoc verbum ‘est’ de eodem subiecto signi-
Þcative sumpto veriÞcetur.
 Hic possent diverse conclusiones de separabilitate et inseparabilitate
accidentis poni, quas ad presens relinquo, quia infra ponentur detentius
suo loco.9
〈ad .〉 Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo maiorem pre-
cise loquendo de omni modo dierendi, sive per se, sive per accidens,
 sive proprie, sive transsumptive. Et ulterius negatur minor, quia omni
accidente circumscripto a Sorte, Sortes minus diert saltem per acci-
dens a Platone quam prius, quia prius dierebat a Platone secundum
accidens, et nunc non. Et dicitur Sortem dierre a Platone per suum acci-
dens duplici causa, primo quia ipsum accidens Sortis diert a Platone,
 secundo quia per suum accidens percipitur per se dierre a Platone, quia
accidentia magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quid est esse rei
secundum Aristotelem, primo De anima.10
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur quod aliquid per inseparabile accidens
ab alio diert quia per accidens 〈diert〉 numero, specie et genere, sicut
 Sortes suo accidente numero diert a Platone per accidens. Unde, quam-
rbvis circumscripto tali accidente | Sortes dierret adhuc numero a Platone,
hoc esset per se et non per accidens. Et consimiliter dicendum est de dif-
ferentia sive de dierre specie et genere, quia secundum tale accidens
Sortes diert a Platone specie et genere, sicut predictum est, quo acci-
 dente circumscripto non taliter dierret.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur negando assumptum istud, scilicet: nullum
accidens facit Sortem specie a Platone dierre, quia secundum quod
prehabitum est,11 aliquod accidens facit Sortem specie dierre a Platone
per accidens et non per se, quamvis etiam Sortes specie dierat a Platone
 per se, sicut in proxima questione patebit.12
 relinquo] relinco E | detentius]  litt. (?) add. necnon del. E
 Videas supra, q.  dist. .
 Videas infra, q.  dist.
 Aristoteles, De anima i, , b–. Auctoritates  (): ‘Accidentia magnam par-
tem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est, id est deÞnitio subjecti.’ (Aristoteles,
De anima, Α, b–).
 Videas supra, concl. .
 Videas infra, q.  concl. .
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〈ad argumenta in oppositum .〉 Ad argumentum in oppositum su -
cienter patet per predicta qualiter scilicet Porphirius sit intelligendus.
〈ad argumenta in oppositum .〉 Ad secundum etiam patet, quia
concedo quod aliquid per se ab alio diert per inseparabile accidens,
quia ipsummet inseparabile accidens vel aliquod compositum ex ipso
inseparabili accidente et subiecto ab alio diert per se, et hoc secundum
inseparabile accidens.
Et si dicatur quod sic sequeretur quod accidens inseparabile esset dif-
ferentia per se, quod est contra Porphirium in textu,13 qui dicit quod
tantummodo dierre speciÞce sit dierre per se, ad istud breviter dicitur
quod Porphirius vocat ibi dierentiam per se sive speciÞcam dieren-
tiam di nitivam sive substantialem. Sed in proposito vocatur dierre
per se dierre per se ipsa vel per suam partem, sive talis pars sit substan-
tia sive accidens.
〈Ad argumenta in oppositum .〉 Ad tertium patet per idem.
 alio] dierunt add. necnon del. E  sit] siat E
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘Magis proprie dierre alterum altero dicitur, quando
speciÞca dierentia distiterit (…)’
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum dierentia speciÞca
semper faceat aliquid ab alio dierre specie.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non.
 Quia si sic, tunc sequeretur quod duo individua eiusdem speciei spe-
cialissime dierrent specie, vel saltem specie dierrent. Sed consequens,
ut videtur, est falsum, igitur et antecedens. Et consequentia declara-
tur, quia: Sortes habet aliquam dierentiam speciÞcam quam non habet
Plato, posito quod Sortes sit albus et Plato niger. Tunc Sortes est disgre-
 gativus visus et Plato non est disgregativus visus, et per consequens ista
dierentia speciÞca disgregativus visus competit Sorti et non Platoni. Et
quod Sortes sit disgregativus visus tali casu posito probatur quia: omne
album est disgregativum visus; Sortes est albus; igitur Sortes est disgre-
gativus visus.
 〈.〉 Item. Nullus terminus facit aliquam rem vel aliquod individuum
reale ab alio specie dierre; sed omnis dierentia speciÞca est terminus;
igitur nulla dierentia speciÞca facit aliquod individuum ab alio specie
dierre. Maior videtur plana, quia nullo termino existente non minus
va| specie dierunt ista que prius specie dierebant, sicut nullo termino
 existente Sortes et asinus non minus specie dierrent. Et minor decla-
ratur quia: omne predicabele in quale est terminus; omnis dierentia
speciÞca est predicabilis in quale; 〈ergo〉 omnis dierentia speciÞca est
terminus. Maior istius adhuc patet, quia omne tale est aptum natum esse
pars propositionis. Et minor patet per di nitionem dierentie.
 〈.〉 Item. Si sic, tunc sequeretur quod ista dierentia mortale faceret
specie dierre, et per consequens omne mortale ab immortali specie
dierret. Consequentia declaratur evidens, quia secundum Porphirium1
mortale est dierentia speciÞca. Et falsitas consequentis declaratur, quia,
si sic, tunc sequeretur quod Sortes specie dierret a sua forma, scilicet
 ab anima intellectiva, cum Sortes sit mortalis et sua anima intellectiva sit
 termino] accidente add. necnon del. E  est]  litt. add. necnon del. E
 Consequentia] di add. necnon del. E
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –, ).
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immortalis, quia secundum Aristoteles, secundo De anima,2 ipsa anima
intellectiva est perpetua. Sed hoc consequens adhuc est falsum, quia,
si Sortes specie dierret a sua forma, cum omnis dierentia speciÞca
Þeret per aliquam speciem sive per aliquam formam, sicut elicitur ab
Aristotele, quinto Metaphysice,3 et septimo,4 sequeretur quod Sortes a sua
forma dierret per aliam formam, et pari ratione ab ista alia forma adhuc
per aliam formam, et sic in inÞnitum. Quod de se patet esse falsum,
quia secundum Aristotelem, primo Posteriorum5 et octavo Physicorum,6
in causis formalibus non est processus in inÞnitum.
〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum est Porphirius,7 qui dicit quod omnis
dierentia speciÞca facit aliud, idest: facit aliquid ab alio specie dierre,
alie vero dierentie faciunt alteratum.
〈distinctio prima〉 Premissis distinctionibus in duabus questionibus
immediate precedentibus presuppositis,8 apponitur adhuc una distinctio
quod talis duplex est dierentia speciÞca, scilicet formalis et materialis.
Formalis que Þt gratia alicuius forme; materialis que Þt gratia alicuius
materie. Formalis adhuc est duplex, nam quedam est substantialis, scili-
cet illa que est gratia alicuius forme substantialis, et quedam accidentalis,
scilicet ista que Þt gratia alicuius forme accidentalis. Accidentalis adhuc
 cum] ab add. necnon del. E  alio] alio corr. mg. E a.m.  alie] dierentie
add. necnon del. E | dierentie] dierentie sup. lin. E  prima] cum(?) add. E
 apponitur] una distinctio add. necnon del. et exp. E
 Aristoteles, De anima ii, , b–. Auctoritates  (): ‘Intellectus separatur
ab aliis potentiis animae sicut perpetuum a coruptibili.’ (Aristoteles, De anima,
Β, b–.) Cf. Aristoteles, De anima iii, , a; Auctoritates  ():
‘Intellectus est immortalis et perpetuus.’
 Aristoteles, Metaphysica v, , b–: ‘Diversa vero specie dicuntur quecumque
eiusdem generis existentia non sub invicem sunt et quecumque in eodem genere
existentia dierentiam habent, et quecumque in substantia contrarietatem habent’ –
rec. Guillelmi.
 Aristoteles, Metaphysica vii, b–.
 Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora i, , b–: ‘si enim est di nire aut si notum
est quod aliquod erat esse, inÞnita autem non est transire, necesse est Þniri in eo
quod quid est predicantia’ – tr. Iacobi. Auctoritates  (): ‘Impossibile est inÞnita
pertransire’ (Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora., Α, b–).
 Aristoteles, Physica viii.
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –, ): ‘Dierentiarum enim aliae quidem alteratum faciunt,
aliae vero aliud. Illae quidem quae faciunt aliud, speciÞcae vocantur, illae vero quae
alteratum, simpliciter dierentiae.’
 Videas supra, q.  dist. –, q.  dist. –.
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est duplex. Quia quedam Þt per se, et quedam per accidens. Per se, sicut
albedo, que est forma accidentalis, per se diert a nigredine; per acci-
dens, sicut Sortes secundum suam albedinem a Platone nigro specie per
accidens diert.
 〈distinctio secunda〉 Secunda distinctio est ista quod ‘species’ acci-
pitur dupliciter quantum est ad presens: uno modo pro forma reali
substantiali vel accidentali, alio modo pro termino mentali, vocali vel
scripto, qui quidem terminus est de pluribus predicabilis numero die-
rentibus in eo quod quid.
 〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista quod quecumque duo indi-
vidua alicuius speciei specie dierunt, dierunt qualitercumque accipi-
vbtur | ‘species’. Ista conclusio probatur sic: quecumque duo individua ali-
cuius speciei sunt et aliqua specie non sunt idem; igitur quecumque duo
individua alicuius speciei specie dierunt. Ista consequentia est plana,
 quia arguitur ab exponentibus ad expositam. Et antecedens quantum ad
primam particulam, scilicet quod quecumque duo individua alicuius
speciei sunt, est de se notum. Et secunda particula, scilicet quod quecum-
que duo individua alicuius speciei aliqua specie non sunt idem, etiam
patet, quia est una universalis cuius quelibet singularis est vera, et ideo
 patet inductive. Nam quibuscumque duobus individuis alicuius speciei
captis, ista aliqua specie non sunt idem, sicut Sortes et Plato aliqua spe-
cie non sunt idem, quia specie asinina non sunt idem, igitur aliqua specie
non sunt idem. Ista consequentia patet, quia arguitur ab inferiori ad supe-
rius postposita negatione. Que consequentia semper valet precipue cum
 substantia subiecti, sicut optime sequitur: aliquis homo non currit; et ali-
quid homo est; igitur aliquod animal non currit. Et consimiliter sequitur:
Sortes et Plato specie asinina non sunt idem; et species asina est; igitur
aliqua specie non sunt idem.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod nulla duo
 individua alicuius speciei substantialis dierunt specie substantiali. Ista
consequentia statim patet, quia, si sic, sequeretur quod alique duo indivi-
dua alicuius speciei erunt, et non erunt idem specie. Consequentia patet,
quia arguitur a propositione ad suas exponentes. Et falsitas consequentis
patet, quia includit contradictionem, scilicet quod alique duo individua
 essent eiusdem specie substantialis, et ista eadem non essent eiusdem
speciei substantialis.
 quelibet] singulis (?) add. necnon del. E  alicuius] species add. necnon del. E
 specie] speciei add. E
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〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod omne individuum
specie ab alio diert. Et sequitur ex prima conclusione, quia omne
individuum est, et specie cum alia non est idem.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod nullum indivi-
duum ab alio diert specie. Ista declaratur, quia si sic, tunc sequeretur
quod aliquod individuum esset et cum alio non esset idem specie. Quod
videtur esse falsum, quia quocumque individuo accepto istud cum omni
individuo est idem specie accidentali vel substantiali, sicut Sortes est
idem specie cum albedine, quia tam Sortes quam albedo sunt a parte
dextra alicuius vel eque distantes ab aliquo vel eque propinqua alicui, et
sic de aliis speciebus accidentalibus que quasi in inÞnitum possunt mul-
tiplicari, quia secundum Aristotelem, secundo Perihermeneias9 et primo
Physicorum10 inÞnita uni accidunt.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod aliquod indivi-
duum ab alio individuo diert specie substantiali. Ista statim patet quia
Sortes ab albedine diert specie substantiali, quia Sortes est et Sortes
albedini non est idem aliqua specie substantiali.
ra 〈conclusio sexta〉 Sexta conclusio est ista | quod nullo termino
existente nulla sunt eiusdem speciei accipiendo ‘speciem’ pro termino.
Ista statim patet quia tunc nulla continentur sub tali specie quia per
casum nulla talis species est.
〈conclusio septima〉 Septima conclusio est ista quod accipiendo
‘speciem’ pro forma reali et non pro termino, aliqua sunt eiusdem speciei
nullo termino existente. Ista conclusio patet, quia aliqua sunt eiusdem
forme, utpote caput Sortis et pes Sortis, quia sunt eiusdem speciei sicut
anime secundum communem opinionem que tenet quod anima intel-
lectiva alicuius est in tota et in qualibet eius parte.
〈conclusio octava〉 Octava conclusio est ista quod eodem modo
accipiendo ‘speciem’ nulla duo individua suppositionaliter discreta ita
quod non sint partes alicuius alterius per se unius, sunt eiusdem speciei,
quia nulla talia duo individua sint eiusdem forme nec accidentalis nec
substantialis, sicut de se patet, saltem secundum communem opinionem.
〈conclusio nona〉 Nona conclusio est ista quod aliqua individua
suppositionaliter discreta sunt earundem specierum, idest: consimilium
 alio] aliquo E  existente] accistente E  termino]  litt. add. necnon del. E
 in] de add. necnon del. et exp. E  duo] dua E | discreta] ista add. necnon del. E
 Aristoteles, De interpretatione . Locus non inventus.
 Aristoteles, Physica i. Locus non inventus.
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specierum ultimatarum, similitudine substantiali, quia anima Sortis et
anima Platonis non possunt similiores esse quam sunt. Et ad istum intel-
lectum conceditur communiter ista propositio: ‘Sortes et Plato sunt eius-
dem speciei specialissime nullo termino existente’, que quidem proprie
 falsa est de virtute sermonis sive in sensu proprio, sed vera est in sensu
transsumptivo. Et est sensus ‘Sortes et Plato habent formas similes ulti-
mata similitudine’, et hoc extendendo nomen ‘similitudinis’ ad substan-
tiam.
〈conclusio decima〉 In isto igitur sensu transsumptivo sequuntur
 alique conclusiones, quarum una est ista, et est decima in ordine, quod
aliqua duo individua que sunt eius〈dem〉 speciei specialissime, sunt
diversarum specierum. Ista statim patet, quia aliqua duo individua que
habent similissimas formas substantiales, habent dissimiles formas acci-
dentales, sicut posito quod Sortes sit albus et Plato niger, tunc Sortes et
 Plato habent similissimas formas substantiales, quia duas animas intel-
lectivas, et per consequens transsumptive loquendo sunt eiusdem speciei
specialissime substantialis, et habent albedinem et nigredinem que sunt
diverse species accidentales, et per consequens sunt diversarum specie-
rum accidentalium.
 〈conclusio undecima〉 Undecima conclusio est ista quod Sortes et
Plato et quecumque alia individua substantialia composita ex materia
et forma sunt per se alterius speciei substantialis non tamen primo, quia
rbSortes secundum | suam materiam que est sua pars essentialis, est alterius
speciei a Platone. Et patet totum.
 〈conclusio duodecima〉 Duodecima conclusio est ista quod die-
rentia speciÞca substantialis de qua loquitur Porphirius, semper facit
aliud, et hoc transsumptive loquendo ad istum intellectum quod talis
dierentia est medium concludendi aliqua duo esse dierentium forma-
rum substantialium, et per consequens quod talia duo habent dissimiles
 formas substantiales, sicut sic arguendo: ‘nullum rationale est asinus;
omnis homo est rationalis; igitur nullus homo est asinus’. In ista syllo-
gismo hec dierentia speciÞca rationale est medium vere concludendi
hominem non esse asinum. Qui quidem homo et asinus habent dissimi-
les formas substantiales, nec aliqua talis dierentia potest esse medium
 concludendi diversitatem inter aliqua, nisi ista duo etiam habeant for-
mas substantiales similes vel ultimatas similitudine substantiale. Et hoc
 est] iste add. necnon del. E  ex]  litt. add. necnon del. E  hec] hec ex
horum(?) E
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est quod Porphirius vult dicere, scilicet quod dierentia speciÞca semper
facit aliud, et non tantum alteratum.
〈ad .〉 Ad primum principale dicitur concedendo consequens, quia
non tantum duo individua eiusdem speciei specialissime aliqua specie
accidentali dierunt, sed etiam aliqua specie substantiali, sicut patet
per predicta.11 Et etiam conceditur quod duo individua eiusdem speciei
specialissime substantialis sunt diversarum specierum specialissimarum
accidentalium, sicut prius declaratum est.12
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur quod maior est falsa accipiendo ‘dierre’
transsumptive, quia sic staret loco istius propositionis ‘nullus terminus
est medium concludendi aliqua specie dierre’, sed accipiendo ‘facere
dierre’ proprie, tunc bene posset concedi, sed sic non est ad propositum
argumenti, nec etiam ad propositum Porphirii.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium vere breviter dicitur concedendo conclusionem,
scilicet quod Sortes specie diert a sua forma non primo, sed per se, quia
secundum suam partem essentialem, scilicet suam materiam. Et ulterius
negatur quod omnis dierentia speciÞca Þt per aliquam speciem precise
quia potest Þeri etiam per materiam sicut Sortes specie diert a sua
specie, per suam materiam et non per aliquam speciem substantialem.
Et ideo Sortes materialiter diert sua forma speciÞca et non formaliter
〈ad argumentum in oppositum〉 Ad argumentum in oppositum, qua-
liter scilicet Porphirius sit intelligendus, patet per superius dicta,13 quia
vult dicere quod nulla dierentia speciÞca substantialis erit medium vere
concludendi aliqua dierre nisi ista specie dierant, idest: nisi habeant
dissimiles formas substantiales substantialiter.
 diversarum] sub add. necnon del. E
 Videas supra, concl. .
 Videas supra, concl. .
 Videas supra, concl. .
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〈questio 〉
vaConsequenter queritur | utrum omne faciens
per se dierre sit dierentia speciÞca.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non.
 Nullum proprium est dierentia speciÞca; aliquod faciens per se dif-
ferre est proprium; igitur aliquid faciens per se dierre non est dierentia
speciÞca. Maior videtur evidens, quia proprium et dierentia speciÞca
sunt species desparate eque primo dividentes aliquod genus; igitur, ut
videtur, unum universaliter ab alio vere negatur. Et minor probatur, quia:
 omne faciens dierre, vel facit per se dierre, vel per accidens; sed pro-
prium non facit per accidens; igitur per se. Assumptum videtur de se
notum, et quod proprium faciat dierre, patet per textum,1 quia acci-
dens facit dierre, igitur a multo fortiori proprium. Et quod proprium
non faciat dierre per accidens, patet primo quia proprium non est acci-
 dens, quia sunt species distincte; secundo quia, cuicumque competit
proprium, sic competit per se secundo modo, sicut satis elicitur ab Aris-
totele, primo Posteriorum.2
〈.〉 Item. Si sic, sequeretur quod genus esset dierentia speciÞca.
Consequens, ut videtur, est falsum, quia nullum genus predicatur in
 quale, igitur nullum genus est dierentia speciÞca. Et prima consequen-
tia declaratur, quia omne genus facit per se dierre, et hoc sive accipiatur
‘facere dierre’ proprie sive transsumptive. Proprie, quia facit seipsum
dierre per se; transsumptive, quia est medium vel potest esse medium
syllogisticum ad concludendum alique per se dierentie, sic arguendo:
 ‘omne animal per se diert a lapide; omnis homo est animal; igitur omnis
homo per se diert a lapide’.
〈.〉 Item. Si sic, sequeretur quod aliquod accidens esset dierentia
speciÞca. Consequens, ut videtur, est falsum ratione qua prius. Et con-
sequentia declaratur, quia aliquod accidens facit per se dierre, nam hec
 dierentia 〈rationalis〉 est accidens, igitur accidens facit per se dierre.
 dierre] utrum omne add. necnon del. E
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –).
 Arisoteles Analytica posteriora i, locus non inventus.
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Maior est de se nota, et patet expresse per textum.3 Et consimiliter
〈dierentia〉 speciÞca facit per se dierre; hec dierentia rationalis est
dierentia speciÞca; igitur hec dierentia rationalis facit per se dierre.
Tam maior quam minor patet per textum.4 Et minor declaratur, ista scili-
cet hec dierentia rationalis sit accidens, quia est accidens materie, igitur
est accidens. Consequentia nota. Et antecedens declaratur, quia hec est
per accidens: ‘ista materia est rationalis’ demonstrata materia alicuius
hominis, quia manifeste 〈de〉 ista materia potest hoc predicatum ratio-
nalis successive vere a rmari et negari ab eodem. Et quod poterit vere
a rmari patet, quia ista materia est habens rationem vel animam intel-
lectivam, igitur ista materia est rationalis, sicut sequitur: ‘ista materia est
habens demonstrationem, igitur est demonstrabilis vel demonstrata’. Et
quod poterit non esse rationalis, de se notum est.
〈.〉 Item. Si sic, sequeretur quod aliquod accidens proprie possit di -
vb niri. Falsitas consequentis | patet per Aristotelem, septimo Metaphysice.5
Consequentia declaratur, quia, si sic, sequeretur quod ista dierentia
disgregativus visus esset dierentia speciÞca, quia facit albedinem per se
dierre a nigredine, et per consequens albedo haberet genus et dieren-
tiam speciÞcam. Et tunc sic: omne habens genus et dierentiam potest
habere proprie di nitionem; albedo est huiusmodi; igitur albedo potest
habere proprie di nitionem. Et per consequens aliquod accidens potest
habere proprie di nitionem. Maior istius rationis patet per Aristotelem,
sexto Topicorum6 et septimo Metaphysicorum,7 et etiam patet per textum
Porphirii.8 Et minor patet, si omne faciens per se dierre sit dierentia
speciÞca.
 proprie] proprie Ec  Metaphysicorum]  litt. (?) add. necnon del. E  minor]
etiam add. necnon del. E
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –).
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘Magis proprie dierre alterum altero dicitur, quando
speciÞca dierentia distiterit, quemadmodum homo ab equo speciÞca dierentia
diert rationali qualitate.’
 Aristoteles, Metaphysica vii, , a–: ‘solius substantie est di nitio’ – rec.
Guillelmi.
 Aristoteles, Topica vi, , b–: ‘quidem oportet per genus et dierentias di -
nire eum qui bene di nit’ – tr. Boethii. Auctoritates  (): ‘Omnis bona deÞnitio
debet constare ex genere et dierentiis (…)’ (Aristoteles, Topica, Z, b–).
 Aristoteles, Metaphysica vii, , b–: ‘Nichil enim aliud est in di nitione
quam primum dictum genus et dierentie’ – rec. Guillelmi. Auctoritates  ():
‘Nihil aliud debet esse in deÞnitione nisi genus et dierentia.’ (Aristoteles, Metaphys.,
Z, b–).
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –).
questio  
2011013 [Van der Helm] 02-Edition-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 327
〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum arguitur per Porphirium,9 qui dicit quod
dierentie per se sint dierentie speciÞce. Unde dicit sic:10 ‘inseparabi-
lium alie sunt per se, alie vero per accidens’. Et postea dicit:11 ‘igitur ille
que per se sunt, in ratione substantie accipiuntur et faciunt aliud’, idest:
 faciunt speciÞce dierentiam.
〈solutio questionis〉 In ista questione primo premittitur una declara-
tio, secundo apponitur una distinctio, tertio eliciuntur quedam conclu-
siones, et quarto solventur rationes principales.
〈declaratio〉 Circa primum igitur est sciendum quod omnis perceptio
 aliquorum dierentium primo Þt per sensum vel presupponit sensatio-
nem qua percipiuntur alique dierentie, nam ex hoc quod alique duo
corpora sentiuntur esse in diversis locis, percipimus talia dierre sal-
tem numero, et quia omnis sensatio est principaliter respectu alicuius
accidentis, ideo prius imponimus aliquem terminum ad signiÞcandum
 aliquod accidens vel accidentaliter mediante quo concludimus talia dif-
ferre. Et talis terminus vocatur ‘dierentia communiter dicta’, eo quod
communis consideratio sive magis confusa precedit considerationem
discretam.
Deinde discretius considerando percipimus adhuc sensatione alique
 accidentia magis propria talium dierentium, utpote aliquod accidens
inseparabile, vel saltem non communiter vel leviter separabile, et secun-
dum talem considerationem imponimus unum terminum ad signiÞ-
candum istud accidens vel accidentaliter; qui quidem terminus non
potest per aliquem processum naturalem vere negari a tali subiecto ipso
 manente. Et talis terminus logicaliter loquendo vocatur ‘accidens insepa-
rabile’ et ‘dierentia proprie dicta’, eo quod 〈per〉 proprius et convenien-
tius sive intentius sive †illativus(?)† illius vel connotatum convenit tali
subiecto quia inseparabiliter, et quia potest esse medium syllogisticum ad
concludendum distinctius talia dierre. Precedentibus igitur istis sensa-
 rationibus sive visionibus accidentium, | quia accidentia magnam partem
conferunt ad cognoscendum quid est rei, sicut vult Aristoteles, primo
 sive] acc add. necnon del. E; con add. E
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –, ).
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘Inseparabilium autem aliae quidem sunt per se, aliae vero
per accidens (…)’
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘Illae igitur quae per se sunt, in substantiae ratione acci-
piuntur et faciunt aliud (…)’
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De anima,12 procedimus ulterius ex talibus actibus sive operationibus ad
inquerendum de essentia talis rei mediante qua inquisitione primo per-
cipimus in tali composito formam substantialem a qua procedunt tales
operationes vel talia accidentia. Et tunc imponimus aliquem terminum
ad signiÞcandum vel cognoscendum talem formam. Et quia talis termi-
nus potest esse medium syllogismi ad concludendum aliqua speciÞce
dierre eo quod mediantibus talibus diversis formis percipimus aliqua
speciÞce dierre, ideo vocamus talem terminum ‘dierentiam speciÞ-
cam’ sive ‘dierentiam magis proprie dictam’ a tali specie sive a tali forma.
Deinde adhuc ulterius investigando per transitionem et per corruptio-
nem sive per separationem et generationem talis forme, percipimus ibi
aliam partem essentialem, scilicet materiam, ratione cuius imponimus
aliquem terminum concretum 〈ad〉 signiÞcandum suum connotatum
ipsius materie. Et quia talis terminus potest esse medium syllogisticum
ad concludendum aliqua speciÞce dierre, extendendo nomen ‘speciei’
ad naturam, ut isti dicuntur speciÞce dierre que sunt diversarum natu-
rarum et dissimilium substantialiter. Ideo adhuc vocamus talem termi-
num ‘dierentiam speciÞcam’ et ‘dierentiam essentialem’, quia conno-
tat partem essentialem sive specialem connotative alicuius extrinseci.
Et talis terminus potest dici secundum aliquam suam signiÞcationem
potentia vel pura potentia, quia sic arguendo: ‘omnis pura potentia est
alterius speciei a composito ex actu et potentia, vel ab actu; sed materia
est pura potentia; igitur materia prima est alterius speciei a composito
ex actu et potentia; vel etiam 〈ab〉 actu’. Prima dierentia vocatur a Por-
phirio13 ‘accidens separabile’; secunda vocatur ‘accidens inseparabile’, et
potest se extendere ad proprium; tertia vocatur dierentia que est unum
de quinque universalibus, sive speciÞca dierentia.
〈distinctio〉 Distinctio apponenda est ista quod ‘dierentia per se’ acci-
pitur multipliciter.
Uno modo, scilicet large pro omni eo quod predicatur per se de ali-
quo, et potest esse medium syllogisticum ad concludendum signiÞcatum
 terminum] concr(?) add. necnon del. E | signiÞcandum] vel connotative ipsius mate-
rie vel add. necnon del. E  ipsius] mane(?) add. necnon del. E | materie] medie(?)
sup. lin. E  ab] ex E
 Aristoteles, De anima i, , b–. Auctoritates  (): ‘Accidentia magnam
partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est, id est subjectum sive deÞnitio
subjecti.’ (Aristoteles, De anima, Α, b–).
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –).
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illius de quo veriÞcatur ab alio speciÞce dierre, et connotat specialiter
aliquem partem essentialem vel aliquod accidens, formaliter procedens
sive materialiter ab aliqua tali parte vel a toto composito ex talibus parti-
rbbus. Et isto modo | omne proprium est dierentia per se et precise omne
 proprium substantiale. Et isto modo non loquitur secundum aliquos Por-
phirius de dierentia.
Cuius oppositum tamen ad presens ego credo, quia loquens de dif-
ferentia per se ponit quedam exempla de proprio, sicut patet capitulo
de dierentia,14 ubi dicit sic: ‘nam rationale per se inest homini, et mor-
 tale, et esse perceptibile discipline’, et clarum est quod esse perceptibile
est proprium et non dierentia substantiallis, quia signiÞcat discrete sive
connotat aliquid extra essentiam hominis, scilicet disciplinam.
Dierentia vero per se stricte vocatur aliquis terminus discrete signiÞ-
cans vel connotans aliquam partem essentialem compositi ex materia et
 forma nihil extrinsecum discrete connotans sive signiÞcans, potens esse
medium syllogisticum ad concludendum aliqua speciÞce dierre. Et de
ista dierentia dicunt aliqui quod Porphirius loquitur, quando facit men-
tionem de dierentiis per se. Et ista est dierentia completiva di nitionis
proprie dicte.
 〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista quod aliquid facit per se
dierre quod non est dierentia speciÞca, quia omne quod est, facit
seipsum ab alio per se dierre, quia seipso a quocumque alio diert, et
tamen non omne quod est, est dierentia speciÞca.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod accipiendo
 transsumptive ‘facere dierre’, aliquid facit per se dierre quod non est
dierentia speciÞca, ad istum intellectum quod aliquid predicatur primo
modo dicendi per se de aliquo subiecto, et potest esse medium syllo-
gisticum ad concludendum signiÞcatum illius subiecti ab alio speciÞce
dierre, quod tamen non est dierentia speciÞca. Ista statim patet, quia
 omne genus per se primo modo predicatur de sua specie, et potest 〈esse〉
medium syllogisticum ad concludendum signiÞcatum sue speciei ab alia
specie dierre, et tamen non omne genus est dierentia speciÞca. Et
quod omne genus sit huiusmodi, patet per argumentum ad principale
factum, scilicet in isto argumento: ‘omne animal est alterius speciei a
 perceptibile] disl add. necnon del. E  esse] est E
 Isagoge, iii,  (, ): ‘(…) nam rationale per se inest homini et mortale et disciplinae
esse perceptibile (…)’
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lapide; omnis homo est animal; igitur, omnis 〈homo〉 est alterius speciei
a lapide; ergo, 〈homo〉 et lapis speciÞce dierunt’. Et sic potest argui per
quodcumque aliud genus respectu sue speciei.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod eodem modo acci-
piendo ‘facere dierre’ aliquid connotans aliquam formam facit per se
dierre quod non est dierentia speciÞca. Ista declaratur, quia aliquid
connotans aliquam formam predicatur per se saltem secundo modo
dicendi per se de aliquo subiecto, et potest esse medium syllogisticum
va | concludendi signiÞcatum talis subiecti ab alio speciÞce dierre; et non
est dierentia speciÞca; igitur aliquid connotans aliquam formam facit
per se dierre, quod tamen non est dierentia speciÞca. Consequentia
videtur evidens. Et antecedens patet de omni proprio, sicut istud pro-
prium risibile connotat aliquam formam, quia actum ridendi vel formam
a qua procedit actus ridendi, et tamen nullum proprium est dierentia
speciÞca.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod omne conno-
tans formam intrinsecam et non extrinsecam, quod predicatur primo
modo dicendi per se de aliquo subiecto, et potest esse medium syllogisti-
cum concludendi signiÞcatum talis subiecti a quocumque alio speciÞce
dierre, est dierentia speciÞca, quia omne tale imponitur ad signiÞ-
candum concretive signiÞcatum talis subiecti connotando partem for-
malem eiusdem a rmative vel negative, nihil extrinsecum connotando
mediante qua forma percipimus istud signiÞcatum ab alio speciÞce dif-
ferre. Sed hec dierentia rationale concretive signiÞcat hominem conno-
tando animam intellectivam a rmative mediante qua percipimus homi-
nem ab asino speciÞce dierre. Et ista dierentia mortale signiÞcat con-
cretive omne vivum corruptibile connotando animam negative, scilicet
ipsum posse separari a materia in qua est, et nullum extrinsecum con-
notat. Et iste dierentie predicantur de se de subiecto primo modo, quia
sunt partes di nitionis propria dicte. Ex isto sequitur unum correlarium,
videlicet quod aliqua dierentia connotat formam tam a rmative quam
negative, sicut iste dierentia composita rationale mortale.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod aliquid est die-
rentia speciÞca quod non discrete connotat aliquam formam. Ista decla-
ratur sic: nam aliquid est quod predicatur de subiecto primo modo
dicendi per se, et connotat vel signiÞcat partem essentialem signiÞcati
 homo] omnis E  subiecti]  litt. (?) add. necnon del. E  qua] conce add.
necnon del. E  vivum] cor … (?) add. necnon del. E  aliquam] speciem add.
necnon del. E | formam] formam sup. lin. Ec
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talis subiecti, et potest esse medium concludendi tale signiÞcatum ab alio
speciÞce dierre, et non connotat discrete aliquam formam; igitur, ali-
qua est dierentia speciÞca, que non connotat aliquam formam discrete.
Consequentia videtur evidens, quia conditiones accepte in antecedente
 su ciunt ad hoc quod aliquid Þt dierentia speciÞca. Et antecedens
declaratur, quia iste terminus ‘habens puram potentiam’ veriÞcatur de
vbhomine primo modo dicendi per se, quia potest poni in di nitione |
naturali, sicut in ista di nitione: ‘homo est habens puram potentiam et
animam intellectivam tamquam suas partes essentiales’. Et iste terminus
 ‘pura potentia’ non discrete connotat aliquam formam et signiÞcat par-
tem essentialem compositi, vel connotat materiam, igitur etcetera.
〈ad .〉 Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo conclusionem,
scilicet quod aliquid faciens per se dierre non est dierentia speciÞca. Et
ad Porphirium dicitur quod ipse loquitur de ‘per se’ primo modo, hoc est
 dictu omne istud quod per se primo modo veriÞcatur de aliquo subiecto
connotans partem essentialem signiÞcati illius subiecti nihil extrinsecum
connotando, est dierentia speciÞca illius, et potest esse simul cum hoc
medium syllogisticum ad probandum istud signiÞcatum ab aliquo specie
dierre.
 〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur negando consequentiam, scilicet quod
si genus faciat per se dierre, quod sit dierentia speciÞca, et causa est,
quia oportet plus addere, scilicet quod connotat discrete aliquam partem
essentialem sui signiÞcati, nihil extrinsecum connotando, et hoc non
facit genus.
 Et si dicatur quod hoc genus animal videtur discrete connotare partem
essentialem, scilicet animam, quia ‘animal’ dicitur ab ‘anima’, ad istud
dicitur ab aliquibus quod, quamvis ‘animal’ 〈ab〉 nomine ipsius ‘anime’
fuit impositum ad signiÞcandum, tamen fuit impositum absolute, et
non connotative ita quod per talem impositionem non potius connotat
 animam quam corpus. Alii dicunt, et forte melius, quod oportet talem
connotationem Þeri adiective et non subiective. Unde, quamvis ‘animal’
connotat animam, hoc tamen non est adiective. Sed de hoc plus patebit
infra.15
 alio] b add. E  illius] ista add. E  dicitur] ned(?) add. necnon del. E
 scilicet] animal quia add. necnon del. E  aliquibus] qui add. necnon del. E
| nomine] nominis E
 Videas infra, q. .
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〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur concedendo quod aliquod accidens est dif-
ferentia speciÞca, sed non illius cuius est accidens. Unde ista dierentia
rationale est dierentia speciÞca hominis, et non materie hominis. Unde
bene conceditur quod aliquid idem respectu diversorum est dierentia
speciÞca, et accidens separabile et inseparabile.
〈ad .〉 Ad quartum dicitur negando quod accidens saltem pro suo
signiÞcato proprie posset di niri. Et ulterius conceditur quod, quamvis
ra accidens habeat dierentiam per se, non tamen speciÞcam | secundum
quod loquitur Porphirius, quia ipse loquitur de dierentia speciÞca que
potius imponitur ad signiÞcandum ratione unius partis essentialis quam
alterius, quia oportet quod connotet discrete alteram partem essentia-
lem, et non omnem. Et sic non facit aliquam dierentiam accidentis, quia
ista dierentia ‘disgregativum visus’ non potius connotat unam partem
albedinis quam aliam, et simul cum hoc connotat aliquod extrinsecum,
utpote visum.
〈ad argumentum in oppositum〉 Ad argumentum in oppositum, qua-
liter scilicet Porphirius sit intelligendus, patet per supra dicta.
 que] que corr. ex quia E
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum dierentia
per se suscipit magis et minus.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod sic:
 omnis conceptus potest intendi et remitti, et per consequens potest
suscipere magis et minus; aliqua dierentia per se est conceptus; igitur
aliqua dierentia per se potest indendi et remitti. Maior videtur evidens,
quia secundum Aristotelem in Predicamentis, capitulo de qualitate,1 ali-
quid potest esse sapientior alio et iustior alio, quod non esset si scientia et
 iustitia, que sunt subiective in anima, non posse〈n〉t intendi et remitti, et
pari ratione omnis conceptus potest intendi et remitti. Item, experientia
patet quod aliquando concipimus aliquid intentius et aliquid remissius.
Et minor patet quia: omne signum de pluribus predicabile est mentale,
vocale, vel scriptum; omnis dierentia est huiusmodi, sicut patet per dif-
 Þnitionem dierentie; igitur, etcetera.
〈.〉 Item. Omnis vox potest intendi et remitti; aliqua dierentia per se
est vox; igitur etcetera. Maior apparet evidens, quia due voces omnino
similes possunt esse in eodem subiecto simul, et per consequens una
intendit aliam, sicut patet duobus luminibus in eodem subiecto existen-
 tibus unum intendit aliud. Et minor patet sicut prius.2
〈.〉 Item. Anima intenditur, igitur dierentia que accipitur ab anima.
Consequentia est satis evidens. Et antecedens demonstratur, quia expe-
rimento apparet quod puer continue crescit in fortitudine, et per con-
sequens puer est magis, et magis fortis, et non nisi per animam; igitur
 anima maioratur, et non extensive, sicut patet per Aristotelem et Com-
mentatorem, tertio De anima,3 igitur intensive.
〈.〉 Item. Omne habens contrarium suscipit magis et minus; dieren-
rbtia per se habet contrarium; igitur dierentia | per se suscipit magis et
 omnis] consi add. necnon del. E  anima] magis add. necnon del. E
 Aristoteles, Predicamenta, , a: ‘magis enim grammaticus alter altero dicitur et
iustior et sanior.’ – tr. Boethii.
 Videas supra, .
 Locus non inventus.
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minus. Maior potest elici ab Aristotele, quinto Physicorum,4 ubi vult quod
omne quod Þt minus tale, Þt minus tale per adventitionem sui contrarii.
Et minor etiam patet, quia rationale et irrationale contrariantur, nam sub
eodem genere maxima distant, et vicissim se expellunt quia ante adven-
tum anime intellective corpus existens in utero materno est irrationale,
et postea rationale.
〈.〉 Item. Experimento patet quod unus homo est magis rationalis
quam alius, quia magis utens ratione.
〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum est Porphirius,5 qui dicit quod ille dif-
ferentie que per se sunt, non suscipiunt magis et minus. Et probat hoc
sic:6 ‘nam neque genus aut magis aut minus predicatur de eo cuius fuerit
genus, neque generis dierentie secundum quas dividitur’, et sequitur:
‘ipse enim sunt que uniuscuiusque rationem complent, esse autem uni-
cuique unum et idem est, neque intentionem neque remissionem susci-
pient.’
〈distinctio〉 In ista questione presuppositis adhuc precedentibus dis-
tinctionibus, precipue 〈de〉 dierentia per se, addo unam distinctionem
que talis est, scilicet quod ‘suscipere magis et minus’ potest accipi dupli-
citer, scilicet realiter et logicaliter. Realiter quando aliquid in essentia sua
intenditur vel remittitur per aliquid simile sibi adveniens, vel ab eo rece-
dens, sicut dicimus calorem intendi per appositionem caloris, et lumen
per appositionem luminis. Logicaliter sive predicative, quando aliquis
terminus de aliquo veriÞcatur aliquando cum hoc adverbio ‘magis’, et ali-
quando cum hoc adverbio ‘minus’, sicut dicimus album intendi vel susci-
pere magis et minus, quia aliquando album veriÞcatur de suo subiecto
cum adverbio ‘magis’, et aliquando cum hoc adverbio ‘minus’.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista quod omnis dierentia sive
per se sive per accidens mentalis potest intendi vel potest remitti realiter,
sicut probat primum argumentum.7
 vicissim] seq. lac.  litt. E  presuppositis] pre add. necnon del. E
 Cf. supra, q. , concl. . Locus non inventus.
 Isagoge, iii,  (, ): ‘Et illae quidem quae per se sunt, non suscipiunt magis et
minus.’
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘(…) nam neque genus aut magis aut minus praedicatur
cuius fuerit genus, neque generis dierentiae, secundum quas dividitur, ipsae enim
sunt quae uniuscuiusque rationem complent, esse autem unicuique unum et idem
neque intentionem neque remissionem suscipiens est (…)’
 Videas supra, .
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〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod nihil suscipit
magis et minus secundum idem realiter. Ista patet, quia, si sic, sequeretur
quod idem secundum idem intenditur et remittitur.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod nihil suscipit magis
 et minus logicaliter secundum idem, respectu eiusdem. Quia si sic, tunc
sequeretur quod aliquid esset minus album et magis album secundum
idem precise respectu eiusdem, quod includit contradictionem.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod aliquid suscipit
vamagis et minus secundum idem respectu diversorum, | quia aliquid est
 magis album Sorte, et minus album Platone, posito casu possibili. Sed de
isto plus patebit supra Predicamenta.8
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod probabiliter po-
test teneri quod aliqua dierentia per se potest suscipere magis et minus
tam logicaliter quam realiter. Et quod realiter, patet per primam con-
 clusionem.9 Et quod logicaliter declaratur, nam omnis species substantie
composite habet vel potest habere dierentiam per se, sicut satis elicitur
ab Aristotele, septimo Metaphysice.10
Item. Aliqua habet vel potest habere, et non maiori ratione una quam
alia, igitur omnis habet vel potest habere, igitur ignis habet vel potest
 habere. Ponatur igitur in esse, et vocetur dierentia per se ipsius ignis
accepta a sua forma substantiali B. Tunc sic probabiliter potest teneri
quod forma ignis potest intendi et potest remitti realiter. Igitur, proba-
biliter potest teneri quod dierentia accepta a tali forma potest susci-
pere magis et minus logicaliter. Ista consequentia est evidens. Et ante-
 cedens patet per Commentatorem, tertio Coeli, commento sexagesimo
septimo,11 ubi ponit formas substantiales elementorum posse intendi et
posse remitti, nec video argumentum multum cogens quin idem posset
teneri de quacumque forma substantiali alicuius substantie augmentabi-
lis et nutribilis preter argumentum de pluralitate rerum †videnda(?)†.
 〈conclusio sexta〉 Sexta conclusio est ista quod nulla dierentia
per se primo modo potest suscipere magis et potest suscipere minus
 et] au (?)add. necnon del. E  album] albus E | possibili] vacat add. necnon del.
a.m. E  Aristotele] Aristoteles E
 omas Manlevelt, Questiones super Praedicamenta, Erfurt sb Ampl. q  (xiv)
.rb–vb, q. , utrum qualitas suscipiat magis et minus (. rb–rb); q. ,
utrum aliqua quarte speciei qualitatis suscipiat magis et minus (. rb–ra).
 Videas supra, concl. .
 Aristoteles, Metaphysica vii, b–a.
 Locus non inventus.
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logicaliter secundum communem opinionem. Ista patet per textum Por-
phirii in argumento ad oppositum allegato ex predictis conclusionibus,
quamvis plures alie possint elici quas studiosis reli〈qu〉untur, quia supra
Predicamenta diusius patebit de ista materia.12
〈ad .〉 Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo conclusionem
in sensu composito, et non de copulato extremo, sicut patet per predictas
conclusiones.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum patet per idem.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur negando quod anima intenditur, et ulte-
rius dicitur concedendo quod puer continue fortiÞcatur, et hoc princi-
paliter et formaliter per animam. Et ulterius negatur consequentia ‘igi-
tur anima intenditur’, quia idem agens precise potest †in(?) formatio-
nes(?)aorens(?) numero(?) intrinseca(?)† sicut homo fortius potest per-
cutere †g-i-la-a† quas †scira-ve(?)†. Et consimiliter eadem anima precise
mediante corpore pueri debilius agit, et mediante corpore adolescen-
tis. Quod aptius est ad operandum mediante augmentatione nutritiva,
postea fortius agit. Ista igitur fortitudo maioratur extensive et non inten-
vb sive, | nisi ponatur quod fortitudo sit quid accidens distributum anime
forti. De qua patebit forte in questione de naturalibus potentiis,13 et in isto
capitulo de qualitate.14
〈ad .〉 Ad quartum dicitur concedendo quod dierentia per se habet
contrarium large accipiendo ‘contrarium’ secundum quod probat argu-
mentum, sed non stricte, quia ad hoc oporteret quod forma a qua acci-
pitur talis dierentia, posset realiter intendi et posset realiter remitti. Et
ulterius dicitur quod auctoritas Aristotelis non est ad propositum, quia
Aristoteles vult dicere quod omne quod potest intendi et quod potest
remitti, habet contrarium, sed non dicit quod omne quod habet con-
trarium, potest intendi et potest remitti. Quia aliquid habet contrarium
logicaliter loquendo quod non recipit remissionem secundum admix-
tionem sui contrarii. Et ideo consequentia non valet, ista scilicet: ‘aliqua
– percutere] percuttere E – adolescentis] addolescentis E
 omas Manlevelt, Questiones super Praedicamenta, Erfurt sb Ampl. q  (xiv)
.rb–vb, q. , utrum dierentia substantialis sit substantia (. ra–vb).
 omas Manlevelt, Questiones super Praedicamenta, Erfurt sb Ampl. q  (xiv)
.rb–vb, q. , utrum naturalis potentia vel impotentia sit secunda species qua-
litatis (. va–ra); q. , utrum omnis potentia naturalis sit accidens (. ra–vb).
 omas Manlevelt, Questiones super Praedicamenta, Erfurt sb Ampl. q  (xiv)
.rb–vb, q. , utrum omnis qualitas sit accidens (.vb–rb).
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dierentia per se habet contrarium; igitur aliqua dierentia per se susci-
pit magis et minus’.
〈ad .〉 Ad quintum dicitur quod non experimur unum hominem
magis rationalem quia non magis habet animam intellectivam, quamvis
 experimur unum hominem magis rationalem, et hoc non est idem.
〈ad argumentum in oppositum〉 Intentio Porphirii quodam modo
patet per predicta.
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum hec dierentia animatum
sensibile sit constitutiva substantie animalis.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non.
Nullum accidens est constitutivum substantie animalis; hec dierentia
est accidens; igitur non est constitutiva substantie animalis. Maior est de
se nota, quia accidens non est constitutivum alicuius substantie, quia ex
natura accidentis non constituitur substantia, sicut vult Aristoteles primo
Physicorum.1 Et minor declaratur, quia hec dierentia vocalis est vox, et
omnis vox est accidens.
〈.〉 Item. Omne istud quod constituit substantiam animalis, est mate-
ria vel forma animalis; sed hec dierentia animatum sensibile non est
materia vel forma animalis; igitur hec dierentia animatum sensibile non
constituit substantiam animalis. Maior patet, quia tantum materia et
forma sunt partes essentiales animalis. Et minor videtur etiam evidens,
quia hec dierentia animatum sensibile est quoddam signum de pluribus
predicabile, et per consequens non est materia vel forma animalis.
〈.〉 Item. Animatum sensibile non est dierentia, igitur non est die-
rentia constitutiva substantie animalis. Consequentia est plana. Et ante-
cedens declaratur, nam: nullum genus est dierentia; animatum sensibile
est genus; igitur animatum sensibile non est dierentia. Maior patet per
Porphirium, capitulo de genere,2 ubi vult quod genus diert a dieren-
tia per hanc particulam distinctivam que est ‘predicari in quid’. Et minor
ra declaratur nam: omne quod predicatur de pluribus | specie dierenti-
bus in eo quid est genus; sed hoc predicatum animatum sensibile est
huiusmodi; igitur hoc predicabile animatum sensibile est genus. Maior
patet per di nitionem generis. Et minor declaratur, quia, quod hoc pre-
dicabile predicatur de pluribus specie dierentibus de se patet; et quod
 substantie] substantia E  accidentis] substantie E
 Aristoteles, Physica i. , a–.
 Isagoge, i,  (, –): ‘A dierentia vero (…) diert genus quoniam etsi de pluribus
et dierentibus specie praedicantur dierentiae (…), sed non in eo quod quid sit
praedicantur, sed in eo quod quale quid sit.’
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predicatur in quid, probatur, quia per ipsum convenienter respondetur
ad questionem factam per quid de animali, nam si queratur ‘quid est ani-
mal?’, convenienter respondetur quod sit substantia animata sensibilis.
〈.〉 Item. Nullum animal est constitutivum subsantie animalis; omne
 animatum sensibile est animal; igitur nullum animatum sensibile est
constitutivum subsantie animalis. Maior videtur evidens, quia aliter ani-
mal componeretur ex animalibus. Et minor est de se nota, quia in ea
predicatur convertibile de convertibili, sicut de se notum est.
〈.〉 Item. Si animatum sensibile esset constitutivum substantie ani-
 malis, sequeretur quod omne animatum sensibile esset animal. Conse-
quentia apparet evidens; et consequens est falsum; igitur et antecedens.
Falsitas consequentis declaratur, nam, si omne animatum sensibile esset
animal, cum quelibet pars integralis ipsius animalis sit animata sensibi-
lis, sequeretur quod quelibet pars integralis ipsius animalis esset animal,
 et per consequens manus et digitus et sic de allis partibus integralibus
omnes essent animalia, quod videtur absurdum.
〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum est Porphirius,3 qui dicit sic: ‘ea autem
que est animati et sensitivi dierentia, constitutiva est substantie anima-
lis.’
 〈distinctio prima〉 〈Prima〉 distinctio in ista questione premittenda est
ista, quod iste terminus ‘substantia’ accipitur multipliciter: uno modo
pro termino absolute signiÞcante substantiam, sicut accipit Aristoteles
in Predicamentis,4 quando loquitur de substantia prima et secunda, et
sic est nomen secunde intentionis. Alio modo accipitur ‘substantia’ pro
 essentia alicuius rei, sive ista res sit per se subsistens, sive alteri inhe-
rens. Et sic accipit Aristoteles in principio Predicamentorum,5 quando
dicit: ‘equivoca sunt, quorum nomen est communis et ratio substan-
tie secundum istud nomen est diversa’, idest: essentie, quia non tantum
loquitur Aristoteles de equivocatione que Þt in terminis substantialibus,
 sed etiam de ista que Þt in terminis accidentalibus, quia di nit equivoca
– substantie] sub add. necnon del. E
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘(…) ea quidem quae est animati et sensibilis dierentia,
constitutiva est substantiae animalis (…).’
 Aristoteles, Predicamenta, , passim.
 Aristoteles, Predicamenta , a: ‘Aequivoca dicuntur quorum nomen solum com-
mune est, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa, ut animal homo et quod
pingitur.’ – tr. Boethii.
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quecumque sint ista sive substantialia sive accidentalia. Et isto modo sub-
stantia est nomen prime intentionis. Tertio modo accipitur ‘substantia’
pro di nitione. Et isto modo accipitur a Porphirio, quando dicit quod
dierentia est constitutiva substantie animalis vel hominis. Et isto modo
adhuc substantia est nomen secunde intentionis.
〈distinctio secunda〉 Secunda distinctio est ista, quod aliquid pre-
dicatur in quid dupliciter, scilicet primo et non primo. Primo, quando
aliquid predicatur in quid ratione sui ipsius, et non ratione alicuius sue
rb partis. Non primo, quando aliquid | predicatur in quid ratione alicuius
sue partis, videlicet quia aliqua sua pars predicatur in quid.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista, quod nulla dierentia spe-
ciÞca accipiendo ‘dierentiam’ sicut logici accipiunt et sicut Porphirius6
accipit, quando dicit: ‘dierentia predicatur in quale’, est constitutiva ali-
cuius substantie, secundum quod ‘substantia’ accipitur pro re que non
〈est〉 signum. Ista statim patet, quia nullus terminus constituit aliquem
talem substantiam.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista, quod omnis die-
rentia speciÞca est constitutiva substantie accipiendo ‘substantiam’ pro
di nitione, quia omnis talis dierentia est completiva di nitionis pro-
prie dicte, que componitur ex genere et dierentia, sicut patet per Aris-
totelem, sexto Topicorum7 et septimo Metaphysice,8 et per Porphirium in
diversis locis sui textus.9
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista, quod nulla di nitio
proprie dicta predicatur in quid primo modo, quia non ratione sue
ipsius, quia non potius in quid quam in quale, cum ponitur eius pars
et substantialiter predicetur in quale, scilicet dierentia.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista, quod omnis di nitio
proprie dicta predicatur in quid non primo, quia rationis sue partis, quia
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘(…) dierentia est quod de pluribus et dierentibus specie
in eo quod quale sit praedicatur (…)’
 Aristoteles, Topica vi, , b–: ‘quidem oportet per genus et dierentias
di nire eum qui bene di nit’ – tr. Boethii. Auctoritates  (): ‘Omnis bona
deÞnitio debet constare ex genere et dierentiis, quia ista sunt priora et notiora quam
species quae deÞnitur.’ (Aristoteles, Topica, Z, b–).
 Aristoteles, Metaphysica vii, , b–: ‘Nichil enim aliud est in di nitione
quam primum dictum genus et dierentie’ – rec. Guillelmi. Auctoritates  ():
‘Nihil aliud debet esse in deÞnitione nisi genus et dierentia.’ (Aristoteles, Metaphys.,
Z, b–).
 E.g. Isagoge, iii,  (, –); iii,  (, –, ).
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omnis dierentia proprie dicta componitur ex genere et dierentia, quod
quidem genus predicatur in quid.
〈conclusioquinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista, quod omne istud a quo
accipitur dierentia speciÞca animalis, constituit substantiam animalis
 accipiendo ‘substantiam’ pro re que non est signum, scilicet pro essentia.
Ista probatur, quia omne istud a quo accipitur talis dierentia animalis,
est materia vel forma animalis, et omnis materia vel forma animalis
constituit realiter substantiam animalis, et precise animam a qua magis
communiter accipitur dierentia speciÞca.
 〈ad .〉 Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo maiorem, acci-
piendo ‘secundam substantiam’ scilicet pro re que non est signum. Et isto
modo etiam conceditur conclusio. Accipiendo ‘substantiam’ pro di ni-
tione negatur maior.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum patet per idem, quia nihil probat aliud nisi
 hec dierentia speciÞca animatum sensibile non constituit substantiam
animalis accipiendo ‘substantiam’ non pro signo. Et cum hoc stat quod
constituit substantiam animalis accipiendo ‘substantiam’ pro di nitione.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur negando antecedens. Et ad probationem
conceditur quod nullum genus sit dierentia speciÞca, quamvis aliquod
 genus sit dierentia accidentalis, sicut hoc genus coloratum. Et ulterius
dicitur negando quod hoc predicabile animatum sensibile predicatur in
quid. Et ad probationem dicitur quod, quando queritur ‘quid est ani-
mal?’, quamvis posset convenienter responderi quod sit substantia ani-
mata sensibilis ratione istius partis que est substantia, tamen nullo modo
 potest dici quod convenienter respondetur si dicatur quod animal sit
animatum sensibile; sed potius, si queratur ‘quale est animal substan-
tialiter?’ convenienter respondetur quod sit animatum sensibile. Unde,
vaquamvis ista di nitio ‘substantia animata | sensibilis’ predicatur in quid
non primo quia ratione sue partis, non tamen propter hoc dierentia
 completiva talis di nitionis predicatur in quid. Unde dierentia non est
de proprietate responsionis, quando respondetur ad questionem factam
per quid de aliquo per eius di nitionem, sed genus tantum. Sed si que-
ratur, quid et quale substantialiter sit animal, tunc dierentia esset de
proprietate talis responsionis, quia tunc convenientissime responderetur
 quod esset substantia animata sensibilis.
 conclusio] secundum ad add. necnon del. E  sit] sed E
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〈ad .〉 Ad quartum dicitur negando maiorem, quia aliquod animal
est pars integralis animalis, sicut totus homo preter digitum est animal,
et tamen est pars integralis animalis compositi ex digito et tali residuo.
Et ulterius dicitur negando istam de virtute sermonis ‘omne animatum
sensibile est animal’, et concedendo istam quod omne animatum primo
sensibile est animal. Et isto modo voco ‘animatum’ primo istud ad cuius
animationem non requiritur aliquod extrinsecum, ut sua anima in ipso
permanet sine tali extrinseco. Unde manus vel digitus, quamvis sit ani-
matus, non tamen primo, quia sine corde vel cerebro non durat anima in
digito, sicut patet per abscisionem.
〈ad .〉 Ad quintum patet per idem.
〈ad argumentum in oppositum〉 Ad argumentum in oppositum, qua-
liter scilicet Porphirius sic intelligendus, diusius patet per supra dicta,
quia Porphirius accipit ‘substantiam’ pro di nitione, vel si cui placeat
dicere probabiliter potest dici quod per istam propositionem ‘animatum
sensibile est constitutivum substantie animalis’, vult Porphirius intelli-
gere quod istud a quo accipitur hec dierentia animatum sensibile, est
constitutivum substantie animalis.
 sua] ai add. necnon del. E  abscisionem] apscisionem E
2011013 [Van der Helm] 02-Edition-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 343
〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum hec
dierentia immortale sit constitutiva Dei.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non.
 Deus est primum principium omnium aliorum a se, sicut patet per
Aristotelem, secundo Physicorum1 et undecimo Metaphysice;2 ergo Deus
non constituitur ab aliquo; igitur hec dierentia non est constitutiva Dei.
〈.〉 Item. Omnis dierentia constitutiva alicuius est convertibilis cum
eo; sed ista dierentia non est convertibilis cum Deo; igitur hec dieren-
 tia non est constitutiva Dei. Maior satis patet ex textu Porphirii. Minor
declaratur, quia multa alia a Deo sunt rationalia et immortalia, sicut
angeli et anime, et secundum aliquos corpora celestia.
〈.〉 Item. Deus est mortalis, quia potest mori, quia potest assumere
aliquam naturam mortalem ratione cuius poterit denominari ‘mortalis’;
 igitur immortalitas non est dierentia Dei, et per consequens non est
dierentia constitutiva Dei.
〈.〉 Item. Si esset dierentia constitutiva Dei, hoc esset quia Deus
haberet di nitionem, cuius di nitionis ista dierentia esset pars com-
pletiva; sed consequens falsum; igitur istud ex quo sequitur. Falsitas con-
 sequentis declaratur: nullum simplex habet di nitionem proprie dic-
vbtam; sed Deus est simplex, quia omnino indivisibilis; | igitur Deus non
habet di nitionem proprie dictam. Maior elicitur ab Aristotele, septimo
Metaphysice,3 ubi vult quod accidens proprie non di nitur quia non
habet partes diversarum rationum; igitur a multo fortiori istud non dif-
 Þnitur proprie quod penitus nullas partes habet; igitur hec dierentia
speciÞca et constitutiva Dei.
 secundo] secundum E  Porphirii] igitur add. E  alia] rationalia add. necnon
del. E  corpora] sunt add. E  Dei] quia add. necnon del. E  ista] pars add.
necnon del. E  di nitur] di nire E  quod] quid E
 Aristoteles, Physica ii, locus non inventus.
 Aristoteles, Metaphysica xi, , b–: ‘Ex tali igitur principio dependet celum
et natura’ – rec. Guillelmi. Auctoritates  (): ‘A primo principio dependet
caelum et tota natura.’ (Aristoteles, Metaphys., Λ, b–).
 Aristoteles, Metaphysica vii, , b–a. Sed non ad verbum.
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〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum est Porphirius in textu,4 quo dicitur: ‘Sed
ea que est rationalis dierentia et mortalis, constitutive sunt hominis,
rationalis vero et immortalis dei’.
〈distinctio prima〉 Distinctio premittenda in ista questione est ista
quod ‘aliquam dierentiam aliquid constituere’ potest intelligi tripliciter:
uno modo existenter sive realiter, sicut materia et forma que constituunt
compositum; alio modo di nitive, sicut dierentia constituit hominem,
quia constituit istam di nitionem, et ideo dierentia est primum dif-
Þnitivum hominis; tertio modo convertibiliter, scilicet quia dierentia
addita alicui non convertibili cum eo cuius est dierentia constitutiva,
contrahit ipsum, ut totum resultans ex ipso et tota dierentia conver-
tibiliter cum eo cuius est dierentia, contrahit ipsum cui additur ad
standum tantummodo pro signiÞcato vel signiÞcatis illius cuius est die-
rentia, sicut hec dierentia rationale mortale addita subiecto vel corpori
vel animali contrahit ipsum ad standum tantummodo pro signiÞcato vel
signiÞcatis.
〈distinctio secunda〉 Secunda distinctio est ista quod iste termi-
nus ‘Deus’ accipitur dupliciter, scilicet proprie, et communiter. Proprie
accipitur pro prima causa, sed communiter accipitur pro quocumque
habente aliquam similitudinem specialem cum prima causa, scilicet vel
quia est per〈p〉etuum sicut prima causa, vel quia habet intellectum sicut
prima causa, vel quia precise diligitur sicut prima causa deberet diligi.
Unde Psalmista5 ‘dixi: dii estis, et Þlii excelsi omnes’, et Apostolus6 etiam
loqui de gulosis dicit ‘quorum deus venter est’, et alibi est Psalmista7
‘omnes dii gentium demonia’.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima igitur conclusio est ista quod Deus proprie
non habet aliquam dierentiam speciÞcam cum eo convertibilem, et hoc
accipiendo proprie ‘Deum’ pro primo principo indivisibili. Ista statim
patet per superius dicta,8 quia ‘Deus’ sic acceptus nullam habet diversi-
 intelligi] d add. necnon del. E  que] quod E  contrahit] h add. necnon
del. E | ipsum] tantummodo add. necnon del. E  vel] primo(?) add. necnon del. E
 indivisibili] indivisibili corr. E ex … (?)
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘Sed ea quae est rationalis dierentia et mortalis, consti-
tutivae Þunt hominis, rationalis vero et immortalis dei (…)’
 Ps. –: ‘Ego dixi: Dii estis, et Þlii Excelsi omnes.’
 Filipp. : : ‘Quorum Þnis interitio, quorum Deus venter est.’
 Ps. : : ‘Quoniam omnes dii gentium demonia.’
 Videas supra, dist. .
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tatem aliquarum partium a qua posset talis dierentia accipi, sicut patet
per Aristotelem, septimo Metaphysice,9 ubi dicit quod accidens non habet
talem dierentiam, quia non componitur ex partibus diversarum ratio-
num.
 〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio que correlarie sequitur, est
ista quod Deus proprie non habet di nitionem, quia omnis di nitio
proprie dicta componitur ex genere et dierentia speciÞca; sed Deus
non habet dierentiam speciÞcam; igitur Deus non habet proprie dif-
Þnitionem. 〈Maior patet per〉 Aristotelem, sexto Topicorum,10 et septimo
 Metaphysice,11 et per Porphirium, capitulo de dierentia,12 ubi dicit sic:
‘et hiis opus est maxime ad divisiones generum et di nitionem specie-
rum, et non est necesse hiis que secundum accidentes inseparabiles sunt’.
Et loquitur ibi Porphirius de speciÞcis dierentiis, sicut patet ex textu
immediate precedenti.13
 〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod hoc predicatum
rationale secundum quod est dierentia speciÞca, non veriÞcatur de Deo,
raaccipiendo ‘Deum’ proprie. Ista | conclusio declaratur sic: ista dieren-
tia rationale secundum quod est dierentia speciÞca, connotat partem
essentialem; sed Deus nullam partem essentialem habet; igitur ista die-
 rentia secundum quod est dierentia speciÞca, non competit Deo. Appa-
ret ex precedentibus, nam ista est di nitio ‘rationalis’ secundum quod
est dierentia speciÞca, scilicet rationale est substantia habens animam
intellectivam tamquam partem suam essentialem. Et minor est de se
nota.
 〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod hic terminus
‘rationalis’ equivoce veriÞcatur de materia hominis, et de homine, et
 aliquarum] partiunt add. necnon del. et exp. E  dierentia] et add. E  quod]
p add. necnon del. E | predicatum] predicabile E  partem] habet add. necnon del. E
 hic] omne E
 Aristoteles, Metaphysica vii, ? Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, Z, a: ‘solius
substantie est di nitio’ – recensio Guillelmi.
 Aristoteles, Topica vi, , b–; Auctoritates  (): ‘Omnis bona deÞnitio
debet constare ex genere et dierentiis, quia ista sunt priora et notiora quam species
quae deÞnitur.’ (Aristoteles, Topica, Z, b–).
 Aristoteles, Metaphysica vii, , b–; Auctoritates  (): ‘Nihil aliud
debet esse in deÞnitione nisi genus et dierentia.’ (Aristoteles, Metaphys., Z,
b–).
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘Et his maxime opus est ad divisiones generum et deÞni-
tiones, sed non his quae secundum accidens inseparabiles sunt, nec magis his quae
sunt separabiles.’
 Isagoge, iii,  (, ): ‘(…) speciÞcae omnes vocantur’.
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de Deo, quia secundum diversas rationes. Nam de materia veriÞcatur
tamquam de subiecto anime rationalis, et est terminus communis acci-
dentalis, sicut superius dictum est;14 et de homine veriÞcatur tamquam
connotans partem eius essentialem; et de Deo veriÞcatur tamquam de
utente ratione, vel tamquam de isto quod ratiocinatur; et de anima veri-
Þcatur tamquam connotans eius operationem.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod, si corpus celeste
non componatur ex corpore et anima intellectiva, tunc di nitio istius
dierentie ‘rationalis’ secundum quod est dierentia speciÞca et di nitio
hominis, est una et eadem di nitio saltem aliquando di nitio hominis,
utpote ista ‘aliquis habens animam intellectivam tamquam partem sui
essentialem’, et potest dici di nitio naturalis hominis.
〈ad .〉 Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo conclusionem,
quia hec dierentia non est constitutiva realiter Dei, nec etiam logicaliter,
quia non constituit eius di nitionem proprie dictam, et hoc accipiendo
‘Deum’ proprie, sed accipiendo ‘Deum’ transsumptive, scilicet pro cor-
pore celesti, tunc, si tale corpus sit compositum ex materia et aniam intel-
lectiva, ista dierentia rationale et 〈im〉mortale est constitutiva logicaliter
Dei, quia est constitutiva di nitionis ipsius, et est constitutiva alicuius
termini convertibilis cum eo, quia tunc corpus celeste est animal ratio-
nale immortale, et hoc convertibiliter et di nitive, semper accipiendo
‘rationale’ secundum quod est dierentia speciÞca. Et sic forte intelligit
Porphirius, quia secundum principia Aristotelis septimo Metaphysice15
tradita nullum potest communem dierentiam speciÞcam.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur concedendo quod convertitur cum Deo
et cum corpore celesti, et ulterius quod nulli alteri competit sub ista
ratione, quia nec angelus, nec anima intellectiva est rationalis et immor-
talis habens animam intellectivam tamquam partem sui essentialem.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur concedendo quod potest assumere sibi
naturam mortalem, et taliter denominari extrinsece ‘mortalis’, sed non
〈secundum naturam〉 sui propriam, sed sicut in proposito loquor. Et
ulterius dicitur quod Deus, cuius rationale immortale est dierentia
speciÞca, non potest sibi assumere tamquam naturam talem, quia sic
accipitur pro corpore celesti.
 habens] hominis E  ipsius] seq. lac.  litt. E  immortale]  litt. (?) add.
necnon del. et exp. E  nullum] seq. lac.  litt. E  naturam] seq. lac.  litt. E
 Videas supra, dist. .
 Locus non inventus.
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〈ad .〉 Ad quartum patet per iam dicta, quia conceditur quod ‘Deus’
proprie acceptus nullam dierentiam speciÞcam habet.
〈ad argumentum in oppositum〉 Ad argumentum in oppositum dici-
tur quod Porphirius vel accipit ibi ‘Deum’ improprie sive transsumptive
 pro corpore celesti, vel loquebatur ponendo exempla introductoria pue-
rbrorum, | non ut ita sint sed ut sentiant qui addiscunt, vel secundum
aliquam opinionem antiquam que posuit Deum componi ex materia et
anima intellectiva.
 loquebatur] seq. lac.  litt. E
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum eadem dierentia
sit discretiva generis et constitutiva speciei.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non.
Nulle actiones opposite competunt eidem precise; sed dividere et
constituere sunt actiones opposite; igitur dividere et constituere non
competunt eidem precise; igitur una et eadem dierentia non est divisiva
et constitutiva. Maior elicitur ex ista propositione Aristotelis, primo De
generatione:1 ‘idem in quantum idem, facit idem’, et minor est nota de se.
〈.〉 Item. Nulle species ex opposito aliquid dividentes sunt eadem; sed
dierentia divisiva et dierentia constitutiva sunt species ex opposito
aliquid dividentes; igitur dierentia divisiva et constitutiva non sunt
eadem, igitur una et eadem dierentia non est divisiva et constitutiva.
Maior est de se nota. Et minor patet per istum textum Porphirii,2 quo
dicitur: ‘rursus eorum que sunt per se dierentiarum, alie quidem sunt
secundum quas dividimus genera in species, alie secundum quas ea que
divisa sunt, speciÞcantur’.
〈ad oppositum, i〉 Ad oppositum arguitur: omnis dierentia divisiva
alicuius generis constituit aliquam speciem; igitur omnis dierentia divi-
siva generis est constitutiva speciei. Consequentia nota. Et antecedens
patet inductive, nam ista dierentia corporea divisiva istius generis quod
est substantia, constituit istam speciem que est corpus. Et ista dieren-
tia animatum divisiva corporis constituit istam speciem vivum, et sic de
quibuscumque aliis poterit Þeri inductio.
 eidem] eodem E  actiones] compo add. necnon del. E
 Vel potius Aristoteles, De generatione et corruptione ii, , a–: ‘idem enim
et similiter habens semper idem innatum est facere’ – tr. vetus. Auctoritates 
(): ‘Idem manens idem semper aptum natum est facere idem.’ (Aristoteles, De
generatione et corruptione, Β, a–).
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘(…) rursus earumquae sunt per se dierentiarum aliae
quidem sunt secundum quas dividimus genera in species, aliae vero secundum quas
haec quae divisa sunt speciÞcantur (…)’
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Item, conÞrmatur per istum textum, quo dicitur, capitulo de dieren-
tia:3 ‘he quidem que sunt dierentie divisive generum, completive sunt
et constitutive specierum’.
〈ad oppositum, ii〉 Item, hoc patet per textum sequentem,4 quo dici-
 tur: ‘quoniam 〈ergo〉 eedem, alio modo quidem concepte, sunt constitu-
tive, alio modo autem divisive, omnes speciÞce vocantur’.
〈conclusio prima〉 In ista questione presuppositis premissis distinctio-
nibus, prima conclusio est ista quod omnis dierentia divisiva generis
per se est constitutiva alicuius speciei per se, idest: apta nata constituere
 aliquam speciem si non penuria nominum impediat. Ista patet su cien-
ter per predicta,5 quia potest probari inductive, sicut predictum est.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod aliqua die-
rentia divisiva generis dividens aliquod genus non constituit aliquam
speciem. Sic ista dierentia animatum que dividit hoc genus corpus non
 constituit aliquam speciem saltem substantialem, quia non constituit ali-
quam speciem nisi esset hoc quod dico ‘vivum’, vel hoc quod dico ‘corpus
animatum’; sed neutrum istorum est species, nam primum non est spe-
cies, quia non predicatur in quid, sed in quale, ut si queratur qualis est
vaplanta, vel quale est hoc corpus, | convenienter respondetur quod sit
 vivum. Nec secundum est species, quia non predicatur primo in quid,
quia non nisi ratione alterius partis. Igitur videtur quod non sit aliqua
species quam constituit ista dierentia animatum quamvis sit constitu-
tiva, idest: apta nata ad constituendum si talis species esset. Et loquor de
constistutione logicali, sicut prescriptum est in precidentibus questioni-
 bus.
Et si instetur contra istam conclusionem per istum textum quo dicitur
‘ea quidem que est animati et sensibilis dierentia constitutiva est sub-
stantie animalis’, dico breviter quod, quamvis ista dierentia composita
animatum sensibile constituat istam speciem animal, propter hoc tamen
 non oportet quod ista dierentia animatum constituat aliquam speciem.
 he] hee E  ergo] consequens E | eedem] heedem E  constitutiva] speciei add.
necnon del. et exp. E
 Isagoge, iii,  (, ): ‘Sed hae quidem quae divisae sunt dierentiae generum,
completivae Þunt et constitutivae specierum (…)’
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘Quoniam ergo eaedem aliquo modo quidem acceptae
Þunt constitutivae, aliquo modo autem divisivae, speciÞcae omnes vocantur.’
 Videas supra, ad opp., i.
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Et si dicatur quod ista dierentia sensibile su cienter constituit istam
speciem animal, quia cum ea convertitur, quia omne sensibile est ani-
mal, et omne animal est sensibile, 〈ergo〉 frustra additur ista dierentia
speciÞca animatum, ad hoc breviter dicitur quod, quamvis hec dieren-
tia sensibile accepta active secundum quod convertitur cum isto quod
est potens formare, vel cum isto 〈quod est〉 habens animam formativam,
convertitur cum ista specie animal, et ut su cienter constitueret istam
speciem animal, tamen ad removendum 〈equivocationem〉 huius die-
rentie sensibile et expressius et manifestius exprimendum substantiam
animalis, convenienter additur ista dierentia animatum, sicut infra dif-
fusius patebit suo loco.6
Pro iam dictis est sciendum quod non omnia exempla auctoris possint
accipi ut ita sint, sed ut sentiant qui addiscunt.
〈ad .〉 Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo maiorem, scili-
cet quod nulle actiones opposite realiter competunt eidem agenti natu-
raliter, distinguendo agens naturale contra agens ex opposito. Et ulterius
dicitur quod non semper dividere et constituere sint actiones opposite,
nam una et eadem actio que est divisio 〈respectu〉 unius, est constitutio
〈respectu〉 alterius. Et ita est in proposito.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur quod Porphirius per istum textum non
vult intelligere aliud nisi quod quedam dierentie sunt divisive, et que-
dam sunt constitutive, ita quod iste due proprietates que sunt dividere et
constituere, competunt dierentiis, et utrum eisdem vel diversis, postea
declarat.7 Unde accipit istum terminum ‘alie’ loco istius termini ‘alique’,
vel si voluimus accipere textum de virtute sermonis, tunc ad hoc nullum
sequitur inconveniens, quia clarum est quod alie dierentie sunt divisive,
quia omnes alique sunt alie, et omnes alie sunt alique.
〈ad argumenta in oppositum, i〉 Ad primum igitur in oppositum
dicitur concedendo textum sicut patet per primam conclusionem; sed
ex hoc non sequitur quod omnis dierentia divisiva generis constituat
 ergo] genus E  equivocationem] eius vocationem E  respectu] idem E
 respectu] idem E  igitur] primum add. necnon del. E
 Videas infra, q.  ad ., q.  concl. .
 Isagoge, iii,  (, ): ‘Sed hae quidem quae divisivae sunt dierentiae generum,
completivae Þunt et constitutivae specierum’.
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speciem, quia non est idem esse constitutivum et constituere, sicut non est
idem esse calefactivum et calefacere. Unde ignis dicitur ‘calefactivus’ quia
vbaptus natus est | calefacere, si calefactibili assit. Et similiter dierentia
dicitur ‘constitutiva’, quia apta nata est constituere speciem, si species
 assit.
〈ad argumenta in oppositum, ii〉 Et per hoc patet ad secundum.
 calefactivus] calefactiva E  calefactibili] calefactive E
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum dierentia
speciÞca sit necessaria ad divisionem generis.
〈.〉 Et primo 〈arguitur〉 quod non:
nihil est necessarium ad aliquam divisionem faciendam sine qua divi-
sio potest Þeri; sed divisio generis potest Þeri sine dierentia speci-
Þca; igitur dierentia speciÞca non est necessaria ad divisionem generis.
Maior est de se nota. Et minor probatur, quia genus potest dividi per
sua accidentia, cuiusmodi est divisio ista: animalium aliud album, aliud
nigrum, aliud medium in qua divisione nulla est dierentia speciÞca.
〈.〉 Item. Potest Þeri per propria, cuiusmodi est talis divisio: anima-
lium aliud risibile, 〈aliud〉 hinnibile, 〈aliud〉 rudibile. Et in nulla tali divi-
sione habetur dierentia speciÞca. Ergo conveniens divisio generis potest
Þeri sine aliqua divisione speciÞca.
Et si dicatur quod, quamvis genus potest dividi sine dierentia speci-
Þca accidentaliter, non tamen per se, contra hoc arguitur: omnis divisio
qua genus dividitur in suas species, est divisio per se; sed sine dieren-
tia speciÞca genus potest dividi in suas species; igitur sine dierentia
speciÞca genus potest dividi per se. Maior videtur nota. Et minor decla-
ratur, quia, si genus dividatur per proprias passiones suarum specierum,
dividitur in suas species, ut si talis Þat divisio animalium: aliud risibile,
aliud hinnibile, nam risibile constituit speciem humanam, quia converti-
tur cum homine, et hinnibile speciem equinam. Igitur genus dividitur in
suas species sine dierentia speciÞca.
〈.〉 Item. Si genus divideretur convenienter per dierentiam speci-
Þcam, sequeretur quod talis divisio esset conveniens: animalium aliud
rationale, aliud irrationale. Consequentia est de se nota. Et consequens
est falsum; igitur et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis declaratur, quia per
omnem divisionem convenientem generis vel genus dividitur acciden-
taliter, vel substantialiter; sed per predictam divisionem non dividitur
 queritur] queritur corr. ex sequitur E  medium] vatium (?) E  aliud] inter
E | aliud] alio E | tali] dierentia add. necnon del. et exp. E  quod] querens add.
necnon del. E  sequeretur] sequitur E | quod] quod iter. E
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genus accidentaliter, sicut per se notum est; nec etiam substantialiter,
quia sic sequeretur quod divideret suas species. Sed consequens est fal-
sum, quia irrationale non constituit aliquam speciem animalis. Et si con-
stituat, detur ista.
 〈.〉 Item. Si sic, tunc ista esset divisio conveniens: animalium aliud
rationale corruptibile sive mortale, aliud immortale, et sic de dieren-
tiis speciÞcis animalis. Sed consequens est falsum, secundum patet per
Boethium, suo libro Divisionum,1 qui dicit quod omnis bona divisio bene
data debet esse tantummodo bimembris; et per consequens 〈non〉 debet
 esse trimembris.
Item, per eundem Boethium ibidem2 dicitur quod omnis divisio bona
debet Þeri per negationem; sed in predicta divisione non est negatio;
igitur non est conveniens.
〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum est Porphirius in isto textu3 quo dicit
 raloquens de dierentiis speciÞcis: ‘et | hiis opus est maxime ad divisionem
generis’.
〈distinctio〉 Distinctio in ista questione premittenda est ista, quod
duplex est divisio: quedam est realis et quedam logicalis. Realis dicitur
ista, qua partes alicuius essentiales, vel integrales, 〈sed de tali nihil ad〉
 presens est dicendum. Divisio vero logicalis est multiplex: nam quedam
est que Þt per negationem, et quedam que Þt 〈per〉 contradictionem
disiunctivam, et quedam que Þt per utrumque, et quedam per alietatis
negationem.
Per negationem, sicut in propositione negativa predicatum dividitur
 a subiecto, idest: negatur a subiecto. Per disiunctivam contradictionem,
sicut quando aliquid alicui attribuitur disiunctive vel disiunctim, ut ‘Sor-
tes tacet vel loquitur’, ‘uterque istorum est Sortes vel Plato’ determina-
tis Sorte et Platone. Per utrumque, ut ‘Sortes est asinus, vel Sortes non
est asinus’. Et hoc semper Þt quando una pars divisionis disiunctive est
 mortale] immortale E  in] est E  logicalis] logicaliter E
 Cf. Boethius, De divisione: ‘constat quaecumque a se aliqua oppositione dierunt eas
solas dierentias sub genere positas genus ipsum posse disiungere.’ (PL , d).
 Boethius, De divisione: ‘oppositio est quae est secundum a rmationem et negatio-
nem’. (PL , d).
 Isagoge, iii,  (, ): ‘Et his maxime opus est ad divisiones generum (…)’
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negativa vel de negato extremo. Per alietatis negationem, sicut quando
dividitur in sua contenta. Et hoc dicitur scilicet per accidens vel per se.
Per accidens, ut animalium aliud album, aliud nigrum. Per se adhuc
dividitur, quia vel primo modo dividitur per se, vel secundo modo.
Primo modo sicut quando aliquid dividitur in sua contenta per se per
aliquid quod eis competat. Primo modo dividitur per se utpote per
dierentiam speciÞcam, ut animalium 〈aliud rationale, aliud irrationale.
Secundo modo sicut quando aliquid dividitur〉 in sua per se contenta
per proprietates contentorum sive per aliqua propria, ut animalium aliud
risibile, aliud hinnibile.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista quod nulla dierentia est
necessaria ad divisionem generis, quia sine dierentia potest genus di-
vidi; igitur nulla dierentia est necessaria ad divisionem generis. Conse-
quentia est nota. Et maior patet per predicta.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod nulla die-
rentia est necessaria ad divisionem generis in suas species, quia genus
potest dividi sine dierentia a suis speciebus; igitur nulla dierentia est
necessaria ad divisionem generis in suas species. Consequentia patet. Et
antecedens declaratur, quia genus potest dividi in suas species per suas
species, utpote tali divisione: animalium aliud homo, aliud asinus, in qua
divisione nulla ponitur dierentia.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod omnis dierentia
est necessaria ad divisionem generis in suas species per se primo modo.
Et patet ista conclusio per secundam conclusionem, quia genus potest
dividi per suas 〈species〉 in suas species per se primo modo, quia de
talibus speciebus tale genus predicatur per se primo modo, et etiam una
species de seipsa.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod nulla dierentia
speciÞca est necessaria ad divisionem generis in suas species secundo
modo per se, quia talis divisio potest Þeri per proprium quod competit
tali speciei per se secundo modo, ut si Þat talis divisio: animalium
aliud risibile, aliud hinnibile, in qua divisione nulla ponitur dierentia
speciÞca, et tamen genus dividitur in suas species, idest: per aliqua que
contrahunt genus ad standum pecise pro suppositis talium specierum,
 de] de add. sup. lin. E  asinus] alius E  divisione] ni(?) add. necnon del.
E –. pro suppositis talium specierum, sicut hoc proprium risibile contrahit hoc
genus animal ad standum precise] pro suppositis talium specierum, sicut hoc proprium
‘risibile’ contrahit hoc genus ‘animal’ ad standum precise corr. mg. E
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sicut hoc proprium risibile contrahit hoc genus animal ad standum
precise proprie pro suppositis ‘hominis’.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod ad divisio〈nem〉
rbgeneris in suas species per se primo modo formaliter, est | aliqua dieren-
 tia speciÞca necessaria necessitate conditionata. Et hoc est dictum quod
talis conditionalis est necessaria. Si genus dividitur in suas species per se
primo modo formaliter, dividitur per aliquam dierentiam speciÞcam.
Ista conclusio declaratur, quia omne quod dividit genus, vel est species,
vel individuum, vel est proprium, vel accidens, vel dierentia speciÞca.
 Sed species non dividit genus per se primo modo formaliter, tum quia
non accipitur a forma, tum quia non complet formaliter di nitionem
speciei. Et per idem etiam patet quod individuum non dividit genus for-
maliter, nec etiam genus dividit in suas species. Et manifestum est quod
nec proprium, nec accidens dividit genus proprie primo modo in suas
 species. Relinquitur ergo quod sola dierentia speciÞca dividit genus per
se primo modo formaliter in suas species, vel saltem dierentie speciÞce,
quia proprie loquendo nulla divisio potest Þeri sine pluribus dividenti-
bus. Et ad istum intellectum loquitur Porphirius,4 quando dicit quod hiis
opus est maxime ad divisionem generum in suas species.
 〈ad .〉 Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo conclusionem,
scilicet dierentia speciÞca non est necessaria ad divisionem generis.
Est tamen necessaria necessitate conditionata ad divisionem generis
per se primo modo formaliterin suas species, et hoc ad intellectum
predeterminatum.
 〈ad .〉 Ad secundum patet per idem, quia conceditur quod genus
potest dividi per sua propria in suas species per se, tamen non primo
modo formaliter.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur concedendo quod per talem divisionem
genus dividitur substantialiter. Et ulterius dicitur quod irrationale est dif-
 ferentia speciÞca que dividit genus in suam speciem saltem mentalem,
quamvis nulla species sit imposita ad signiÞcandum. Et vocetur ad pre-
sens ista species A, que quidem species alienando signiÞcet omnis animal
irrationale.
 precise] pro add. necnon del. E | suppositis] supponitur E  formaliter]
formalem E | species] per se non tamen primo modo formaliter add. necnon del. et exp. E
 dividi] substantialiter. Et ulterius dicitur add. necnon del. et exp. E  alienando]
alida E
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〈ad .〉 Ad quartum dicitur quod Boethius loquitur ibidem5 de divi-
sione data per negationem ad conclusionem 〈disiunctivam〉 que Þt com-
muniter in predicata contradicentia, vel que petit alteram partem con-
tradictionis, vel que petit, vel que dat, alteram partem contradictionis,
cuiusmodi est ista: ‘Sortes currit vel Sortes non currit’, ‘Sortes est homo
vel Sortes non est homo’. Et talis semper debet dari per negationem, et
est precise bimembris, et sic intelligit Boethius. Vel potest dici quod ipse
loquitur de dierentia compendiosiori que est magis distributiva, et talis
semper est bimembris, et, ut communiter, Þt per negationem.
〈ad argumentum in oppositum〉 Ad argumentum in oppositum satis
patet per predicta, quia Porphirius loquitur ibidem de divisione generis
per se primo modo formaliter.
 conclusionem] seq. lac.  litt. + veram E – contradictionis] contradictionem E
 contradictionis] contradictionem E  sic] tunc E  formaliter] formali E
 Boethius, De divisione. (PL , d).
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum dierentia speciÞca
sit necessaria ad di nitionem faciendam.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non.
 Nulla dierentia speciÞca est necessaria ad di nitionem faciendam
sicut ad di nitionem datam per additamentum, quia talis di nitio
potest Þeri per proprium, sicut patet per Aristotelem, septimo Metaphy-
vasice.1 Nec etiam est necessaria ad di nitionem | dierentia speciÞca. Et
quod non sit necessaria ad di nitionem propriissime dictam, declara-
 tur: nulla dierentia speciÞca est necessaria ad di nitionem manifeste
exprimende〈m〉 essentiam di niti; igitur nulla dierentia speciÞca est
necessaria ad di nitionem propriissime datam. Ista consequentia patet,
quia omnis di nitio manifeste exprimens essentiam di niti est di ni-
tio propriissime dicta. Et antecedens declaratur, quia in ista di nitione
 ‘homo est corpus et anima intellectiva essentialiter unita’ non ponitur
aliqua dierentia speciÞca, et tamen ista di nitio manifeste exprimit
essentiam di niti, quia exprimit utramque partem essentialem, scilicet
tam materiam quam formam hominis; igitur nulla dierentia speciÞca
est necessaria ad di nitionem que manifestissime exprimit essentiam
 di niti.
〈.〉 Item. Nulla dierentia speciÞca est necessaria ad di nitionem
propriissime dictam que connotat aliquod extrinsecum; sed omnis dif-
ferentia speciÞca connotat aliquod extrinsecum; igitur nulla dieren-
tia speciÞca est necessaria ad di nitionem propriissime dictam. Maior
 elicitur ab Aristotele, septimo Metaphysice,2 ubi vult quod di nitio
 speciÞca] est necessaria add. E  exprimendem] esses add. necnon del. E  est]
ex E  speciÞca] seq. lac.  litt. E add.  litt(?) E
 Aristoteles, Metaphyica, vii, a–: ‘Palam itaque quia solius substantie est dif-
Þnitio. Nam et si aliarum cathegoriarum, necesse est ex additione esse.’ Cf. Aucto-
ritates  (): ‘DeÞnitio accidentium Þt per additamentum, scilicet substantiae.’
(Cf. S. omas, In Metaphys., vii, lect. , n. . Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphys., Z,
a–).
 Auctoritates  (): ‘DeÞnitio est sermo indicans quid est esse rei per essentialia.’
(Aristoteles, Metaphys., Z, a–).
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propriissime dicta debet dari per essentialia et non per aliquod extrinse-
cum connotativum. Di nitionem factam per proprium vocat Aristote-
les ibidem ‘di nitionem datam per additamentum’, eo quod ‘proprium’
connotat aliquod extrinsecum quasi superadditum essentie di niti. Et
minor declaratur, scilicet quod omnis dierentia speciÞca connotat ali-
quod extrinsecum, quia omnis dierentia speciÞca connotat actum nobi-
liorem di niti, sicut hec dierentia speciÞca animatum sensibile conno-
tat actum sciendi, et hec dierentia speciÞca rationale mortale connotat
actum ratiocinandi, sed hoc proprium risibile connotat actum ridendi,
et hoc proprium hinnibile actum hinniendi. Igitur pari ratione qua nulla
di nitio propriissime dicta potest dari per proprium quia connotat ali-
quod extrinsecum, igitur nulla di nitio propriissime dicta potest dari
per dierentiam speciÞcam, que connotat aliquod extrinsecum.
〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum est Porphirius in textu superius alliga-
tor,3 quo dicit: ‘et hiis opus est maxime ad divisiones generum et di ni-
tionem specierum’. Sed non est necesse hiis que sunt secundum accidens
inseparabiles, ex quo plane patet quod Porphirius vult dicere quod die-
rentia speciÞca sit necessaria ad di nitionem propriissime dictam. Sed
proprium non est necessarium ad talem di nitionem.
〈distinctio prima〉 Prima distinctio est ista quod triplex est di nitio,
nam quedam est di nitio quid nominis, et quedam est oratio descriptiva
sive descriptio, et quedam est di nitio propriissime dicta.
Di nitio vero quid nominis est oratio compendiosa indicans quid
nomen signiÞcat. Et accipitur hic ‘nomen’ largissime secundum quod
convertitur cum ‘dictione’, sive talis dictio sit verbum, sive nomen accep-
tum stricte, sive composita sive simplex. Talis di nitio quid nominis
adhuc accipitur dupliciter, scilicet proprie et communiter. Proprie sci-
licet, quando convertitur cum di nito. Communiter, quando extendit
vb se ad orationem indicantem quid nomen | signiÞcat, quamvis talis oratio
non convertitur cum di nito.
 connotativum] connotantia E | per] per sup. lin. E  superadditum] subadditum
E  ratiocinandi] -cinandi sup. lin. Ec; cui additur add. necnon del. E  superius]
superius iter. E  quid] quid sup. lin. Ec  nominis] adhuc accipitur dupliciter
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Descriptiva vero di nitio est oratio compendiosa indicans essentiam
di niti per genus 〈et〉 per proprium sive per propria talis di niti. Et ista
vocatur ab Aristotele, septimo Metaphysice,4 ‘di nitio data per addita-
mentum’, quia datur per aliquid quod connotat aliquod extrinsecum, de
 qua connotatione inferius in ista questione plus patebit.
Di nitio vero propriissime dicta est oratio compendiosa indicans
essentiam di niti per essentialia sive per substantialia, idest: per termi-
nos non connotantes aliquid extrinsecum essentie rei di nite. Et talis
di nitio subdividitur secundum quod elicitur ab Aristotele, primo De
 anima,5 nam: quedam est naturalis, et quedam est dialectica.
Di nitio vero naturalis est oratio compendiosa indicans essentiam
di niti per substantialia, secundum substantialium aliquid signiÞcat
specialiter materiam rei di nite, ut si di niatur domus sic: ‘domus est
substantia composita ex fundamento, lapide et parietibus, lignis et tecto,
 stramento’, vel aliquid consimile, quod specialiter signiÞcat vel connotat
materiam rei distincte, vel formam talis rei existere in tali materia.
Di nitio vero dialectica est oratio compendiosa indicans essentiam
rei distincte per substantialia, quorum substantialium aliquid signiÞcat,
vel connotat formam rei di nite, et utrum〈que〉 signiÞcat specialiter,
 vel connotat materiam vel formam, ut si ‘domus’ sic di niatur: ‘domus
est quod dicitur protectivum a pluviis et ventis, scilicet caloribus et
frigetudinibus’, vel: ‘domus est quod dicitur protectivum a passionibus
aeris’.
Et dicitur prima di nitio ‘naturalis’ propter hoc quod naturalis phi-
 losophus specialiter inquirens naturam rei, et eius principia essentialia
exprimit per di nitionem suam principia naturalia rei di nite. Secun-
da vero di nitio dicitur ‘dialectica’, quia dialecticus non ita profunde
 di nitio] di nito E  extrinsecum] quod add. E  essentialia] -lem add. necnon
del. E  vero] vero sup. lin. E  domus] domum E  rei] dis add. necnon exp.
E  dicitur] contentivum add. E
 Cf. Auctoritates  (): ‘DeÞnitio accidentium Þt per additamentum, scilicet
substantiae.’ (Cf. S. omas, In Metaphys., vii, lect. , n. . Cf. Aristoteles,
Metaphys., Z, a–).
 Aristoteles, De anima i, , a–. Cf. Auctoritates  (): ‘Triplex est deÞnitio:
una quae datur ad materiam tantum, ut cum dicitur domus est quid constans ex
lapidibus et lignis; alia est quae datur per formam tantum, ut cum dicitur domus
est quoddam cooperimentum defendens nos a caumatibus et imbribus; tertia quae
datur per utrumque, scilicet cum dicitur domus est cooperimentum quoddam
defendens nos a caumatibus et imbribus constans ex lapidibus et lignis.’ (Aristoteles,
De anima, Α, b–).
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speculatur, nec ita exquisite inquirit de principiis naturalibus rei, sed
su cit sibi per aliquam opinionem devenire ad formam rei, et ipsam
quoddammodo in di nitione exprimere.
Unde di nitio naturalis est duplex, nam quedam distincte exprimit
materiam tantum, et quedam tam materiam quam formam, sive Þnem,
quia forma et Þnis intrinsecus coincidunt. Et ista est di nitio propriis-
sime naturalis, ut si ‘domus’ sic di niatur: ‘domus est quoddam compo-
situm ex lignis et lapidibus protectivum a passionibus aeris’, vel si ‘homo’
sic di niatur: ‘homo est animal compositum ex corpore et anima intel-
lectiva’.
Di nitio vero dialectica vocatur sicut predictum est, que Þt cum
expressione forme vel Þnis in di nito, ut si ‘homo’ sic di niatur: ‘homo
est rationale mortale’.
〈distinctio secunda〉 Secunda distinctio est ista quod aliquid dicitur
‘extrinsecum’ dupliciter: uno modo quia non est ipsummet, nec aliqua
eius pars essentialis vel integralis, sed visus nec est albedo nec aliqua
pars albedinis. Et ideo ista di nitio ‘albedo est color disgregativus visus’
datur per extrinsecum. Alio modo accipitur ‘extrinsecum’ largius pro
illo B quod nec est ipsamet res cui dicitur extrinsecum, nec est aliqua
pars istius rei, nec principalis actus vel operatio talis rei. Et isto modo
ra actus intelligendi sive ratiocinandi non est aliquod extrinsecum | homini,
quamvis secundum communem opinionem sit accidens superadditum,
nec etiam actus sentiendi est extrinsecus animali, vel actus vegetandi ipsi
plante.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista, quod omnis di nitio est
oratio compendiosa, sicut satis ex predictis elici potest. Patet etiam per
Aristotelem, sexto Topicorum.6 Unde, quamvis ista alia oratio indicet
essentiam rei, vel quid nominis et non compendiose, non est di nitio
eius, ut si ‘homo’ sic indicetur: ‘homo est substantia habens duas manus
 de] primis add. necnon del. E  opinionem] operationem E | et] propter add.
necnon del. E  Þnem] formam E  di niatur] et add. E  di nitio] ad add.
necnon del. E  extrinsecum] homini, quamvis secundum communem opinionem
add. mg. E. Idem textus invenitur initio f. ra. Sub columna f. ra hec littera ‘P.’ scripta est.
 accidens superadditum] sive additum E  Patet] per add. E
 Aristoteles, Topica, vi, , b–: ‘omne quod appositum est in di nitione
superßuum’ – tr. Boethii. Auctoritates  (): ‘Oportet deÞnientem planissima
interpretatione uti eo quod causa cognoscendi traditur deÞnitio, unde deÞnitio
non debet esse obscura, nec aliquid superßuum continere.’ (Aristoteles, Topica, Z,
b–).
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et decem digitos et duos pedes, potens sentire et potens intelligere et
potens ridere’. Ista oratio, quamvis indicet essentiam rei, non tamen est
di nitio eius, quia non est compendiosa.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista, quod omnis di -
 nitio est eque nota vel notior di nito; aliter non indicaret di nitum.
Unde, quamvis circa istam materiam multe conclusiones possent poni,
cum dierentie non essent ad propositum, de quibus supersedeo ali-
quas. Tamen ut principale propositum melius intelligatur, quodammodo
declarabo.
 〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod omnis di nitio
est di nitio quid nominis, quia omnis di nitio indicat quid nomen
signiÞcat, et per consequens di nitio propriissime dicta est di nitio
quid nominis, nisi vocetur ‘di nitio quid nominis’: ‘oratio compendiosa
per terminos predicantes primo modo per se, vel per terminos non
 connotantes aliquid extrinsecum’.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod aliqua di ni-
tio proprie dicta non datur per dierentiam 〈acceptam〉 a specie, vel a
formalitate. Statim patet, quia aliqua talis di nitio potest dari per dif-
ferentiam acceptam a materia, cuius〈modi〉 est hec di nitio: ‘corpus est
 substantia materialis’. Nec credo quod facile sit aliter corpus di nire. Et
ideo proprie loquendo corpus non habet di nitionem dialecticam, sed
tantummodo naturalem, sicut sequitur ex predictis.7
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod omnis di nitio
dialectica propriissime dicta datur per dierentiam speciÞcam, quia per
 dierentiam acceptam a specie, sive a forma. Et patet per correlarium ex
predictis.
〈conclusio sexta〉 Sexta conclusio est ista quod aliqua di nitio
proprie dicta datur per dierentiam speciÞcam connotantem aliquod
extrinsecum quod non est de essentia rei cui dicitur extrinsecum. Ista
 patet, quia ista dierentia mortale connotat actum moriendi. Qui quidem
actus sunt accidentia sibi addita; non tamen sunt tales actus extrinseci
large accipiendo ‘extrinsecum’.
 aliter] personaliter E  istam]  litt.(?) add. necnon del. E  propositum] ideo
ad primo(?) add. E; seq. lac.  litt. E  di nitio] est add. E  per] dicendi
add. E  datur] datens(?) E  loquendo] loco E | dialecticam] dialecticum E
 extrinsecum] idem add. E  accidentia] sunt large accipiendo sub add. necnon
del. E | sunt tales] sunt tales iter. E  accipiendo] predictum add. necnon del. E
 Videas supra, dist. .
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〈conclusio septima〉 Septima conclusio est ista quod inter di ni-
tiones proprie dictas una est rationabilior alia, sicut ista expressius, com-
pendiosius et essentialius indicat essentiam di niti. Et talis est di nitio
naturalis exprimens tam materiam quam formam, ut si ‘homo’ sic di -
niatur: ‘homo est substantia composita ex corpore et anima intellectiva’.
〈conclusio octava〉 Octava conclusio est ista quod dierentie for-
marum non – saltem non omnes – debent poni in di nitione, quia tunc
non esset oratio compendiosa propter hoc quod homo esset sic di -
rb niendus: ‘homo est substantia | corporea animata sensibilis rationalis
mortalis’. Et ideo multi volunt dicere quod ista non est di nitio ‘animalis’
proprie dicta: ‘animal est substantia animata sensibilis’, sed ista ‘animal
est substantia animalis sensibilis’, accipiendo li ‘sensibile’ active prout stet
loco istius quod est ‘potens sentire’. Sed alii dicunt 〈quod〉, quamvis appo-
nantur univoce dierentia superiorum ad maiorem expressionem – que
quidem appositio non multum impedit compendiositatem orationis –
non propter hoc impeditur quin talis oratio probabiliter posset dici ‘dif-
Þnitio’. Unde stricte et proprie loquendo primum dictum plus valet.
〈conclusio nona〉 Nona conclusio est ista: voco ‘dierentiam spe-
ciÞcam’ dierentiam que 〈est〉 apta nata esse medium concludendi alia
speciÞce dierentie, et que non connotat aliquod extrinsecum large acci-
piendo ‘extrinsecum’; tunc omnis di nitio proprie dicta sive naturalis,
sive dialectica, datur per dierentiam speciÞcam. Et potest ista conclu-
sio satis faciliter intelligi ex predictis.
〈ad .〉 Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo quod vocando
‘dierentiam speciÞcam’ 〈ista que est〉 accepta a forma, tunc aliqua dif-
Þnitio proprie dicta potest dari sine dierentia speciÞca, sicut patet de
ista di nitione: ‘corpus est substantia materialis’. Sed vocando ‘dieren-
tiam speciÞcam’ ista que est apta nata esse medium concludendi alia
speciÞce dierentie, tunc nulla di nitio proprie dicta potest dari sine
dierentia speciÞca. Et ulterius dicitur pro forma argumenti negando
istam consequentiam ‘aliqua di nitio propriissime accepta potest dari
sine dierentia speciÞca; igitur nulla dierentia speciÞca est necessaria
ad di nitionem proprie dictam’, quia ad omnem di nitionem dialec-
ticam est aliqua dierentia speciÞca necessaria necessitate conditionata
et non absolute, unde nulla dierentia est necessaria. Et ulterius dicitur
 esset] est E  substantia] compositum add. necnon del. E | substantia] quamvis sub
columna E | sensibilis] accipiendo li s add. necnon del. E  dierentiam] esse add. E
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quod ista di nitio: ‘homo est corpus et anima intellectiva essentialiter
unita’ non Þt sine dierentia speciÞca, quia anima intellectiva est ibi dif-
ferentia speciÞca.
Et si dicatur quod oportet dierentiam speciÞcam predicari per se et
 di nito, et etiam quamlibet partem di nitionis, ad hoc dicitur breviter
quod hoc non oportet in di nitione naturali, sed in di nitione dialec-
tica.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur negando omnem dierentiam speciÞ-
cam connotare aliquod extrinsecum large accipiendo ‘extrinsecum’, sci-
 licet pro isto quod non est de essentia rei ut eius actus principalis. Sed
bene conceditur omnem dierentiam speciÞcam accepta a forma, vel sal-
tem multas dierentias speciÞcas acceptas a forma, connotare aliquod
extrinsecum, stricte accipiendo ‘extrinsecum’ secundum quod se exten-
dit ad actum principalem rei, qui quidem actus non vocatur aliquod
 extrinsecum in proposito, scilicet quando dicitur: di nitio proprie dicta
debet dari per substantialia et per terminos non connotantes aliquod
extrinsecum. Unde, quamvis connotent actum principalem istius forme
a qua tales termini concipiuntur, non dicuntur tamen connotare aliquod
extrinsecum et dierentia superius, vel saltem multas dierentias speci-
 Þcas propter istam dierentiam speciÞcam animatum que non videtur
connotare aliquod actum, secundum aliquos. Et hoc puto fore verum.
〈ad argumentum in oppositum〉 Ad argumentum in oppositum, patet
qualiter scilicet Porphirius sit intelligendus, quia ipse loquitur de die-
rentia speciÞca, vocando dierentiam speciÞcam ista〈m〉 que apta nata
 vaest concludendi alia speciÞce | dierre. Et patet totum per predicta.
 secundum] primum add. necnon del. et exp. E  est] extrinsecum add. necnon del.
E  termini] termini corr. sup. lin. E  hoc] ad add. E  predicta] in omnem
add. Ec
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum ista di nitio dierentie sit
bene data: ‘dierentia est qua abundat species a genere’.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non.
Alicui competit di nitio cui non competit di nitum; igitur di nitio
non est bona. Consequentia nota. Et antecedens declaratur, quia, sicut
species abundat a genere dierentia, ita a proprio, et etiam diversis
accidentibus que universaliter competunt speciei et non generi; sicut
omnis homo est animal 〈rationale〉, omnis homo est rectus, omnis homo
〈est〉 superciliosus, et non omne animal est huiusmodi, ut patet.
〈.〉 Item. Hec est falsa: dierentia 〈est〉 in qua abundat species a
genere; igitur di nitio non est bona. Consequentia nota, quia omnis
bona di nitio veriÞcatur de di nito. Et antecedens probatur, quia:
omnis dierentia que competit speciei, competit generi talis speciei;
igitur nulla dierentia abundat species a genere. Consequentia videtur
evidens. Et antecedens probatur, quia: quidquid competit speciei per-
sonaliter sumpto, hoc competit generi personaliter sumpto. Nam, sicut
iste sunt vere: ‘homo est rationalis’, ‘homo est mortalis’, ‘homo est risi-
bilis’, ‘homo est rectus’, consimiliter iste sunt vere: ‘animal est rationale’,
‘animal est risibile’, etcetera, quia, si non, tunc arguatur sic ex opposito:
‘nullum animal est rationale; omnis homo est animal; igitur nullus homo
est rationalis’. Conclusio falsa; et non minor; igitur maior.
〈.〉 Item. Si species abundaret dierentia a genere, hoc esset quia
dierentia competeret actu speciei et non generi, sed potentia tantum,
sicut dicitur in littera.1 Sed hoc est falsum, quia sicut hec actu est vera
‘homo est rationalis’, ita hec actu est vera ‘animal est rationale’, et non
tantum ista ‘animal potest esse rationale’; igitur videtur quod dierentia
non potius competat generi potestate et non actu quam speciei, nec e
converso.
 abundat] habundat sic E  hec] habet E
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘potestate quidem omnes habent sub se dierentias, actu
vero nullam.’
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〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum est Porphirius2 ubi loquens de dieren-
tiis speciÞcis distinguendo eas contra actus separabilia et inseparabilia
que sunt dierentie communiter et non proprie dicte, dicit sic: ‘Quas
etiam determinantes dicunt: dierentia est qua abundat species a genere.’
 〈distinctio〉 Distinctio istius questionis est ista quod ‘actus et potentia’
accipiuntur dupliciter, scilicet realiter et logicaliter. Realiter secundum
quod ‘materia prima’ dicitur potentia respectu forme, et ‘forma’ dicitur
actus respectu materie, et etiam secundum quod ‘potentia intellectiva’
et ‘potentia visiva’ et ‘potentia auditiva’ et 〈sic de〉 aliis dicuntur potentie
 respectu actus.
Logicaliter, ut si aliquod predicatum competat alicui subiecto parti-
culariter et non universaliter, eo quod subiectum sit in plus quam predi-
catum, hoc est quod subiectum sit communius quam predicatum, tunc
dicitur breviter loquendo quod tale predicatum competit tali subiecto
 tantum potentia et non actu. Et si aliquod predicatum competat alicui
subiecto universaliter, tunc dicitur quod sibi competit actu quia actuali-
tate universaliter.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista quod predicta di nitio
‘dierentie’ de virtute sermonis non convertitur cum di nito. Ista con-
 clusio patet per primum argumentum ad principale quod probat quod,
sicut species abundat a genere dierentia, et proprio et aliquibus acci-
dentibus. Et si dicatur quod Porphirius di nit ibidem dierentiam in
sua maxima communitate, scilicet secundum quod se extendit ad dif-
ferentiam communiter dictam et ad dierentiam magis proprie dictam,
 hoc non potest esse, sicud patet ex processu littere prius allegate, quia
Porphirius dicit ibidem3 quod dierentiis speciÞcis maxime opus est ad
divisiones et di nitiones, et non accidentibus inseparabilibus, ea, multo
fortiori, nec accidentibus separabilibus. Et tunc sequitur:4 ‘Quas etiam
 loquens] Porphirius add. E  Logicaliter] universaliter E  dierentia]
respectu add. E  accidentibus] non add. necnon del. E
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –, ): ‘Quas etiam determinantes dicunt: dierentia est qua
abundat species a genere.’
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘Et his maxime opus est ad divisiones generum et deÞni-
tiones, sed non his quae secundum accidens inseparabiles sunt, nec magis his quae
sunt separabiles.’
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –, ): ‘Quas etiam determinantes dicunt (…)’. Videas supra,
ad opp.
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determinantes etcetera’, idest quas dierentias speciÞcas; ergo Porphirius
vb intendit ibi specialiter di nire dierentiam | speciÞcam.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod predicta di -
nitio est bona secundum intellectum auctoris, scilicet si suppleatur istud
quod auctor intelligit, et tunc debet sic suppleri: dierentia est qua abun-
dat actu et per se primo modo species a genere. Ista patet, quia tunc
ista di nitio competit dierentie speciÞce et non aliis; igitur di nitio
est conveniens. Consequentia videtur evidens, quia nihil aliud a die-
rentia speciÞca competit speciei universaliter per se primo modo quod
non competit generi talis speciei universaliter, sicut patet discurrendo
per singula.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod aliqua dierentia
speciÞca competit generi actu. Ista patet, quia aliqua dierentia speciÞca
competit generi universaliter, sicut ista dierentia speciÞca sensibile sive
animatum sensibile competit isti generi animal universaliter, quia omne
animal est animatum sensibile.
〈contra i〉 Sed contra istam conclusionem instatur per textum,5 qui
dicit quod dierentia competit generi potestate, actu vero non.
〈contra ii〉 Item. Si sic, tunc species non abundaret dierentia a
genere.
〈adcontra i〉 Ad primum dicitur quod textus intelligit quod dieren-
tia divisiva alicuius generis in suam speciem non competit generi actu,
idest, universaliter.
〈ad contra ii〉 Ad secundum dicitur negando consequentiam, quia,
quamvis actu dierentia speciÞca competat generi universaliter quod
competit speciei talis generis.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Et ideo quarta conclusio est ista quod nulla
dierentia speciÞca alicuius speciei competit actu generi talis speciei.
Ista statim patet, quia nihil convertibile cum specie competit universa-
liter generi talis speciei; sed omnis dierentia speciÞca alicuius speciei
est convertibilis cum ista specie cuius dicitur dierentia speciÞca; igitur
nulla dierentia speciÞca alicuius speciei competit actu generi talis spe-
ciei.
 quia] quod E  competit] h add. necnon del. E  vero] vel E – die-
rentia] dist add. necnon del. E
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘(…) potestate quidem omnes habent sub se dierentias,
actu vero nullam.’ Videas supra, .
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Et si dicatur quod ista dierentia speciÞca rationale mortale competit
universaliter isti generi animal, quia hec est vera demonstratis Sorte et
Platone ‘uterque animal de numero animalium est rationale mortale’, et
ista est universalis, igitur predicatum competit subiecto universaliter, ad
 istud dicitur quod conclusio intelligitur universalitate generali per quam
Þt distributio pro omni supposito personaliter, et non de universalitate
speciali sive restrictiva in qua restringitur subiectum ad standum pro ali-
quibus suis suppositis et non pro omnibus. Unde, quando dicit textus
quod dierentia speciÞca non competit generi actu, idest universaliter,
 loquitur de universalitate generali sive absoluta et non speciali et restric-
tiva, quia cuicumque communi aliquod predicatum competit potentia,
idest particulariter, eidem competit actu actualitate restrictiva.
〈ad 〉 Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo consequentiam,
et negando antecedens, ad intellectum auctoris superius expressum.6 Et
 ad probationem: quod, quamvis species abundaret proprio et aliquibus
accidentibus a genere, non tamen primo modo dicendi per se quod
subintelligitur in predicta di nitione.
〈ad 〉 Ad secundum dicitur quod sit falsum. Et ad probationem dici-
tur negando consequentiam istam: ‘quidquid competit speciei, competit
 generi talis speciei; igitur species non abundat dierentia a genere’, quia
species non dicitur abundare dierentia a genere quia aliqua dieren-
tia competit speciei que non competit generi, sed quia aliqua dierentia
competit speciei universaliter absolute que non competit generi talis spe-
ciei. Sed exponitur satis in supplemento predicte di nitionis.
 〈ad 〉 Ad tertium patet per predicta, quia non dicit quod dierentia
competit alicui actu ideo quia propositio in qua de ipso subiecto talis
radierentia veriÞcatur, est actu vera, sed ideo quia | sibi competit uni-
versaliter absolute, et tali actualitate non competit dierentie speciÞce
generis eius speciei cuius est dierentia speciÞca.
 〈ad argumentum in oppositum〉 Ad argumentum in oppositum su -
cienter patet per predicta.
 Videas supra, concl. .
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum aliqua alia
di nitio dierentie convertitur cum dierentia.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non:
quia non ista di nitio dierentie qua dicitur ‘dierentia est que predi-
catur de pluribus specie dierentibus in eo quod quale’,1 quia ista tantum-
modo competit dierentibus subalternis, quia dierentia specialissima
non predicatur de pluribus specie dierentibus.
〈.〉 Item. Ista di nitio competit pluribus accidentibus, sicut de se
notum est.
〈.〉 Nec etiam di nitio ‘dierentia est istud quod est aptum natum
dividere ista que sunt sub eodem genere’,2 quia hoc etiam competit pro-
prio, sicut patet per Porphirium in textu ubi exempliÞcat de isto proprio
aptum natum navigare,3 quod quidem proprium est aptum natum divi-
dere hominem ab aliis animalibus.
〈.〉 〈Nec etiam ista di nitio ‘dierentia est qua dierunt a se singula’,4
quia ista tantummodo competit dierentie specialissime.〉
〈.〉 Nec etiam ista di nitio ‘dierentia est istud quod ad esse rei
conducit et eius quod est esse rei pars est’,5 quia hoc competit tam materie
quam forme quarum nulla est dierentia, quia nulla est universale. Igitur,
ut videtur, nulla alia di nitio dierentie ab ista dicta ‘est qua abundat
species a genere’ est convertibilis cum di nito, et per consequens nulla
alia est conveniens di nitio dierentie.
 specie] specie mg. Ec
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘DeÞniunt autem eam et hoc modo: dierentia est quod de
pluribus et dierentibus specie in eo quod quale sit praedicatur (…)’
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘Describunt autem huiusmodi dierentias et hoc modo:
dierentia est quod aptum natum est dividere quae sub eodem sunt genere (…)’
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘(…) neque enim quod aptum natum est navigare erit
hominis dierentia, etsi proprium sit hominis.’
 Isagoge, iii,  (, ): ‘Assignant autem etiam hoc modo: dierentia est qua
dierunt a se singula (…)’
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘Interius autem perscrutantes de dierentia, dicunt (…)
esse dierentiam, (…) quod ad esse conducit et quod eius quod est esse rei pars est
(…)’
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〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum arguitur per Porphirium qui quasi
omnes alias di nitiones corrigens ponit istam di nitionem ipsam, ut
videtur, ultra omnes alias commendans dicens: ‘interius perscrutantes
et speculantes dicunt non quodlibet eorum que sunt eodem genere sunt
 dividendum esse dierentiam, sed quod ad esse rei convenit et eius quod
est esse rei pars est.’6
〈distinctio prima〉 Prima distinctio istius questionis est ista quod du-
plex est ‘quale’, scilicet substantiale et accidentale. Quale substantiale
querit de forma substantiali; quale vero accidentale querit de forma
 accidentali sive de alia proprietate accidentali.
〈distinctio secunda〉 Secunda distinctio est ista quod ‘esse’ accipitur
multipliciter: uno modo pro ipsa re existente, secundo modo pro forma
rei; et istis duobus modis est nomen prime intentionis. Tertio modo
accipitur pro di nitione sive descriptione; et sic est nomen secunde
 intentionis.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista quod ista di nitio ‘dieren-
tia est que predicatur de pluribus specie dierentibus in eo quod quale’
non convertitur 〈cum〉 dierentia, sicut probat primum argumentum,
quia non competit dierentie specialissime.
 〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod ista di ni-
tio convertitur cum di nito secundum intellectum auctoris, quia auctor
intendit ibi di nire dierentiam speciÞcam subalternam. Et tunc debet
sic exprimi: ‘dierentia speciÞca subalterna est istud quod predicatur de
pluribus specie dierentibus in eo quod quale substantiali’. Et quod auc-
 tor intendat loqui de dierentia speciÞca, patet per hoc quod sequitur in
littera de isto exemplo metaphysice,7 quo dicit auctor quod, sicut statua
constat ex aere et Þgura tamquam ex materia et forma, ita homo com-
munis et specialis ex genere tamquam ex materia et ex dierentia tam-
quam ex forma. Et ideo dierentia predicatur in quale substantiale quod
 distinctio] est ista add. necnon del. E
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘Interius autem perscrutantes de dierentia, dicunt non
quodlibet eorum quae sub eodem sunt genere esse dierentiam, sed quod ad esse
conducit et quod eius quod est esse rei pars est (…)’
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘Rebus enim ex materia et forma constantibus vel
ad similitudinem materiae specieique constitutionem hebentibus, quemadmodum
statua ex materia est aeris, forma autem Þgura, sic et homo communis et specialis
ex materia quidem similiter consistit genere, ex forma autem dierentia (…)’
 thomas manlevelt, questiones libri porphirii
2011013 [Van der Helm] 02-Edition-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 370
querit de forma substantiali a qua accipitur dierentia speciÞca, nam,
rb sicut in compositione et generatione rei naturalis pre-|-supponitur mate-
ria et postea inducitur forma, ut sic habeat esse completum rei, igitur in
compositione di nitionis prima ponitur genus, et postea apponitur dif-
ferentia speciÞca, et sic habetur di nitio completa.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod ista di nitio: ‘dif-
ferentia est istud quod est aptum natum dividere ista que sunt sub eodem
genere’ non est convertibilis cum dierentia speciÞca. Ista conclusio
patet per textum prius allegatum,8 quia competit proprio, nam proprium
est aptum natum dividere ista que sunt sub eodem genere, quia dividit
hominem ab equo, sicut patet de ista proprietate risibile, et similiter etiam
de ista quam tangit auctor in littera ‘aptum natum navigare’.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod ista di nitio
convertitur cum di nito ad intentionem auctoris, quia auctor intendit
ibi tantummodo di nire ‘dierentiam’ secundum quod se extendit ad
dierentiam proprie dictam et magis proprie dictam, et hoc est ad
proprium et ad dierentiam speciÞcam, ut sic exprimatur: ‘dierentia
speciÞca vel proprium est istud quod est aptum natum dividere ista que
sunt sub eodem genere speciÞce’, quia licet accidens aliquali divisione
dividat ista que sunt sub eodem genere, non tamen oportet quod dividit
ista speciÞce.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod ista propositio
〈‘dierentia est qua dierent a se singula’〉 secundum intellectum auctoris
est vera, quia auctor intelligit:9 ‘singula qua a se dierunt, et est dieren-
tia’.
〈conclusio sexta〉 Ex quo sequitur correlarie ista conclusio quod ali-
qua di nitio non est predicabilis de suo di nito, quia si hoc di nitum
‘dierentia’ ponatur a parte subiecti, tunc propositio est falsa, sicut iam
dictum est.10
Secundum correlarium est istud quod aliquod di nitum est veriÞ-
cabile de sua di nitione, quequidem di nitio de ipso di nito non est
veriÞcabilis, quia: de ista di nitione ‘singula qua a se dierunt’ est hoc
di nitum ‘dierentia’ veriÞcabile, quia hec est vera: ‘singula qua a se dif-
 quod] habet add. necnon del. E  qua] con-li E – dierentia] dicta E
 di nitio] -to add. necnon del. E
 Videas supra, .
 Isagoge, iii,  (, ): ‘Assignant autem etiam hoc modo: dierentia est qua
dierunt a se singula (…)’
 Videas supra, .
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ferunt est dierentia’, ut patet inductive, quia ista ‘qua a se dierunt’ est
dierentia, et ista ‘qua a se dierunt’ est dierentia talis, et tamen hec
di nitio non est veriÞcabilis de isto di nito, sic quod de ipso vere pre-
dicetur, quia hec est falsa: ‘dierentia est qua dierunt’, vel ‘dierentia est
 singula qua dierunt’.
Verumtamen ad vitandum tales conclusiones mirabiles volunt aliqui
dicere quod aliquando istud quod sequitur verbum, est subiectum et
quid precedit, est predicatum. Sed hoc est contra communem consue-
tudinem loquendi. Ideo plus placet tenere predictas conclusiones, que
 non sunt multum mirabiles in proposito, quamvis non intelligentibus
appareant esse mirabiles, quia tota causa quare hoc di nitum est predi-
cabile de di nitione et non e contra, est signum distributivum in di ni-
tione positum. Quod quidem signum est pars propositionis, et ideo non
potest poni a parte predicati, secundum istam propositionem Aristotelis,
 primo Perihermeneias11 ‘nulla est a rmatio in qua universale universa-
liter sumptum predicatur.’
Tertium correlarium est istud quod non semper di nitio et di nitum
convertuntur, quia non semper veriÞcantur de se mutuo universaliter et
a rmative.
 Et si dicatur quod Porphirius12 non intendit dierentiam di nire
quando dicit ‘dierentia est qua dierunt a se singula’, hoc videtur esse
contra illum textum precedentem,13 quo dicitur ‘assignant ergo et hoc
modo’. Per quem textum videtur quod Porphirius vult dicere quod anti-
qui di niunt dierentiam hoc modo, et sic communiter exponitur ab
 vaexpositoribus. Et hec dicta non sunt simpliciter a rmative | sed tam-
quam probabilia et possibilia sustineri.
Verumptamen aliter potest dicere quod forte melius distinguendo pre-
dictam propositionem secundum ampliationem sensus proprius est fal-
sus, sicut predictum est; sensus vero transsumptivus in quo dicit eam
 auctor, est verus, et tunc stat loco istius propositionis ‘dierentia est qua
possunt prolari cui speciÞce dierentie tamquam pars’, quod accipitur a
 vel] vel Ec  quamvis] quamvis iter. E  tota] quod add. necnon del. E
 quidem] po(?) est add. necnon del. E  esse] esse Ec  transsumptivus]
transsumptiva E
 Cf. Auctoritates  (): ‘Hoc signum “omnis” non est “universale” sed signiÞcat
“universaliter”, id est designat quod unusquisque terminus teneatur universaliter.’
(Aristoteles, De interpretatione, , b–).
 Isagoge, iii,  (, ): ‘(…) dierentia est qua dierunt a se singula (…)’
 Isagoge, iii,  (, ): ‘Assignant autem etiam hoc modo (…)’
 thomas manlevelt, questiones libri porphirii
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parte essentiali et rei. Et sic di nitio convertitur cum di nito, scilicet
cum dierentia speciÞca.
〈conclusio septima〉 Septima conclusio est ista ‘quod ad esse rei
conducit, et quod eius quod est esse rei pars est’,14 igitur non est di nitio
convertibilis cum dierentia speciÞca, si accipiatur de virtute sermonis.
Ista statim patet, quia genus adducit ad esse rei, idest ad di nitionem,
quia est pars essentialis di nitionis.
〈conclusio octava〉 Octava conclusio est ista quod ista di nitio
convertitur cum dierentia speciÞca ad intellectum auctoris, quia auctor
intelligit quod dierentia speciÞca est istud quod di nitionem proprie
dictam complet, et quod est pars formalis di nitionis proprie dicte; igi-
tur quod ista coniunctio ‘et’ stet ibi expositive, et non copulative, quia
tunc ista particula addita pars superßueret, nam omne istud quod com-
plet di nitionem est pars formalis di nitionis. Debet ergo sic intelligi:
‘dierentia est istud quod complet di nitionem rei proprie dictam, idest,
quod est pars formalis di nitionis proprie dicte’.
Et sic patet quod ‘dierentia’ habet plures descriptiones. Et si dicatur
quod unius rei una est di nitio, dicitur quod unitas ista intelligitur de
unitate convertibilitatis, quia omnes di nitiones unius rei convertuntur,
nam aliter non esset quod ista di nitio sit vera, nam unius rei possunt
esse plures di nitiones proprie dicte, utpote di nitio naturalis et di ni-
tio dialetica. Iterum unius rei possunt esse plures descriptiones, secun-
dum quod unius rei possunt esse plures proprietates complentes tales
descriptiones, sicut ista est una descriptio hominis: ‘homo est animal
risibile’, completa per istam proprietatem risibile; et ista est alia descrip-
tio hominis: ‘homo est animal susceptibile discipline’, et consimiliter
secundum diversas proprietates dierentie ponuntur diverse descriptio-
nes eiusdem.
〈ad 〉 Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo quod di nitio
‘dierentia est que predicatur de pluribus etcetera’ non convertitur cum
 scilicet] scilicet sup. lin. Ec  igitur] igitur sup. lin. Ec  convertibilis] convertitur
E  intellectum] intellectui E  ergo] ergo sup. lin. Ec  unitate] convertibiliter
add. necnon del. et exp. E  est que] est que sup. lin. Ec
 Isagoge, iii,  (, –): ‘Interius autem perscrutantes de dierentia, dicunt non
quodlibet eorum quae sub eodem sunt genere esse dierentiam, sed quod ad esse
conducit et quod eius quod est esse rei pars est (…)’
questio  
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dierentia speciÞca subalterna sub intellectu quo superius dictum est,15
scilicet quod li ‘quale’ accipiatur pro quali substantiali.
〈ad 〉 Et per hoc patet ad secundum, quia ista di nitio non competit
pluribus accidentibus, quia, quamvis accidentia predicentur in quale,
 non tamen in quale substantiale.
〈ad 〉 Ad tertium dicitur concedendo quod ista di nitio ‘dieren-
tia est istud quod aptum natum est dividere ista que sunt sub eodem
genere’ non convertitur cum dierentia speciÞca, 〈sed〉 convertitur cum
dierentia secundum quod se extendit ad dierentiam speciÞcam, et ad
 proprium.
〈ad 〉 Ad quartum dicitur concedendo etiam quod ista sit falsa,
quod dierentia est qua dierunt a se singula, et hoc si accipiatur in
sensu proprio, sed in sensu transsumptivo est vera, intelligendo sicut
predictum est.16
 〈ad 〉 Ad quintum dicitur quod ista di nitio ‘dierentia est quod
ad esse rei conducit’ convertitur cum dierentia speciÞca secundum
intellectum auctoris, quia ibi ‘esse’ accipitur pro di nitione proprie dicta.
Et sic accipiendo ‘esse’ materia et forma non conducunt ad esse rei,
quia non intrant di nitionem, quia non sunt signa. Et patet totum per
 predicta.
Et sic est Þnis questionis.
 intellectu] intellectum E
 Videas supra, dist. .
 Videas supra, concl. .
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum proprium dicatur quadrupliciter.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non.
vb Quia nullum proprium dicitur quadrupliciter; igitur nec proprium. |
Consequentia videtur evidens. Et antecedens patet inductive, quia: non
proprium quod convenit omni etsi non soli, dicitur quadrupliciter, nec
proprium quod convenit soli sed non omni, nec proprium quod convenit
omni et soli, sed non semper, nec proprium quod convenit omni et soli et
semper; et omne proprium est aliquod istorum; igitur nullum proprium
dicitur quadrupliciter.
〈.〉 Item. Nullum est proprium quod convenit omni et non soli; igitur
proprium non dicitur quadrupliciter. Consequentia videtur de se nota.
Et antecedens declaratur, quia: capiantur omnia ista quibus competit tale
proprium, tunc vel omnia illa continentur sub aliqua specie, vel sub ali-
quo genere, vel sub aliquo transcendente. Si sub aliqua specie, tunc istud
proprium competit illi soli speciei; si sub aliquo genere, tunc competit illi
soli 〈generi; si sub aliquo transcendente, tunc competit illi soli〉 transcen-
denti. Igitur omne proprium quod competit omni, competit soli; igitur
nullum est proprium quod competit omni et non soli.
〈.〉 Item. Nullum est proprium quod competit soli et non omni; igitur
proprium non dicitur quadrupliciter. Consequentia videtur evidens. Et
antecedens probatur, quia, si aliquod proprium competit soli, tunc istud
solum vel est species vel est genus vel est transcendens, et per consequens,
si competit tali soli, competit alicui contento sub illo; igitur competit
alicui alteri ab illo; igitur non illi soli, ut si hoc proprium esse medicum
competit soli homini ita quod non competat alicui alteri ab ista specie
homo; igitur non competit alicui contento sub ista specie, vel si competit
alicui contento sub ista specie homo, igitur non competit isti soli speciei
homo.
〈.〉 Item. Nulli soli homini competit; igitur non soli homini competit.
Consequentia nota. Et antecedens patet inductive.
 est] est sup. lin. Ec  sub] se E  sub] sub sup. lin. Ec  proprium]
compedit add. necnon del. E | sub] sequitur E  soli] vel add. E
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〈.〉 Item. Nullum est proprium quod competit omni et soli sed non
semper; igitur proprium non dicitur quadrupliciter. Consequentia vide-
tur evidens. Et antecedens declaratur, quia, si esset aliquod tale proprium,
esset hoc proprium tale canescere in senectute, sicut patet in textu.1 Sed
 hoc non competit omni et soli sed non semper, quia hec est falsa: ‘omnis
homo canescit in senectute’, sicud de se notum est.
〈.〉 Item. Nullum 〈est〉 proprium quod competit omni et soli et sem-
per, quia, si aliquod esset tale, tunc hoc proprium risibile esset tale. Con-
sequens est falsum, quia nullus homo est semper risibilis, quia nullus
 homo est semper.
〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum est Porpyrius in littera,2 qui dicit ‘pro-
prium vero quadrifariam dividunt, etcetera’.
〈solutio questionis〉 In ista questione primo recitanda est una opinio
reprobanda; secundo ponende sunt alique conclusiones; tertio solvende
 sunt rationes principales.
〈opinio communis〉 Circa primum est sciendum quod quondam fuit
communis opinio quod omne proprium esset res que non est signum,
rasicut hoc proprium | risibile; quidam posuerunt ex parte rei unam apti-
tudinem ridendi existentem in homine subiective, et ad hoc ponendum
 talibus movebantur motivis:
〈i〉 Primo, quia proprium sequitur formam speciÞcam; et nullus ter-
minus sequitur formam speciÞcam.
〈ii〉 Secundo, quia proprium est inseparabile ab eo cuius est proprium;
sed nullus terminus est inseparabilis.
 〈iii〉 Tertio, quia proprium est demonstrabile de eo cuius est proprium;
sed nullus terminus est demonstrabilis de aliquo.
〈iv〉 Quarto, quia proprium per se competit illi cuius est proprium; sed
nullus 〈terminus〉 per se competit alicui.
 proprium] tale add. E  non] non sup. lin. Ec  ponende] posite E  motivis]
mor-vus E  sequitur] prime add. necnon del. E  inseparabile] quia proprium
est demonstra add. necnon del. E
 Isagoge, iv (, –): ‘Et quod soli et omni et aliquando, ut homini in senectute
canescere (…)’
 Isagoge, iv (, ): ‘Proprium vero quadrifariam dividunt.’
 thomas manlevelt, questiones libri porphirii
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〈v〉 Quinto, quia proprium non potest negari ab eo cuius est proprium,
sicud risibile non potest vere negari ab homine; sed hic terminus potest
vere negari ab homine, quia nullus homo est terminus.
〈contra istam opinionem〉 Sed ista opinio per modernos studiosos
perscrutantes ex toto quasi reprobatur, quia iam quasi ab omnibus poni-
tur, quia ‘proprium’ nihil aliud est quam terminus competens alicui per
se secundo modo, et hoc precipue ‘proprie proprium’.
Primo, quia nihil predicatur de subiecto nisi terminus; omne pro-
prium predicatur de suo subiecto.
Secundo, quia nihil convertitur cum suo subiecto nisi terminus; con-
vertibilitas est proprietas terminorum sive propositionum; sed proprium
convertitur cum suo subiecto.
Tertio, quia omne demonstrabile de suo subiecto est terminus, quia
omne tale est predicabile; sed proprium est demonstrabile de suo sub-
iecto; igitur etcetera.
Ad istam partem multe rationes adducuntur. Que causa brevitatis
obmittantur, et etiam: quasi nullus predictam opinionem tenet, et iterum
quia ipsamet opinio sua evidenti irrationabilitate destruit seipsam.
〈ad i〉 Ad primum igitur eorum motivum dicitur concedendo maio-
rem ad bonum intellectum, istam, scilicet, ‘omne proprium sequitur
formam speciÞcam’, idest, omne proprium veriÞcatur de suo subiecto
ratione forme speciÞce, vel nature speciÞce, et precipue proprie pro-
prium. Et ad eundem intellectum negatur minor, ista, scilicet, ‘nullus
terminus sequitur formam speciÞcam’, quia nihil aliud quam terminus
veriÞcatur de aliquo ratione nature speciÞce.
〈ad ii〉 Ad secundum dicitur concedendo maiorem, et hoc loquendo
de inseparabilitate logicali et de proprie proprio. Et uniformiter loquen-
do negatur minor, ista, scilicet, ‘nullus terminus est inseparabilis’, quia
nihil aliud est inseparabile nisi terminus, quia, si proprium esset talis res
que non esset signum, tunc posset separari, saltem per potentiam prime
cause; sed tentis signiÞcatis vocabulorum proprium non potest separari
a suo subiecto, sicud hoc proprium risibile non potest vere negari ab
homine per aliquam potentiam.
〈ad iii〉 Ad tertium dicitur concedendo maiorem et negando mino-
rem, quia nihil aliud quam terminus est demonstrabile.
 quia proprium] quia proprium iter. E  toto] corpositionibus E  nullus] hiis
corporibus add. E  speciÞcam] quia nihil aliud quam terminus add. necnon del. E
 terminus] est inseparabile add. E; quia nihil aliud est inseparabile add. necnon del. E
questio  
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〈ad iv〉 Ad quartum dicitur similiter negando minorem quod nihil
competit alicui secundo modo dicendi per se nisi terminus.
〈ad v〉 Ad quintum dicitur negando minorem, istam, scilicet, ‘omnis
terminus potest vere negari ab homine’, quia iste terminus ‘homo’ non
 potest vere negari ab ‘homine’, nec iste terminus ‘risibilis’.
Et ad probationem dicitur, quod, quamvis hec sit vera: ‘nullus homo
est terminus’, propter hoc tamen non sequitur quod omnis terminus
posset vere negari ab homine. Unde omnia ista motiva pure oriuntur ex
ignorantia logice.
 rbEt si dicatur quod ex predictis sequeretur | quod hoc proprium risibile
esset proprium alicuius quod impossibile esset ridere, et quod non posset
esse risibile, quia esset proprium istius termini ‘homo’, et impossibile est
hunc terminum ‘homo’ ridere, igitur esse risibile, ad istud dicitur totum
concedendo, de quo plus patebit statim in conclusionibus.
 〈conclusio prima〉 Est igitur prima conclusio quod ‘proprium’ dicitur
quadrupliciter, quia iste terminus ‘proprium’ accipitur quadrupliciter,
sicud patet ex textu.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod hec propositio
est impossibilis: ‘proprium competit soli speciei’. Demonstratur sic, quia
 si competat alicui speciei, competit alicui contento sub tali specie, quod
contentum non est talis species; igitur non competit soli speciei.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod ista propositio:
‘aliquid est proprium quod 〈competit〉 omni et non soli’ ad intellectum
auctoris est vera, quia stat loco istius ‘aliquid est proprium quod competit
 omni homini vel omni individuo istius speciei homo’, et non veriÞcatur
de ista specie sumpta cum dictione exclusiva, sicud hoc proprium esse
bipedem vel aptum natum 〈esse〉 bipedem.
Et si dicatur quod non potius stat loco istius propositionis quam loco
istius ‘aliquod proprium competit omni individuo istius speciei asinus’,
 et non veriÞcatur de ista specie asinus sumpta cum dictione exclusiva, ad
istud dicitur concedendo quod non stat potius loco unius quam alterius,
quia stat loco cuiuscumque talis.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod hec propositio
est falsa: ‘aliquod proprium alicuius speciei competit omni individuo
 conclusionibus] clusionibus E  alicui] speciei comp add. necnon del. E
 dictione] ex dictione add. E
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alicuius speciei’, quia omne individuum est individuum alicuius speciei
et nullum proprium alicuius speciei competit omni individuo.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod ad intellectum
auctoris hec est vera: ‘aliquod est proprium quod competit soli sed non
omni’, quia stat loco istius ‘aliquod est proprium quod veriÞcatur 〈de
individuo istius solius speciei, et non〉 de omni individuo istius speciei’.
Et sic ponitur actus signiÞcatus qui debet sic exerceri: ‘solus homo est
medicus, et non omnis homo est medicus’, et non tantum potest per
istum actum exerceri, verum etiam per quemque alium consimilem,
sicud per istum: ‘solus homo est geometer, et non omnis homo est
geometer’.
〈conclusio sexta〉 Sexta conclusio est ista quod istud proprium
canescere in senectute non est tale proprium quod competit 〈omni〉 et
soli sed non semper, quia non omnis homo canescit in senectute, quia
puer non canescit in senectute.
Et si queratur quid sit dicendum ad textum auctoris, ad hoc breviter
respondetur quod auctor ponit exemplum non ut ita est, sed ut sentiunt,
qui addiscunt, sicud frequentissime auctores faciunt.
〈conclusio septima〉 Septima conclusio est ista quod aliquod est
proprium quod competit omni et soli sed non semper, ad intentionem
auctoris, quia stat loco istius ‘aliquod est proprium quod veriÞcatur de
aliqua specie’ sumpta cum isto ‘solus’ sive dictione exclusiva. Et quod
competit omni individuo istius speciei sed non semper, competit tali
speciei vel talibus individuis, sicud hoc proprium esse risibile dummodo
Sortes ridet vel esse risibile dummodo sol est in oriente ut esse risibile in
hoc instanti, demonstrato instanti presenti quia solus homo est risibilis in
hoc instanti, et omnis homo est risibilis in hoc instanti, et hoc proprium
va non competit isti speciei semper, demonstrando | idem instans quod
prius, vel ‘omnis homo est risibilis in A instanti’ vocando istud instans
proprie A prius demonstratum.
〈conclusio octava〉 Octava conclusio est ista quod aliquod est pro-
prium quod competit omni et soli et semper, ad istum intellectum quod
aliquod proprium veriÞcatur de aliquo specie sumpta cum dictione
exclusiva, et veriÞcatur de ista specie universaliter et numquam vere
negatur ab ista specie, et hoc utrisque, scilicet tam specie quam proprio,
sumptis personaliter, sicud hoc proprium risibile veriÞcatur de ista specie
homo universaliter, et veriÞcatur de ea cum dictione exclusiva.
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Ex isto sequitur aliqua 〈correlaria quorum〉 primum est hoc quod
proprium risibile competit alicui tamquam proprie proprium quod im-
possibile est ridere, sicud isti speciei homo que non potest ridere.
Secundum est quod hoc proprium risibile competit alicui tamquam
 proprie proprium quod impossibile est esse risibile. Istud correlarium
iam patet de ista specie homo, quem impossibile est esse risibilem.
Tertium correlarium est quod hoc proprium risibile non est proprium
alicuius quod potest ridere, quia non est proprium nisi alicuius termini
vel signi, et nullum tale potest ridere.
 〈conclusio nona〉 Ultima conclusio est ista quod istud proprium
quod competit omni et soli et semper est unum universale de quo
principaliter intendit Porphirius, quia alia sunt accidentia.
〈ad 〉 Ad primum igitur principale dicitur negando consequentiam, si
subiectum antecedentis supponit personaliter et subiectum consequentis
 materialiter, et negando antecedens, si subiectum supponat materialiter,
et concedendo utramque istarum ‘nullum proprium dicitur quadruplici-
ter’, et ‘proprium dicitur quadrupliciter’ quia in prima subiectum suppo-
nit personaliter et in secunda materialiter. Et sic non est con〈sequentia〉
propter equivocationem.
 〈ad 〉 Ad secundum dicitur negando antecedens secundum intel-
lectum auctorum. Et ad probationem dicitur quod omnia ista quibus
competit tale proprium, continentur sub aliqua specie. Et ulterius dicitur
concedendo quod istud proprium competat omni speciei sumpte cum
dictione exclusiva, sed non competit omnibus contentis sub ista specie,
 sicud ‘tantum animal est bipes’ et ‘non omne animal est bipes’. Iterum
dicitur quod sic istud competit aliquibus contentis sub aliqua specie vel
genere vel transcendente, de qua vel de quo istud proprium veriÞcatur
exclusive, sicud hoc proprium esse bipedem competit aliquibus que con-
tinentur sub aliquo quod est species, genus vel transcendens de quo istud
 proprium exclusive veriÞcatur. Et ideo non competit omni et soli.
〈ad 〉 Ad tertium dicitur quod ista propositio ‘proprium competit
soli speciei’ stat loco istius ‘competit alicui speciei exclusive, vel sumpte
cum ista dictione “solus” ’ et sic intendit Porphirius, et cum hoc stat quod
competat contentis sub specie.
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〈ad〉 Ad quartum dicitur concedendo consequentiam et consequens,
accipiendo ‘consequens’ proprie et predicatum personaliter. Sed acci-
piendo ‘consequens’ transsumptive in sensu composito dictum, tunc
negatur consequentia, vel si predicatum consequentis supponat materia-
liter, quia competit soli homini, scilicet isti termino ‘solus homo’.
〈ad 〉 Ad quintum patet per predicta, quia hoc proprium quod dico
‘canescere in senectute’ non est tale proprium, quamvis gratia exempli
ponatur.
〈ad 〉 Ad sextum dicitur negando antecedens, quia hoc proprium
risibile competit omni et soli homini universaliter et exclusive non tamen
semper, quia hec est falsa: tantum omnis homo est risibilis, sed divisive.
Sed hoc copulativa est vera: omnis homo est risibilis et tantum homo est
risibilis. Et competit sibi semper. Hoc est si ista universalis ‘omnis homo
est risibilis’ semper esset, esset semper vera.
Et ulterius dicitur negando istam conseqentiam: ‘nullus homo est risi-
bilis semper, igitur hoc proprium non competit homini semper’, quia isto
homini actu signiÞcato hoc proprium risibile competit homini semper,
non debet sic exerceri: omnis homo est semper risibilis, sed sic: quan-
vb documque hec propositio ‘omnis homo est | risibilis’ est vel erit, ipsa est
vel erit vera, et hoc dico reddendo singula singulis videlicet quandocum-
que fuit, fuit vera; et quandocumque est, est vera; et quandocumque erit,
erit vera. Et impossibile est ipsam esse falsam sine nova impositione. Et
sic debet intelligi quando dicitur ab aliquibus quod proprium non potest
separari ab eo cuius est proprium: hoc non potest ab eo vere negari,
sumptis personaliter.
〈ad argumentum in oppositum〉 Ad argumentum in oppositum patet
per predicta quid sit dicendum.
Et sic est Þnis questionis.
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum aliquod accidens
absit et assit preter subiecti corruptionem.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non:
 quia sic ista accidentia sedere, stare essent huiusmodi que aderunt et
aberunt preter subiecti corruptionem. Ista consequentia videtur evidens
ex textu.1 Et falsitas consequentis declaratur, quia, si sic, sequeretur quod
aliquid posset sedere et stare preter subiecti corruptionem, igitur preter
sui debilitationem, et per consequens posset adhuc per tantum tempus
 stare preter subiecti debilitationem, et pari ratione adhuc per tantum
tempus, et sic in inÞnitum; igitur aliquis posset stare per inÞnitum tem-
pus preter subiecti debilitationem. Sed hoc est falsum, sicud de se patet;
igitur istud ex quo sequitur, scilicet, quod stare sit accidens quod potest
adesse preter subiecti corruptionem. Et quod ista consequentia ‘aliquis
 posset stare sine subiecti corruptione et sine subiecti debilitatione’, sit
vera, declaratur, quia debilitatio nihil aliud videtur esse 〈quam〉 corruptio
virtutis, nec virtus videtur aliud esse quam ipsa res virtuosa, ergo debi-
litatio rei non est aliud quam corruptio rei. Et consimiliter arguitur de
sedere et de quocumque alio accidente quo subiectum posset fatigari.
 〈.〉 Item. Si sic, tunc sequeretur quod accidens posset separari a
subiecto. Consequentia videtur evidens. Et falsitas consequentis decla-
ratur, quia, si sic: ponatur igitur in esse quod aliquod accidens separatur
a subiecto: vel igitur accidens quod est, separatur a subiecto, vel acci-
dens quod non est; non accidens quod est, quia omne tale inheret suo
 subiecto; igitur nullum tale separatur a subiecto. Ista consequentia patet,
quia: capiatur aliquod accidens quod non separatur a suo subiecto, et
vocetur A, et aliud accidens quod dicitur separari a subiecto, et voce-
tur B. Tunc quero, utrum B sit in subiecto vel non; si sic, tunc non
potius separatur a subiecto quam A; si non, tunc accidens subsisteret sine
 subiecto, quod est contra Aristotelem,2 primo Physicorum, ubi vult quod
 videtur] declaratur(?) E  quo] quod E  quod] accidens add. necnon del. et
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passiones non possunt existere sine subiecto. Item, tunc non esset acci-
dens, quia accidens dicitur esse eo, quia alicui accidit, et alteri inhereat. Et
sic potest dicere quod accidens quod non est, potest separari a subiecto,
quia non entis non est separatio sine alio.
〈.〉 Item. Si sic, tunc calor ignis posset separari ab igne, sine corrup-
tione 〈ignis, et animal posset〉 esse sine calore naturali, et sic de singulis.
Sed ad istud dicitur quod ista sunt accidentia inseparabilia, de quibus
predicta di nitio intelligitur.
Sed contra: calor ignis et calor naturalis animalis possint remitti; igitur
ab eorum subiecto possint separari. Consequentia patet, quia remissio
accidentis non videtur aliud quam corruptio eiusdem. Et antecedens
patet de se.
〈.〉 Item. Nullum accidens adest et abest alicui subiecto, igitur nec
accidens. Antecedens patet inductive, quia aliter sequeretur quod ali-
quod accidens competeret alicui subiecto solo, quod includit contra dic-
tionem.
〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum est Porphirius.3
ra 〈distinctio prima〉 Prima distinctio est ista quod ‘accidens’ accipitur
dupliciter.
Uno modo pro termino qui accidentaliter predicatur, hoc est, non
per se primo modo vel secundo modo dicendi per se. Et sic accidens
est quintum universale. Et isto modo iste terminus ‘accidens’ est nomen
secunde intentionis.
Alio modo accipitur ‘accidens’ pro aliqua re inherente alicui subiecto
cum quo non facit per se unum, sive talis res sit signum, sive non. Et sic
iste terminus ‘accidens’ est nomen prime intentionis.
〈distinctio secunda〉 Secunda distinctio est ista quod ‘adesse et
abesse’ accipitur dupliciter, scilicet, logicaliter et realiter. Logicaliter ali-
 includit] concludit E  accidens] et add. necnon del. E  intentionis]
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quid dicitur ‘adesse et abesse’ per divisionem a rmativam vel negativam,
realiter per realem inherentiam vel per realem separationem.
〈distinctio tertia〉 Tertia distinctio est ista quod ‘subiectum acci-
dentis’ accipitur dupliciter: uno modo pro isto de quo accidens acciden-
 taliter predicatur; alio modo pro isto cui accidens realiter inheret.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista quod nullum accidens adest
et abest preter subiecti corruptionem, et hoc qualitercumque accipitur
‘accidens’ sive ‘adesse et abesse’, quia ex hoc sequeretur quod aliquid
competeret alicui et istud non competeret eidem, quod est manifesta
 contradictio, sicud pretangebatur 〈in〉 argumento principali.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod hec proposi-
tio: ‘accidens adest et abest etcetera’ est vera secundum intellectum auc-
toris, quia stat loco istius ‘accidens potest adesse et abesse preter subiecti
corruptionem’.
 〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod omne accidens
quod est universale, potest adesse et potest abesse preter subiecti cor-
ruptionem. Ista conclusio patet inductive, quia, si aliquod non posset,
sit gratia exempli hoc accidens nigrum, quod non potest abesse Ethiopi
vel corvo. Sed clarum est quod hoc potest adesse et potest abesse, quia,
 quamvis non posset abesse Ethiopi vel corvo, potest tamen adesse et
potest abesse alicui alteri subiecto.
Et si dicatur quod hoc accidens compositum Ethiops niger non potest
adesse et abesse etcetera, ad istud dicitur negando assumptum, quia non
sequitur naturam speciÞcam, sed accidentalem complexionem individui,
 que posset, quamvis de di cili, mutari. Et hoc est quod Porphirius forte
intendit per hoc quod dicit: ‘Potest autem subintelligi corvus albus et
Ethiops nitens candore.’4
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod omne accidens
reale potest a subiecto separari preter corruptionem subiecti. Ista decla-
 ratur quia: si aliquod non posset, hoc maxime videtur verum de caliditate
ignis et de calore naturali animalis, sine quibus ista subiecta videntur
non posse subsistere. Quia, si non, tunc sequeretur quod omne istud
quod posset talem calorem remittere in aliquo, posset eius subiectum
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corrumpere. Quod non apparet verum, quia sic sequeretur quod gutta
rb aque posset corrumpere spheram ignis, | quod non videtur verisimile.
Patet igitur quod sine omni caliditate potest ignis existere, et per conse-
quens omnis caliditas est separabilis ab igne, et consimiliter sine omni
calore naturali potest hoc animal existere, quia, si non: capiatur aliquis
calor naturalis sine quo hoc animal non potest existere. Qui calor vocetur
A, et incipiat aliquod agens in hoc instanti remittere A; tunc sic A post
instans non erit, quia immediate post hoc instans corrumpetur secun-
dum aliquid sui. Et hoc animal non potest existere sine A; igitur hoc
animal post hoc instans non erit, et per consequens, hoc est ultimum
instans esse istius animalis. Quod est contra Aristotelem, sexto Physico-
rum,5 ubi vult quod non est dare ultimum instans rei permanentis in esse;
igitur sine A potest hoc animal esse. Et sic arguitur de quocumque alio
calore naturali.
Et si instetur quod sic sequitur quod aliquod elementum posset exi-
stere sine sua propria qualitate, et aliquod animal sine suo propria calore
naturali, quorum primum est contra Aristotelem in De proprietatibus
elementorum6 et secundo De generatione,7 et contra Commentatorem,
tertio De anima, capitulo de tactu,8 et secundum est contra Aristotelem,
secundo De anima,9 ubi vult quod omnis operatio vite procedit ex calore
naturali, vel mediante calore naturali, ad istud breviter dicitur negando
istam consequentiam ‘sine calore naturali potest hoc animal esse; igitur
animal potest esse sine calore naturali’, quia antecedens 〈est〉 verum et
consequens est impossibile, nam sua de inesse est impossibilis, ista, sci-
licet, ‘hoc animal est sine calore naturali’.
Et si dicatur quod consimiliter ista de inesse que correspondet huic:
‘sine calore naturali hoc animal potest esse’ est impossibilis, ista scilicet
 ignis] ignis mg. E  instans] stans E – Physicorum] uib add. necnon del. E
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 Vel potius Aristoteles, Physica viii, , b–a?
 Ps.-Aristoteles, De proprietatibus elementorum. Locus non inventus.
 Aristoteles, De generatione ii, , b–: ‘Non enim in faciendo aliquid aliud
neque in patiendo ab alio dicuntur, oportet autem activa ad invicem et passiva esse
elementa: miscentur enim et transmutant in invicem’ – tr. vetus. Auctoritates 
(): ‘Elementa activa et passiva sunt ad invicem cum subjecto.’ (Aristoteles, De
generatione ii, , b–).
 Averroes, In De anima iii, com. , p. , l. –: ‘forme enim materiales non
sunt separabiles’. Auctoritates  (): ‘Formae naturales non sunt separabiles’
(Averroes, In De anima iii, com. , p. , l. –).
 Aristoteles, De anima ii, , b–.
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‘sine calore naturali hoc animal est’, ad istud dicitur quod ista non est sua
de inesse, quia non oportet propositionem de impossibili poni in esse
cum nota universalitatis a parte subiecti, sed su cit ad veritatem talis de
possibili, quod nulli eius singulari repugnat poni in esse, sicud manifeste
 patet de ista propositione de possibili ‘utrum〈que〉 istorum potest esse
verum’ demonstratis duobus contradictoriis que non possunt sic poni
in esse 〈quod〉 utrum〈que〉 istorum est verum, sed su cit quod quelibet
eius singularis poterit poni in esse. Sed quando in aliqua propositione de
possibili signum universale ponitur a parte predicati, ad eius veritatem
 requiritur ipsam poni in esse cum eodem predicato, quia predicatum
appellat suam propriam formam.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod aliquod acci-
dens quod est universale, dicitur inseparabile respectu alicuius subiecti
determinati et non absolute, sicud hoc accidens quod est moveri, non
 potest separari a primo mobili saltem naturaliter loquendo, quia physice
loquendo hec est impossibilis ‘primum mobile non movetur’, quamvis
forte secundum rei veritatem et precise secundum theologos est possibi-
lis.
〈conclusio sexta〉 Sexta conclusio est ista quod hec est possibilis:
 va| ‘accidens separatur a subiecto’, nam sequitur: ‘accidens quod nunc est
in subiecto, immediate post hoc non erit in subiecto, igitur accidens
separatur a subiecto’. Et antecedens est possibile, igitur et consequens.
Et consequentia patet, quia consequens est expositio antecedentis.
〈conclusio septima〉 Septima conclusio est ista quod ista est possi-
 bilis: ‘accidens est quod separatur a subiecto’. Et probatur sicut imme-
diate precedens. Et si dicitur quod nihil inherens subiecto separatur a
subiecto, dicitur negando istam, quia nihil aliud est accidens separari a
subiecto quam nunc esse in subiecto et immediate post hoc non esse in
subiecto.
 〈conclusio octava〉 Octava conclusio est ista quod hec est impossi-
bilis: ‘accidens quod non est, separatur a subiecto’. Quia, si hec in aliquo
sensu posset veriÞcari, hoc esset in isto sensu: aliquod accidens non est in
subiecto quod immediate ante hoc fuit in subiecto, et hoc est falsum, quia
nullum accidens immediate ante hoc fuit in subiecto quod nunc non est
 in subiecto, et precipue nullum accidens quod successive acquirebatur
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vel deperdebatur, quia sic sequitur quod istud accidens non successive
corrumpebatur.
〈conclusio nona〉 Nona conclusio est ista quod hec est impossibilis:
‘aliquod accidens separatur totaliter a subiecto’, et hoc ad istum intel-
lectum: aliquod accidens nunc est in subiecto quod immediate post hoc
secundum nullam eius partem erit in subiecto, quia sic esset dare ulti-
mum instans rei permanentis in esse. Et consimiliter aliquod accidens
corrumpetur subito et non successive, quod non videtur verum.
Et multa istorum dicta sunt gratia exercitii et probabiliter potius quam
exercitive determinationis.
〈ad 〉 Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo quod sedere et
stare et moveri sunt huiusmodi accidentia que possunt adesse et pos-
sunt abesse preter subiecti corrumptionem, et etiam preter debilitatio-
nem. Quia experimur aliquando subiectum per motum conformari et
sanari, utpote quando per motum convenientis exercitii vel sudorum vel
evacuationis vel alicuius consimilis, mala materia inÞrmitatis impediens
operationem naturalem removetur.
Et ulterius dicitur negando consequentiam: ‘si per tantum tempus ali-
quid potest stare preter sui debilitationem, igitur pari ratione adhuc per
tantum tempus potest stare sine sui debilitatione’, et hoc, quia cetera non
sunt paria, quia possibile est quod prima statio induxit bonam comple-
xionem, et secunda dissolvebat bonam complexionem ceteris existen-
tibus paribus. Tunc est consequentia bona, et tunc negatur antecedens,
scilicet quod aliquod fatigabile per stationem vel per motum per aliquod
tempus in isto fatigetur. Et ulterius dicitur quod talis debilitatio vel fatiga-
vb tio | est corruptio virtutis. Et ulterius negatur quod talis virtus sit ipsa res
virtuosa, hoc est: ipsum principale subiectum; sed aliqua re superaddita,
utpote calor naturalis, vel bona complexio naturalis, vel spiritus vitalis,
vel omnia ista que, vel quorum, aliquid dissolvitur vel remittitur sensibi-
liter vel insensibiliter per talem stationem vel per talem motum. Et ista
patet, quia non omnis debilitatio alicuius subiecti est corruptio eiusdem
subiecti.
〈ad 〉 〈Ad〉 secundum patet per predicta, quia conceditur quod acci-
dens quod est, separatur a subiecto, et non accidens quod non est. Et
ulterius dicitur quod potius B separatur a subiecto quam A, quia B nunc
 instans] in sup. lin. Ec  removetur] removetur Ec; vacat add. necnon del. E
 complexionem] secundum add. necnon del. E  dicitur] concedendo sup. lin.
Ec
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est in subiecto et immediate post hoc non erit in subiecto, et hoc est: sepa-
rari a subiecto. Sed sic non est de A, per casum, quia A est in subiecto et
immediate post hoc erit in subiecto.
〈ad 〉 Ad tertium dicitur concedendo quod calor potest separari ab
 igne, et qualitas naturalis suo proprio elemento, et calor naturalis ab
animali. Et ulterius negatur ista consequentia, igitur ignis potest esse sine
calore, et animal sine calore naturali, et patet totum per predicta.10
〈ad 〉 Ad quartum dicitur concedendo quod nullum accidens adest
et abest etcetera, sed qualiter hec debeat intelligi, su cienter 〈patet〉 in
 precedentibus.
〈ad argumentum in oppositum〉 Et per hoc patet ad argumentum in
oppositum quid sit dicendum.
 immediate] mediate E
 Videas supra, concl. .
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum ex subiecto et
accidente componatur aliquod per se unum.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod sic:
ex subiecto et forma substantiali componitur aliquod per se unum; et
omnis forma substantialis est accidens; igitur ex subiecto et accidente
componitur aliquod per se unum. Consequentia videtur evidens. Et
prima particula antecedentis patet; et secunda, videlicet quod omnis
forma substantialis sit accidens, declaratur, quia potest adesse et potest
abesse preter subiecti corruptionem, idest: preter materie corruptionem,
nam quedam materia est proprie subiectum forme substantialis, et istud
subiectum secundum Aristotelem, primo1 et secundo2 Physicorum, est
ingenerabile et incorruptibile.
〈.〉 Item. Sicud forma substantialis extenditur intrinsece ipse mate-
rie, sic videlicet quod, ubicumque est aliqua pars materie, ibi est aliqua
pars forme, et e converso, ita quod materia et forma sunt precise in
eodem loco, nec per adventum forme augmentatur quantitas materie,
nec e converso; nec etiam quantitas alicuius tertii, sic, ut videtur, accidens
intrinsece extenditur suo subiecto secundum omnes conclusiones iam
dictas. Igitur, pari ratione qua ex materia et forma substantiali componi-
tur aliquod per se unum, consimili ratione ex accidente et suo subiecto
componitur aliquod per se unum.
〈.〉 Item. Sicud materia et forma sunt partes essentiales substantie
ra composite, ita subiectum | et accidens sunt partes essentiales aggregati
sive compositi ex substantia et accidente, igitur, ut videtur, sicud ex
materia et forma componitur per se unum, ita ex subiecto et accidente
componitur per se unum.
 accidente] excidente E  quedam] est add. necnon del. E  precise] et add.
necnon del. E  augmentatur] acmentatur E  et] et iter. E
 Aristoteles, Physica i, , a–: ‘in quantum autem est secundum potentiam,
non per se, sed incorruptibilem et ingenitum necesse est ipsum esse’ – tr. vetus. Cf.
Auctoritates  (): ‘Principia semper oportet manere.’ (Aristoteles Physica, Α,
a–).
 Cf. Auctoritates  (): ‘Subiectum et ejus propria passio sunt ejusdem considera-
tionis.’ (Cf. Aristoteles Physica, Β, b–).
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〈.〉 Item. Sicud forma substantialis non potest recedere sine corrup-
tione compositi ex materia et tali forma, ita accidens non potest recedere
sine corruptione compositi ex subiecto et isto accidente. Et sicud acci-
dens potest recedere sine corruptione sui subiecti, ita forma substantialis
 potest recedere sine corruptione sui subiecti vel materie, igitur, sicud ex
materia et forma substantiali componitur aliquod per se unum, ita ex
subiecto et accidente componitur aliquod per se unum, quia ex utraque
parte omnes proprietates sunt similes.
Et si dicatur quod dierentia est, quia accidens facilius recedit a suo
 subiecto quam forma substantialis a materia, hoc non videtur verum,
primo, quia in perfecte compositis corporibus sicud in hominibus, anima
facillime recedit a materia, quia per agens valde debile et in brevi tem-
pore, sicud per vermem, vel per araneam vel aliquid consimile quod est
agens debile, quod tamen statim interÞcit hominem sicud experimur.
 Tunc sic: omne quod Þt ab agente debili et in brevi tempore, istud facili-
ter Þt, sed sepenumero forma substantialis a materia Þt de brevi tempore,
et ab agente debili; igitur faciliter Þt.
〈.〉 Item. Multa accidentia sunt de di cili mutabilia a subiecto, utpote
omnis habitus, sicud patet per Aristotelem in Predicamentis, capitulo de
 qualitate.3
〈.〉 Item. Alique forme substantiales consimiliter separantur et cor-
rumpuntur sicud earum accidentia, utpote forma substantialis ipsius
ignis, que faciliter intenditur et remittitur, sicud caliditas ignis secundum
quod vult Commentator, tertio Celi commento ,4 et per consequens in
 igne non facilius separatur accidens a suo subiecto quam forma substan-
tialis a materia.
〈.〉 Item. Secundum Aristotelem5 et Commentatorem,6 tertio Celi,
unumquodque tantum acquirit de loco quantum acquirit de forma, et
pari ratione, quantum perdit de loco, tantum perdit de forma; igitur
 forma substantialis ita de facili separatur a materia, sicud accidens a
subiecto.
 potest] ne(?) add. necnon del. E  perfecte] perfectionis(?)E  facillime]
facillima E  et] ag add. necnon del. E  forma] materia E
 Aristoteles, Predicamenta, , b–: ‘Et una quidem species qualitatis habitus
aectioque dicantur. Diert autem habitus aectione quod permanentior et diutur-
nior est’ – tr. Boethii.
 Averroes, In De celo. Locus non inventus.
 Aristoteles, De celo et mundo iii. Locus non inventus.
 Averroes, In De celo. Locus non inventus.
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Ex quibus omnibus, ut videtur, apparet, quod ex subiecto et accidente
componatur aliquod per se unum.
〈ad oppositum i〉 Ad oppositum arguitur primo: si sic, sequeretur quod
non maiori ratione dicetur forma accidentalis accidens vel accidens
forma accidentalis quam substantialis, quia, sicud accidens potest adesse
et potest abesse, ita forma substantialis. Igitur, si ex accidente et subiecto
sicud ex caliditate et subiecto Þeret per se unum, non esset aliqua ratio
rb quare caliditas non esset forma substantialis, | vel quare forma substan-
tialis ignis non esset forma accidentalis.
〈ad oppositum ii〉 Secundo sequeretur quod aggregatum esset per
se in aliqua genere, quia omne per se unum est per se in aliquo predi-
camento, quia omne tale est individuum per se alicuius speciei, et per
consequens aliquod aggregatum esset per se in predicamento substan-
tie vel per se in predicamento accidentis. Quod videtur falsum, quia non
maiori ratione in uno predicamento quam in alio, igitur, in omni vel in
nullo, sed non in omni, quia secundum Simplicium7 predicamenta sunt
impermixta; igitur in nullo.
〈ad oppositum iii〉 Tertio sequeretur quod nihil esset unum per
accidens, quod est contra Aristotelem, quinto Metaphysice.8
〈distinctio prima〉 Prima distinctio est ista que ad presens presuppo-
nitur de accidente, quia in precedenti questione pona〈ba〉tur.
〈distinctio secunda〉 Secunda distinctio est de uno, nam ‘unum’
accipitur multipliciter:
〈i: unum essentialiter〉 scilicet pro ‘uno essentialiter’; quod quidem
unum componitur ex partibus diversarum rationum, quarum una est
potentia respectu alterius, et 〈que〉 sunt precise in eodem situ, sicud
materia et forma.
〈ii: unum secundum gradus accidentales〉 Alio modo dicitur
‘unum’ secundum gradus accidentales; quod quidem unum componitur
 esset] pers add. necnon del. E  predicamento] predicatis add. necnon del. E
 sed] in add. E
 Simplicius, In Predicamenta (?) vel In De celo (?). Locus non inventus.
 Aristoteles, Metaphysica, v, , a–: ‘Ens dicitur hoc quidem secundum acci-
dens illud vero secundum se. Secundum accidens quidem, ut iustum musicum esse
dicimus et hominem musicum et musicum hominem’ – rec. Guillelmi. Auctoritates
 (): ‘Ens per accidens est quando unum accidens dicitur de alio, ut album est
musicum, vel accidens de subjecto, ut homo est albus, vel subjectum de accidente, ut
album est homo, vel musicum est homo.’ (Aristoteles, Metaphys., ∆, a–).
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ex partibus eiusdem rationis, que quidem partes sunt precise simul, sive
sibi invicem inexistentes, et hoc sive tale unum sit extensum sive non.
Exemplum primi sicud albedo, que componitur ex partibus graduali-
bus eiusdem rationis. Que quidem partes graduales secundum intensio-
 nem et secundum extensionem sunt sibi invicem inexistentes et precise
in eodem situ subiective.
Exemplum secundi ut aliquod accidens mentale, sicud gaudium vel
dilectio, quia talia accidentia mentalia intensionalia et remissibilia com-
ponuntur ex partibus gradialibus eiusdem rationis. Que quidem partes,
 quamvis proprie loquendo non sunt in eodem situ, tamen sunt sibi invi-
cem 〈in〉existentes, quia sunt in subiecto individuali utpote in anima
intellectiva.
Et isti duo modi unitatis propriissime dicuntur unitates per se, quia
sunt maxime unitates que Þunt ex distinctis rebus excepta sola unitate
 Þlii Dei et nature assumpte, de qua nihil ad presens quia alterius existit
speculationis.
〈iii: unum indivisibilitate〉 Tertio modo dicitur aliquod ‘unum indi-
visibilitate’, sicud Deus est unus, et angelus, et anima intellectiva. Et hoc
est similiter maxime unum.
 〈iv: unumcontinuatione〉 Quarto modo dicitur aliquod ‘unum con-
tinuatione’, sive corporali sive incorporali. Corporale sicud unum lignum
continuum, cuius partes secundum extensionem continuantur sibi invi-
cem; incorporale sicud partes solis integrales sibi invicem continuantur.
Et isto modo aliquod dicitur unum per se.
 〈v: unum situ vel subiecto〉 Quinto modo dicitur aliquod ‘unum
situ vel subiecto’, ista, scilicet, que precise sunt in eodem situ sive in
eodem subiecto, sicud albedo et dulcedo sunt precise in eodem situ et
in eodem subiecto sicud in lacte, et sicud grammatica et musica sunt
precise in eodem subiecto, scilicet in anima.
 〈vi: unum per accidens proprie loquendo〉 Sexto modo dicitur
aliquod ‘unum per accidens’ proprie loquendo, sicud aggregatum ex
subiecto et accidente, quamvis etiam quintus modus sit unitas acciden-
talis.
va〈alii modi unitatis〉 Alii vero sunt modi | unitatis, utpote unum
 numero, unum specie, unum genere, unum di nitione etcetera, de qui-
bus non oportet ad presens tractare, sed alibi erit locus eorum.9
 gaudium] nec(?) add. necnon del. E  quia] quod E | existit] existat E  incor-
porale] incorporalem E  unitas] unita E
 Locum invenire non potui.
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〈conclusio prima〉 Prima igitur conclusio est ista quod ex subiecto et
accidente illius subiecti accipiendo ‘accidens’ secundum quod est nomen
secunde intentionis, non componitur unum per se, quia sunt diverse res
quarum una est subiectum propositionis, et reliqua predicatum, et qua-
rum una non est materia sive potentia respectu alterius, quamvis subiec-
tum se habeat ad modum materie et predicatum ad modum forme. Nec
etiam sunt diversi gradus eiusdem rationis existentes precise in eodem
situ, vel sibi invicem inexistentes, nec etiam sunt unum indivisibilitate,
vel continuatione. Et patet totum de se.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod isto modo
accipiendo ‘subiectum’ et ‘accidens’ ex subiecto 〈et〉 accidente componi-
tur unum unitate subiecti, quia tam subiectum quam accidens possunt
simul esse in eodem subiecto, sicud patet de ista propositione mentali
‘homo est albus’.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod accidente isto
modo accepto, scilicet, pro uno predicabili accidentaliter, Deo potest
competere aliquod accidens, quia: capiatur ista propositio ‘Sortes sedet’,
que tantum sit vera per unam horam, et vocetur A, tunc hoc accidens
sciens A competit Deo, quia hec est vera: ‘Deus est sciens A’, et hoc
accidens potest adesse Deo et potest abesse, sicud de se notum est.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod ex subiecto et
accidente secundo modo accipiendo ‘accidens’, videlicet ut accidens est
nomen prime intentionis, non Þt unum per se, quia non essentialiter,
vel gradualiter, nec indivisibilitate, nec continuatione. Et patet totum per
predicta.10
〈ad .〉 Ad primum igitur principale dicitur negando istam ‘omnis forma
substantialis est accidens’. Et ad probationem dicitur quod ad hoc quod
aliquid sit accidens, non su cit quod poterit adesse vel quod poterit
abesse preter subiecti corruptionem, sed requiritur quod ipsum vel ali-
quid eiusdem speciei specialissime poterit adesse alicui subiecto substan-
tiali post eius esse substantiale perfectum. Et hoc est precisa causa quare
aliquid dicitur accidens, scilicet quia accidit rei et advenit post ultima-
tum esse talis rei, vel saltem quia aliquid eiusdem speciei potest alicui
tali advenire. Et sic intelligenda est predicta di nitio accidentis. Sed hoc
 accidente] accidens E  accepto] acceptum E  prime] secunde E
 quod] quod sup. lin. Ec – substantiali] quod add. necnon del. E
 Videas supra, dist. , q.  dist. .
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non competit forme substantiali, quia nulla forma substantialis potest
advenire alicui subiecto substantiali post eius ultimatam perfectionem,
saltem secundum quamlibet eius partem integralem. Quod dico propter
formam generatam in nutritione, de qua alias plus patebit.
 〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur negando consequentiam quia iste con-
clusiones non sunt cause quare ex materia et forma substantiali compo-
nitur per se unum, sed quia materia est potentia, et forma actus, sicud eli-
citur ab Aristotele, secundo De anima.11 Unde breviter: materia et forma
sunt talis nature quod ex eis constituitur per se unum, et subiectum et
 accidens non sunt talis nature.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur consimiliter negando consequentiam. Et
causa iam dicta est.12
〈ad .〉 Ad quartum consimiliter etiam dicitur negando consequen-
vbtiam, | quia iste similitudines non sunt su cientes ad hoc quod ex
 subiecto et accidente Þat per se unum, et hoc quia accidens potest adve-
nire rei post eius esse completum.
〈ad .〉 Ad quintum dicitur quod, quamvis multa accidentia sint de
di cili mobilia, propter hoc tamen non sequitur quod ex eis et eorum
subiectis Þat per se unum.
 〈ad .〉 Ad sextum dicitur quod Commentator ibidem communiter
non tenetur.
〈ad .〉 Ad septimum dicitur quod Aristoteles intelligit quod unum-
quodque, quantum acquirit de loco naturaliter et per principium intrin-
secum, tantum habet de forma inclinante ad talem locum. Et ulterius
 dicitur concedendo quod in multis casibus ita faciliter separetur forma
substantialis a materia sicud accidens 〈a subiecto〉. Nec ista est causa
quare ex subiecto et accidente deberet Þeri per se unum, sed causa est,
sicud superius dictum est, quia accidens potest advenire rei post eius
esse completum. Et per consequens accidens in natura sua habet tan-
 tam extraneitatem cum suo subiecto, et tantam disimilitudinem, quod
ex ipso et suo subiecto non potet Þeri per se unum.
Et ista sunt dicta secundum communem locutionem †pl-m† verumta-
men sicud placeat. Non mihi apparet ratio cogens quin poterit probabi-
liter teneri quod ex accidente et subiecto Þat ita bene per se unum sicud
 ex] materia add. necnon del. E
 Aristoteles, De anima., ii, , a–. Auctoritates  (): ‘Materia est potentia,
forma vero actus.’ (Aristoteles, De anima., Β, a–).
 Videas supra, concl. .
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ex materia et forma substantiali. Et hoc diusius pertractabitur Supra
Predicamenta.13
〈ad primum in oppositum〉 Ad primum in oppositum dicitur quod,
quamvis ex subiecto et accidente Þeret per se unum, tamen quia adhuc
forma accidentalis advenit rei post eius esse completum, ideo potius
poterit dici accidens quam forma substantialis.
〈ad secundum in oppositum〉 Qualiter vero compositum ex subiecto
et accidente Þt in predicamento, et qualiter non, patebit Super Predica-
menta,14 quia ibi potius habet locum.
〈ad tertium in oppositum〉 Ad ultimum potest dici quod non opor-
tet istam consequentiam valere, quia, quamvis ex subiecto et accidente
Þeret per se unum, tamen ex accidentibus existentibus in eodem subiecto
Þeret unum per accidens, sicud ex grammatica et musica in anima, et
albedine et dulcedine in lacte.
 et] ex E  et] et sup. lin. Ec; ex add. necnon del. E
 omas Manlevelt, Questiones super Praedicamenta, Erfurt sb Ampl. q  (xiv)
.rb–vb, qq. –?
 omas Manlevelt, Questiones super Praedicamenta, Erfurt sb Ampl. q  (xiv)
.rb–vb, qq. –?
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum corvus possit subintelligi albus.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod non:
quia si sic: ponatur etiam in esse, scilicet quod corvus subintelligitur
 albus, igitur corvus albus intelligitur, igitur corvus albus est. Sed conse-
quens est impossibile, ut suppono ad presens, igitur istud ex quo sequitur.
Et quod ista consequentia ‘corvus albus intelligitur; igitur corvus albus
est’ sit vera, patet per Aristotelem, capitulo de relatione,1 ubi vult quod
ista consequentia sit vera: ‘scientia est, igitur scitum est, et igitur scibile
 raest’, et pari ratione sequitur ‘intellectio est, igitur intellectum est | et intel-
ligibile est’, et similiter quod ista consequentia sit vera: ‘corvus intelligitur
albus, igitur corvus albus intelligitur’. Patet quia sequitur ‘corvus intelligi-
tur albus, igitur corvus est intellectus albus, igitur quoddam intellectum
album est corvus, et nullum aliud intellectum album a corvo est corvus,
 igitur aliquid intellectum album quod est corvus est corvus, igitur cor-
vus qui est quoddam intellectum album, intelligitur, igitur corvus albus
intelligitur’.
〈.〉 Item. Si corvus potest subintelligi albus, vel igitur vere vel false.
Non vere, quia sic intelligendo non esset accidens inseparabile corvo,
 quod est contra textum. Et si false, consimiliter quodcumque predica-
tum potest subintelligi inesse corvo, quia false corvus potest subintelligi
asinus, vel Deus, vel quidquid aliud quod est in rerum natura. Et sic
sequitur quod ista propositio ponetur preter propositum et sine causa,
scilicet quod corvus potest subintelligi albus.
 〈.〉 Item. Si corvus posset subintelligi albus, igitur talis intellectio
posset ab aliquo obiecto causari. Consequentia est de se nota, quia omne
quod potest esse et non est, potest ab aliquo causari. Falsitas consequentis
declaratur, quia talis intellectio, si poterit causari ab aliquo obiecto, hoc
esset a corvo vel albedine; sed non a corvo, quia corvus non naturaliter
 corvus] est add. necnon del. E  aliquo] subiecto causari add. necnon del. E
 quia]  litt. (?) add. necnon del. E
 Aristoteles, Predicamenta, , b–: ‘scibile enim scientia prius esse videbitur;
namque in pluribus subsistentibus iam rebus scientias accipimus; in paucis enim
vel in nullis hoc quisque perspicet, simul cum scibili scientiam factam.’ – tr. Boethii.
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causat 〈conceptum albedinis〉, sicud de se patet; nec etiam ab albedine,
quia albedo non naturaliter causat conceptum corvi, igitur a nullo potest
talis intellectus sive conceptus causari.
〈.〉 Item. Si corvus potest subintelligi albus, igitur corvus potest subin-
telligi esse quoddam album, igitur potest subintelligi esse hoc album vel
hoc album et sic de singulis; sed quocumque albo demonstrato erit talis
propositio impossibilis; igitur corvus non potest Þeri albus. Ista ultima
consequentia patet ex hoc quia intellectus non potest assentire alicui
propositioni quam scit esse impossibilem, quia omnis impossibilitas est
ratione alicuius contradictionis; et nulli contradictioni potest intellectus
assentire quam scit esse contradictionem, sicud patet 〈per〉 Aristotelem,
quarto Metaphysice.2
〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum est Porphirius,3 qui dicit expresse in
textu: ‘potest autem subintelligi corvus albus et Ethiops nitens candore’.
〈solutio questionis〉 In ista questione premittende sunt quedam sup-
positiones; secundo subiungende sunt quedam conclusiones; et tertio
solvende sunt principales rationes.
〈suppositio prima〉 Prima igitur suppositio est ista quod omnes tales
dictiones ‘intellectio’, ‘desideratio’, ‘credulitas’ sive ‘creditio’, ‘conceptus’
sive ‘conceptio’, ‘voluntas’ sive ‘volitio’ sint relativa. Et capit ista suppositio
evidentiam ab Aristotele, capitulo de relatione,4 ubi vult quod scientia et
sensatio sunt relativa, quia pari ratione qua scientia est alicuius scibilis,
et alicuius sciti, et sensatio alicuius sensibilis et sensati. Intellectio est
rb alicuius | intelligibilis et intellecti, et desideratio alicuius desiderabilis
et desiderati, et creditio alicuius credibilis et crediti, et volitio alicuius
volibilis et voliti, et sic de consimilibus.
 causat] seq. lac.  litt. E  tales] sup add. necnon del. E  conceptio] volup add.
necnon del. E  quia] quia corr. ex quam E | ratione] p add. E
 Aristoteles, Metaphysica iv, , b–: ‘At vero nec medium contradictionis
nichil esse contingit, sed necessarium aut dicere aut negare unum de uno quod-
cumque’ – rec. Guillelmi.
 Isagoge,v,  (, –): ‘Potest autem subintelligi et corvus albus et Aethiops amittens
colorem praeter subiecti corruptionem.’
 Aristoteles, Predicamenta, , b–, tr. Boethii: ‘scientia alicuius scientia; ut
scientia scibilis rei dicitur scientia et scibile scientia scibile, (et sensus sensibilis
sensus et sensibile sensu sensibile).’
questio  
2011013 [Van der Helm] 02-Edition-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 397
〈suppositio secunda〉 Secunda suppositio est ista que similiter ibi-
dem5 ab Aristotele elici potest, quod relativa sibi invicem non includentia
ampliationem – utpote aliquod verbum possibilitatis vel de preterito vel
de futuro – sint simul natura, ita quod consequentia existendi ab uno ad
 reliquum et e converso, utrisque acceptis personaliter, est bona, sicud ista
consequentia est bona: ‘scientia, igitur scitum est, et e converso’, ‘sensatio
est, ergo sensatum est, et e converso’, et simili ratione sequitur ‘intellec-
tio est, ergo intellectum est, et e converso’, ‘creditio est, ergo creditum est,
et e converso’, ‘volitio est, ergo volutum est, et e converso’. Videtur satis
 evidens quod ista fuerat intentio Aristotelis, sicud legenti capitulum de
relatione satis patet.
〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista quod istud quod non potest
esse, non potest intelligi. Que statim patet ex iam dictis, quia, si aliquid
posset intelligi quod non posset esse: ponatur in esse, scilicet quod intel-
 lectio sit non existentis, tunc sic intellectio non existentis est, igitur non
existens est intellectum, et ultra, igitur tale intellectum est. Ista conse-
quentia patet per secundam suppositionem. Et quod omnis intellectio
sit alicuius intellecti, patet per primam suppositionem. Sed hoc conse-
quens ‘non-existens est intellectum’ terminis sumptis non materialiter ut
 suppono ad presens, est impossibile, igitur istud ex quo sequitur, scilicet
quod intellectio possit esse non existentis.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista que satis evidenter
sequitur ex conclusione iam posita, scilicet: quod non est, non intelligi-
tur. Et ista sine ulteriori declaratione patet ex iam dicta.
 〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista quod hominem esse
est homo. Que probatur sic: hominem esse est aliquid et non aliud
ab homine, igitur est homo. Consequentia plana. Et secunda particula
antecedentis patet. Et prima declaratur, scilicet quod hominem esse
sit aliquid, quia hominem esse est scitum et volitum et desideratum;
 igitur, hominem esse est aliquid. Et potest totum probari per predictas
suppositiones.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista quod hominem esse
animal est aliquid, quia hominem esse animal est homo et animal, et
 converso]  litt. (?) sup. lin. add. necnon del. E  non] entis add. necnon del. E
| existentis] etiam add. necnon del. E
 Aristoteles, Predicamenta, , b, –: ‘Videtur autem ad aliquid simul esse
natura’ – tr. Boethii. Auctoritates  (): ‘Relativa sic se habent quod posita se
ponunt et perempta se perimunt.’ (Aristoteles, Predicamenta, , b, –).
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identitas hominis et animalis, et totum est homo. Et probatur sicud pre-
dicta conclusio immediate, et conÞrmatur per Commentatorem, quarto
Metaphysice,6 ubi vult quod ens homo et unus homo non est aliud quam
homo.
〈conclusio quinta〉 Quinta conclusio est ista quod hominem esse
asinum non est aliquid vel aliqua quia: quod non sit aliquid, videtur
va evidens, et quod non sit aliqua, declaratur, quia si | esset aliqua, tunc
oportet quod esset homo et asinus et identitas hominis et asini, quod
patet esse falsum, quia identitas hominis et asini non est. Et loquor de
identitate numerali ratione cuius vere dicitur quod hoc est hoc.
〈conclusio sexta〉 Sexta conclusio est ista quod Platonem esse non
potest intelligi, posito quod Plato non sit nec poterit esse. Et sequitur ex
prima conclusione.
〈conclusio septima〉 Septima conclusio est ista quod Platonem esse
non potest credi, posito quod Plato non sit, nec poterit esse. Et patet sicud
predicta precedens.
〈conclusiooctava〉 Octava conclusio est ista quod posito quod Plato
non sit, et quod Sortes habeat actum complexum in mente sua, vel
saltem aliquem actum quo crederet Platonem esse, si Plato esset, et lateat
Sortem Platonem non esse, tunc Sortes non crederet Platonem esse. Ista
statim patet, quia Platonem esse nihil est; igitur non est creditum; igitur
Sortes hoc non credit, et hoc supposito quod nulli termini supponant
materialiter vel simpliciter.
〈conclusio nona〉 Nona conclusio est ista quod tento eodem casu
Sortes non credit se credere Platonem esse, quia Sortem credere Pla-
tonem esse nihil est, igitur non est creditum. Consequentia patet per
secundam suppositionem. Et antecedens declaratur, quia, si Sortem cre-
dere Platonem esse esset aliquid, hoc esset Sortes et credens Platonem
esse et identitas Sortis et credentis Platonem esse, sicud patet ex prece-
denti conclusione. Igitur Sortem esse credentem Platonem esse nihil est,
igitur non est creditum, igitur Sortes non credit se credere Platonem esse.
Et si instetur sic: Sortes decipitur, et omnis deceptio est respectu
actus credulitatis, igitur Sortes habet actum credulitatis et non alium,
ut suppono, nisi istum quo credit Platonem esse, igitur Sortes credit
Platonem esse, vel Sortes credit Sortem credere Platonem esse, ad istud
 immediate] immediata E  identitas] idemptitas E  quo] quod E  istum]
quo add. necnon del. E
 Averroes, In Metaphys. Locus non inventus.
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breviter dicitur concedendo quod Sortes decipitur tali casu posito. Et
ulterius negatur quod omnis deceptio est ratione alicuius credulitatis,
quia deceptio potest esse ratione actus qui esset credulitas si habet
subiectum. Et sic est in proposito. Unde quia Sortes habet unum actum
 in mente quo crederet Platonem esse, si Plato esset, et Plato 〈non〉 est,
igitur Sortes decipitur, et consimiliter potest dici quod Sortes decipitur,
quia credit istam propositionem ‘Plato est’. Sed tunc non omnes termini
sic se habent quod non supponunt materialiter vel simpliciter, sicud
presupponitur.
 〈conclusio decima〉 Decima conclusio est ista quod supposito quod
corvus albus non sit, tunc corvus albus non subintelligitur. Et si non pote-
rit esse, non potest subintelligi. Et patet totum per primam et secundam
conclusionem. Et ad Porphirium dicitur in solvendo rationes principales.
〈ad .〉 Ad primam rationem dicitur concedendo quod, si corvus albus
 intelligitur, corvus albus est, et si impossibile sit quod corvus sit albus,
impossibile est corvum album intelligi, sicud su cienter patet per pre-
dicta.
Et ulterius dicitur quod istud quod supponitur non est verum, scilicet
vb| quod hec sit impossibilis: ‘corvus est albus, vel corvus albus est’, quia,
 quamvis forte per communem cursum nature corvus non potest esse
albus, potest tamen per potentiam prime cause, quia albedo non repu-
gnat principiis essentialibus corvi, sed forte repugnat alicui complexioni
accidentali. Et ideo intellectis signiÞcatis terminorum potest intellectus
assentire huic propositioni ‘corvus est albus’, quia nullam contradictio-
 nem includit.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur quod corvus non potest subintelligi albus
vere nec false, nisi corvus albus posset esse. Et hoc dico tentis signiÞcatis
vocabulorum.
Et ulterius dicitur negando quod corvus potest subintelligi esse asinus,
 quia corvum esse asinum nihil est. Et hoc dico nullo termino accepto
materialiter vel simpliciter.
Et ulterius dicitur, quando queritur quare Porphirius dicit hoc, hoc
infra patebit.7
 qui] quid E  in] de add. necnon del. E; in sup. lin. Ec  subintelligitur]
supintelligitur E  essentialibus] essentialis E  potest] potestus (sic) E
 Videas infra, ad opp.
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〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur quod talis conceptus potest causari a corvo
et ab albedine et ab inherentia albedinis in corvo, si talis inherentia potest
esse, et si non potest esse, non potest ab ea causari.
Et ulterius dicitur quod corvus causat conceptum simplicem corvi,
et album causat conceptum simplicem albi, vel saltem albedo existens
in albo. Et tunc habitis istis duobus conceptibus simplicibus intellec-
tus de se est potens tales conceptus componere vel dividere, secun-
dum a rmationem vel negationem mediante conceptu substantivo ver-
bali.
Et si dicatur quod tunc sequeretur quod intellectus esset potentia
activa et non tantum passiva, ad hoc dicitur concedendo quod intellectus
est ipsa anima intellectiva, et omnis anima intellectiva, dummodo est in
corpore, est actus corporis, et est formale principium agendi multas ope-
rationes corporales. Sed quod Aristoteles8 et Commentator,9 tertio De
anima, dicunt intellectum esse potentiam passivam, intelligunt respectu
primorum actuum, vel specierum rerum intelligilibilium respectu qua-
rum intellectus se habet pure passive, quia intellectus non causat aliquam
speciem alicuius rei intelligibilis que non est ipse intellectus, sed res
ipsa causat in intellectum suam speciem, saltem vel mediate, vel imme-
diate. Et hoc vult Aristoteles intelligere quando dicit quod intelligere est
quoddam pati. Cum hoc tamen stat quod habitis talibus speciebus sive
conceptibus simplicibus potest intellectus virtute sua propria se habere
active respectu compositionis a rmative vel divisionis negative talium
conceptuum.
Et ulterius dicitur quod tunc talis compositio vel talis propositio
non habet aliquod obiectum totale sibi correspondens, et ideo non est
intellectio simplex vel composita, quamvis poterit concedi quod habeat
ra obiectum sive obiecta partialia, scilicet albedinem | et corvum, quia
corvus est obiectum subiecti, et albedo vel album est obiectum predicati.
Et consimiliter dicitur de ista propositione mentali ‘homo est asinus’, quia
ex parte rei nihil correspondet sibi obiective adequate.
 Aristoteles, De anima, Γ, a–, –. Auctoritates  (): ‘Intellectus est
pars animae. Intelligere est pati.’ (Cf. Aristoteles, De anima, Γ, a–, –.);
Auctoritates  (): ‘Intellectus noster est ens in potentia.’ (Cf. S. omas, In De
anima, iii, lect. , n. ; Cf. Aristoteles, De anima, Γ, b–).
 Averroes, In De anima, iii, com. , p. , l. –: ‘(…) intelligere est passio, non
actio.’ Auctoritates  (): ‘Intelligere est passio et non actio.’ (Averroes, In De
anima, iii, com. , p. , l. –).
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〈ad .〉 Ad quartum dicitur concedendo quod, si corvus albus non
potest esse, corvus albus non potest subintelligi, sicud predictum est.
Et ulterius conceditur quod intellectus non potest assentire alicui pro-
positioni quam scit impossibilem, saltem respectu illius sensus ratione
 cuius est impossibilis. Et ulterius quod ista non est impossibilis: ‘corvus
est albus’, sicud predictum est.
〈ad argumentum in oppositum〉 Ad argumentum vero in oppositum
dicitur quod Porphirius volens ostendere qualiter intellexit nigredinem
esse inseparabilem a corvo et ab Ethiope, videlicet non sic sicud pro-
 prie proprium est inseparabile ab eo cuius est proprium, dicit quod
potest subintelligi corvus albus, hoc est, intellectus potest assentire huic
propositioni ‘corvus est albus’ et huic ‘Ethiops est albus’, et hoc intel-
lectis signiÞcatis vocabulorum, quia corvus et nigredo sunt res totaliter
distincte, et nigredo non sequitur corvum nec Ethiopem ratione suorum
 principiorum essentialium, sed ratione alicuius complexionis accidenta-
lis. Que quidem complexio posset artiÞcialiter vel per potentiam prime
cause taliter mutari quod in corvo resultaret albedo, quamvis hoc non
posset Þeri secundum communem cursum nature. Non igitur includit
contradictionem quod corvus sit et non sit niger, sed albus, et ideo pote-
 rit intellectus assentire huic propositioni ‘corvus est albus’. Vult igitur
Porphirius dicere quod nigredo est accidens inseparabile corvo, non sic
quod nullo modo posset separari, sed sic quod secundum cursum nature
non potest separari. Sed sic non est de proprio, quia intellectis signiÞca-
tis terminorum intellectus non potest assentire huic propositioni ‘homo
 est, et non est risibilis’, quia secundum Lincolniensem, primo Posterio-
rum capitulo de per se,10 homo est risibilis ratione suorum principiorum
essentialium, ita quod talibus principiis simul unitis sic videlicet quod
homo existat, Deus non posset facere quin homo esset risibilis. Et ideo
proprium per nullam potentiam est separabile ab eo cuius est proprium,
 hoc est, tentis signiÞcatis vocabulorum. Proprium signiÞcative sump-
tum nullo modo potest vere negari ab eo cuius est proprium signiÞca-
tive sumpto, idest personaliter sumpto. Ad ostendendum igitur dieren-
tiam inter 〈in〉separabilitatem proprii a suo subiecto et inseparabilitatem
 communem] nature add. necnon del. E  dicere] dicere corr. ex dicitur E | non]
non sup. lin. Ec
 Robert Lincolniensis (= Grosseteste), In Posteriorum analyticorum. Ed. P. Rossi, In
A.Po. i, , p. , l. –p. , l. 
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accidentis inseparabilis a suo subiecto, dicit Porphirius:11 ‘potest autem
rb subintelligi corvus albus | et Ethiops nitens candore’.
Et sic patet istius questionis intellectus.
 Isagoge,v,  (, –): ‘Potest autem subintelligi et corvus albus et Aethiops amittens
colorem praeter subiecti corruptionem.’
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum aliquod
accidens sit genus substantiale.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod sic:
 iste terminus vocalis ‘animal’ est genus substantiale; iste terminus
vocalis ‘animal’ est accidens; igitur, accidens est genus substantiale. Maior
patet de se, et minor similiter.
〈.〉 Item. Omne istud quod facit aliquam propositionem esse per acci-
dens est accidens; aliquod genus substantiale facit propositionem esse
 per accidens; igitur, aliquod genus substantiale est accidens. Maior vide-
tur evidens per istam regulam Aristotelis, primo Posteriorum,1 ‘propter
quod unumquodque tale et istud magis’. Si igitur aliqua propositio dica-
tur per accidens ratione alicuius termini, iste terminus erit accidens.
Et minor declaratur, quia hec est per accidens: ‘dominus est homo’, vel
 ‘dominus est animal’, et hoc ratione istius termini ‘animal’, quia ista est per
se: ‘dominus est dominus’. Igitur, si isto predicato remoto et alio apposito
resultet propositio per accidens, hoc erit ratione illius predicati appositi,
igitur ista propositio ‘dominus est animal’ est per accidens ratione istius
predicati appositi animal; igitur hoc predicatum animal est accidens.
 〈.〉 Item. Omne istud quod est alicui accidens, est accidens; sed ali-
quod genus substantiale est alicui accidens; igitur aliquod genus substan-
tiale est accidens, et ultra: igitur accidens est genus substantiale. Maior
est evidens. Et minor patet per Aristotelem, capitulo de relatione,2 qui
dicit sic: ‘si servus ad dominum dicatur circumscriptis omnibus que sunt
 minor] declaratur add. necnon exp. E  est] alica(?) add. necnon del. E
 Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, Α, a–: ‘semper enim propter quod est
unumquodque, illud magis est’ – tr. Iacobi. Auctoritates  (): ‘Non solum
necesse est praecognoscere prima principia, aut omnia, aut quaedam, aut conclu-
sionem, sed et magis; propter unumquodque tale et ipsum magis, ut propter quod
amamus rem, illud est magis amatum et omnia posteriora scimus et credimus. Per
primo ergo, illa magis scimus.’ (Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, Α, a–).
 Aristoteles, Predicamenta, , a–: ‘ut si servus ad dominum dicitur, circum-
scriptis omnibus quae sunt accidentia domino, ut esse bipedem vel scientiae suscep-
tibilem vel hominem, relicto vero solo dominum esse, semper servus ad illud dice-
tur; servus enim domini servus dicitur’ – tr. Boethii.
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accidentia domino, ut esse bipedem vel esse scientie susceptibilem vel
hominem’, ex isto textu manifeste apparet quod ista predicata 〈esse〉
bipes, esse scientie susceptibile et homo sunt accidentia domino. Et pari
ratione iste terminus ‘animal’. Igitur aliquod genus substantiale est acci-
dens domino, et per consequens alicui est accidens.
〈ad oppositum〉 Ad oppositum est Porphirius,3 qui dicit quod accidens
est quod contingit eidem inesse et non inesse, vel quod neque est genus,
neque species, neque dierentia, neque proprium etcetera. Ex quo patet
quod secundum ipsum nullum accidens est genus substantiale, quia de
tali genere, ut videtur ibidem, loquitur in ista conclusione presuppositis
di nitionibus de accidente suprapositis.
〈distinctio〉 Addo istam distinctionem quod aliquid dicitur ‘accidens’
tripliciter.
〈i〉 Uno modo quia de aliquo per accidens veriÞcatur, sicud iste termi-
nus ‘homo’ veriÞcatur per accidens de ‘domino’.
〈ii〉 Alio modo quia potest alicui adesse et eidem abesse preter subiecti
corruptionem – idest preter hoc quod ‘esse’ vere negatur a tali subiecto
signiÞcative sumpto – sicud iste terminus ‘sedens’ est accidens ‘homini’.
〈iii〉 Tertio modo quia connotat aliquod extrinsecum quod est acci-
dens realiter inherens subiecto, sicud iste terminus ‘nigrum’ vel ‘niger’
connotat aliquod extrinsecum corvo quod est realiter in corvo sicud
accidens in subiecto.
va 〈conclusio prima〉 Prima igitur conclusio est ista | quod omnis termi-
nus, sive substantialis, sive accidentalis primo modo, est accidens, quia
omnis terminus competit alicui per accidens, igitur omnis terminus est
accidens. Consequentia patet per primum membrum distinctionis. Et
antecedens satis manifeste elicitur ab Aristotele in textu allegato, in capi-
tulo de relatione, nam, sicud ‘homo’ est accidens domino, ita ‘Deus’ est
accidens scienti A propositionem, et sic de quibuscumque aliis terminis,
communibus 〈vel〉 substantialibus vel accidentalibus.
 predicata] scilicet(?) add. necnon del. E
 Isagoge, v,  (, –): ‘DeÞnitur autem sic quoque: accidens est quod contingit
eidem esse et non esse, vel quod neque genus, neque species, neque dierentia,
neque proprium (…)’
questio  
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Ex quo sequitur correlarie quod omne genus substantiale est accidens,
et omnis species substantialis, et omnis dierentia, et omne proprium,
quia quodlibet istorum est terminus, et ultra: igitur aliquod accidens est
genus substantiale, et aliquod accidens est species, etcetera.
 〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio est ista quod nullum acci-
dens secundo modo acceptum secundum quod potest adesse vere per
predicationem a rmativam alicui subiecto et potest abesse vere per pre-
dicationem negativam ab eodem subiecto sine corruptione subiecti, est
genus substantiale. Ista statim patet, quia de quocumque veriÞcatur iste
 terminus ‘animal’, ab eodem non potest vere negari ipso existente in
rerum natura, et pari ratione nec aliquod aliud genus substantiale, igitur
nullum genus substantiale est tale accidens. Et per consequens nullum
tale accidens est genus substantiale.
〈ad .〉 Ad primum principale dicitur concedendo conclusionem quan-
 tum 〈est〉 de virtute conclusionis, quia suppono ad presens quod omnis
terminus mentalis sit accidens realiter alicui inherens, et similiter omnis
terminus vocalis. Non est tamen accidens secundo modo acceptum, quo-
modo accipit Porphirius accidens.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur concedendo conclusionem in sensu quo
 ponitur prima conclusio. Nec plus probat argumentum.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium patet per idem, quia non aliud concludit nisi
quod aliquod genus substantiale competit alicui per accidens. Et hoc
conceditur, sicud predictum est.4
〈ad argumentum in oppositum〉 Ad argumentum in oppositum dici-
 tur quod Porphirius accipit ‘accidens’ secundo modo, et de tali accidente
verum est dicere quod non est genus substantiale, nec species, nec die-
rentia, nec proprium.
Vel potest dici quod accipit ibi ‘accidens’ tertio modo propter istud
quod sequitur, quo dicit:5 ‘semper autem est in subiecto subsistens’ idest
 de tali accidente personaliter sumpto potest semper veriÞcari ‘esse in
subiecto’, et hoc sine aliqua nova impositione terminorum.
 primum] primum iter. necnon del. E  nec] sub add. necnon del. E  termi-
norum] Explicit expliciat qui plus vult scribat. Expliciunt questiones libri Porphirii. add.
Em
 Videas supra, concl. .
 Isagoge, v,  (, ): ‘(…) semper autem est in subiecto subsistens.’
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Index verborum notabilium
Accidens: accidens logicale accipia-
tur tantummodo pro termino qui
accidentaliter predicatur, et reale pro
re que accidentaliter inheret alicui
subiecto. q. , dist.  (vb).
– ‘accidens’ accipitur dupliciter.
Uno modo pro termino qui acciden-
taliter predicatur, hoc est, non per
se primo modo vel secundo modo
dicendi per se. Et sic accidens est
quintum universale. Et isto modo
iste terminus ‘accidens’ est nomen
secunde intentionis. Alio modo
accipitur ‘accidens’ pro aliqua re
inherente alicui subiecto cum quo
non facit per se unum, sive talis res
sit signum, sive non. Et sic iste ter-
minus ‘accidens’ est nomen prime
intentionis. q. , dist.  (ra).
– aliquid dicitur ‘accidens’
tripliciter. i: Uno modo quia de
aliquo per accidens veriÞcatur, sicud
iste terminus ‘homo’ veriÞcatur per
accidens de ‘domino’. ii: Alio modo
quia potest alicui adesse et eidem
abesse preter subiecti corruptionem –
idest preter hoc quod ‘esse’ vere
negatur a tali subiecto signiÞcative
sumpto – sicud iste terminus
‘sedens’ est accidens ‘homini’. iii:
Tertio modo quia connotat aliquod
extrinsecum quod est accidens
realiter inherens subiecto, sicud
iste terminus ‘nigrum’ vel ‘niger’
connotat aliquod extrinsecum corvo
quod est realiter in corvo sicud
accidens in subiecto. q. , dist.
un. (rb).
– iste terminus ‘accidens’ non est
per se superius ad qualitatem, sed e
converso. q. , concl.  (va) –
nullum accidens adest et abest
preter subiecti corruptionem, et hoc
qualitercumque accipitur ‘accidens’
sive ‘adesse et abesse’. q. , concl. 
(ra) – hec propositio: ‘accidens
adest et abest etcetera’ est vera
secundum intellectum auctoris,
quia stat loco istius ‘accidens potest
adesse et abesse preter subiecti
corruptionem’. q. , concl. 
(ra) – omne accidens quod est
universale, potest adesse et potest
abesse preter subiecti corruptionem.
q. , concl.  (ra) – omne
accidens reale potest a subiecto
separari preter corruptionem
subiecti. q. , concl.  (ra) – hec
est possibilis: ‘accidens separatur a
subiecto’. q. , concl.  (rb–va) –
ista est possibilis: ‘accidens est quod
separatur a subiecto’. q. , concl. 
(va) – hec est impossibilis:
‘accidens quod non est, separatur a
subiecto’. q. , concl.  (va) – hec
est impossibilis: ‘aliquod accidens
separatur totaliter a subiecto’.
q. , concl.  (va) – aliquod
accidens est genus substantiale,
et aliquod accidens est species,
etcetera. q. , concl.  (va) –
nullum accidens secundo modo
acceptum secundum quod potest
adesse vere per predicationem
a rmativam alicui subiecto et
potest abesse vere per predicationem
negativam ab eodem subiecto
sine corruptione subiecti, est
genus substantiale. q. , concl. 
(va).
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Actus et potentia: ‘actus et potentia’
accipiuntur dupliciter, scilicet
realiter et logicaliter. – Actus et
potentia si accipiantur realiter:
Realiter secundum quod ‘materia
prima’ dicitur potentia respectu
forme, et ‘forma’ dicitur actus
respectu materie, et etiam secundum
quod ‘potentia intellectiva’ et
‘potentia visiva’ et ‘potentia auditiva’
et 〈sic de〉 aliis dicuntur potentie
respectu actus. – Actus et potentia
si accipiantur logicaliter: Logicaliter,
ut si aliquod predicatum competat
alicui subiecto particulariter et non
universaliter, eo quod subiectum sit
in plus quam predicatum, hoc est
quod subiectum sit communius
quam predicatum, tunc dicitur
breviter loquendo quod tale
predicatum competit tali subiecto
tantum potentia et non actu. Et
si aliquod predicatum competat
alicui subiecto universaliter, tunc
dicitur quod sibi competit actu quia
actualitate universaliter. q. , dist.
un. (va).
Actus exercitus/actus signiÞcatus:
duplex est ‘actus logicalis’, scilicet
actus exercitus et actus signiÞcatus.
Actus exercitus est propositio, cuius
copula sive verbum principale est
hoc verbum ‘est’, sicut patet 〈in〉
talibus propositionibus ‘homo est
animal’, ‘Sortes est homo’, ‘albedo
est color’, et sic de aliis. Actus
signiÞcatus est propositio cuius
copula sive verbum principale est
hoc verbum ‘predicatur’ vel aliquid
sibi equivalens, cuiusmodi sunt talia:
‘competit’, ‘inest’, ‘dicitur’, ‘veriÞcatur’,
et similia. Et tales propositiones
sunt huiusmodi: ‘animal predicatur
de homine’, ‘animal dicitur de
homine’, ‘animal competit homini’,
‘predicatum inest subiecto’, ‘animal
veriÞcatur de homine’, et consimiles.
Et vocatur primus actus ‘exercitus’
et secundus ‘signiÞcatus’, quia per
primum exercitur predicatio que per
secundum signiÞcatur, sicut patet
per istam: ‘animal predicatur de
homine’, signiÞcatur ista prima que
exercetur in ista propositione: ‘homo
est animal’. q. , dist.  (vb–ra).
Adesse et abesse: ‘adesse et abesse’
accipitur dupliciter, scilicet,
logicaliter et realiter. Logicaliter
aliquid dicitur ‘adesse et abesse’
per divisionem a rmativam vel
negativam, realiter per realem
inherentiam vel per realem
separationem. q. , dist. 
(ra).
Anterioritas: premittitur distinctio
de anterioritate reali et logicali, et
quod ‘anterioritas’ in proposito
accipitur brevitatis gratia pro
‘superioritate per se’. q. , dist. un.
(vb).
Cognitio predicamentorum: –
nullum necesse est habere cogni-
tionem generis ad 〈cognitionem〉
predicamentorum habendam.
q. , concl.  (rb) – ad perfectam
cognitionem predicamentorum
habendam necesse est necessi-
tate conditionata cognitionem
generis et aliorum universalium
haberi. q. , concl.  (rb–va) – ad
perfectam cognitionem predicamen-
torum habendam non est necesse
necessitate absoluta cognitio uni-
versalium haberi. q. , concl. 
(va).
Videas Scientia.
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Cognitio relativorum: non
cuiuslibet relativi prima notitia
qua cognoscitur quid tale relativum
signiÞcat, est eius notitia di nitiva
per suam correlarium. q. ,
concl.  (va) – prima notitia
alicuius relativi qua scitur 〈quid〉
tale relativum signiÞcat, causatur
per aliquam informationem non
di nitivam sed potius narrativam.
q. , concl.  (va) – possible est
primam notitiam 〈esse〉 di nitivam.
q. , concl.  (va) – possibile
est aliquem scire quid relativum
signiÞcat principale sine hoc
quod sciat quid signiÞcat suum
correlarium. q. , concl. 
(vb) – impossibile est aliquem
scire di nitive quid relativum
signiÞcat principaliter et connotat
nisi sciat quid signiÞcetur per
suum correlarium. q. , concl. 
(vb).
Commune: ‘commune’ est duplex,
scilicet, commune univocum et
commune equivocum. – Commune
univocum: ‘Commune univocum’
dicitur istud quod competit pluribus
mediante eodem conceptu, sive
simplici sive composito eque
primo, ita quod, si sit conceptus
compositus, non competit uni
ratione unius partis talis conceptus
et alteri ratione alterius partis,
sed utricumque competit ratione
cuiuslibet partis talis conceptus
compositi; et talis conceptus
compositus est di nitivus quia
competit cuilibet supposito
sub di nito ratione cuiuslibet
sue partis, sicud ista di nitio
‘animal rationale mortale’ non
tantum competit Sorti ratione
‘animalis’, sed etiam ratione
‘rationalis’ et ‘mortalis’. – Commune
univocum: ‘Commune equivocum’
dicitur istud quod competit
pluribus ratione diversorum
conceptuum, sive isti conceptus
sint simplices, sive compositi, ita
videlicet quod istud commune
competit uni mediante uno
conceptu simplici, et alteri mediante
alio, et tertio mediante tertio,
quamvis ex istis conceptibus unus
conceptus componatur. q. ,
dist.  (vb).
Consequentia: a propositione ad
suas exponents q. , concl. 
(vb).
Credere: Platonem esse non potest
credi, posito quod Plato non sit, nec
poterit esse. q. , concl.  (va) –
posito quod Plato non sit, et quod
Sortes habeat actum complexum in
mente sua, vel saltem aliquem actum
quo crederet Platonem esse, si Plato
esset, et lateat Sortem Platonem
non esse, tunc Sortes non crederet
Platonem esse. q. , concl. 
(va) – tento eodem casu Sortes
non credit se credere Platonem esse.
q. , concl.  (va).
Credulitas: omnis notitia infor-
mativa ab homine vel a libero pre-
supponit credulitatem addiscentis.
q. , concl.  (vb).
De virtute sermonis: q. , ad . 〈ad
probationem prime propositionis, ad
probationem secunde propositionis〉
(rb, va); q. , ad . (ra); q. , ad
opp. (rb); q. , ad . (rb); q. ,
ad . (ra); q. , dist.  (ra);
q. , ad . (rb); q. , concl. 
(ra); q. , ad . (va); q. , ad .
(va); q. , concl.  (va); q. ,
concl.  (va).
Descriptio: q. , dist. un. (vb).
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Descriptiva oratio: q. , dist. un.
(vb).
Deus: iste terminus ‘Deus’ accipitur
dupliciter, scilicet proprie, et
communiter. – Deus proprie
acceptus: Proprie accipitur pro
prima causa, – Deus communiter
acceptus: sed communiter accipitur
pro quocumque habente aliquam
similitudinem specialem cum
prima causa, scilicet vel quia est
per〈p〉etuum sicut prima causa, vel
quia habet intellectum sicut prima
causa, vel quia precise diligitur
sicut prima causa deberet diligi.
Unde Psalmista ‘dixi: dii estis, et
Þlii excelsi omnes’, et Apostolus
etiam loqui de gulosis dicit ‘quorum
deus venter est’, et alibi est Psalmista
‘omnes dii gentium demonia’. q. ,
dist.  (vb).
– Deus proprie non habet
aliquam dierentiam speciÞcam
cum eo convertibilem, et hoc
accipiendo proprie ‘Deum’ pro
primo principo indivisibili. q. ,
concl.  (vb) – Deus proprie
non habet di nitionem. q. ,
concl.  (vb) – hoc predicatum
‘rationale’ secundum quod est
dierentia speciÞca, non veriÞcatur
de Deo, accipiendo ‘Deum’ proprie.
q. , concl.  (vb) – hic
terminus ‘rationalis’ equivoce
veriÞcatur de materia hominis, et de
homine, et de Deo. q. , concl. 
(ra) – accidente accepto pro uno
predicabili accidentaliter, Deo potest
competere aliquod accidens. q. ,
concl.  (va).
Dierentia: ‘aliquam dierentiam
aliquid constituere’ potest intelligi
tripliciter: uno modo existenter sive
realiter, sicut materia et forma que
constituunt compositum; alio modo
di nitive, sicut dierentia constituit
hominem, quia constituit istam
di nitionem, et ideo dierentia
est primum di nitivum hominis;
tertio modo convertibiliter, scilicet
quia dierentia addita alicui non
convertibili cum eo cuius est
dierentia constitutiva, contrahit
ipsum, ut totum resultans ex ipso et
tota dierentia convertibiliter cum
eo cuius est dierentia, contrahit
ipsum cui additur ad standum
tantummodo pro signiÞcato
vel signiÞcatis illius cuius est
dierentia, sicut hec dierentia
‘rationale mortale’ addita subiecto
vel corpori vel animali contrahit
ipsum ad standum tantummodo
pro signiÞcato vel signiÞcatis. q. ,
dist.  (vb).
– Perceptio dierentium: omnis
perceptio aliquorum dierentium
primo Þt per sensum vel presuppo-
nit sensationem qua percipiuntur
alique dierentie. q. , decl. (vb).
Videas Suscipere magis et minus.
Dierentia per se: ‘dierentia
per se’ accipitur multipliciter. –
Dierentia per se large accepta: Uno
modo, scilicet large pro omni eo
quod predicatur per se de aliquo, et
potest esse medium syllogisticum
ad concludendum signiÞcatum illius
de quo veriÞcatur ab alio speciÞce
dierre, et connotat specialiter
aliquem partem essentialem
vel aliquod accidens, formaliter
procedens sive materialiter ab
aliqua tali parte vel a toto composito
ex talibus partibus. Et isto modo
omne proprium est dierentia
per se et precise omne proprium
substantiale. (…) – Dierentia
per se stricte accepta: Dierentia
vero per se stricte vocatur aliquis
terminus discrete signiÞcans
index verborum notabilium 
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vel connotans aliquam partem
essentialem compositi ex materia
et forma nihil extrinsecum discrete
connotans sive signiÞcans, potens
esse medium syllogisticum ad
concludendum aliqua speciÞce
dierre. (…) Et ista est dierentia
completiva di nitionis proprie
dicte. q. , dist. un. (rab).
– nulla dierentia proprie
dicta predicatur in quid primo
modo. q. , concl.  (rb) –
omnis dierentia divisiva generis
per se est constitutiva alicuius
speciei per se. q. , concl. 
(rb) – aliqua dierentia divisiva
generis dividens aliquod genus non
constituit aliquam speciem. q. ,
concl.  (rb) – nulla dierentia
est necessaria ad divisionem
generis. q. , concl.  (ra) –
nulla dierentia est necessaria
ad divisionem generis in suas
species. q. , concl.  (ra) –
omnis dierentia est necessaria
ad divisionem generis in suas
species per se primo modo. q. ,
concl.  (ra) – omnis dierentia
est accidens. q. , concl.  (va).
Dierentia speciÞca: duplex est dif-
ferentia speciÞca, scilicet formalis
et materialis. – Dierentia speciÞca
formalis: Formalis que Þt gratia ali-
cuius forme; – Dierentia speciÞca
materialis: materialis que Þt gratia
alicuius materie. – Dierentia speci-
Þca formalissubstantialis: Formalis
adhuc est duplex, nam quedam est
substantialis, scilicet illa que est gra-
tia alicuius forme substantialis, et
quedam accidentalis, – Dierentia
speciÞca accidentalis: scilicet ista que
Þt gratia alicuius forme accidentalis.
Accidentalis adhuc est duplex. Quia
quedam Þt per se, et quedam per
accidens. Dierentia speciÞca acci-
dentalis per se: Per se, sicut albedo,
que est forma accidentalis, per se
diert a nigredine; Dierentia spe-
ciÞca accidentalis per accidens: per
accidens, sicut Sortes secundum
suam albedinem a Platone nigro
specie per accidens diert. q. ,
dist.  (va). – dierentia speciÞca
substantialis de qua loquitur Por-
phirius, semper facit aliud, et hoc
transsumptive loquendo ad istum
intellectum quod talis dierentia
est medium concludendi aliqua
duo esse dierentium formarum
substantialium, et per consequens
quod talia duo habent dissimiles for-
mas substantiales. q. , concl. 
(rb) – aliquid facit per se dierre
quod non est dierentia speciÞca.
q. , concl.  (rb) – accipiendo
transsumptive ‘facere dierre’, ali-
quid facit per se dierre quod
non est dierentia speciÞca. q. ,
concl.  (rb) – accipiendo trans-
sumptive ‘facere dierre’, aliquid
connotans aliquam formam facit per
se dierre quod non est dierentia
speciÞca. q. , concl.  (rb) –
omne connotans formam intrin-
secam et non extrinsecam, quod
predicatur primo modo dicendi per
se de aliquo subiecto, et potest esse
medium syllogisticum concludendi
signiÞcatum talis subiecti a quo-
cumque alio speciÞce dierre, est
dierentia speciÞca. q. , concl. 
(va) – aliquid est dierentia spe-
ciÞca quod non discrete connotat
aliquam formam. q. , concl. 
(va) – nulla dierentia speci-
Þca accipiendo ‘dierentiam’ sicut
logici accipiunt et sicut Porphirius
accipit, quando dicit: ‘dierentia
predicatur in quale’, est consti-
tutiva alicuius substantie. q. ,
concl.  (rb) – omnis dierentia
speciÞca est constitutiva substantie
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accipiendo ‘substantiam’ pro
di nitione. q. , concl. 
(rb) – omne istud a quo accipitur
dierentia speciÞca ‘animalis’,
constituit substantiam animalis
accipiendo ‘substantiam’ pro re
que non est signum, scilicet pro
essentia. q. , concl.  (rb) –
nulla dierentia speciÞca est
necessaria ad divisionem generis
in suas species secundo modo
per se. q. , concl.  (ra) – ad
divisio〈nem〉 generis in suas species
per se primo modo formaliter, est
aliqua dierentia speciÞca necessaria
necessitate conditionata. q. ,
concl.  (rab) – aliqua dierentia
speciÞca competit generi actu. q. ,
concl.  (vb) – nulla dierentia
speciÞca alicuius speciei competit
actu generi talis speciei. q. ,
concl.  (vb).
Dierre: ‘aliquid dierre ab alio’
potest intelligi dupliciter, scilicet
primo, vel non primo sed secundum
partem. – Aliquid primo dierre
ab alio: Primo quando aliquod
totum diert ab isto a quo diert
secundum se et secundum quodlibet
sui partem, sicut Sortes diert a
Platone. – Aliquid non primo sed
secundum partem dierre ab alio:
Non primo sed secundum partem
quando aliquid diert ab aliquo a
quo diert secundum aliquam sui
partem, et secundum quamlibet
sui partem ab isto non diert, sicut
Sortes diert a sua manu dextera
secundum suam manum sinistram,
vel pedem, et non diert a sua manu
dextera secundum suam manum
dexteram. q. , dist. un. (rb).
– aliquid ab alio potest dierre
tripliciter: uno modo primo et
per se, quando scilicet aliquid
ab alio diert secundum se et
secundum quamlibet sui partem;
alio modo non primo sed per se,
scilicet quando aliquid ab alio diert
secundum aliquam sui partem et
non secundum quamlibet; tertio
aliquid ab alio diert nec primo
nec per se, sed tantum secundum
accidens, quia tali 〈modo〉 ab eo
diert secundum suum accidens.
q. , dist.  (vb).
– aliquid ab alio potest dierre
dupliciter: uno modo proprie et
stricte, sicut Sortes diert a Platone
per semetipsum et per eius partem;
alio modo transsumptive, sicut
dicimus quod Sortes si sit sedens
diert a Platone stante per hoc
separabile accidens, scilicet ‘sedens’,
quod stat loco istius propositionis
Sortes concluditur dierre ab
Platone syllogistice per hoc medium
‘sedens’, igitur Sortes diert a
Platone ita quod ista propositio
Sortes per hoc separabile accidens
sedens diert a Platone. Et est
distinguende penes amphiboliam:
in sensu proprio falsa est; in sensu
transsumptive secundum quod
iam expositum est, est vera. Et ista
distinctio in ista materia maxime
est necessaria, quia Porphirius et
alii doctores in ista materia loquitur
transsumptive potius quam proprie.
q. , dist.  (ra).
– nihil diert ab aliquo. q. ,
concl.  (rb) – nihil diert ab alio.
q. , concl.  (rb) – nihil quod
est, diert ab aliquo, et omne quod
est, ab alio diert. q. , concl. 
(va) – nihil diert a se. q. ,
concl.  (va) – omne quod est,
diert a se quod non est. q. ,
concl.  (va) – omne quiescens
diert a se currente. q. , concl. 
(va) – omnis stans diert a se
sedente. q. , concl.  (va) –
omnis puer diert a se sene. q. ,
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concl.  (va) – omne senex
diert a se puero. q. , concl. 
(va) – accipiendo ‘dierentiam’
(…) pro termino qui predicatur
in quale, per quid tamquam per
medium syllogisticum potest vere
syllogisari aliquid ab alio dierre,
nihil aliud a termino ab alio diert
per aliquam dierentiam proprie
accipiendo ‘dierre’. q. , concl. 
(rb) – omne quod ab aliquo diert,
ab eodem diert per accidens
separabile logicale accipiendo
‘dierre’ transsumptive. q. ,
concl.  (rb) – omnis dierentia
ab alio diert per dierentiam
proprie accipiendo ‘per aliquid
dierre’. q. , concl.  (rb) –
aliquid ab alio diert proprie, primo
et per se inseparabili accidente.
q. , concl.  (vb) – aliquid
ab alio diert transsumptive
inseparabili accidente. q. ,
concl.  (vb).
Videas Dierentia speciÞca.
Di nitio: ‘di nitio’ accipitur tripli-
citer, scilicet, large, stricte et stric-
tissime, hoc dictu est: communiter,
proprie et propriissime. – Di nitio
large accepta: Di nitio large accepta
extendit se ad quemcumque conno-
tationem, sive convertibilem, sive
non convertibilem cum di nito. –
Di nitio stricte accepta: Di nitio
stricte accepta non extendit se ad
connotationem, sed ad descriptio-
nem sive di nitionem datam per
additamentum, et talis di nitio
datur per genus et per proprium
et aliquando per plura accidentia,
sive per plures terminos accidentales
qui simul compositi faciunt unum
accidens convertibile cum di -
nito, sicut patet in ista di nitione
‘homo est animal et bipes, recte
intendens’. – Di nitio stricissemte
accepta: Di nitio vero strictissime
accepta vocatur illa que componitur
ex genere di niti et dierentia spe-
ciÞca cum di nito convertibili, sicut
patet de ipsa di nitione ‘substan-
tia animata sensibilis’. q. , dist. 
(rb).
– triplex est di nitio, nam
quedam est di nitio quid nominis,
et quedam est oratio descriptiva sive
descriptio, et quedam est di nitio
propriissime dicta. – Di nitio
quid nominis: Di nitio vero quid
nominis est oratio compendiosa
indicans quid nomen signiÞcat. Et
accipitur hic ‘nomen’ largissime
secundum quod convertitur cum
‘dictione’, sive talis dictio sit verbum,
sive nomen acceptum stricte,
sive composita sive simplex. Talis
di nitio quid nominis adhuc
accipitur dupliciter, scilicet proprie
et communiter. – Di nitio quid
nominis proprie accepta: Proprie
scilicet, quando convertitur cum
di nito. – Di nitio quid nominis
communiter accepta: Communiter,
quando extendit se ad orationem
indicantem quid nomen signiÞcat,
quamvis talis oratio non convertitur
cum di nito. – Di nitio descriptiva:
Descriptiva vero di nitio est
oratio compendiosa indicans
essentiam di niti per genus 〈et〉
per proprium sive per propria
talis di niti. Et ista vocatur ab
Aristotele, septimo Metaphysice,
‘di nitio data per additamentum’,
quia datur per aliquid quod
connotat aliquod extrinsecum
(…). – Di nitio propriissime
dicta: Di nitio vero propriissime
dicta est oratio compendiosa
indicans essentiam di niti per
essentialia sive per substantialia,
idest: per terminos non connotantes
aliquid extrinsecum essentie
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rei di nite. Et talis di nitio
subdividitur secundum quod elicitur
ab Aristotele, primo De anima,
nam: quedam est naturalis, et
quedam est dialectica. – Di nitio
propriissime dicta naturalis:
Di nitio vero naturalis est oratio
compendiosa indicans essentiam
di niti per substantialia, secundum
substantialium aliquid signiÞcat
specialiter materiam rei di nite,
ut si di niatur domus sic: ‘domus
est substantia composita ex
fundamento, lapide et parietibus,
lignis et tecto, stramento’, vel aliquid
consimile, quod specialiter signiÞcat
vel connotat materiam rei distincte,
vel formam talis rei existere in
tali materia. (…) Et dicitur (ista)
di nitio ‘naturalis’ propter hoc
quod naturalis philosophus
specialiter inquirens naturam
rei, et eius principia essentialia
exprimit per di nitionem suam
principia naturalia rei di nite. (…)
Unde di nitio naturalis est duplex,
nam quedam distincte exprimit
materiam tantum, et quedam tam
materiam quam formam, sive Þnem,
quia forma et Þnis intrinsecus
coincidunt. Et ista est di nitio
propriissime naturalis, ut si ‘domus’
sic di niatur: ‘domus est quoddam
compositum ex lignis et lapidibus
protectivum a passionibus aeris’,
vel si ‘homo’ sic di niatur: ‘homo
est animal compositum ex corpore
et anima intellectiva’. – Di nitio
propriissime dicta dialectica:
Di nitio vero dialectica est oratio
compendiosa indicans essentiam rei
distincte per substantialia, quorum
substantialium aliquid signiÞcat,
vel connotat formam rei di nite, et
utrum〈que〉 signiÞcat specialiter, vel
connotat materiam vel formam, ut
si ‘domus’ sic di niatur: ‘domus
est quod dicitur protectivum a
pluviis et ventis, scilicet caloribus
et frigetudinibus’, vel: ‘domus
est quod dicitur protectivum
a passionibus aeris’. (…) (Ista)
di nitio dicitur ‘dialectica’, quia
dialecticus non ita profunde
speculatur, nec ita exquisite inquirit
de principiis naturalibus rei, sed
su cit sibi per aliquam opinionem
devenire ad formam rei, et ipsam
quoddammodo in di nitione
exprimere. (…) Di nitio vero
dialectica vocatur sicut predictum
est, que Þt cum expressione forme
vel Þnis in di nito, ut si ‘homo’
sic di niatur: ‘homo est rationale
mortale’. q. , dist.  (vab).
si sit notitia generis, omnis
di nitio potest assignari. q. ,
concl.  (vb) – possibile est
aliquem scire aliquam di nitionem
dari per genus sine hoc quod talis
sciat quid sit genus di nitive.
q. , concl.  (ra) – necesse est
necessitate conditionata genus poni
in di nitione speciei ad istum
intellectum quod hec sit vera:
si species bene di nitur, genus
poni〈tur〉 in eius di nitione. q. ,
concl.  (vb) – nulla di nitio
proprie dicta predicatur in quid
primo modo. q. , concl. 
(rb) – omnis di nitio proprie
dicta predicatur in quid non
primo, quia rationis sue partis.
q. , concl.  (rb) – di nitio
est oratio compendiosa. q. ,
concl.  (ra) – omnis di nitio
est eque nota vel notior di nito.
q. , concl.  (ra) – omnis
di nitio est di nitio quid nominis.
q. , concl.  (ra) – aliqua
di nitio proprie dicta non datur
per dierentiam 〈acceptam〉 a
specie, vel a formalitate. q. ,
concl.  (ra) – omnis di nitio
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dialectica propriissime dicta
datur per dierentiam speciÞcam.
q. , concl.  (ra) – aliqua
di nitio proprie dicta datur
per dierentiam speciÞcam
connotantem aliquod extrinsecum
quod non est de essentia rei
cui dicitur extrinsecum. q. ,
concl.  (ra) – inter di nitiones
proprie dictas una est rationabilior
alia. q. , concl.  (ra) –
dierentie formarum non – saltem
non omnes – debent poni in
di nitione. q. , concl.  (ra) –
omnis di nitio proprie dicta sive
naturalis, sive dialectica, datur
per dierentiam speciÞcam. q. ,
concl.  (rb).
Di nitio data per additamentum:
q. , dist. un. (vb).
Di nitio dierentie ‘dierentia
est qua abundant species a genere’:
predicta di nitio ‘dierentie’ de
virtute sermonis non convertitur
cum di nito. q. , concl. 
(va) – predicta di nitio est bona
secundum intellectum auctoris,
scilicet si suppleatur istud quod
auctor intelligit, et tunc debet
sic suppleri: dierentia est qua
abundat actu et per se primo modo
species a genere. q. , concl. 
(vb).
Di nitio dierentie ‘dierentia
est que predicator de pluribus
specie dierentibus in eo quod
quale’: ista di nitio non convertitur
〈cum〉 dierentia. q. , concl. 
(ra) – ista di nitio convertitur
cum di nito secundum intellectum
auctoris, quia auctor intendit ibi
di nire dierentiam speciÞcam
subalternam. q. , concl. 
(ra).
Di nitio dierentie ‘dierentia
est istud quod est aptum natum
dividere ista que sunt sub eodem
genere’: ista di nitio non est
convertibilis cum dierentia
speciÞca. q. , concl.  (rb) –
ista di nitio convertitur cum
di nito ad intentionem auctoris,
quia auctor intendit ibi tantummodo
di nire ‘dierentiam’ secundum
quod se extendit ad dierentiam
proprie dictam et magis proprie
dictam, et hoc est ad proprium et
ad dierentiam speciÞcam. q. ,
concl.  (rb).
Di nitio dierentie ‘dierentia
est qua dierent a se singula’: ista
propositio secundum intellectum
auctoris est vera, quia auctor
intelligit: ‘singula qua a se dierunt,
et est dierentia’. q. , concl. 
(rb) – aliqua di nitio non est
predicabilis de suo di nito, quia
si hoc di nitum ‘dierentia’ ponatur
a parte subiecti, tunc propositio
est falsa. q. , concl.  (rb) –
aliquod di nitum est veriÞcabile
de sua di nitione, quequidem
di nitio de ipso di nito non est
veriÞcabilis, quia: de ista di nitione
‘singula qua a se dierunt’ est hoc
di nitum ‘dierentia’ veriÞcabile.
q. , concl.  (rb) – non semper
di nitio et di nitum convertuntur,
quia non semper veriÞcantur de se
mutuo universaliter et a rmative.
q. , concl.  (rb).
Di nitio dierentie ‘dierentia est
istud quod ad esse rei conducit, et
quod eius quod est esse rei pars est’:
non est di nitio convertibilis cum
dierentia speciÞca, si accipiatur de
virtute sermonis. q. , concl. 
(va) – ista di nitio convertitur
cum dierentia speciÞca ad
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intellectum auctoris, quia auctor
intelligit quod dierentia speciÞca
est istud quod di nitionem proprie
dictam complet, et quod est pars
formalis di nitionis proprie dicte.
Debet ergo sic intelligi: ‘dierentia
est istud quod complet di nitionem
rei proprie dictam, idest, quod
est pars formalis di nitionis
proprie dicte’. q. , concl. 
(va).
Di nitio quid nominis: Di nitio
vero quid nominis vocatur oratio
indicans quid nomen signiÞcat,
convertibilis cum tali nomine, quam
non oportet aliquod genus intrare.
q. , dist. un. (vb).
– sine genere potest di nitio
quid nominis assignari. q. ,
concl.  (vb).
Di nitio quid rei: Di nitio vero
quid rei accipitur dupliciter, quia
quedam est que datur per essentialia,
idest: per terminos essentiales
nihil extrinsecus connotantes
cuiusmodi sunt genus di niti, et
dierentia speciÞca, et vocatur
di nitio propriissime dicta. Alia
est di nitio quid rei que datur per
propria sive accidentalia et per genus
di niti, ut si homo di niretur:
‘homo est animal risibile’ vel ‘homo
est animal recte sedens’, et vocatur
per Aristotelem ‘di nitio data per
additamentum’, et a Boethio vocatur
‘descriptio’ sive ‘descriptiva oratio’.
q. , dist. un. (vb). – nulla di nitio
quid rei potest assignari sine omni
genere vel sine genere istius. q. ,
concl.  (vb) – di nitio quid
rei potest assignari ab aliquo sine
hoc quod sciatur quid sit genus
di nitive ab eodem. q. , concl. 
(vb) – necesse est necessitate
conditionata scientem se di nire
di nitione quid rei scire quid
sit genus etcetera. q. , concl. 
(ra).
Di nitio specie ‘species est que
predicatur de pluribus numero
dierentibus in eo quod quid sit’:
ista di nitio speciei: ‘species est
quod predicatur de pluribus numero
dierentibus in esse quod quid’ non
est bona. q. , concl.  (vb) –
potest teneri quod predicta di nitio,
etiam cum suppletione 〈‘species est
que predicatur de pluribus numero
dierentibus, et non specie, in eo
quod quid’〉, non est bona. q. ,
concl.  (rb) – ista di nitio
‘species est que immediate ponitur
sub genere’ est bona di nitio. q. ,
concl.  (rb) – di nitio speciei
specialisime debet sic suppleri:
‘species specialissima est que ponitur
immediate sub genere et que de
pluribus numero dierentibus et
non specie univoce predicatur in eo
quod quid’. q. , concl.  (rb) –
probabiliter potest teneri predictam
di nitionem sine ista particula ‘que
immediate ponitur sub genere’ esse
bonam. q. , concl.  (va).
Divisio: quedam est divisio realis
et quedam logicalis. – Divisio rea-
lis: Realis divisio vocatur ista qua
partes essentiales vel integrales ali-
cuius rei ab invicem separantur. –
Divisio logicalis: Divisio vero logica-
lis vocatur ista qua aliquod signum
commune contrahitur pro aliquibus
signiÞcatis per aliquam dieren-
tiam vel per aliquam suam speciem,
sicud hoc signum commune ‘animal’,
quando additur sibi hec dierentia
‘irrationale’, contrahitur ad stan-
dum pro aliis suis signiÞcatis. Et ista
divisio subdividitur, quia quedam
est essentialis et quedam acciden-
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talis. – Divisio logicalis essentialis:
Essentialis dicitur ista qua aliquod
commune dividitur vel per suas dif-
ferentias speciÞcas sive essentiales,
vel per sua inferiora per se. Prima
divisio〈ne〉 potest 〈genus〉 dividi in
suas species per suas dierentias
speciÞcas. Secunda divisione, scili-
cet, per sua per se inferiora, potest
species specialissima de se dividi
per sua supposita, sed non per dif-
ferentiam speciÞcam, quia species
specialissima non habet divisiones
speciÞcas divisivas, sed tantummodo
constitutivas. Exemplum primi, ut
‘animalium aliud rationale, aliud
irrationale’; exemplum secundi, ut
‘hominum alius Sortes, alius Plato’. –
Divisio logicalis accidentialis: Divi-
sio vera accidentalis est ista qua
aliquis terminus substantialis sive
accidentalis dividitur per aliquos
terminos accidentales, ut ‘hominum
alius longus, alius brevis’, ‘alborum
aliud dulce, aliud amarum’. Et ex
isto infertur unum correlarium,
videlicet quod divisione acciden-
tali minus commune dividitur per
communiora, quia clarum est quod
quilibet istorum terminorum ‘breve’
et ‘longum’ communior est quam
iste terminus ‘homo’. q. , dist. un.
(ra).
– duplex est divisio: quedam
est realis et quedam logicalis. –
Divisio realis: Realis dicitur ista,
qua partes alicuius essentiales,
vel integrales (…). – Divisio
logicalis: Divisio vero logicalis est
multiplex: nam quedam est que
Þt per negationem, et quedam
que Þt 〈per〉 contradictionem
disiunctivam, et quedam que Þt per
utrumque, et quedam per alietatis
negationem. – Divisio logicalis que Þt
per negationem: Per negationem,
sicut in propositione negativa
predicatum dividitur a subiecto,
idest: negatur a subiecto. – Divisio
logicalis que Þt per contradictionem
disiunctivam: Per disiunctivam
contradictionem, sicut quando
aliquid alicui attribuitur disiunctive
vel disiunctim, ut ‘Sortes tacet vel
loquitur’, ‘uterque istorum est Sortes
vel Plato’ determinatis Sorte et
Platone. – Divisio logicalis que Þt
per negationem et contradictionem
disiunctivam: Per utrumque,
ut ‘Sortes est asinus, vel Sortes
non est asinus’. Et hoc semper
Þt quando una pars divisionis
disiunctive est negativa vel de
negato extremo. – Divisio logicalis
que Þt per alietatis negationem: Per
alietatis negationem, sicut quando
dividitur in sua contenta. Et hoc
dicitur scilicet per accidens vel
per se. – Divisio logicalis que Þt per
alietatis negationem per accidens: Per
accidens, ut animalium aliud album,
aliud nigrum. – Divisio logicalis que
Þt per alietatis negationem per se: Per
se adhuc dividitur, quia vel primo
modo dividitur per se, vel secundo
modo. – Divisio logicalis que Þt per
alietatis negationem per se primo
modo: Primo modo sicut quando
aliquid dividitur in sua contenta per
se per aliquid quod eis competat.
Primo modo dividitur per se utpote
per dierentiam speciÞcam, ut
animalium in 〈aliud rationale, aliud
non rationale. – Divisio logicalis
que Þt per alietatis negationem per
se secundo modo: Secundo modo
sicut quando aliquid dividitur in〉
sua per se contenta per proprietates
contentorum sive per aliqua propria,
ut animalium aliud risibile, aliud
hinnibile. q. , dist. un. (ra).
ad nullam divisionem realem
faciendam est necesse scire quid
sit genus. q. , concl.  (ra) –
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ad nullam divisionem logicalem
faciendam est necesse scire quid sit
genus. q. , concl.  (ra) – necesse
est scire quid sit genus 〈necessitate〉
conditionata ad faciendam aliquam
divisionem qua scit 〈talem〉 esse
generis in suas species vel speciei
in sua per se inferiora. q. , concl. 
(rb).
Ens: ens predicatur univoce de
subiecto et accidente. q. , opinio 
(vb) – unus est conceptus entis
distinctus a conceptu substantie et
conceptu accidentis. q. , opinio 
(ra) – ens non est universale q. ,
concl.  (rb) – ‘ens’ est pars
alicuius predicati quod predicatur
in quid, quia istius predicati ‘ens
per se subsistens’. q. , concl. 
(rb) – ens est pars generis, quia
pars istius predicati quod est ‘ens
per se subsistens’. q. , c. (rb) –
omne ens diert a non ente. q. ,
concl.  (va).
Equivocum: iste terminus ‘equivo-
cum’ accipitur multipliciter. Uno
modo pro equivoco a casu, alio
modo pro equivoco a consilio. Et
uterque istorum modorum accipi-
tur dupliciter, scilicet, uno modo
pro equivoco equivocante, et alio
modo pro 〈equivoco〉 equivocato
(…). – Equivocum equivocans: equi-
vocum equivocans, idest, terminus
equivoce signiÞcans, accipitur mul-
tipliciter: 〈i〉 uno modo strictissime
prout distinguitur contra univo-
cum strictissime acceptum. (…) 〈ii〉
Secundo modo accipitur ‘equivo-
cum’ pro illo quod predicatur de
pluribus in quid di nitive, quamvis
non predicetur de eisdem pluribus
unica impositione, 〈et〉 non unico
conceptu. 〈iii〉 Tertio modo acci-
pitur ‘equivocum’ pro aliquo quod
predicatur de pluribus mediantibus
diversis conceptibus speciÞcis. q. ,
d. (ra).
– (Equivocorum) quoddam
est complexum et quoddam
incomplexum. (…) Complexum
sicud hoc disiunctum: ‘Sortes vel
Plato’, incomplexum sicud iste
terminus ‘Sortes’ diversa signiÞcans
proprie et non appellative. q. ,
dist.  (vb).
Esse: ‘esse’ accipitur multipliciter:
uno modo pro ipsa re existente,
secundo modo pro forma rei; et
istis duobus modis est nomen prime
intentionis. Tertio modo accipitur
pro di nitione sive descriptione; et
sic est nomen secunde intentionis.
q. , dist.  (ra).
Extrinsecum: aliquid dicitur ‘extrin-
secum’ dupliciter: – Extrinsecum
stricte acceptum: uno modo quia non
est ipsummet, nec aliqua eius pars
essentialis vel integralis, sed visus
nec est albedo nec aliqua pars albe-
dinis. Et ideo ista di nitio ‘albedo
est color disgregativus visus’ datur
per extrinsecum. – Extrinsecum
largius acceptum: Alio modo acci-
pitur ‘extrinsecum’ largius pro illo
B quod nec est ipsamet res cui dici-
tur extrinsecum, nec est aliqua pars
istius rei, nec principalis actus vel
operatio talis rei. Et isto modo actus
intelligendi sive ratiocinandi non
est aliquod extrinsecum homini,
quamvis secundum communem opi-
nionem sit accidens superadditum,
nec etiam actus sentiendi est extrin-
secus animali, vel actus vegetandi
ipsi plante. q. , dist.  (vb–ra).
Fallacia: fallacia compositionis et
divisionis. q. , ad . (vb). – fallacia
equivocationis. q. , ad . (va).
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Fantasia: fantasia indeterminata.
q. , ad arg. contra concl. 
(rb).
Genus: iste terminus ‘genus’
multipliciter accipitur. Uno
modo pro principio, alio modo
pro predicamento. – Genus pro
principio acceptum: Pro principio
accipitur dupliciter: uno modo
pro principio productivo sive
generativo, alio modo pro principio
contentivo. – Genus pro principio
productivo acceptum: Pro principio
productivo, sicud ‘Romulus fuit
genus Romanorum’, ‘pater genus
Þliorum’, et sic de similibus. – Genus
pro principio contentivo acceptum:
Pro principio contentivo adhuc
dicitur uno modo pro principio
contentivo circumscriptive, alio
modo pro principio contentivo
predicative vel signiÞcative vel
communicative, quod totum
reducitur ad idem. Exemplum primi,
sicud ‘locus in quo quis generatur
vel producitur’ dicitur genus talis
producti, quia est eius principium
contentivum circumscriptive.
Exemplum secundi sicut iste
terminus ‘animal’ dicitur genus
hominis quia est eius principium
predicative vel signiÞcative, quia
predicatur de homine in quid et
de aliis ab homine dierentibus,
et signiÞcat quidquid ‘homo’
signiÞcat, et aliquid plus, et est
communior quam iste terminus
‘homo’, et di nitur proprie, et ideo
dicitur eius principium di nitivum
contentivum predicativum. q. ,
dist.  (vb–ra).
– genus accipitur pro principio
contentivo predicative cui supponitur
〈species〉. q. , dist. un. (vb).
– tota multitudo hominum est
genus. q. , concl.  (ra) – tota
multitudo entium non est genus.
q. , concl.  (rb) – omne princi-
pium productivum, vel contentivum
circumscriptive, vel predicative
sive signiÞcative, a quo vel ratione
cuius aliquod principiatum habet
denominationem distinctivam ab
alio predicamento, est genus. q. ,
concl.  (rb) – alius terminus est
genus tamquam principium conten-
tivum predicative sive signiÞcative.
q. , concl.  (va) – genus est
equivocum, et hoc sive accipiatur
materialiter, sive signiÞcative. q. ,
concl.  (va) – non omne istud
est genus cui supponitur species.
q. , concl.  (vb) – non est genus
nisi habuerit sub se plures species
actu. q. , concl.  (vb) – quod-
libet genus potest non esse genus,
ipso existente in rerum natura.
q. , concl.  (vb) – iste terminus
‘genus’ de nullo predicatur per se.
q. , concl.  (vb) – omne illud est
genus cui immediate supponitur sua
species. q. , concl.  (ra) – aliquid
est per se superius ad aliud quod
non est suum genus. q. , concl. 
(ra) – genus est principium conten-
tivum suarum specierum predica-
tive. q. , concl.  (rb) – genus est
principium compositivum suarum
specierum. q. , concl.  (rb) –
genus predicatur de pluribus pro se
vel pro suo simili vel equivalenti.
q. , concl.  (ra) – omne genus
materialiter acceptum predicatur
de pluribus stantibus materialiter
in tali propositione. q. , concl. 
(rb) – omne genus predicatur de
pluribus stans signiÞcative in tali
propositione. q. , concl.  (rb) –
nullum genus predicatur de plu-
ribus pro se. q. , concl.  (rb) –
nullum genus predicatur de plu-
ribus pro aliquo suo signiÞcato.
q. , concl.  (rb) – omne genus
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predicatur de pluribus pro aliquo
suo signiÞcato. q. , concl.  (rb) –
si naturalis potentia vel impotentia
sit una species in predicamento
qualitatis, tunc nullum genus
predicatur de pluribus dierentibus
specie. q. , concl.  (rb) – omne
genus predicatur de pluribus specie
dierentibus. q. , concl.  (rb) –
omne genus predicatur in quid de
aliquo. q. , concl.  (vb) – aliquod
genus predicatur in quale primo.
q. , concl.  (vb) – non omne
genus predicatur in quid primo de
quacumque sua specie predicatione
dubii remotiva. q. , concl.  (vb) –
omne genus simplex substantie
predicatur in quid de se ipso
accipiendo ‘predicationem in quid’
pro predicatione absoluta. q. ,
concl.  (vb) – nullum genus
predicatur in quid de quocumque
suo individuo predicatione dubii
remotiva. q. , concl.  (vb) –
aliquod genus predicatur in quale
de sua specie quamvis non primo.
q. , alie concl. (ra) – 〈si〉 aliquod
genus predicatur in quid de sua
specie, de eadem predicatur in
quale. q. , alie concl. (ra) –
genus non diert ab individuo
large accipiendo individuum.
q. , concl.  (va) – omne
genus continetur ab aliqua specie
tamquam signiÞcatum alicuius
speciei, non tamen tamquam
inferius ad illam speciem. q. ,
concl.  (va) – non omne genus,
accipiendo ‘genus’ materialiter,
est alicuius speciei genus. q. ,
concl.  (vb) – aliquod genus
est species specialissima.q. ,
concl.  (vb) – aliqua coordinatio
generalissimi et specialissimi 〈est〉
sine speciebus subalternis mediis
q. , concl.  (vb) – omne
genus est alicuius speciei genus,
si ly ‘genus’ supponat personaliter.
q. , concl.  (vb) – omne genus
est principium contentivum. q. ,
concl.  (va) – aliquod genus est
pars integralis speciei specialissime.
q. , concl.  (rb) – nullum
genus absolutum componitur,
tamquam ex partibus integralibus,
ex pluribus speciebus absolutis
precipue eque communibus. q. ,
concl.  (rb–va) – omne genus
substantiale est accidens. q. ,
concl.  (va).
Videas Relativa – genus et species;
Species.
Genus generalissimum: aliquod
genus generalissimum est pars
individui stricte accipiendo ‘indi-
viduum’. q. , concl.  (va) –
aliquod genus generalissimum est
per se inferius ad aliud genus gene-
ralissimum. q. , concl.  (va) –
aliquod genus est superius per se
ad aliquod genus generalissimum.
q. , concl.  (rb) – omne genus
generalissimum est primum prin-
cipium. q. , concl.  (va) –
genus generalissimum est primum
principium compositivum. q. ,
concl.  (vb) – genus generalis-
simum est aliquando principium
eectivum. q. , concl.  (ra) –
genus generalissimum 〈est〉 primum
principium initiativum sive termina-
tivum. q. , concl.  (ra).
Homo: ista propositio ‘plures
homines sunt unus homo’ est vera
in sensu proprio precipue tenendo
quod partes nihil aliud sint quam
suum totum. q. , concl. 
(ra) – plures homines totaliter
distincti non sunt unus homo. q. ,
concl.  (ra) – ista propositio
‘plures homines sunt unus homo’
est vera in sensu transsumptivo.
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q. , concl.  (rab) – uterque
istorum – demonstrando Sortem
et Platonem – est unus homo
singularis, et per consequens
est unus homo sensibilis, et
unus homo non-universalis, et
unus homo capiendus et sic de
quibuscumque aliis conditionibus
individuantibus. q. , concl. 
(rb) – si corpus celeste non
componatur ex corpore et anima
intellectiva, tunc di nitio istius
dierentie ‘rationalis’ secundum
quod est dierentia speciÞca et
di nitio hominis, est una et eadem
di nitio saltem aliquando di nitio
hominis, utpote ista ‘aliquis habens
animam intellectivam tamquam
partem sui essentialem’, et potest dici
di nitio naturalis hominis. q. ,
concl.  (ra) – hominem esse
est homo. q. , concl.  (rb) –
hominem esse animal est aliquid,
quia hominem esse animal est homo
et animal, et identitas hominis et
animalis, et totum est homo. q. ,
concl.  (rb) – hominem esse
asinum non est aliquid vel aliqua.
q. , concl.  (rb).
Idem: aliqua possunt dici ‘eadem’ vel
‘plura’ multipliciter, scilicet numero
vel specie vel genere, vel secundum
equivalentiam. Unde aliqua sunt
eadem secundum equivalentiam que
dierunt genere, sicut signum vocale
et signum scriptum. q. , dist. 
(rb).
Individuum: iste terminus indivi-
duum potest accipi dupliciter, sci-
licet, large vel stricte. – Individuum
large acceptum: Large secundum
quod est nomen prime intentionis,
signiÞcans re〈m〉 materialiter exi-
stentem sive istud sit signum sive res
que non est signum. – Individuum
stricte acceptum: Stricte secundum
quod est nomen secunde intentionis,
signiÞcans signum quod signiÞcative
sumptum non predicatur de pluri-
bus saltem univoce. q. , dist. un.
(va).
– quoddam dicitur individuum
ut nunc, et quoddam simpliciter. –
Individuum ut nunc: Individuum ut
nunc potest istud dici quod pronunc
non competit alicui nisi uni soli,
ita quod non competat pluribus,
quamvis sine nova impositione
posset pluribus competere, et talia
individua sunt omnes termini
habentes tantum unum suppositum.
Et ad istum intellectum loquitur
Porphirius quando dicit quod Þlius
Sophronisci sit individuum, idest,
iste terminus ‘Þlius Sophronisci’,
si solus sit ei Socrates Þlius. –
Individuum simpliciter: Individuum
vero simpliciter dicitur istud
quod non potest univoce pluribus
competere sine nova impositione,
sicud ‘Socrates’ et ‘hoc album’ et ‘hoc
veniens’, etcetera. q. , dist. un.
(ra).
– In ista questione presupponitur
(…) quod ‘individuum’ semper acci-
pitur pro individuo individualitate
predicationis et non existentie. q. ,
dist.  (vb).
– individuum non est indi-
viduum. q. , concl.  (va) –
nullum individuum est nomen
appellativum. q. , concl. 
(vb) – nullum individuum cor-
respondet conceptui appellativo
absolute, primo et principaliter.
q. , concl.  (vb) – aliquod
individuum quod est nomen pro-
prium, correspondet conceptui
appellativo connotative sive acciden-
taliter, secondario et ex consequenti.
q. , concl.  (ra) – aliquod
individuum sive nomen proprium
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convertitur cum termino appella-
tivo q. , concl.  (rb) – aliquod
individuum alicuius speciei ab alio
individuo eiusdem speciei diert per
accidens. q. , concl.  (vb) –
quecumque duo individua alicuius
speciei specie dierunt, dierunt
qualitercumque accipitur ‘species’.
q. , concl.  (vab) – nulla duo
individua alicuius speciei substan-
tialis dierunt specie substantiali.
q. , concl.  (vb) – omne indi-
viduum specie ab alio diert. q. ,
concl.  (vb) – nullum indivi-
duum ab alio diert specie. q. ,
concl.  (vb) – aliquod indivi-
duum ab alio individuo diert specie
substantiali. q. , concl.  (vb) –
nullo termino existente nulla sunt
eiusdem speciei accipiendo speciem
pro termino. q. , concl.  (ra) –
accipiendo ‘speciem’ pro forma reali
et non pro termino, aliqua sunt eius-
dem speciei nullo termino existente.
q. , concl.  (ra) – accipiendo
‘speciem’ pro forma reali et non pro
termino, nulla duo individua suppo-
sitionaliter discreta ita quod non sint
partes alicuius alterius per se unius,
sunt eiusdem specie. q. , concl. 
(ra) – aliqua individua supposi-
tionaliter discreta sunt earundem
specierum, idest: consimilium spe-
cierum ultimatarum, similitudine
substantiali. aliqua duo individua
que sunt eius〈dem〉 speciei specia-
lissime, sunt diversarum specierum.
q. , concl.  (ra) – Sortes et
Plato et quecumque alia individua
substantialia composita ex materia
et forma sunt per se alterius spe-
ciei substantialis non tamen primo.
q. , concl.  (ra).
Individuum large acceptum:
‘individuum’ large acceptum est
transcendens. q. , concl.  (va) –
‘individuum’ large acceptum est
superius ad genus generalissimum.
q. , concl.  (va).
Individuum stricte acceptum:
omne individuum predicatur
univoce de pluribus. q. , concl. 
(va) – ‘individuum’ strictissime et
propriissime acceptum predicatur
de pluribus univoce personaliter
sumptis. q. , concl.  (va) –
‘individuum’ propriissime acceptum
predicatur de pluribus univoce
personaliter acceptis mediante
conceptu composito. q. ,
concl.  (ra) – ‘individuum’
proprie acceptum non predicatur
de pluribus totaliter distinctis
personaliter acceptis mediante unico
conceptu simplici precise. q. ,
concl.  (ra).
InÞnitum: quod iste terminus
‘inÞnitum’ accipitur dupliciter.
Uno modo sincategorematice, alio
modo categorematice. – InÞnitum
sincategorematice acceptum:
Sincategorematice accipitur quando
tenetur distributive sive divisive,
et tunc reddit propositionem
universalem, ut patet in talibus
‘inÞnite dies precesserunt diem
istam’, ‘inÞniti homines fuerent
ante istum hominem’, ‘in inÞnitum
continuum est divisibile’. Et
tunc debent tales propositiones
sic exponi: ‘plures homines
precesserunt hunc hominem’, vel
‘plures dies precesserunt istum diem’,
et non tot quin plures; et tunc tales
sunt singulares: ‘isti duo homines
precesserunt hunc hominem’, et
iste terminus ‘et sic in inÞnitum’
semper demonstrando homines in
tali minori qui precesserunt hunc
hominem. Cum hoc tamen stat
quod omnis multitudo hominum
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que precessit hunc hominem sic
accepta, sit Þnita. Et consimiliter
est de ista propositione cuius
universales iste sunt singulares:
‘in istas duas partes continuum
est divisibile’, et ‘in istas tres partes
continuum est divisibile’, et sic
in inÞnitum. Cum hoc tamen
stat quod omnes partes in quas
continuum est divisibile, sunt Þnite,
quia due sunt Þnite et tres sunt
Þnite et quattuor sunt Þnite, et sic
in inÞnitum. Et ideo multi logici
non negant istam ‘continuum est
divisibile in inÞnitum’ ponendo ly
‘in inÞnitum’ a parte predicati. Et
tunc, ut dicunt, stat categorematice
sive collective, quod idem est. Et
tunc ad veritatem talis requiritur
quod continuum posset esse actu
divisum in aliquam multitudinem
inÞnitam discrete, quod Aristoteles,
〈primo〉 Physicorum, dicit esse
impossibile, quamvis aliqui
theologi hoc concedunt, quod




〈〉 Uno modo privative tantum,
et sic tantummodo signiÞcat
privationem Þnis, et isto modo
omne istud quod non habet Þnem
vel terminum, est inÞnitum. Et sic
omne indivisibile est inÞnitum,
quodcumque fuerit. 〈〉 Alio modo
accipitur non tantum privative,
sed etiam includit a rmationem
alicuius magnitudinis vel molis vel
corporis vel virtutis. Et sic adhuc
accipitur multipliciter secundum
quod innuit Aristoteles, tertio
Physicorum: 〈.〉 Quia quod
est ‘inÞnitum intensive’ utpote
virtualiter, sicut prima causa
dicitur inÞnita in sua virtute et
potentialitate, quia non est dare
〈aliquid〉 quod non potest. 〈.〉
Alio modo dicitur aliquid ‘inÞnitum
durative’, quia durabit et non erit
Þnis sue durationis. 〈..〉 Tertio
modo dicitur aliquid ‘inÞnitum
extensive’, si aliquod tale esset,
scilicet quod extendetur et non
habebit Þnem sue extentionis. Et
istud adhuc subdividitur. 〈..〉
Quia aliquid potest dici ‘inÞnitum
extensive’, quia extenditur et non
habet Þnem extrinsecum sue
extensionis, et isto modo longitudo
gyrativa alicuius continui est inÞnita
extensive. 〈..〉 Alio modo quod
extenditur et non habet Þnem
sue extentionis intrinsecum, et
isto modo nihil est inÞnitum, nec
potest esse, secundum aliquos.
〈.〉 Quarto modo adhuc capitur
‘inÞnitum successive’, quali inÞnitate
tempus et motus celi dicuntur
inÞniti, de quibus est tractatum,
sed ista ad presens hic ponuntur
ne juvenes dampnum incurrant
ignorantia terminorum. q. ,
dist.  (va–ra).
– de quolibet inÞnito qualiter-
cumque accipitur et de qualibet
parte inÞniti est di nitiva et noti-
Þcativa scientia sive notitia et cer-
tissima. q. , concl.  (ra) – de
inÞnitis sive de inÞnito intensive est
scientia humana. q. , concl. 
(ra) – de inÞnitis continuatione
sive extensione est ars et scientia
humana. q. , concl.  (ra) – de
inÞnitis duratione est ars et scien-
tia humana. q. , concl.  (ra) –
de inÞnito non est ars et scientia
humana, sic videlicet quod ipsum
inÞnitum secundum se et secundum
quamlibet sui proportionalitatem et
secundum quamlibet sui partem
distincte ab homine qui non est
Deus, cognoscitur. q. , concl. 
(ra).
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Inseparabile accidens: aliquod
accidens quod est universale, dicitur
inseparabile respectu alicuius
subiecti determinati et non absolute.
q. , concl.  (rb).
Videas Dierre.
Inseparabilitas: presupponitur
distinctio de inseparabilitate logicali
et reali – Inseparabilitas logicalis:
logicalis est ista qua non potest
veriÞcari per aliquam negationem,
sicut dicimus quod propria passio
est inseparabilis a suo subiecto, hoc
est, non potest vere negari a suo
subiecto primo; – Inseparabilitas
realis: realis est que Þt realiter sine
aliqua propositione, scilicet quando
due res non possunt a se invicem
dividi sive separari. q. , dist. 
(vb).
Instinctus: instinctus nature. q. ,
ad arg. contra concl. , iii
(rb).
Intelligere: istud quod non potest
esse, non potest intelligi. q. ,
concl.  (rb) – quod non est, non
intelligitur. q. , concl.  (rb) –
Platonem esse non potest intelligi,
posito quod Plato non sit nec poterit
esse. q. , concl.  (va) – suppo-
sito quod corvus albus non sit, tunc
corvus albus non subintelligitur.
q. , concl.  (va).
Motus: iste terminus ‘motus’ non
est per 〈se〉 superior ad actionem,
sed e converse. q. , concl. 
(va) – omnis motus est passio, et
per consequens motus non est per
se superior ad passionem. q. ,
concl.  (va).
Necessitas: necessitas est duplex,
scilicet complexa et incomplexa. –
Necessitas incomplexa: Necessitas
incomplexa est res que non potest
non esse. – Necessitas complexa:
Complexa adhuc subdividitur,
quia quedam est absoluta sive
categorica, et quedam conditionata
sive hypothetica. q. , dist.  (rb).
NotiÞcatio: quedam est notiÞca-
tio remissa et quedam perfecta et
quedam perfectior et quedam per-
fectissima. – NotiÞcatio remissa:
Remissa vero generat aliqualem
notiÞcationem utrum quid signiÞ-
catur per terminum vel per notitiam
confusam. Que quidem notiÞcatio
habet multos sensus. – NotiÞca-
tio perfecta: NotiÞcatio perfecta
est illa qua scitur de aliqua re ali-
quas suas proprietates accidentales
sibi inesse. – NotiÞcatio perfectior:
NotiÞcatio perfectior est illa qua
scitur proprietates propriissimas ali-
cuius rei secundum aliquid inesse. –
NotiÞcatio perfectissima: NotiÞcatio
perfectissima est illa qua scitur res
di nire propriissime et proprie et
communiter, hoc est qua cognosci-
tur dierentia speciÞca convertibilis
rei inesse, et qua cognoscuntur pro-
prietates rei inesse, et etiam qua
cognoscitur accidens talis rei sibi
inesse, et per consequens ista notitia
est composita ex pluribus notitiis vel
saltem est plures notitias supponens.
q. , dist.  (rb–va).
Predicamentum: duplex est ‘pre-
dicamentum’: quoddam est pre-
dicamentum prime intentionis, et
quoddam secunde intentionis. –
Predicamentum prime intentionis:
‘〈Predicamentum〉 prime intentionis’
vocatur istud quod componitur ex
coordinationibus primarum inten-
tionum, cuiusmodi sunt ista decem
de quibus pertractat Aristoteles in
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Predicamentis. – Predicamentum
secunde intentionis: ‘Predicamen-
tum secunde intentionis’ vocatur
coordinatio secundum sub et supra
composita ex terminis secunde
intentionis, cuiusmodi e〈s〉t talis
coordinatio: ‘hoc genus’, ‘genus
universale’, et sic de consimilibus
coordinationibus. q. , dist. 
(rb).
– ista exclusiva ‘tantum sunt
decem predicamenta’ in omni suo
sensu est falsa. q. , concl. 
(rb) – plura sunt predicamenta
prime intentionis quam decem.
q. , concl.  (rb).
Predicare: ‘predicare’ accipitur
dupliciter, scilicet large et stricte. –
Predicare large acceptum: Large
extendit se ad omnem predicatio-
nem, sive negativam, sive veram,
sive falsam, sive universalem, sive
particularem, sive indeÞnitam, sive
singularem. – Predicare stricte accep-
tum: Stricte accipitur tantummodo
pro predicatione a rmativa vera, ita
quod convertitur cum isto termino
‘veriÞcare de aliquo’. q. , dist. un.
(rab).
– Aliquid predicari de pluribus:
‘aliquid predicari de pluribus’
intelligitur dupliciter, scilicet
secundum actualitatem vel secundum
aptitudinem, idest, actualiter vel
aptitudinaliter. q. , dist. un. (ra).
– large accipiendo ‘predicari’
quilibet terminus de quolibet
termino predicatur vel saltem est
predicabilis. q. , concl.  (rb) –
inferius predicatur de suo superiori;
quod quidem superius stat confuse
et distributive. q. , concl. 
(rb) – accipiendo ‘predicari’ pro
‘a rmative de aliquo veriÞcari’,
sicut accipit communiter Porphirius
predicari, 〈inferius predicatur de
suo suoeriori〉. q. , concl. 
(rb) – nullum inferius predicatur
de suo superiori universaliter, hoc
est: nullum inferius predicatur
de suo superiori stante confuse et
distributive respectu talis inferioris.
q. , concl.  (rb).
Predicari in quid: ‘predicari in quid’
accipitur dupliciter: uno modo pro
predicatione absoluta, alio modo
pro predicatione dubii remotiva ad
questionem factam per ‘quid?’. q. ,
dist.  (vb).
– Predicari in quid; predicari
in quale: ‘predicari in quid’ vel
‘predicari in quale’ accipitur
dupliciter: uno modo primo, idest,
non ratione alicuius partis, alio
modo non primo, quia ratione
alicuius partis. q. , dist.  (vb).
– Predicari in quid: aliquid
predicatur in quid dupliciter, scilicet
primo et non primo. – Predicari
in quid primo: Primo, quando
aliquid predicatur in quid ratione
sui ipsius, et non ratione alicuius
sue partis. – Predicari in quid non
primo: Non primo, quando aliquid
predicatur in quid ratione alicuius
sue partis, videlicet quia aliqua
sua pars predicatur in quid. q. ,
dist.  (rab).
Principium: ‘principium’ accipitur
multipliciter, (…): uno modo
accipitur pro principio productivo,
〈sicud〉 pro causa e ciente,
universali vel particulari; alio modo
accipitur pro principio compositivo
sicud pro materia vel forma, ex
quibus equales res componuntur
tamquam ex principiis; tertio modo
accipitur pro principio terminativo,
sicud pro causa formali; quarto
modo accipitur pro principio
contentivo, et hoc dicitur uno modo
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circumscriptive, sicut locus est
principium vel patria (…); alio
modo predicative vel signiÞcative
sicut pro predicabili in quid de
pluribus specie dierentibus,
quod quidem continet unam
predicationem vel signiÞcationem
〈sicud〉 sua per se inferiora. q. ,
dist. un. (rb).
– ‘principium’ accipitur multipli-
citer, scilicet pro principio conten-
tivo, et principio eectivo, sive pro
principio compositivo. – Principium
contentivum: Principium contenti-
vum vocatur principium logicale,
quod propter suam communita-
tem tamquam superius continet
sub se sua inferiora. Et de tali prio-
ritate sive principalitate loquitur
Aristoteles, quod tale principium
dicitur principium in Postpredica-
mentis, capitulo de prius, ubi dicitur
quod ‘prius’ dicitur istud a quo non
convertitur subsistendi consequen-
tia. – Principium compositivum:
Principium vero compositivum dici-
tur ex quo res componitur, quod
quidem principium est pars rei et
manet in rei, sicut vult Aristote-
les, primo Physicorum, et tale est
principium naturale intrinsecum,
sicut materia et forma. – Princi-
pium eectivum: Principium vero
eectivum dicitur causa e ciens,
quod quidem dicitur principium
extrinsecum, et est similiter prin-
cipium naturale sive reale. Finis
vero propinquus rei, quia coinci-
dit cum forma, sicut vult Aristoteles,
secundo Physicorum, ideo est prin-
cipium intrinsecum, sicud forma.
q. , dist.  (rb–va).
– Principium terminativum: Veru-
mtamen potest addi quartum mem-
brum divisionis, scilicet principium
terminativum, et istud subdividitur
in principium terminativum intrin-
secum et extrinsecum. – Principium
terminativum intrinsecum: ‘Intrinse-
cum’ dicitur pars rei vel essentialis,
ut forma, que est pars generatio-
nis, vel pars quantitativa, que est
pars magnitudinis vel terminans
magnitudinem, sive initians conti-
nuationem et successionem, quod
dico pro principio initiativo vel suc-
cessivo, de quo alibi diusius patet,
utpote in Questione de tempore sive
quarto Physicorum. – Principium ter-
minativum extrinsecum: Principium
vero terminativum sive initiativum
‘extrinsecum’ est causa e ciens, vel
Þnis remotus rei et hoc essentialiter
loquendo; sed quantitative loquendo,
tunc istud a quo res incipit exclusive
vel ad quod terminatur, dicitur prin-
cipium vel terminus, sicut si aliquod
longum extendatur ab isto pariete ad
ostium, tunc iste paries est princi-
pium extrinsecum illius extensionis,
et ostium est terminus extrinsecus,
vel e converso, secundum diversam
considerationem diversorum. q. ,
dist.  (va).
Propositio: 〈Boecius〉 vult quod
omnis propositio sit vocalis,
mentalis vel scripta q. , ad. opp.
(vb). – sicut tota propositio vocalis
correspondet toti mentali, sic pars
principalis parti principali, utpote
subiectum subiecto, et predicatum
predicato. q. , concl.  (ra) –
non semper eodem modo partes
vel equivalentes constituunt
propositionem equivalentem
q. , ad ., ad prob. . prop.
(va) – quandocumque alique
tres propositiones sic se habent
quod in dubio sunt due, et tertia
certa sive 〈s〉cita, et quod habent
idem subiectum, tunc aliud est
predicatum propositionis scite
a predicato propositionis dubie
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q. , opinio  (vb) – alique
due propositiones possunt sic se
habere quod subiecta earum precise
supponunt pro eisdem, et predicata
similiter, quarum tamen una esset
vera et reliqua esset falsa. q. ,
concl.  (va).
Propositio mentalis: nulla propo-
sitio mentalis eque simplex corre-
spondet convertibiliter isti vocali
‘Sortes est homo’. q. , concl. 
(va) – aliqua mentalis sibi corre-
spondet convertibiliter, quamvis
non sit eque simplex, sicut ista res
que vocatur Sortes. q. , concl. 
(va).
Propositio singularis: aliqua
propositio est singularis in qua
subicitur terminus communis
sine signo. q. , concl.  (rb) –
nulla propositio est singularis cuius
subiectum est terminus communis
univocus primo sine signo et
sine pronomine demonstrative
q. , concl.  (rb) – aliqua
est propositio singularis cui nulla
mentalis eque simplex correspondet
convertibiliter. q. , concl. 
(rb).
Proprium: ‘proprium’ nihil aliud est
quam terminus competens alicui per
se secundo modo, et hoc precipue
‘proprie proprium’. Primo, quia nihil
predicatur de subiecto nisi terminus;
omne proprium predicatur de
suo subiecto. Secundo, quia nihil
convertitur cum suo subiecto
nisi terminus; convertibilitas
est proprietas terminorum sive
propositionum; sed proprium
convertitur cum suo subiecto. Tertio,
quia omne demonstrabile de suo
subiecto est terminus, quia omne
tale est predicabile; sed proprium
est demonstrabile de suo subiecto;
igitur etcetera. q. , contra op.
comm. ( ra).
– proprietas individualis, acci-
piendo ‘proprietatem’ sive ‘proprium’
primo vel secundo vel tertio modo
quo accipit Porphirius ‘proprium’,
potest competere pluribus indi-
viduis. q. , concl.  (ra). –
proprietas individualis accipiendo
quarto modo ‘proprium’, scilicet,
secundum quod convertitur cum
isto cum quo est proprietas unius
individui, numquam potest univoce
alteri individuo competere. q. ,
concl.  (rb) – ‘proprium’ dicitur
quadrupliciter, quia iste terminus
‘proprium’ accipitur quadrupliciter.
q. , concl.  (rb) – hec pro-
positio est impossibilis: ‘proprium
competit soli speciei’. q. , concl. 
(rb) – ista propositio: ‘aliquid est
proprium quod 〈competit〉 omni
et non soli’ ad intellectum auctoris
est vera, quia stat loco istius ‘aliquid
est proprium quod competit omni
homini vel omni individuo istius
speciei homo’, et non veriÞcatur de
ista specie sumpta cum dictione
exclusive. q. , concl.  (rb) –
hec propositio est falsa: ‘aliquod
proprium alicuius speciei compe-
tit omni individuo alicuius speciei’.
q. , concl.  (rb) – ad intellec-
tum auctoris hec est vera: ‘aliquod
est proprium quod competit soli sed
non omni’, quia stat loco istius ‘ali-
quod est proprium quod veriÞcatur
〈de individuo istius solius speciei, et
non〉 de omni individuo istius spe-
ciei’. q. , concl.  (rb) – istud
proprium canescere in senectute
non est tale proprium quod com-
petit 〈omni〉 et soli sed non simper.
q. , concl.  (rb) – aliquod est
proprium quod competit omni et
soli sed non semper, ad intentionem
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auctoris, quia stat loco istius ‘ali-
quod est proprium quod veriÞcatur
de aliqua specie’ sumpta cum isto
‘solus’ sive dictione exclusiva. q. ,
concl.  (rb) – aliquod est pro-
prium quod competit omni et soli et
semper, ad istum intellectum quod
aliquod proprium veriÞcatur de ali-
quo specie sumpta cum dictione
exclusiva, et veriÞcatur de ista specie
universaliter et numquam vere nega-
tur ab ista specie, et hoc utrisque,
scilicet tam specie quam proprio,
sumptis personaliter. q. , concl. 
(va) – proprium ‘risibile’ competit
alicui tamquam proprie proprium
quod impossibile est ridere. q. ,
concl.  (va) – hoc proprium
‘risibile’ competit alicui tamquam
proprie proprium quod impossi-
bile est esse risibile. q. , concl. 
(va) – hoc proprium ‘risibile’ non
est proprium alicuius quod potest
ridere q. , concl.  (va) – istud
proprium quod competit omni et
soli et semper est unum universale
de quo principaliter intendit Por-
phirius, quia alia sunt accidentia.
q. , concl.  (va) – omne pro-
prium est accidens. q. , concl. 
(va).
Quale: duplex est ‘quale’, scilicet
substantiale et accidentale. – Quale
substantiale: Quale substantiale
querit de forma substantiali; – Quale
accidentale: quale vero accidentale
querit de forma accidentali sive de
alia proprietate accidentali. q. ,
dist.  (ra).
Relatio: Suppositio prima: Prima
igitur suppositio est ista quod
omnes tales dictiones ‘intellectio’,
‘desideratio’, ‘credulitas’ sive ‘creditio’,
‘conceptus’ sive ‘conceptio’, ‘voluntas’
sive ‘volitio’ sint relativa. Et capit ista
suppositio evidentiam ab Aristotele,
capitulo de relatione, ubi vult quod
scientia et sensatio sunt relativa,
quia pari ratione qua scientia est
alicuius scibilis, et alicuius sciti, et
sensatio alicuius sensibilis et sensati.
Intellectio est alicuius intelligibilis
et intellecti, et desideratio alicuius
desiderabilis et desiderati, et creditio
alicuius credibilis et crediti, et volitio
alicuius volibilis et voliti, et sic de
consimilibus. Suppositio secunda:
Secunda suppositio est ista que
similiter ibidem ab Aristotele elici
potest, quod relativa sibi invicem
non includentia ampliationem –
utpote aliquod verbum possibilitatis
vel de preterito vel de futuro – sint
simul natura, ita quod consequentia
existendi ab uno ad reliquum
et e converso, utrisque acceptis
personaliter, est bona, sicud ista
consequentia est bona: ‘scientia,
igitur scitum est, et e converso’,
‘sensatio est, ergo sensatum est, et
e converso’, et simili ratione sequitur
‘intellectio est, ergo intellectum
est, et e converso’, ‘creditio est,
ergo creditum est, et e converso’,
‘volitio est, ergo volutum est, et
e converso’. Videtur satis evidens
quod ista fuerat intentio Aristotelis,
sicud legenti capitulum de relatione
satis patet. q. , suppositiones
(rab).
Relativa – genus et species: nulla
species que est homo, nec aliquod
genus quod est animal dicuntur
relative ad invicem. q. , concl. 
(ra) – species et genus que
veriÞcentur de homine et animali,
dicuntur relativa ad invicem, quia
isti duo termini ‘species’ et ‘genus’.
q. , concl.  (ra) – non omne
genus et species sunt sibi invicem
relativa. q. , concl.  (vb).
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‘Res que vocatur Sortes’: iste
terminus ‘res que vocatur Sortes’
est terminus accidentalis, non
substantialis. q. , c. (ra) – iste
terminus ‘res que vocatur Sortes’ est
in predicamento qualitatis. q. , c.
(rab).
Scientia: ‘scientia’ accipitur triplici-
ter: uno modo propriissime, scilicet
pro notitia causata demonstra-
tione; alio modo accipitur largius,
scilicet pro notitia evidenti veri
necessarii; tertio modo accipitur
largissime, scilicet pro notitia evi-
denti et probabili alicuius veri. q. ,
dist.  (ra). – aliqua scientia est
necessaria ad cognitionem predica-
mentorum habendam q. , concl. 
(ra) – nulla scientia que 〈non〉 est
prima causa, est necessaria aliqua
necessitate ad cognitionem predica-
mentorum habendam q. , concl. 
(rb) – possibile est aliquem habere
scientiam predicamentorum sine
scientia generis. q. , concl. 
(rb) – scientia universalium presup-
ponit scientiam singulorum. q. ,
ad . (va).
Videas Cognitio.
Sensus transsumptivus: q. , ad .
(rb); q. , concl.  (rb), ad .
(va); q. , dist. , concl.  (ra);
q. , dist.  (ra), concl.  (rb),
ad ., ad . (rb), ad opp. (va);
q. , dist. , (vb), concl. 
(vb–ra), ad . (ra); q. ,
concl. , concl. , concl. 
(ra), concl. , ad . (rb); q. ,
. (va), concl.  (rb); q. ,
ad . (ra), ad opp. (ra); q. ,
concl. , ad . (va); q. , ad .
(va).
Separabile: duplex est ‘separabile’,
(…) scilicet reale et logicale. –
Separabile reale: Reale, quod realiter
inheret alicui subiecto et potest
non inherere manente subiecto. –
Separabile logicale: Reale Logicale,
quod a rmatur de aliquo subiecto
et potest negari ab eodem subiecto
signiÞcative sumpto. q. , dist. 
(rb).
Separabile accidens: duplex est
‘separabile accidens’, scilicet realis
et logicalis. – Separabile accidens
realis: Realis est que Þt ex parte
rei alicuius accidentis in subiecto
cui realiter inheret, sicud quando
caliditas separatur a ligno, vel
ab aliquo. – Separabile accidens
logicalis: Logicalis est ista quando
aliquis terminus accidentalis vere
negatur a subiecto, sicut patet in ista
propositione: ‘Sortes non est sedens’,
posito quod Sortes prius fuit sedens
et nunc non sit sedens. q. , dist. 
(rab).
Species: ‘species’ accipitur multipli-
citer: uno modo pro pulchritudine;
secundo modo pro forma; ter-
tio modo pro di nitione; quarto
modo pro similitudine representativa;
quinto modo pro quoddam univer-
sali. q. , dist. un. (vb).
– ‘species’ accipitur dupliciter
quantum est ad presens: uno modo
pro forma reali substantiali vel
accidentali, alio modo pro termino
mentali, vocali vel scripto, qui
quidem terminus est de pluribus
predicabilis numero dierentibus
in eo quod quid. q. , dist. 
(va). – sive species accipiatur
pro re que non est signum, sive
pro signo, Sortes et Plato sunt
eiusdem speciei. q. , concl. 
(rb) – homo est species animalis.
q. , concl.  (vb) – homo est
species ‘animal’. q. , concl. 
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(ra) – hec est concedenda: ‘omne
“homo” est species animalis’. q. ,
concl.  (ra) – omnis species
est aliciuius generis species, si ly
‘species’ supponat personaliter. q. ,
concl.  (vb) – aliqua species
est pars integralis generis. q. ,
concl.  (rb) – species est pars
subiectiva generis et individuum
speciei, quia sunt per se inferiora ad
genus et ad speciem. q. , concl. 
(va) – aliqua species est pars
essentialis generis. q. , concl. 
(va) – omnis species substantialis
est accidens. q. , concl.  (va).
Videas Genus: Relativa – genus et
species.
Species pro pulchritudine accepta:
aliquod signum est species primo
modo accepta. q. , concl. 
(vb) – non omnis species isto
modo accipiendo ‘speciem’ est
signum vel terminus. q. , concl. 
(ra).
Species pro forma accepta: aliqua
‘species’ secundo modo accepta
est terminus vel signum. q. ,
concl.  (ra) – non omnis
‘species’ taliter accepta est signum.
q. , concl.  (ra) – proprie
loquendo nullo signo existente
aliqua sunt eiusdem speciei
accipiendo ‘speciem’ pro forma.
q. , concl.  (ra) – nullo signo
existente Sortes et Plato proprie
loquendo secundum communem
opinionem non sunt eiusdem
speciei, quamvis forte secundum
opinionem Commentatoris qui
posuit unum intellectum esse in
omnibus, possent dici in aliquo
sensu ‘eiusdem speciei’, quia
eiusdem intellectus. q. , concl. 
(rb) – transsumptive loquendo
nullo signo existente Sortes et
Plato sunt eiusdem speciei, idest:
Sortes et Plato habent consimiles
formas ultimatas. q. , concl. 
(rb).
Species pro di nitione accepta:
omnis ‘species’ tertio modo accepta
est signum vel signa. q. , concl. 
(ra).
Species pro similitudine represen-
tativa accepta: aliqua ‘species’ quarto
modo accepta est signum vel termi-
nus. q. , concl.  (ra).
Species pro quoddamuniversali
accepta: omnis ‘species’ quinto
modo accepta est signum simplex
vel compositum. q. , concl. 
(ra).
Species specialissima: omne
quod est proxime et univoce
ante individua, est 〈species〉
specialissima, si illud immediate
et per se supponitur generi. q. ,
concl.  (vb) – sub specie
specialissima nihil continetur
nisi individuum. q. , concl. 
(vb) – aliquid est per se ante
individua proxime quod non est
species specialissima, nec genus,
sed individuum. q. , concl. 
(ra) – nulla species specialissima
componitur, tamquam ex partibus
integralibus, ex pluribus speciebus
specialissimis absolutis. q. ,
concl.  (va) – aliquod species
specialissima componitur, tamquam
ex partibus integralibus, ex
pluribus speciebus 〈specialissimis〉




uno modo pro isto de quo accidens
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accidentaliter predicatur; alio modo
pro isto cui accidens realiter inheret.
q. , dist.  (ra).
Substantia: iste terminus ‘substantia’
accipitur multipliciter: uno modo
pro termino absolute signiÞcante
substantiam, sicut accipit Aristoteles
in Predicamentis, quando loquitur
de substantia prima et secunda, et
sic est nomen secunde intentionis.
Alio modo accipitur ‘substantia’
pro essentia alicuius rei, sive ista
res sit per se subsistens, sive alteri
inherens. Et sic accipit Aristoteles
in principio Predicamentorum,
quando dicit: ‘equivoca sunt,
quorum nomen est communis et
ratio substantie secundum istud
nomen est diversa’, idest: essentie,
quia non tantum loquitur Aristoteles
de equivocatione que Þt in terminis
substantialibus, sed etiam de ista
que Þt in terminis accidentalibus,
quia di nit equivoca quecumque
sint ista sive substantialia sive
accidentalia. Et isto modo substantia
est nomen prime intentionis. Tertio
modo accipitur ‘substantia’ pro
di nitione. Et isto modo accipitur
a Porphirio, quando dicit quod
dierentia est constitutiva substantie
animalis vel hominis. Et isto
modo adhuc substantia est nomen
secunde intentionis. q. , dist. 
(ra).
Superpositio, suppositio: ‘superpo-
sitio’ et ‘suppositio’ (…) accipi〈un〉
tur dupliciter: uno modo logicaliter,
alio modo localiter. Localiter sicud
paries superponitur fundamento et
fundamentum supponitur parieti.
Logicaliter, sicud magis commune
superponitur minus communi et
〈minus〉 commune supponitur magis
communi. q. , dist. un. (vb).
Supponere: supponere naturaliter
q. , ad . (va) – supponere
materialiter q. , ad . (rab);
q. , ad . (va)); q. , ad .
(va); q. , concl. , concl. 
(va) – supponere simpliciter
q. , concl. , concl.  (va) –
supponere personaliter. q. , ad .
(va), q. , concl.  (ra); q. ,
ad . (va) – supponere confuse et
distributive q. , . ad . prop. (va),
q. , ad prob. . prop. (va); q. ,
concl.  (rb); q. , concl. 
(rb–va) – supponere confuse
tantum q. , . ad . prop. (va),
q. , ad prob. . prop. (va); q. ,
concl. , ad i (rb); q. , ad .
(va).
Suppositio: presupponitur distinctio
de suppositione materiali et personali
et simplici. q. , dist. un. (vb);
distinctio inter suppositionem
signiÞcativam et personalem
tamquam superius et inferius q. ,
ad . (rab).
Species pro universali accepta:
ista consequentia est bona: ‘una
species est, igitur alia species est’.
q. , concl.  (vb).
Suscipere magis et minus: ‘suscipere
magis et minus’ potest accipi
dupliciter, scilicet realiter et
logicaliter. – Suscipere magis et
minus realiter: Realiter quando
aliquid in essentia sua intenditur
vel remittitur per aliquid simile
sibi adveniens, vel ab eo recedens,
sicut dicimus calorem intendi per
appositionem caloris, et lumen per
appositionem luminis. – Suscipere
magis et minus logicaliter: Logicaliter
sive predicative, quando aliquis
terminus de aliquo veriÞcatur
 index verborum notabilium
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aliquando cum hoc adverbio
‘magis’, et aliquando cum hoc
adverbio ‘minus’, sicut dicimus
album intendi vel suscipere magis
et minus, quia aliquando album
veriÞcatur de suo subiecto cum
adverbio ‘magis’, et aliquando cum
hoc adverbio ‘minus’. q. , dist. un.
(rb).
– omnis dierentia sive per se
sive per accidens mentalis potest
intendi vel potest remitti realiter
q. , concl.  (rb) – nihil suscipit
magis et minus secundum idem
realiter. q. , concl.  (rb) – nihil
suscipit magis et minus logicaliter
secundum idem, respectu eiusdem.
q. , concl.  (rb) – aliquid
suscipit magis et minus secundum
idem respectu diversorum, q. ,
concl.  (rb) – probabiliter potest
teneri quod aliqua dierentia per
se potest suscipere magis et minus
tam logicaliter quam realiter. q. ,
concl.  (va) – nulla dierentia
per se primo modo potest suscipere
magis et potest suscipere minus
logicaliter secundum communem
opinionem. q. , concl. 
(va).
Terminus: omnis terminus cum
alio termino a quo vere negatur,
vere predicatur de seipso mediante
hoc verbo ‘diert’. q. , concl. 
(va) – omnis terminus, sive
substantialis, sive accidentalis primo
modo, est accidens. q. , concl. 
(va).
Terminus appellativus: presuppono
quod omnis terminus appellativus







Terminus mentalis: est conceptus
simplex vel composites q. ,
concl.  (vb) – est in intellectu
subiective q. , concl.  (vb) –
aliqua mentalis sibi correspondet
convertibiliter, quamvis non sit eque
simplex q. , concl.  (va).
Terminus proprius: aliquis terminus
proprius convertitur cum aliquo
termino communi. q. , concl. 
(ra) – aliquis terminus proprius
est commune equivocum. q. ,
concl.  (rb) – aliquis terminus
proprius habet inferius. q. ,
concl.  (rb).
Terminus scriptus: Vide Universale.
Terminus univocus: duo termini
absolute convertuntur, quorum
unus est univocus et alius equivocus.
q. , concl.  (ra).
Terminus vocalis/prolatus: Vide
Universale.
Totum, pars: ‘totum’ et ‘pars’
dicuntur multipliciter, nam
quoddam est 〈totum〉 integrale, et
〈quoddam〉 est totum universale 〈vel
subiectivum, et quoddam est totum
essentiale〉, et similiter quedam
est pars integralis, et quedam pars
universalis vel subiectiva, et quedam
est pars essentialis. – Pars essentialis:
‘Pars vero essentialis’ dicitur
ista, que cum aliquo componit
aliquod totum essentiale, quod non
excedit in quantitate talem partem
essentialem. Unde pars essentialis
addita parti essentiali non facit
totum maius quantitative, vel remota
index verborum notabilium 
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non facit totum minus, sicut patet de
forma niville, que separata ab nivilla
non diminuit quantitatem niville.
Consimiliter forma adveniens
materie non facit totam magis
extensum quam sit ipsa materia
vel ipsa forma. – Pars integralis:
‘Pars vero integralis’ vocatur ista ex
qua cum aliis partibus integralibus
integratur totum componens.
Que quidem pars addita parti
facit unum totum integrale maius
quantitative aliqua sua parte, sicut
pes vel manus facit ipsum totum cui
additur maius quantitate. Et talis
pars integralis adhuc subdividitur,
quia: quedam est pars continuativa,
et quedam aggregativa, et quedam
multiplicativa, et quedam ordinativa,
et sic de aliis. – Pars subiectiva:
‘Pars vero subiectiva’ accipitur
potius in logica, et dicitur semper
‘inferius respectu sui superioris’,
quia subicitur in propositione in
qua Þt predicatio directa, et quia
signiÞcat partem sui totius signiÞcati
per suum superius, sicut ‘homo’
signiÞcat aliquid quod animal
signiÞcat, et non signiÞcat istud
quod animal signiÞcat, et ideo
dicitur ‘pars subiectiva’ respectu
animalis et ‘totum universale’
respectu Sortis et Platonis et de aliis
individuis. q. , dist. un. (rab).
Universale: duplex est universale,
quod quoddam est universale
naturale sive per se, et quoddam
est universale ad placitum sive per
accidens. Et quodlibet istorum
membrorum subdividitur. –
Universale naturale: universale
naturale est duplex quia: quoddam
est universale naturale predicatione,
quoddam reale; primo modo
predicatum vocatur universale
logicale; secundo modo vocatur
universale physecum. – Universale
naturale predicatione sive logicale:
conceptus predicabilis de pluribus
si plura habeat supposita vel
posset habere plura supposita.
Quod dico propter conceptum
mundi et solis et lune et sic de
consimilibus. Unde universaliter:
omnis conceptus appellativus posset
dici isto modo universale, quia
omne tale universale est quoddam
signum simplex vel compositum. –
Universale naturale reale sive
physicum: res sine qua pauci vel
nulli eectus naturales in spera
activorum et passivorum possunt
e ci, et talia universalia sunt Deus
et omnis corpora supercelestia. –
Universale ad placitum: Universale
ad placitum sive per accidens est
duplex: quoddam est ex communi
usu, scilicet, vocale et scriptum.
Vocale est terminus appellativus
vocalis simplex vel compositus;
scriptum est terminus scriptus
appellativus simplex vel compositus.
q. , dist. un. (vab).
– aliquid predicatur de pluribus
univoce quod non est universale.
q. , concl.  (rb) – hoc genus
‘universale’ est per se superius
ad genus generalissimum. q. ,
concl.  (rb) – omne genus
substantiale est accidens, et omnis
species substantialis, et omnis
dierentia, et omne proprium. q. ,
concl.  (va).
Universale mentale: est in intellectu
subiective q. , concl.  (vb). –
duo universalia mentalia possunt
simul esse in eodem intellectu.
q. , concl.  (vb) – aliqua
duo universalia eiusdem speciei
specialissime possunt simul esse
〈in〉 intellectu. q. , concl. 
(vb). – universale intensum et
 index verborum notabilium
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universale remissum possunt
simul esse intellectu. q. , concl. 
(vb) – duo universalia intensa non
possunt simul esse in intellectu. q. ,
concl.  (vb).
Universale scriptum: non est in
aliqua substantia tamquam accidens
in subiecto, quia est substantia vel
substantie q. , concl.  (ra).
Universale vocale: est in aere
tamquam in subiecto q. , concl. 
(ra).
Univocum: univocum strictissime
acceptum (…) accipitur pro terminis
qui mediante unica impositione sive
unico conceptu sive unica ratione
di nitiva predicantur de pluribus in
quid, et non perfectius neque prius
de uno quam de alio, idest, non cum
ista additione ‘perfectius’ predicatur
de aliquo illorum respectu alterius
illorum, sicut homo predicatur de
suis suppositis, quia Sortes non est
perfectius homo quam Plato, nec
quam Cicero. q. , dist.  (ra).
– univocorum quoddam
est complexum et quoddam
incomplexum (…). q. , dist. 
(vb).
– univocorum quoddam est
primo univocum, idest non ratione
alicuius sue partis precise, sed
ratione totius; et quoddam est
univocum non primo, quia est uni-
vocum ratione alicuius sue partis,
et non totius vel cuiuslibet partis. –
Univocum primo: Exemplum primi:
iste terminus ‘homo’ est univocus
primo modo, quia non ratione ali-
cuius sue partis precise, et similiter
iste terminus complexus ‘animal
rationale mortale’. – Univocum non
primo: Exemplum secundi sicud
iste terminus complexus ‘res exi-
stens Sortes’ est terminus univocus
ratione istius partis ‘res existens’ et
〈non〉 ratione istius termini ‘Sortes’,
et similiter iste terminus ‘substantia
existens Sortes’ sive ‘substantia que
vocatur Sortes’. q. , dist.  (ra).
– omne istud predicatur univoce
de aliquibus de quibus aliquid
predicatur secundum nomen et
secundum eandem rationem. q. ,
opinio  (vb).
Unum: ‘unum’ accipitur multipli-
citer: i: Unum essentialiter: scilicet
pro ‘uno essentialiter’; quod quidem
unum componitur ex partibus diver-
sarum rationum, quarum una est
potentia respectu alterius, et 〈que〉
sunt precise in eodem situ, sicud
materia et forma. ii: Unum secun-
dum gradus accidentales: Alio modo
dicitur ‘unum’ secundum gradus
accidentales; quod quidem unum
componitur ex partibus eiusdem
rationis, que quidem partes sunt
precise simul, sive sibi invicem
inexistentes, et hoc sive tale unum
sit extensum sive non. Exemplum
primi sicud albedo, que componi-
tur ex partibus gradualibus eiusdem
rationis. Que quidem partes gra-
duales secundum intensionem et
secundum extensionem sunt sibi
invicem inexistentes et precise in
eodem situ subiective. Exemplum
secundi ut aliquod accidens men-
tale, sicud gaudium vel dilectio, quia
talia accidentia mentalia intensio-
nalia et remissibilia componuntur
ex partibus gradialibus eiusdem
rationis. Que quidem partes, quam-
vis proprie loquendo non sunt in
eodem situ, tamen sunt sibi invicem
〈in〉existentes, quia sunt in subiecto
individuali utpote in anima intel-
lectiva. Et isti duo modi unitatis
propriissime dicuntur unitates per
index verborum notabilium 
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se, quia sunt maxime unitates que
Þunt ex distinctis rebus excepta sola
unitate Þlii Dei et nature assumpte,
de qua nihil ad presens quia alte-
rius existit speculationis. iii: Unum
indivisibilitate; Tertio modo dici-
tur aliquod ‘unum indivisibilitate’,
sicud Deus est unus, et angelus,
et anima intellectiva. Et hoc est
similiter maxime unum. iv: Unum
continuatione: Quarto modo dicitur
aliquod ‘unum continuatione’, sive
corporali sive incorporali. Corpo-
rale sicud unum lignum continuum,
cuius partes secundum extensionem
continuantur sibi invicem; incor-
porale sicud partes solis integrales
sibi invicem continuantur. Et isto
modo aliquod dicitur unum per se.
v: Unum situ vel subiecto: Quinto
modo dicitur aliquod ‘unum situ vel
subiecto’, ista, scilicet, que precise
sunt in eodem situ sive in eodem
subiecto, sicud albedo et dulcedo
sunt precise in eodem situ et in
eodem subiecto sicud in lacte, et
sicud grammatica et musica sunt
precise in eodem subiecto, scilicet in
anima. vi: Unum per accidens pro-
prie loquendo: Sexto modo dicitur
aliquod ‘unum per accidens’ pro-
prie loquendo, sicud aggregatum ex
subiecto et accidente, quamvis etiam
quintus modus sit unitas accidenta-
lis. Alii modi unitatis: Alii vero sunt
modi unitatis, utpote unum numero,
unum specie, unum genere, unum
di nitione etcetera (…). q. ,
dist.  (rb–va).
– ex subiecto et accidente illius
subiecti accipiendo ‘accidens’
secundum quod est nomen secunde
intentionis, non componitur unum
per se. q. , concl.  (va) – isto
modo accipiendo ‘subiectum’ et
‘accidens’ ex subiecto 〈et〉 accidente
componitur unum unitate subiecti.
q. , concl.  (va) – ex subiecto
et accidente accipiendo ‘accidens’
ut accidens est nomen prime
intentionis, non Þt unum per se.
q. , concl.  (va).
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Index exemplorum
A: omnis A est littera q. , ad .
(rb).
Adam: Adam non est q. , .
(ra) – Adam non est, igitur homo
non est q. , . (ra).
Albedo: albedo est color q. ,
dist.  (ra).
Album: alborum aliud dulce, aliud
amarum q. , dist. un. (ra).
Animal: animal est animal q. ,
concl.  (vb); q. , concl. 
(vb) – animal est homo q. , .,
., . (vb–ra); q. , concl. ,
concl. , concl. , concl. 
(rb–va); q. , ad . (va) – animal
est rationale q. , ., . ( va) –
animal potest esse rationale q. ,
. ( va) – animal est risibile
q. , . ( va) – animal est genus
q. , concl.  (rb) – animal est
substantia animata sensibilis
q. , concl.  (rb) – animal est
substantia animalis sensibilis q. ,
concl.  (rb) – omne animal
est homo q. , concl.  (va);
q. , ad . (va) – animalium aliud
rationale, aliud irrationale q. , dist.
un., concl.  (ra); q. , dist. un.
(ra) – animalium aliud risibile,
aliud hinnibile q. , dist. un.,
concl.  (ra) – animalium aliud
album, aliud nigrum q. , dist. un.
(ra) – hoc animal est animal q. ,
concl. , c. (vb) – hoc animal est
sine calore naturali q. , concl. 
(rb) – aliquod animal est homo
q. , ad opp. – (ra) – nullum
animal est homo q. , ad opp. 
(ra) – nullum animal irrational
est homo q. , ad opp.  (ra) –
omne animal est q. , . (ra) –
omne animal est animal q. , .
ad . prop. (rb); q. , ad . 〈Ad
probationem prime propositionis〉
(ra) – omne animal 〈est〉 substantia
q. , . ad . prop. (va) – omne
animal est ens q. , . ad . prop.
(va) – omne animal est homo q. ,
., ., ad opp.  (vb–ra); q. ,
concl. (rb) – omne animal
preter animal irrationale est homo
q. , ad opp.  (ra) – non omne
animal est bipes q. , ad . (va) –
animal est omnis homo q. , ad .
ad prob. . prop. (rb) – animal
rationale est animal q. , ad .
(va) – tantum animal est bipes q. ,
ad . (va) – utrumque animal
istorum animalium est homo q. ,
concl.  (va) – uterque animal de
numero animalium est rationale
mortale (demonstratis Sorte et
Platone) q. , concl.  (vb) –
animal predicatur de homine q. ,
dist.  (ra) – animal dicitur de
homine q. , dist.  (ra) – animal
competit homini q. , dist. 
(ra) – animal veriÞcatur de homine
q. , dist.  (ra).
Animalis: animalis est genus
hominis q. , ad . (rb).
Calor naturalis: sine calore naturali
potest hoc animal esse; igitur animal
potest esse sine calore naturali
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q. , concl.  (rb) – sine calore
naturali hoc animal potest esse
q. , concl.  (rb) – sine calore
naturali hoc animal est q. ,
concl.  (rb).
Coloratum: hoc coloratum est
coloratum q. , concl.  (vb).
Corpus: hoc corpus est corpus
q. , concl.  (vb) – ‘corpus est
substantia’ q. , concl.  (ra) –
‘corpus est substantia composita ex
materia et forma’ q. , concl. 
(ra).
Deus: Deus est q. , concl.  (va);
q. , concl.  (ra) – Deus est sciens
A q. , concl.  (va).
Dominus: dominus est animal q. ,
. (rb) – dominus est dominus
q. , . (rb) – dominus est homo
q. , . (rb).
Fundamentum: fundamentum non
est, igitur domus non est q. , .
(ra).
Genus: aliquod est genus q. ,
concl.  (ra) – genus est quod
predicatur de pluribus specie
dierentibus q. , concl.  (ra).
Homo: homo est homo q. ,
concl.  (vb) – hominum alius
Sortes, alius Plato q. , dist. un.
(ra) – hominum alius longus, alius
brevis – homo est species q. , dist.
un., concl.  (rb) – homo est spe-
cies animalis q. , ad . (rb) –
homo est animal q. , concl.  (vb);
q. , concl.  (ra); q. , dist. 
(ra) – homo est animal rationale
mortale q. , concl.  (ra) – homo
est rationale mortale q. , dist.
(vb) – homo est rationalis q. , .,
. ( va) – homo est mortalis q. ,
. ( va) – homo est risibilis q. ,
. ( va) – homo est, et non est risi-
bilis q. , ad . (ra) – homo est
animal compositum ex corpore et
anima intellective q. , d. (vb) –
homo est animal risibile q. , dist. 
(vb); q. , concl.  (va) – homo
est animal recte sedens q. , dist. 
(vb) – homo est animal et bipes,
recte intendens q. , dist. (rb) –
homo est rectus q. , . ( va) –
homo est animal susceptibile disci-
pline q. , concl.  (va) – homo
est asinus q. , ad . (ra) – homo
est substantia composita ex corpore
et anima intellectiva q. , concl. 
(ra) – homo est substantia cor-
porea animata sensibilis rationalis
mortalis q. , concl.  (rab) –
homo est substantia habens duas
manus et decem digitos et duos
pedes, potens sentire et potens
intelligere et potens ridere q. ,
concl.  (ra) – nullus homo est
q. , . (ra) – nullus homo est asi-
nus q. , concl.  (rb) – omnis
homo est q. , . (ra) – omnis
homo est animal q. , ad . 〈Ad pro-
bationem secunde propositionis〉
(va) – omnis homo est homo q. ,
. ad . prop. (rb); q. , ad ., ad
prob. . prop. (ra) – omnis homo
esr risibilis q. , ad . (vab) –
omnis homo est substantia q. , .
〈secundo quantum ad secundam
propositionem〉, ad ., ad prob. .
prop. (va, va) – omnem hominem
videt homo q. , ad ., ad prob. 
prop. (rb) – est homo animal omnis
q. , ad ., ad prob. . prop. (va) –
homo non est, igitur animal non est
q. , ., ad . (ra, vb).
Plato: Plato est q. , concl. 
(va) – Plato est animal q. ,
concl.  (rb) – Plato est homo
index exemplorum 
2011013 [Van der Helm] 04-Indexes-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 441
q. , concl.  (rb) – Plato est
individuum q. , . (rb) – Plato
est iste q. , ad . (rb).
Predicatum: predicatum inest
subiecto q. , dist.  (ra).
Sortes: Sortes est animal q. ,
concl.  (rb) – Sortes est homo
q. , concl.  (rb); q. , dist. 
(ra) – Sortes est individuum q. ,
. (rb) – Sortes est iste q. , ad .
(rb) – Sortes currit q. , concl. 
(ra); q. , concl.  (ra) – Sortes
scribit q. , . (vb) – Sortes sedet
q. , concl.  (va) – Sortes tacet
vel loquitur q. , dist. un. (ra) –
Sortes est asinus, vel Sortes non est
asinus q. , dist. un. (ra) – Sortes
est, ergo Sortes vel Plato est q. , .
(vb) – Sortes potest portare duas
tales lapides, ergo potest portare tres
q. , ad . (rb).
Sortes et Plato: Sortes et Plato
habent formas similes ultimata
similitudine q. , concl.  (ra) –
Sortes et Plato sunt eiusdem speciei
specialissime nullo termino existente
q. , concl.  (ra) – Sortes et
Plato sunt plures homines q. , .,
ad . (va, rbva) – Sortes et Plato
sunt unus homo q. , ., ad .
(va, rbva) – Sortes et Plato sunt
unus homo in communi q. , .,
ad . (va, vb) – uterque istorum
est Sortes vel Plato (determinatis
Sorte et Platone) q. , dist. un.
(ra).
Substantia: omnis substantia
est homo q. , ., . ad . prop.,
ad ., ad prob. . prop. (va, va). –
‘substantia est ens’ q. , concl. 
(ra).
Terminus: aliquis terminus est
genus q. , concl.  (ra) – iste
terminus scriptus ‘animal’ est animal
q. , concl.  (rb) – iste terminus
prolatus ‘animal’ est animal q. ,
concl.  (rb) – iste terminus ‘genus’
est genus q. , concl.  (rb).
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〈questio 〉
Consequenter queritur utrum aliquis conceptus sit equivocus.
〈.〉 Et arguitur primo quod sic.
Omnis proprietas conveniens alicui termino vocali vel scripto ratione
 alicuius conceptus convenit isti conceptui; sed equivocatio convenit ter-
mino vocali vel scripto ratione alicuius conceptus, igitur equivocatio
similiter convenit conceptui; igitur aliquis conceptus est equivocus. Ma-
ior videtur evidens per istam propositionem primo Posteriorum,1 ‘unum-
quodque propter quid est et illud magis’.
 Item, hoc idem patet discurrendo per singulas proprietates termino-
rum vocalium vel scriptorum; nam nullus terminus vocalis vel scriptus
est nomen vel verbum, vel singularis numeri, vel nominativi casus, vel
tertie persone et sic de aliis nisi quia talis terminus correspondet ali-
cui conceptui nominali vel verbali, vel singularis numeri, vel nomina-
 tivi casus, vel tertie persone etcetera, sicut satis potest elici ab Aristotele
primo Perihermenias,2 et precipue a suo commentatore Boethio ibidem,3
supra istum textum ‘Voces sunt note earum que sunt in anima passio-
num’; igitur pari ratione nullus terminus vocalis est equivocus nisi quia
correspondet conceptui equivoco.
 Et si dicatur quod non est simile de ista proprietate que est equivocatio
et de aliis proprietatibus, tunc assignetur, dissimilitudo scilicet quare ista
proprietas potius competit termino vocali vel scripto preter hoc quod
 Et]  mg. E1  Item]  mg. E1  tertie] pers add. necnon del. E  termino]
terminus E
 Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora i, , a–; Auctoritates  (): ‘Non solum
necesse est precognoscere prima principia, aut omnia, aut quedam, aut conclusio-
nem, sed et magis; propter unumquodque tale et ipsum magis, ut propter quod
amamus rem, illud est magis amatum et omnia posteriora scimus et credimus. Per
prima ergo, illa magis scimus.’
 Aristoteles, De interpretatione , a–: ‘Sunt ergo ea que sunt in voce earum que
sunt in anima passionum note.’
 Boethius, In librum De Interpretatione Editio prima (PL , a): ‘Sunt ergo ea que
sunt in voce, earum que sunt in anima passionum note, id est, ipse, inquit, voces
intellectus qui sunt anime passiones signiÞcant, eorumque sunt signiÞcative;’ In
librum De Interpretatione Editio secunda (PL , a).
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competat alicui conceptui, quam aliqua alia sua proprietas grammaticalis
vel logicalis.
〈.〉 Item, posito quod Sortes audiat vel videat istum terminum ‘canis’,
et quod sit omnino indierens ad cogitandum de animali latrabili et de
celesti sidere et pisce marino, ita quod non plus inclinetur ad cogitandum
supra unum quam supra reliquum, tunc per talem auditionem generatur
unus conceptus in mente Sortis cui correspondet iste terminus ‘canis’, et
non conceptus univocus, quia tunc iste terminus ‘canis’ esset univocus
ad ista tria signiÞcata; igitur conceptus equivocus.
Et si dicatur quod in tali auditore generabuntur tres conceptus, tali
casu posito, scilicet conceptus animalis latrabilis et conceptus piscis
marini et conceptus sideris celestis; quia non maiori ratione unus quam
alius; igitur omnis vel nullus. Et non nullus, sicut experimento patet;
igitur omnis. Et ita non generatur aliquis unus conceptus precise cui
correspondet iste terminus ‘canis’ convertibiliter.
Sed contra: si sic, ponatur tunc quod iste terminus ‘canis’ sit equivocus
ad mille signiÞcata – sicut de facto iste terminus ‘Ioannes’ est equivo-
cus ad mille signiÞcata, vel potius ad centum milia, – et quod Sortes
sit indierens omnino ad cogitandum supra aliquod istorum signiÞcato-
rum; quo posito, ex predicta ratione sequitur quod quando Sortes audi-
ret talem terminum ‘Ioannes’, generaretur in mente eius centum milia
conceptus, quibus correspondet ratione diversorum signiÞcatorum iste
terminus ‘Ioannes’ eque primo; cuius oppositum experimur. Relinqui-
vb tur | igitur quod tali termino equivoco correspondeat unus conceptus
equivocus.
〈.〉 Item, omne signum quod competit pluribus diversa ratione est
equivocum; sed aliquis conceptus competit pluribus diversa ratione; igi-
tur aliquis conceptus est equivocus. Maior elicitur ex textu Aristote-
lis4 quo dicit quod equivocum est cuius nomen est commune, et ratio
diversa. Minor declaratur, nam conceptus discretus et proprius ipsius
Sortis competit ipsi Platoni, posito casu possibili, scilicet quod Sortes
et Plato sint in tantum similes, quod in absentia unius et in presentia
 celesti] scelesti E | marino] iste add. necnon del. E | plus] plus superscr. E | ad] con
add. necnon del. E  supra] sequitur E  casu] q add. necnon del. E
– piscis marini] piscus marinus E  sideris] scideris E  milia] i
E – signiÞcatorum] q add. necnon del. E  predicta] ratione add. necnon del.
E  igitur] quod add. necnon del. E
 Aristoteles, Predicamenta , a–: ‘Equivoca dicuntur quorum nomen solum com-
mune est, secundum nomen vero substantie ratio diversa.’
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alterius non poterit discerni utrum presens sit Sortes vel Plato. Tunc cla-
rum est quod Sortes presens alicui causabit suum conceptum proprium
et discretum in mente istius cui est presens; quo conceptu causato, remo-
vetur Sortes et presens detur Plato sine scitu concipientis, et continuet
 conceptum sui. Tunc iste concipiens experitur se – eodem conceptu quo
concepit Sortem – concipere hanc rem sibi presentem, que quidem res est
Plato; igitur conceptus Sortis discretus competit Platoni, et non eadem
ratione, quia non videtur possibile quod conceptus discretus et proprius
alicuius eadem ratione competeret alteri, quia tunc non esset discretus et
 proprius, sed communis.
〈.〉 Item, nullus conceptus specialissime speciÞcus potest competere
alicui individuo alterius speciei nisi diversa ratione et equivoce; sed ali-
quis conceptus specialissime speciÞcus competit alicui individuo alte-
rius speciei; igitur aliquis conceptus specialissime speciÞcus est equi-
 vocus. Maior videtur de se nota, quia sicut iste terminus ‘homo’ qui
est species specialissima non potest competere alicui individuo alterius
speciei, utpote asino, nisi equivoce, ita etiam iste conceptus specialissi-
mus ‘homo’ non potest competere alicui individuo alterius speciei nisi
equivoce. Minor declaratur, posito quod Sortes videat aliquam rem a
 remotis, que quidem res in rei veritate sit asinus, et quod appareat Sorti
quod ista res sit homo; tunc Sortes concipit istam rem conceptu speci-
Þco hominis; igitur conceptus speciÞcus hominis competit asino, et per
consequens conceptus specialissime speciÞcus competit alicui individuo
alicuius speciei. Igitur aliquis conceptus specialissime speciÞcus est equi-
 vocus.
〈.〉 Item, aliquis conceptus competit sibi ipsi et rei extra, que quidem
res diert a tali conceptu genere; et non competit sibi ipsi et tali rei extra
univoce; igitur equivoce.
Prima particula antecedentis declaratur, posito quod Sortes intelligat
 lapidem; tunc quero utrum Sortes experiatur se concipi lapidem, vel non.
Si non, tunc pari ratione periret omnis experientia, quod est absurdum.
Hoc etiam est contra Aristotelem, ut videtur, secundo De anima,5 ubi
vult quod sentiens sentit se sentire, et videns videt se videre, et sic de
 sentiens] centiens E | videns] d add. necnon del. E
 Aristoteles, De anima ii, b–: ‘Quoniam autem sentimus nos audire et videre,
necesse est quod sentire quod nos videmus aut est per hunc visum, aut per aliud; sed
illud erit visus, et coloris subiecti. Aut duo unius, aut idem sui. Et etiam, si sensus
quo sensimus nos videre sit alius, aut erit hoc in inÞnitum, aut erit idem sui. Oportet
igitur ut hoc faciat primo.’
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aliis. Igitur pari ratione intelligens intelligit se intelligere; vel igitur eadem
intellectione vel alia. Non potest dici quod alia, quia pari ratione sentiens
ra aliquid sentiret se sentire alia sensatione ab ista sensatione, qua sentit |
istud ad extra, et sic esset processus in inÞnitum, quod videtur esse
vitandum; igitur standum est in primo, scilicet quod eodem conceptu
quo Sortes concipit lapidem concipit istum eundem conceptum lapidis.
Igitur conceptus specialissime speciÞcus lapidis competit sibi ipsi et
lapidi extra.
Secunda particula antecedentis, videlicet quod talis conceptus non
competit sibi ipsi et lapidi univoce, patet quia sic sequeretur quod lapis
et talis conceptus essent eiusdem speciei specialissime. Quod de se patet
esse falsum, quia genere dierunt, sicut dictum est. Et conÞrmatur:
capiendo istam propositionem mentalem ‘homo est species’, tunc quero
utrum subiectum supponat pro se vel non. Si sic, habetur propositum,
scilicet quod conceptus specialissime speciÞcus hominis potest compe-
tere sibi ipsi et homini extra. Si non, tunc sequeretur quod nullus ter-
minus mentalis posset supponere materialiter, quod videtur esse falsum,
quia omnis res potest se ipsam representare; igitur talis conceptus potest
se ipsum representare, et per consequens pro se ipso supponere, igitur
sibi ipsi competere et rei extra.
〈suppositio prima〉 In ista questione primo ponende sunt alique suppo-
sitiones, quarum prima est ista, quod omnis res naturaliter representat se
ipsam. Et hec suppositio videtur rationalis, quia omnis representatio est
ratione alicuius convenientie vel identitatis; igitur, cum nulla res tantum
conveniat alicui ut ita loquar, vel sit eadem alicui sicut sibi ipsi, videtur
quod omnis res sit sui ipsius representatio.
〈suppositio secunda〉 Secunda suppositio est ista, quod omne istud
quod representat diversa diversis rationibus sit equivocum equivocans,
saltem a casu vel consilio. Et ista suppositio satis elicitur ex textu Aristo-
telis6 et sui commentatoris Boethii in principio istius Boethii.7
 sentit] istud ad extra, et sic esset processus in inÞnitum add. sub columna, eadem
manu E; pi add. sub columna, eadem manu E  Secunda] pro add. necnon del. E
 representat] repugnat E
 Aristoteles, Predicamenta , a–: ‘Equivoca dicuntur quorum nomen solum com-
mune est, secundum nomen vero substantie ratio diversa.’
 Boethius, In Cat.: ‘Equivocorum alia sunt casu, alia consilio.’ (PL , b).
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〈conclusio prima〉 Prima conclusio est ista, quod aliquid ex sua natura
est equivocum equivocans. Ista declaratur sic: aliquid ex sua natura est
representativum diversorum diversis rationibus; igitur aliquid ex sua
natura est equivocum equivocans. Ista consequentia patet per secundam
 suppositionem. Et antecedens declaratur, nam latratus canis represen-
tat semetipsum naturaliter, per primam suppositionem; et etiam experi-
mento patet quod precise representat semetipsum auditui, quia auditor
et non representat se ipsam ex impositione ad placitum, nec per acci-
dens nec per se nec primo nec secundario; igitur representat se ipsum
 auditui ex sua natura. Et hoc dico, habitis omnibus circumstantiis requi-
rendis, utpote quod debita sit distantia inter talem sonum et auditum,
et quod sensus sit dispositus, et quod medium sit aptum, et sic de aliis.
Et talis latratus representat canem, sicut patet experimento; quia audito
tali latratu, concipitur canis, et non representat canem ex impositione
 rbad placitum, | saltem ex humana impositione; igitur naturaliter. Clarum
〈est〉 quod non eadem impositione representat semetipsum et canem;
igitur diversa ratione. Igitur est naturaliter representativum diversorum
diversa ratione.
〈conclusio secunda〉 Secunda conclusio, que consimili ratione se-
 quitur, est ista, quod aliquis conceptus est equivocus equivocans; quia
aliquis conceptus est representivus diversorum diversa ratione; igitur ali-
quis conceptus est equivocus equivocans. Ista consequentia patet sicut
prius. Et antecedens similiter declaratur, quia aliquis conceptus represen-
tat seipsum intellectui, quia est presens intellectui; et non impeditur, ut
 suppono, quin representat seipsum intellectui. Quia per aliquem nimiam
sollicitudinem ipsius intellectus vel discretionem alicuius rei represen-
tat semetipsum intellectui. Et representat rem extra cuius est conceptus
et ipsi intellectui, et non eadem ratione; quia talis conceptus et talis res
extra cuius est conceptus genere generalissimo dierunt; igitur aliquis
 conceptus est representivus diversorum diversa ratione.
Item, sensus potest diversa sentire mediante 〈eodem〉 sono; igitur
a simili vel a fortiori intellectus potest diversa concipere et intelligere
mediante eodem conceptu; quia non videtur ratio quin pari ratione
 Prima conclusio] Conclusio prima mg. E1  quod] quam E | representat] repugnat
E | auditui] auditui mg. E  representat] repugnat E  audito] similiter add.
necnon del. E  latratu] con add. E | non] repugnat add. necnon del. E  Secunda
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qua sensus mediante eadem specie potest diversa diversis rationibus
sentire, ipse intellectus mediante eodem conceptu potest diversa diversis
rationibus intelligere, scilicet ipsum conceptum et rem extra cuius est
conceptus.
〈conclusio tertia〉 Tertia conclusio est ista, quod unus et idem con-
ceptus proprius et discretus unius rei potest esse conceptus proprius alte-
rius rei. Ista declaratur sic: ponatur quod Sortes et Plato sint in tantum
similes, quod in absentia unius non discernitur quis istorum sit presens,
scilicet utrum Sortes sit presens vel Plato; quo posito, ponatur Plato alicui
concipienti ipsum Platonem conceptu proprio et discreto; et removetur
Plato sine scitu concipientis et presentetur Sortem, et continuet conci-
piens conceptum suum – qui quidem conceptus vocetur A – tunc sic: A
prius fuit conceptus proprius ipsius Platonis, et iam A est conceptus pro-
prius ipsius Sortis; igitur proprius conceptus unius potest esse proprius
conceptus alterius, et hoc ratione maxime similitudinis. Et quod unus et
idem conceptus qui fuit Platonis sit postea Sortis, et non alius, patet: quia
concipiens experitur se concipere eundem conceptum.
Et a simili potest etiam declarari, posito quod B ignis causet calorem
in aliquo subiecto, et quod C ignis precise eque intentius cum B igne
succedat B ignem, in qua successione conservetur F calor per potentiam
prime cause sine sui diminutione; tunc clarum est quod F calor non
corrumpetur, sed ulterius conservabitur per C ignem. Quia non potest
assignari ratio corruptionis, quia C ignis non corrumpet F calorem,
nec aliquid aliud, ut suppono; igitur nihil corrumpit ipsum. Et pari
ratione conceptus A, qui fuit causatus a Platone, postea causabitur et
continuabitur a Sorte.
va 〈obiectio〉 Et si instetur | quod ista conclusio includat contradictio-
nem, scilicet quod idem conceptus sit communis et non communis, quia
si sit proprius Platoni, tunc non est communis; et si conveniat Sorti et
Platoni, videtur quod tunc sit communis.
Ad istud dicitur quod conceptus non dicitur communis quia potest
competere pluribus successive, sed quia potest pluribus competere simul;
quod non potest A conceptus. Quia si intellectui primo Sortes presenta-
retur, Plato alio conceptu concipetur; vel, si eodem – quod forte verius
 sentire] vacat mg. E. Sequitur textus vacuus 3/4 linee: Oscitat ille diu qui furnum vincit
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est – hoc esset equivoce et non univoce. Unde quod aliquid idem quod
est proprium uni secundum unam rationem individualem sit commune
alteri secundum aliam rationem individualem, hoc non includit contra-
dictionem; quia non secundum idem est proprium et commune.
 Et ista conclusio ponenda est non omnino assertive, sed tamquam
probabilis. Quia, si cui placeat, posset dicere quod, posito casu priori de
Sorte et Platone maxime similibus, A conceptus non esset ipsius Sortis,
sed semper ipsius Platonis. Et in presens Sortis generaretur conceptus
Sortis, quod tamen lateret concipientem propter maiorem similitudi-
 nem, tam conceptum generationis Sortis et Platonis quam etiam cor-
ruptionis generantium tales conceptus. Et tunc consequenter potest dici
quod talis conceptus non est equivocus.
〈conclusio quarta〉 Quarta conclusio est ista, quod aliquod deÞni-
tum mentale competat alicui cui non competit eius deÞnitio. Ista sta-
 tim patet per predicta, quia capiatur conceptus specialissime speciÞ-
cus hominis; tunc iste conceptus representat hominem, ratione cuius
representationis competit sibi ista deÞnitio ‘animal rationale mortale’; et
representat seipsum, sicut patet per primam suppositionem et secundam
conclusionem; et ipsemet conceptus non est animal rationale mortale;
 igitur talis conceptus competit alicui cui non competit aliqua sua deÞni-
tio.
〈ad .〉 Ad primum igitur principale dicitur quod, quamvis conclusio sit
concedenda, scilicet quod aliquis conceptus sit equivocus, sicut patet per
predictas conclusiones, non tamen cogit hoc istud argumentum. Et ideo
 ad propositiones ordinarie respondetur.
Primo concedendo maiorem, videlicet quod quandocumque aliqua
proprietas competit alicui ratione alicuius conceptus precise etc.
Et ulterius dicitur negando minorem, scilicet quod equivocatio com-
petit aliqui termino vocali vel scripto precise ratione alicuius conceptus,
 quia equivocatio competit termino vocali vel scripto ratione diversorum
conceptuum; quia scilicet talis terminus correspondet diversis concepti-
bus et diversis impositionibus diversarum rationum.
Et ulterius dicitur quod non est simile de proprietate equivocationis
et de aliis proprietatibus. Et potest ratio dissimilitudinis taliter assignari,
 videlicet quod alie proprietates possunt haberi ratione unius conceptus
 non] non superscr. E  Quarta conclusio] Quarta conclusio mg. E1  specialis-
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 appendix
2011013 [Van der Helm] 05-Appendix-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 452
tantum, sed equivocatio non, nisi ratione plurium conceptuum diversa-
rum rationum.
〈ad .〉 Ad secundum dicitur concedendo, tali casu posito, quod in
mente Sortis generabitur unus conceptus correspondens isto termino
‘canis’, non simplex sed compositus; non equivocus simpliciter sed uni-
vocus, scilicet iste conceptus ‘aliquid quod vocatur “canis”,’ vel aliquis
conceptus consimilis. Unde non est inconveniens quod termino puro
equivoco correspondeat adequate conceptus univocus compositus. Sed
vb esset inconveniens dicere quod tali termino correspondet adequate | con-
ceptus simplex univocus. Et dixi quod talis conceptus compositus non
esset equivocus; et hoc intellexi ratione diversorum signiÞcatorum alio-
rum a seipso, scilicet quod talibus signiÞcatis non esset equivocatio.
〈ad .〉 Ad tertium dicitur dupliciter. Primo secundum conclusionem
superius positam, concedendo quod talis conceptus est equivocus, quia
una ratione individuali competit Sorti, et alia ratione individuali compe-
tit Platoni.
Secundo potest dici, si cui placeat, quod non eodem conceptu concepit
Sortem et Platonem, quamvis hoc lateat concipientem, sicut predictum
est;8 sed alio et alio.
〈ad .〉 Ad quartum dicitur concedendo maiorem, et negando mino-
rem. Et ad probationem dicitur quod in tali apparentia concipiens non
concipit asinum conceptu speciÞco hominis, quamvis ipse deceptus asse-
reret quod ipse conceptu hominis conciperet talem rem. Si concipiat
istam rem, concipit aliquo alio conceptu, utpote hoc conceptu ‘ista res’;
et conceptu hominis quem habet in mente concipit hominem. Si sit in
rerum natura vel nihil, concipit isto conceptu. Si homo non sit in rerum
natura – sicut si quis videt aliquem hominem de quo simplissime crede-
ret, propter magnam similitudinem, quod esset personaliter suus amicus,
qui in rei veritate non esset suus amicus sed inimicus, quem summe
odiret – tunc talis videns crederet quod summe diligeret istum homi-
nem visum, et tamen decipitur per hoc quod summe diligit amicum
suum quem credit esse istum hominem. Et ideo, sicut quis potest tali-
ter decipi in actibus ipsius voluntatis, ita potest decipi in actibus intel-
lectus. Verumtamen posset probabiliter susteneri quod talis conceptus
hominis competeret in tali casu asino equivoce. Sed quidquid sit de hoc,
 termino] or add. necnon del. E  et] ned add. necnon del. E  videt] v add.
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saltem oportet necessario concedere quod asinus vel accidentia asini
in tali distantia cum talibus circumstantiis saltem personaliter causant
conceptum speciÞcum hominis.
〈ad .〉 Ad quintum dicitur concedendo, sicut patet per conclusio-
 nes positas, quod talis conceptus est equivocus, quia competit sibi ipsi
ratione identitatis, et competit rei extra ratione representative similitu-
dinis, sicut expresse patet in exemplo posito de latratu canis, qui repre-
sentat semetipsum et canem.
〈obiectio〉 Et si dicatur quod non representat canem nisi arguitive
 vel propter aliquem sensationem precedentem intuitivam ipsius canis
latrantis, ad hoc dicitur concedendo; sed tamen hoc non obstante, talis
latratus post talem experientiam representat canem; et hoc su cit ad
propositum.
Et per hoc patet ad conÞrmationem, quia conceditur quod talis concep-
 tus semetipsum representat, et se ipso considerato concipitur; et pro se
ipso supponere potest, sicut patet in ista propositione mentali ‘homo est
species’, supposito quod idem sit subiectum in tali propositione mentali
quod est subiectum in ista propositione mentali ‘homo est animal risi-
bile’. Verumtamen cum hoc stat quod in ista propositione mentali ‘homo
 est species’ supponit personaliter, si conceptus ipsius conceptus homi-
nis subiciatur; quia ego pono ad presens quod omnis conceptus potest se
ipso concipi, et alio conceptu.
〈i.〉 Ad oppositum arguitur sic: quandocumque aliqua proprietas alicui
rei 〈competit〉 naturaliter et nullo modo ad placitum vel ex positione
 voluntaria, tunc talis proprietas competit isti rei uniformiter, dummodo
talis res est in rerum natura; sed hec proprietas que est representare rem
extra intellectui competit naturaliter ipsi concipienti et non ad placitum;
igitur uniformiter competit sibi et semper, dummodo talis conceptus
existeret, et per consequens talis conceptus non representabit aliquid
 aliud a tali re extra; igitur, ut videtur, nullus conceptus representabit
radiversa diversis | rationibus. Maior patet ex simili: nam et proprietas,
〈que〉 est califacere, competit naturaliter igni, vel esse califactivum, et
non competit sibi; igitur nec potest sibi competere ipso manente, nec
aliud potest proprie et per se, quamvis accidens, califacere. Et similiter
 tamen] tamen superscr. E | obstante] opstante E
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dicendum est de conceptu. Et conÞrmatur per Aristotelem secundo De
generatione,9 ubi vult quod idem inquantum idem semper Þat idem. Et
minor patet per experientias.
〈ii.〉 Item, si aliquis conceptus esset equivocus sicut terminus voca-
lis vel scriptus, tunc sequitur quod sicut terminus vocalis vel scriptus
potest equivocare indierenter ad quamcumque rem sive ad quodcum-
que signum, similiter et conceptus. Sed consequens falsum, igitur istud
ex quo sequitur. Falsitas consequentis patet de se, quia conceptus lapidis
non potest representare deum, vel proprius conceptus albi vel albedi-
nis non potest representare nigredinem. Et consequentia patet, quia non
videtur esse maior ratio de uno quam de alio. Et si sit, tunc assignetur.
〈iii.〉 Item, si aliquis conceptus posset presentare plura diversis rationi-
bus, hoc maxime videtur verum quod conceptus alicuius rei extra repre-
sentat istam rem extra et semetipsum diversis rationibus, sicut superius
arguebatur.10 Sed hoc non videtur verum, quia tunc talis conceptus seipso
conciperetur, cuius oppositum videtur apparere per experientiam. Quia
multi laici rudes habent multos conceptos quos nesciunt se habere, et
per consequens quos non intelligunt. Quia si intelligerent, experirentur
se intelligere.
〈iv.〉 Item, si sic, tunc possemus manifeste scire quod talis conceptus
distinguitur ab ipso intellectu, quod tamen non videtur verum, quia
multi valentes opinantur oppositum.
〈v.〉 Item, nos experimur nos ex consequenti intelligere conceptus
nostros; et hoc facta diligenti inquisitione prius 〈ali〉quomodo intelligi-
mus rem extra; igitur non videtur quod intelligimus equivoce conceptum
ipsius rei extra et ipsam rem extra; ergo conceptus non representat seip-
sum intellectui.
〈vi.〉 Item, si representaret seipsum intellectui, pari ratione quidquid
〈esset〉 in intellectu, representaret seipsum intellectui; et per consequens
omnes habitus scientiÞci vel dubitativi vel opinativi vel creditivi existen-
tes in intellectu alicuius representarent se intellectui, et per consequens
quilibet homo actu intelligeret omnes tales habitus, et hoc distinctis et
 inquantum] in quam E  vel] ut E  ratio] ratione E  sicut] sicud
E  conciperetur] q add. necnon del. E  laici] layci E  aliquomodo] re
add. necnon del. E  intellectu] corr. ex tellectus E  habitus] et habitus add. E
| distinctis] dis E; lac. duo litt. E
 Aristoteles, De generatione et corruptione ii,  a–; Auctoritates  ():
‘Idem manens idem semper aptum natum est facere idem.’
 Videas supra, concl. .
questio  
2011013 [Van der Helm] 05-Appendix-proef 4 [date 1201301431 : version 0] page 455
propriis conceptibus. Et sic non posset esse oblivio alicuius existentis
in intellectu; cuius oppositum experimur, quia factis cum magno labore
aliqua quorum cognitiones habituales iste habemus in mente, ad memo-
riam nostram reducimus, sicut manifestiva apparentia docet.
 〈ad i.〉 Ad primum igitur in oppositum, dicitur concedendo quod talis
proprietas mentalis inest uniformiter isti cuius est proprietas et semper
ipso manente, nisi impediatur. Et consimiliter conceditur quod repre-
sentare rem extra inest conceptui uniformiter quantum est ex parte sui
et semper ipso manente, nisi impediatur, vel per corruptionem rei extra,
 que quando non est non representatur; vel per diversionem ipsius intel-
lectus. Quia quamvis intellectus se habeat passive respectu receptionis
specierum intelligibilium, sicut vult Aristoteles tertio De anima,11 tamen
rbpost talem receptionem se habet active | in advertendo se intelligere
actus, et continendo vel divertendo se a talibus actibus ad alios actus, vel
 simpliciter ad non intelligendum, sed suspendendo omnem sui actum.
Conceditur igitur ad intellectum iam dictum quod in talibus uniformiter
representat intellectui rem extra.
Et ulterius negatur ista consequentia ‘igitur non representat intellectui
aliquid aliud a tali rei extra’, quia ita naturaliter et ita uniformiter talis
 conceptus representat semetipsum intellectui ratione identitatis, sicut
representat rem extra ratione representative similitudinis. Et de ista
materia haberetur quodammodo diusius in questionibus secundi De
anima,12 ubi tractaretur de speciebus representationis.
Et ad auctoritatem Aristotelis, dicitur ipsam similiter concedendo. Ad
 intellectum dicentis, quia idem agens naturale, quantum est ex parte sui,
semper facit idem dummodo est, nisi impediatur. Et hoc non est aliud
dicere nisi quod agens naturale et non voluntarium, ceteris paribus, non
valet ad opposita, quia non agit per voluntatem, saltem suam, quamvis
per voluntatem divinam.
 〈ad ii.〉 Ad secundum dicitur negando consequentiam. Quia terminus
vocalis vel scriptus, quantum est de se, est indierens simpliciter ut
ponatur ad signiÞcandum quamcumque rem. Et sic non est de conceptu,
 active] in add. necnon del. E  sui] corr. ex suum(?) E  ista] a add. necnon
del. E
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qui est determinatus per sui naturam ad representandum certas res; nec
est alia ratio assignanda nisi quia est talis nature.
Et si queratur pueriliter quare est talis nature, dicitur quod quia prima
causa fecit eum talis nature. Et ibi est standum.
〈ad iii.〉 Ad tertium dicitur concedendo quod conceptus representat
rem extra et semetipsum. Et ulterius conceditur quod conceptus se ipso
concipitur confuse tantum et remisse. Propter quam confusionem et
remissionem laici non percipiunt se intelligere tales conceptus, nec etiam
clerici, nisi ex consequenti et argumentative, facta diligenti inquisitione
qualiter intellectus se habet in concipiendo rem extra; sicut quando
aliqua imago tota videtur, multe videntur eius partes visione totius, quas
partes videns non experitur se vidisse. Quia si queratur ab eo, utrum
talis imago habeat longos digitos vel breves, vel utrum habeat quinque
digitos vel non, satis possibile est quod ipse nesciat; et tamen videt
omnes digitos et omnes partes. Sed quando talis in visione postea advertit
suam visionem distincte ad manum, tunc distincte videt manum, et forte
eadem specie qua prius, mediante qua distincta visione, vel mediante qua
advertentia vel adversione scit respondere ad plures questiones de tali
manu factas. Et consimiliter quodammodo potest dici de conceptu, quod
va conceptu concipitur distincte res extra | aliquando, et ipsemet conceptus
confuse et remisse. Et ideo si queratur de aliquo concipiente utrum
concepit talem conceptum, dubitabit; sed postea si intellectus advertat
se diligenter ad talem conceptum, tunc experitur se concipere talem
conceptum. Et ex istis patet quod non sequitur, si tali conceptu ipsemet
conceptus concipiatur, quod concipiens hoc experitur.
〈ad iv.〉 Ad aliud dicitur negando consequentiam. Quia quamvis talis
conceptus distincte concipiatur, per hoc tamen non potest sciri utrum sit
ipse intellectus vel aliqua res alia ab ipso intellectu.
〈ad v.〉 Ad aliud dicitur concedendo quod nos experimur nos intel-
ligere conceptus nostros distincte et intense, facta tali inquisitione; sed
cum hoc stat quod prius intelligimus eosdem conceptus remisse.
〈ad vi.〉 Ad ultimum negatur consequentia: ‘si actus intellectus vel
conceptus intellectualis ipsius intellectus representaret se intellectui, ita
quod intellectu concipiatur, pari ratione omnis habitus scientiÞcus vel
dubitativus vel opinativus etc. representat se intellectui, ita ut actu
 diligenti] diligenti superscr. E; ex consequenti add. necnon del. E  imago] ymago
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intelligatur’; quia alia ratio est de actu et de habitu. Nam actus est istud
quo intellectus actu operatur, et ideo actu se representat intellectui ut
actu intelligatur; et sic non est de habitu.
Verumptamen potest, si alicui placeat, distinguere de representatione
 actuali et habituali. Representatio actualis est qua res actu intelligitur;
habitualis est non qua actu Þt intellectio, sed qua poterit Þeri sive inno-
tescere alicuius rei extra. Et sic bene conceditur quod omnis habitus
existens in intellectu habitualiter representat semetipsum intellectui, et
cum tali representatione oblivio bene potest stare.
 sive] s add. necnon del. E
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Samenvatting
De Questiones libri Porpirii, toegeschreven aan omas Manlevelt, voe-
ren het Ockhamisme tot zijn uiterste grenzen.
De logische traktaten van omas Manlevelt, van wie wij weinig meer
weten dan dat hij rond  vermoedelijk in Parijs werkzaam was,
vonden gretig arek in de veertiende- en vijiende-eeuwse academische
wereld. Handschrien daarvan zijn er dan ook nog in groten getale. Van
het hier uitgegeven commentaar in de vorm van questiones op de Isagoge
van Porphyrius is echter maar één handschri bekend.
Voor deze editie betekent dit dat ik alle tekstuele onduidelijkheden,
verschrijvingen, herhalingen en omissies moest oplossen zonder andere
handschrien er op na te kunnen slaan.
Een later bovenaan het handschri toegevoegde opmerking schrij dit
commentaar aan omas Manlevelt toe. De tekst zelf gee geen enkele
aanleiding om deze toeschrijving in twijfel te trekken. Integendeel: de
onalledaagse verwijzing naar het hertogdom Brabant in een van de ques-
tiones strookt wonderwel met de weinige biograÞsche gegevens die over
Manlevelt bekend zijn. Volgens de provisorische biograÞe die Lorenz van
hem hee opgesteld, moet Manlevelt eind jaren dertig van de veertiende
eeuw vanuit Parijs naar pre-universitair Leuven zijn getrokken. Ook gaat
de tekst bijvoorbeeld uit van de suppositieleer die uit de traktaten van
Manlevelt bekend is. Zonder veel voorbehoud durf ik deze tekst daarom
aan omas Manlevelt toe te schrijven. Daarbij dateer ik de tekst rond
de jaren dertig tot veertig van de veertiende eeuw, en beschouw hem als
aomstig uit Leuven, waar Manlevelt enigszins in de periferie van de
academische wereld werkte, wat weer de beperkte verbreiding van dit
geschri zou verklaren.
De inleiding tot deze editie plaatst dit commentaar op de Isagoge
in een historisch, ÞlosoÞsch en geograÞsch kader. Hoofdstuk  biedt
een eerste kennismaking met de Þlosoof omas Manlevelt, aan de
hand van een eerder door Andrews onder de aandacht gebracht staaltje
extreem Ockhamisme. Manlevelt ontkent namelijk niet alleen, in het
voetspoor van Ockham, het bestaan van alle Aristotelische categorieën
op substantie en kwaliteit na. Ook het bestaan van substantie ontkent
hij, zodat in de werkelijkheid alleen nog individuele instanties van de
 samenvatting
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categorie kwaliteit overblijven. Op deze zelfde radicaal-Ockhamistische
wijze gaat Manlevelt in het hier uitgegeven commentaar op de Isagoge
ons denken te lijf. Ook van ons denken lijkt uiteindelijk niets anders te
resteren dan een stoet van individueel elkaar opeenvolgende instanties
van de vijf Porphyriaanse universalia, elk voor zich niets meer dan een
accidentje van de menselijke geest. Helaas is Manlevelts commentaar op
Aristoteles’ De anima, waarnaar hij regelmatig verwijst, tot nu toe niet
teruggevonden.
Hoofdstuk  gaat nader in op leven en werk van omas Manlevelt.
Deze editie zou het voorbehoud moeten wegnemen waarmee de toe-
schrijving aan Manlevelt van het hier uitgegeven commentaar op de Isa-
goge, alsook het in handschri daarop naadloos aansluitende commen-
taar op de Categorieën tot nu toe gepaard ging. Zelfs dient Manlevelts
bibliograÞe nog uitgebreid met twee nog onbekende werken van zijn
hand: commentaren op Aristoteles’ De anima en Physica. Zoals gezegd
past de hier uitgegeven tekst keurig binnen het biograÞsche raamwerk
dat Lorenz van Manlevelt hee opgesteld. Ik ga ervan uit dat omas
Manlevelt inderdaad rond  zijn academische hoogtijdagen in Parijs
hee beleefd, waarna hij zijn carrière in Leuven hee voortgezet. Dit
commentaar op de Isagoge stamt dan uit zijn Leuvense periode. Hoe-
wel zijn bijnaam ‘Anglicus’ luidt, meen ik uit de beschikbare gegevens
te mogen opmaken dat hij wel Engels van ÞlosoÞsche overtuiging, maar
niet van geboorte was.
Hoofdstuk  biedt verdere argumenten voor de toeschrijving van deze
tekst aan omas Manlevelt, onder meer op grond van intertekstuele
verwijzingen in de tekst zelf. Ook ga ik in op de Franciscaanse context
waarbinnen dit werk past, zonder overigens daarmee te willen implice-
ren dat Manlevelt zelf een theoloog was.
In hoofdstuk  schets ik de historische achtergrond van deze Questio-
nes libri Porhirii. De tekst zelf plaats ik in de lange traditie van commenta-
ren op de Isagoge. De auteur geef ik een plaats binnen de Ockhamistische
beweging in de vroege veertiende eeuw, en ik bezie in hoeverre hij in ver-
band kan worden gebracht met de Ockhamistische ontwikkelingen op de
universiteiten van Oxford en Parijs.
Hoofdstuk  is gewijd aan vorm en inhoud van de hier uitgegeven
tekst. De uiterst gestructureerde vorm van het traditionele commentaar
in de vorm van questiones gee de auteur alle ruimte om zijn hoogst ori-
ginele ideeën te berde te brengen. Daarbij gaat hij zonder meer uit van de
juistheid van de nominalistische, of preciezer Ockhamistische opvatting
omtrent de status van de universalia (genus, species, dierentia, proprium,
samenvatting 
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accidens): in de echte wereld bestaan geen algemeenheden maar alleen
individuele dingen, algemeenheid is voorbehouden aan de begrippen
waarmee wij in ons denken aan deze dingen in de buitenwereld refe-
reren. In zijn commentaar staat Manlevelt stil bij de individualiteit die
niet alleen bestaat in de buitenwereld, maar ook in onze eigen denkwe-
reld. Het individuele en het accidentele: dat is wat Manlevelt steeds weer
benadrukt. Want daaruit bestaat ons hele denken: individuele gedachten,
die – hoe algemeen ook van strekking – als accidenten aan onze geest
toekomen. Zelfs het meest algemene van de vijf universalia, het genus, is
niet meer dan een accident van onze geest. En deze accidenten wisselen
elkaar in een voortdurende opeenvolging af. Als ik denk: eens mens is
een levend wezen, dan heb ik eerst het idee van mens in mijn hoofd en
vervolgens het idee van levend wezen. En zelfs deze twee brokjes ken-
nis kan ik niet beide tegelijk even intensief ter beschikking hebben. Het
hoe geen betoog dat deze rücksichtsloze doorvoering van het Ockha-
mistische programma uiteindelijk zal tornen aan de mogelijkheid van de
totstandkoming van de menselijke kennis.
Een beschrijving van het handschri waarop deze editie is gebaseerd
biedt hoofdstuk  van de inleiding. Hoofdstuk  gee een korte verant-
woording van de wijze van uitgeven.
De teksteditie beoogt allereerst een bijdrage te leveren aan de kennis
van de ÞlosoÞsche ontwikkelingen vanuit logisch-semantische invals-
hoek, eerste hel van de veertiende eeuw. Daarbij verrijken deze Ques-
tiones libri Porphirii ons beeld van het continentale Ockhamisme. Velen
biedt deze uitgave bovendien een eerste uitgebreide kennismaking met
een denker, wiens ideeën van meer dan alleen historisch belang zijn.
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